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Cognitive problems are among the important and common sequelae in child patients with
PTSD, for example poor memory, poor concentration, intrusive thoughts and flashbacks
(e.g., Yule, &Gold 1993; Last; 1993). In recent years, investigators have started to study
these functions in adults with PTSD, but they have yet to be investigated in young people
with PTSD. Therefore, following extensive investigations of cognitive processing in
adults with anxiety disorder including PTSD, it is proposed to apply some of these
paradigms to investigate PTSD in children.
Chapter One presents a general introduction describing the background to the work and
an outline of the proposed studies. Chapter Two describes the concept of PTSD,
phnomenology, classification of PTSD and PTSD in children and finally three non-
cognitive theories of PTSD. Two basic concepts of cognition i.e. memoiy and attention
are described in Chapter Three. Cognitive theories of emotional disorders especially that
of Williams et al. (1988) and cognitive models of PTSD are presented. Chapter Four
describes how a dictionaiy of emotional words was developed and a list of different types
of emotional words was created.
In the first experiment in Chapter 5, young people with PTSD, children of adults with
PTSD and normal subjects, participated in a colour naming task. The task consisted of
5 categories of words: threat-related depressed-related, trauma-related, positive and
neutral words which appeared randomly, one after the other on the screen of a computer
in four different colours three times. The results indicated that the PTSD patients had a
greater interference toward trauma-related words than other types of words compared to
the control group. Children of adults with PTSD showed an attentional bias towards
trauma-related and threat-related words.
Chapter Six describes a second experiment on attention with children with PTSD. Four
types of words -physical threat, social threat, depressed and neutral words- were
presented to the subjects one after the other. The subjects were asked to press a button
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when they saw a dot on the screen of the computer. The results showed that the PTSD
patients shifted their attention towards threat words, while their attention shifted away
from depressed words.
Chapter Seven describes an investigation on recall and recognition with young people
with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD compared with controls. The findings
indicated that PTSD patients generally recalled fewer words than controls which
confirmed poor memory in young people with PTSD, but both experimental groups did
not show any memory bias towards a particular type of emotional words on the recall or
recognition task.
Chapter Eight compared the findings of PTSD and controls' performance on the
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson et.al ., 1990, RBMT). PTSD patients
showed a poor memory performance on this task compared with normal subjects. They
particularly had impairment in prospective items (those items which related to the future),
story immediate and delayed recall and orientation.
A final chapter presents a full discussion of the results of the emprical studies and
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED
STUDIES
The intention behind the research reported in this thesis is to provide a clearer
understanding of the cognitive characteristics, in particular attention, and memory for
emotional material and performance in general memory tests in children and adolescents
with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and children and adolescents of adults with
PTSD. The research methodology for the study of attention and memory involves the
presentation of a set of information-processing paradigms, drawn from cognitive
psychology, to groups suffering from PTSD, children of PTSD patients and normal
control subjects. Most of the theoretical impetus behind this approach inevitably draws
heavily on previous research which investigated information processing and memory
deficits in adult subjects with anxiety disorders particularly PTSD. Consequently,
Chapters Two, and Three present a wide ranging review of the theoretical frameworks
which were developed in cognitive psychology and clinical psychology.
Chapter Two includes two parts: the first part begins by offering a brief historical view
of the concept and definition of PTSD in terms of DSMIII-R, DSMW, and lCD-b.
PTSD is defmed as an emotional reaction to events, disasters or accidents that are outside
the range of usual human experience which can occur after natural disasters like flood,
earthquake or war, rape, chronic illness, sexual abuse, kidnapping with three main
characteristics: reexperiencing the traumatic event in thoughts, flashback and dreams;
avoidance of any cues or reminders related to the trauma or situation; and hyperarousal
such as disturbance of sleep, poor concentration, poor memory and hypervigilance. The
classification of PTSD as a sub-group of anxiety disorder or dissociative disorder is
discussed in some detail, and a short discussion of the symptomatology, and assessment
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of PTSD in adults and children is presented. The biological, and neuropsychological
findings are also discussed in some detail and indicate that the psychophysiological
measures of autonomic and somatic activities provide a useful approach in the diagnosis
of PTSD and also provide insights into the emotional seqeulae of traumatic experiences.
The results of neuropsychological studies also show that emotions associated with the
PTSD symptomatic state are mediated by the limbic system including the hippocampus.
The second part of Chapter Two comprises a review of the literature related to children
and adolescents with PTSD and this falls into several topics. The symptomatology of
PTSD in children and adolescents is discussed with respect toYule' s (1992) questions.
Yule argued that the criteria of PTSD were not developed on the basis of studies of young
people, so there are several essential questions such as "Do the same symptoms
manifest?" A brief review of the child literature shows that, although young people with
PTSD demonstrate most of the same symptoms as adults, there are some significant
differences between the long term responses of children and adults (Terr, 1983) and there
may be considerable comorbidity with depression, generalized anxiety, or pathological
grief reactions (Yule, 1994). The developmental considerations are described where in
the manifestation of PTSD symptoms depends on the developmental stage of the
individual during the time of the trauma and are affected by factors such as age, sex,
family functions, and the trauma events effect on the school performance of students with
PTSD. Three non-cognitive theories are discussed in this chapter: Psychodynamic theoiy,
Mowrer's (1968) two factor theory and the developmental model of Pynoos et al. (1995).
According to Janet (1889) trauma results from a failure to take effective action against
a potential threat. This view is similar to later cognitive psychodynamic theory.
Following a trauma, dissociation of thoughts, actions and feelings from conscious
awareness and voluntary control was the key process in Janet's theory. Freud (1920)
emphasised two different factors in the development of what is now PTSD: (1) the
quantitative aspects of the event, and (2) the 'preparedness' of the person involved in the
traumatic event. Freud suggested that a traumatic event produces a breakthrough in the
"stimulus barrier" and leads to to an overstimulation situation which the person confronts
without any defence. Mowrer's two factor theory consists of two types of learning,
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classical and operant conditioning. Classical conditioning shapes a neutral stimulus via
temporal contiguity which becomes associated with an unconditioned stimulus (original
stimulus) that evokes a series of symptoms such as anxiety, fear etc. Then the neutral
stimulus converts to a conditioned stimulus which elicits fear response when presented
to the subject by two mechanisms generalization, and higher order conditioning. Pynoos
et al.'s developmental model (1995) provides a comprehensive formulation for
integrating various aspects of traumatic stress which are involved in the etiology, course,
and outcome of PTSD in children and adolescents. This model pays attention to the
traumatic experiences, the role of traumatic reminders, the nature, severity, and course
of posttraumatic distress and its interactions with emerging personality, development,
psychopathology, and the social ecology of the child.
Chapter Three describes two main functions of cognition (i.e. attention, and memory) and
cognitive theories of emotional disorders particularly those related to PTSD. Attention
is referred to as a selection of stimuli for future processing (Eysenck, 1991), and two
forms are considered, focused-attention and divided attention. Theoretically, memory
consists of three stages, encoding, storage and retrieval which interact in any kind of
information processing, particularly in long term memory. Long term memory is split into
two types, (a) declarative memory in which an individual has conscious access to
memories that can be stated directly either verbally or by some other means. This
includes semantic memory (general knowledge) and episodic memory (personal
knowledge). Recall and recognition are two ways to assess declarative memory. (b) Non-
declarative memory is knowledge to which the individual has no conscious access and
can only be demonstrated indirectly through some form of action such as skills or
priming.
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate attention and memory performance with
respect to emotional material of children and adolescents with PTSD and children of
adults with PTSD using various tasks. The Stroop colour-naming and attentional
deployment tasks were used to study attentional bias,while recall and recognition tasks
were used to study memory bias. The Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test was also
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used to study general memory in children and adolescents with PTSD.
Beck's (1979, 1985) schemata theory argues that anxiety-related experiences may lead
to the formation of negative schemata related to danger in anxious people. Schemata are
explained as cognitive structures for encoding, screening, and retrieving information.
According to Beck the schemata are the source of cognitive biases in the processing of
danger-related cues at all levels of the cognitive system. Bower's (1980) model suggests
that all information in long-term memory (LTM) is stored in a network as nodes. Bower
proposes that each emotional state is represented by a specific node in the network which
acts as a focusing point for all associated aspects of that emotion and that information
related to those aspects is more accessible when the subject is in the appropriate mood
state. Bower concluded that the range and complexity of the network leave the anxious
subject with an extensive and integrated set of connections centred on the anxiety node.
Both of the aforementioned theories (Beck and Bower) suggest that anxious subjects will
demonstrate systematic cognitive biases towards anxiety-related information across a
wide range of cognitive paradigms. In contrast, Williams et al. (1988) propose that
anxious individuals will show a bias in attentional tasks such as the Stroop and
attentional deployment tasks which measure attention, while they show some kind of
inhibition mechanism which prevents them from elaborating anxiety-related information
in LTM and consequently they will not exhibit any processing biases on standard tests
of memory such as recall and recognition. In line with these predictions, there has been
a consistent failure to demonstrate biases in studies which have employed traditional
recall and recognition memory tests with anxious subjects, nor in those which have used
the Stroop colour-naming task with depressed individuals. Such a pattern of findings
does not fit with the cognitive models of Beck and Bower which predict memory biases
in recall and recognition tasks for anxious subjects. In contrast, Williams et al.'s model
seems to fit the empirical data. One of the main aims of this thesis is to ascertain the
profile of memory and attention effects in children and adolescents with PTSD.
Cognitive theories of PTSD which were mostly developed in the last decade are
described in some detail. According to Horowitz (1979), traumatic events involve heavy
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amounts of internal and external information. Most of this information cannot be matched
with an individual cognitive schema, therefore it leads to non-integrated information and
information overload. Consequently this leads to symptoms of PTSD. Foa's fear
network model of PTSD (1989) was developed on the base of Lang's analysis of fear
structures (e.g. Lang, 1985) which is discussed in the same chapter. Foa maintains that
the fear network consists of three types of information: information about the traumatic
stimulus, information about cognitive, physiological and behavioural responses to the
trauma, and information about interpretation of the stimulus. The fear network can be
activated by triggering stimuli which cause information to enter consciousness in the
network and this leads to PTSD symptoms such as intrusion. Brewin et al.'s (1996) and
Creamer et a!. 's (1992) cognitive models are described. Creamer et al. 's model is a
combination of Horowitz's formulation and the network conceptualisation of Foa. They
suggest five stage for the processing of trauma-related information: (a) objective
exposure, (b) network formation, (c) intrusive thoughts, (d) avoidance and (e) outcome.
Creamer et al. carried out a study with victims of an office block shooting in Australia
to support their model. The SPAARS (Schematic, Propositional, Associative and
Analogical Representational Systems; Daigleish & Power, 1995) approach is a functional
model which comprises four levels of representation of information: analogical,
propositional, schematic models, and the associative level. The traumatic information is
appraised at the schematic model level as a threat and fear is generated and it is encoded
and represented at the analogical, propositional and schematic levels of meaning and
these kind of representations of trauma-related information are incongruent with the
individual's schematic model of self, the world and others and consequently this will
cause various PTSD symptoms.
The traumatic experience presents information which is incompatible with the pre-
existing models or representations. Unsuccessful processing occurs when the individual
is unable to integrate the trauma-related material with the current information leading to
cognitive dysfunction. The present study sought to examine elements of this hypothesis,
namely, information processing, in children and adolescents with PTSD.The empirical
research which bears on information processing in emotional disorders is reviewed in
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later chapters.
Cognitive problems are among the important and common sequelae in patients with
PTSD, for example poor memory, poor concentration, intrusive thoughts and flashbacks
(Yule, & Gold 1993; Last; 1993; Bouman & Scholing; 1992 ). In recent years,
investigators have started to study these functions and some of the imagery paradigms
like Stroop and memory paradigms have been used to assess psychophysiological
reactivity associated with traumatic memories in combat-related PTSD, but have yet to
be used to investigate PTSD in young people (McNally; 1991). Therefore, this literature
is reviewed briefly in chapter three and the later chapters describe different experiments
which were carried out on cognitive functions (attention and memory) with children with
PTSD and children of adults with PTSD.
The development of a Dictionary of Emotional Words is described in Chapter Four.
Many studies (see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, for a review) have tried to study
information processing in emotional disorders using various experimental paradigms
such as memory, attention, and interpretation. In these paradigms, words with differring
emotional content (for example, threat, sad, happy, and neutral) are used as stimuli. The
frequency, length, emotionality, and self-relevance of the words are four factors which
influence the subjects' responses to such tasks. To develop experimental tasks for adults,
words with different emotional contents are chosen from available sources and used as
stimuli. There are no published sources containing the frequency of usage of emotional
words by children and adolescents. The purpose of this study was to develop a pool of
emotional words collected from children and adolescents. Two hundred and twenty one
child students from primary and secondary schools completed a questionnaire that
included 10 questions in which children were asked to write down different types of word
(i.e. threat, sad, neutral and happy words). Through analysis of these data, a suitable
dictionary of emotional words was created.
Chapter Five presents the first experiment involving attention using a version of the
Stroop paradigm. In this experiment, young people with PTSD, children of adults with
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PTSD and normal subjects, participated in a colour naming task. The task consisted of
five categories of words: threat-related, depressed-related, trauma-related, positive and
neutral words which appeared on the screen of the computer in different colours.
Increased relative mean latency to name the colours a particular word type are written in
is thought to reflect a processing bias for these words. The literature using this task on
adults with PTSD shows that PTSD patients generally took longer to say the colour of
trauma-related words (Kaspi & McNally, 1991; Cassiday, McNally & Zeitlin, 1992;
McNally, English, & Howard, 1993; 1992, 1993; Foa, 1991; Thrasher, Daigleish & Yule,
1994). Also the results of the one study with grown-up children of adults with PTSD
indicated that the children showed colour naming interference on the Stroop task (Motta
et aL, 1994). The present study sought to investigate such processing biases in children
with PTSD as well as in children of adults with PTSD.
A second experiment relating to attention is described in Chapter Six. Patients with
PTSD and normal subjects participated in the probe dot task. Four types of words:
physical threat, social threat, sad and neutral words, were presented in pairs via computer
to the subjects. Following the word pair, a dot sometimes appeared in the position of one
the previously presented words. The subjects were asked to press a button when they saw
the dot on the screen. Faster response to the dot is taken to indicate that subjects had been
attending to the word which the dot replaced. Research with adult subjects with anxiety
indicates relatively faster response times when the dot has replaced a threat word.
Findings using this measure to assess attention in children with anxiety disorders have
yielded a similar attentional bias (Vassey et al., 1994; 1995). The present study sought
to examine attentional processing of emotional material in children with PTSD using this
task.
Chapter Seven investigates memory bias in young people with PTSD and children of
PTSD patients. In this experiment, subjects performed recall and recognition tasks. Five
categories of words including: (a) threatening words, (b) depressed words,(c) PTSD
words related to trauma,(d) happy words, and (e) categorised neutral word were used.
According to Williams et al.'s (1988) model (see Chapter 3), memory bias is for
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emotional material related to strategic processing of information, and patients with
anxiety who have problems in automatic processing of information but not strategic
should not show a memory bias. Research with adults with PTSD (a subgroup of anxiety
disorder) is equivocal with respect to memory for trauma-related material. The present
study sought to investigate memory for such material in children affected by trauma.
The last experiment is discussed in Chapter Eight. Patients with PTSD and normal
subjects participated in a neuropsychological memory assessment (Rivermead
Behavioural Memory Test; Wilson et al., 1990).
The adult literature suggests that PTSD patients suffer from general memory deficits
(Everly & Horton, 1989 Gil et.al ., 1990; Bremner Ct. al., 1993; Bremner et al., 1995, and
Yehuda et. al., 1995). The findings of a study with children with PTSD also showed that
the traumatised group differed on the basis on neuropsychological functions including
memory, attention, and higher cognitive functions from the control group (Palmer, 1995).
The present study was a comprehensive examination of general memory performane in
children affected by PTSD.
Finally, Chapter Nine is a concluding chapter which summarises the experimental
findings reported in the earlier chapters and presents a discussion of their possible
explanations in the context of previous research, particularly with respect to the cognitive
models discussed in chapter three. The last part of this chapter discusses the implications




2.1. Historical view of PTSD
In the last decades reaction to trauma has been described under various labels such as
Compensation Neurosis (Rigler, 1879), Nervous Shock (Page, 1885), Traumaphobia
(Rado, 1942), War Neurosis (Grinker and Spiegel, 1943), and Hysteria (Putnam, 1981).
Later descriptions of PTSD were labelled according to the type of trauma, e.g., "rape
trauma syndrome" (Burgess and Holstromm, 1974), "survivor syndrome (Kijak and
Funlowicz, 1982), and "shell shock" (Myers, 1940).
The concept of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was developed in 1980 to describe
the consequences of extreme experiences. The concept was strongly influenced first by
psychoanalysis and more recently by cognitive behavioural psychology. This historical
discussion will clarify the various ideas, issues and their development over the years
leading to the develpoment of the classification of PTSD. An historical perspective of
PTSD must consider three period stages as follow (Kleber & Brom, 1992):
1- Before World War I
2- World War II
3- Modem Developments
I will consider each period in turn. A formal appraisal of the psychophysiological effects
of massive trauma arose in the Nineteenth Centuiy (Cooper, 1986). In that time, attention
initially turned to the psychological effects of combat (Trimble 1981). During the
American Civil War, physicians observed states of physical and mental exhaustion, or
neurasthenia, occurring in soldiers exposed to fighting. Some time later, Da Costa (cited
by Kellett, 1982) used the term 'irritable heart' (which had previously been used by
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McLean, 1867) in clinical descriptions. According to this view, irritable heart was a form
of cardiac malady common among camp soldiers.
During World War I there were many cases of shell shock in addition to physical injuries.
Many soldiers suffered from different types of symptoms like panic attacks, startle
responses, sleep disturbances and repetitive battle dreams. Some authors attributed these
symptoms to brain lesions (Mott, 1919), while some authors tried to explain the physical
factors of this phenomena, some others attended to the importance of non-organic factors
in an individual's reaction to the stress.
During World War II, Kardiner and Spiegel (1940) postulated that war stress was a
psychological trigger for all the variously named conditions such as shell shock, battle
neurosis and combat fatigue. Since then, many types of psychological stressor like fire,
rape, kidnap, personal violence and so on have been examined.
In 1958, the first edition of the American Diagnostic and Statistical manual (DSM-I) did
not recognise any syndrome of traumatic stress reaction but included this constellation
problems as gross stress reaction, a transient response to severe physical or emotional
stress. The DSM-ll eliminated the diagnostic category of gross stress reaction. It was only
in DSM-Ifl (1980) that PTSD was recognised as a distinct clinical entity.
2.2. The concept of PTSD
Post-traumatic stress disorder is defined as an emotional reaction to events, disasters or
accidents that are outside the range of usual human experience. PTSD can occur after
natural disasters like floods, earthquakes or after war, rape, chronic illness, sexual abuse,
and kidnapping.
PTSD has three main characteristics as follow: (a)the traumatic event (s) is reexperienced
in thoughts, flashbacks and dreams; (b) avoidance of any cues or reminders related to the
trauma and its situation; (c) hyperarousal such as disturbance of sleep, poor
concentration, poor memory and hypervigilance.
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2.3. PTSD criteria in DSM-LV and ICD-1O
There are two major classifications of mental disorders: (a) Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) and (b) International Classification of Diseases
(lCD-b).
2.31. PTSD in DSM-IV
In DSM-IV, PTSD is classified as an anxiety disorder, (APA,1994, p. 424):
"The essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the development of
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving
direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious
injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves
death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about
unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a
family member or other close associate (Criterion A)."
Exposure to traumatic events without the formation of symptoms of PTSD occurs
frequently. Therefore it should be noted that the presence of a traumatic history does not
necessarily lead to PTSD symptoms (Blank, 1994). However, in cases of PTSD, the
traumatic event will lead to the following symptoms:
Re-experiences symptoms (Criterion B): The subject reexperiences the traumatic event
in the form of emotions, thoughts, behaviours, and physical reactions.These groups of
symptoms consist of intrusive recollections (B 1), distressing dreams such as nightmares
(B2), acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring with vivid images or
flashbacks (B3). Yager and Gitlin (1995) state that:
"A flashback is an intense visual reexperience of highly charged past events, which are
often replays of hallucinations.... In Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders some complex
intrusive flashbacks like images may attain hallucinatory vividness. Images often include
horrifying memories of traumatic events that force themselves repeatedly into
conciousness until they are acknowledged and worked through (1995, pp. 656)".
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Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise an
aspect of the traumatic event (B4), and physiologic reactivity on exposure to cues (B5).
Avoidance symptoms (Criterion C): Avoidance symptoms can also occur at different
levels. The sub-criteria of the avoidance symptoms are: avoidance of reminders of the
trauma which consist of avoiding thoughts, feelings, or conversations (C 1), and activities,
people, or places (C2), amnesia (C3), markedly diminished interest or participation in
significant activities (C4), detachment or estrangment from others (C5), restricted range
of affect (C6), and a sense of a foreshortend future (C7).
Increased arousal symptoms which consist of: difficulty falling or staying asleep (Dl),
irritability or outbursts of anger (D2), difficulty with concentration (D3), hypervigilance
(D4), and an exaggerated startle response (D5).
DSM-IV notes that the duration of the disturbance including symptoms B, C, and D
should be more than one month. If the symptoms last for less than three months, a
dignosis of "acute PTSD" is given. Chronic PTSD is diagnosed if symptoms appear for
three months or more. Delayed onset PTSD is diagnosed if the onset of PTSD appears
at least 6 months after the traumatic event.
2.3.2. PTSD in ICD-1O
ICD-1O (1992) states that PTSD "arises as a delayed and/or protracted response to a
stressful event or situation (either short- or long-lasting) of an exceptionally threatening
or catastrophic nature, which is likely to cause pervasive distress in almost anyone (e.g.
natural or man-made disaster, combat, serious accident, witnessing the violent death of
others, or being the victim of torture, terrorism, rape, or other crime) (pp: 147)."
Predisposing factors such as previous history and personality traits are neither sufficient
nor necessary to explain PTSD. According to ICD-lO, the symptoms include: occurrences
of repeated remembering of the traumatic events via intrusive memories such as
a
flashbacks and dreams when exposed to the traumatic event or circumstances associated
with the stressor (Criteria B), to display avoidance symptoms such as numbness when
exposed with the traumatic event (Criteria C), inability to recall some important aspects
of the traumatic event, to exhibit an increased psychological sensitivity and arousal such
as sleep difficulty, irritability, difficulty in concentration, startle response, and
hypervigilance (Criteria D).
ICD-1O states that criteria B, C, and D must be met within 6 months of the event.
Comparing DSM-1V and ICD-lO, it seems that both emphasise very similar criteria and
symptoms. ICD-lO places more stress emphasis on the reexperiencing phenomena and
much less on the emotional numbing which has proved difficult to fmd in adults and
young people. ICD-lO also has stated that PTSD must be diagnosed only when it arises
within 6 months of the major trauma.
2.4. Phenomenology of PTSD
2.4.1. Duration
It seems that immediately following a trauma normal and pathological reactions to
(PTSD) may appear similar, even in intensity. The course would be expected, however,
to deviate with normal reactions dissipating and pathological reactions becoming chronic.
Foa and Rothbaum (1990a, 1990b) found that nearly all of the rape victims in their
sample exhibited PTSD symptoms immediately following the assault, but less than half
continued to meet PTSD criteria after three months. The results from victims of
nonsexual criminal assault were similar to those found for the rape victims. McFarlane
(1988) suggested that PTSD at four months is a relatively good predictor for chromcity
of the disorder.
2.4.2. Classification of PTSD
Brett (1994) stated that although PTSD is classified as an anxiety disorder, there is a
debate over whether PTSD is an anxiety or dissociative disorder. The advisory
subcommittee on PTSD for DSM-IV suggested that PTSD be placed in a new
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classification of Stress Response which is subsumed within the anxiety disorders.
2.4.2.1. PTSD classified as an anxiety disorder
In the present classification, PTSD is cited as a an anxiety disorder. It should be noted
that the requirements for meeting a diagnosis of PTSD have changed slightly between
(DSM-ffl, 1980) and DSM-IV (1994). Furthermore, it has been argued whether or not
PTSD is an anxiety or dissociative disorder (Brett et al., 1988). There is some emprical
evidence for the classification of PTSD as an anxiety disorder or dissociative disorder.
Unlike other anxiety disorders PTSD occurs only in response to an external event (as a
diagnostic criterion). Various studies have shown that PTSD has comorbidity with
anxiety disorders (Davidson et al. 1991; Green et al. 1989). Brett (1993) explains that
PTSD co-ocurs most frequently with other disorders such as anxiety, depression and
substance abuse. Green et al. (1989) concluded that some forms of PTSD are
characterised by anxiety which is caused by stress experiences. Depresssion may also be
a secondary condition developing in response to the chronic stress disorder rather than
developing directly in reaction to stressful events.
A few studies of family history show that there probably is a genetic relationship
between PTSD and anxiety disorders (Davidson et al. 1985, 1989). Although the results
of some studies demonstrated that there are some psychological symptoms or
physiological responses in common between PTSD and anxiety disorders, there also
some differences between them. The association between PTSD and anxiety disorders
is not strong on the basis of comorbidity and family studies. According to DSM-IV and
lCD- 10 the etiology of PTSD is very clear, while the aetiology of anxiety disorders is
unknown.
2.4.2.2. PTSD as a dissociative disorders
However, as noted above, there are some arguments about the classification of PTSD as
an anxiety disorder. According to Brett (1994) "evidence for this is, first the intense
controversy in DSM-ffl-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) over whether PTSD
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was an anxiety or dissociative disorder (Brett et a!. 1988), and second, the unanimous
vote of the DSM-IV Advisoiy Subcommittee on PTSD to classify PTSD in a new stress
response category (pp. 191)." Regarding this point some brief discussion is warranted.
Studies on dissociative phenomena, indicate that PTSD patients are more hypnotisable
than patients with other disordres (Stutman & Bliss, 1985; Spiegel et a!., 1988).
Particularly, compared with generalised anxiety disorders, hypnotisability was twice as
high in PTSD. Spiegel (1988) concluded that anxiety dissociation increases with severity
of the disorder. Lowenstein and Putnam (1988) suggests that dissociation is a common
trait in PTSD and multiple personality disorder (MPD). There is a physical manifistation
of dissociation in some PTSD patients in response to traumatic events (Van der Kolk et
al., 1989). However, Brett (1994) reviewed the studies on the relationship of dissociation
and PTSD and concluded that PTSD can be related to dissociation in several ways, (1)
Both dissociative disorder and PTSD are reactions to severe stress, (2) both disorders
demonstrate memory disruptions which are more severe than other anxiety disorders, (3)
amnesia symptoms such as flashbacks are common between PTSD and dissociative
disorder. It therefore seems that the overlap between symptoms of PTSD and dissociative
disorders is greater or more basic than the overlap between PTSD and anxiety or even
depressive disorders.
Discussions about the relationship between PTSD and anxiety disorders on the one hand
and between dissociative disorder and PTSD on the other hand, lead some authors to
propose another classification of reaction to traumatic events. For example Brett cited a
new category which has been proposed by Horowitz ( unpublished,1989) under the title
of Stress Response Disorder. This classification includes: (a) Acute Stress Disorder, (b)
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and (c) Pathological Grief and Adjustment Disorder.
In summary, the recognition of PTSD as a separate category of psychiatric disorder in
adults has been very meaningful and productive. PTSD is similar in some aspects but
different in othe1jfrom other anxiety disorders, particularly in the reexperiencing of the
traumatic incident (Yule, 1994).
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2.4.3. Biological and Physiological Studies
The features of PTSD can be divided into two groups, tonic and phasic. Tonic refers to
those features that appear all the time or most of the time as a group of types of mental
functioning. While phasic features are manifest from time to time. Symptoms like
nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive recollections are phasic rather than tonic and the
avoidance symptoms are tonic rather than phasic (Pitman, 1993). Arousal symptoms in
PTSD are a mixture: for example, some of them like insomnia and hypervigilance are
tonic and some others, like the exaggerated startle response, are phasic features.
Numerous research studies have been done on the biology of PTSD. Rainey Ct al. (1987)
proposed that traumatic memories, nightmares, flashbacks, or somatic reactions could be
activated by autonomic arousal. Pitman and colleagues (1995) have employed Lang's
(1985) script-driven imagery technique to study psychophysiological aspects of PTSD.
They carried out four independent studies of medication-free PTSD and non-PTSD
subjects, matched with regard to age, educational level, and severity of traumatic
experience. Heart rate, skin conductance (SC), and lateral frontalis electromyogram
(EMG-frnt) were recorded during subjects' personal traumatic imagery. In all four studies,
they found significantly higher physiological responses during personal traumatic
imagery in the PTSD subjects (Pitman, Orr, Forgue, de Jong, & Claiborn, 1987; Pitman
et al., 1990; Orr, Pitman, Lasko, & Herz, 1993; Shalev, Orr, & Pitman, in press).
High heart rate and high systolic and diastolic blood pressure have been reported in
patients who suffer from PTSD (Davidson & Baum, 1986). Recently Gerardu Ct al.
(1994) compared 32 Vietnam veterans with combat-related PTSD and 26 Vietnam-era
veterans with no combat experience, on various biological features. They found that
PTSD veterans had significantly higher heart rate, systolic blood pressure, and diastolic
blood pressure. These fmdings support the position that individuals with PTSD do indeed
demonstrate higher levels of cardiovascular arousal across settings. These results
confirmed the previous findings by Palhneyer (1986), Mally et al. (1983), Blanchard et
al. (1991a, 1991b). In another study, McFall et al. (1990) exposed a group of Vietnam
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veterans with PTSD and without PTSD to combat and noncombat stress films and
compared physiological responses. They found greater increase in plasma epinephrine,
heart rate, and blood pressure.
Many of the biological reactions are mediated by the autonomic nervous system,
particularly the reticular activating system of the brain stem, the hypothalamus, and the
pituitary gland (Van der Kolk, 1988). Studies on startle response with PTSD patients
have shown that PTSD subjects had significantly greater startle response amplitude than
control subjects at mterinediate intensities of acoustic stimuli (Butler et al., 1990). Sleep
disturbances are important features of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Meliman et
al. (1995) report on the phenomenology and physiological correlates of symptomatic
sleep events in PTSD. Recurrent awakenings, threatening dreams, thrashing movements
during sleep, and awakenings with startle or panic are all common features in PTSD.
In summary, the psychophysiological measures of autonomic and somatic activities
provide a useful approach in the diagnosis of PTSD and also in providing insights in to
the emotional sequelae of traumatic experiences. Such studies are a good base for the
examination of similarities and differernces in the patterns of physiologic reactivity
across the various types of trauma by means of common methodology. It seems that
neuropsychological studies will be useful in achieving a better understanding of the
nature of PTSD.
2..4.3.1. Neuropsychology of PTSD
There have been two approaches to the neuropsychological study of PTSD, one approach
tries to apply a selection of neuropsychological tests to find particular deficits in PTSD
patients. Most of these standard tests are related to memory, concentration, attention and
so on, and will be discussed later in detail (Chapter 7). The other approach is related to
specific hypotheses and uses particular experimental methods.
The theory of Multiple Memory Systems (Nadel & O'Keefe, 1974; Nadel, 1994; Schacter
& Tulving, 1994) emphasised that there are two brain systems of memory. One dependent
54
on the hippocampus and the other not. It is clear that different parts of the brain produce
different types of memory: for example, the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex are
centeral to episodic context, whereas procedural systems involve the basal ganglia and
cerebellum (Nadel & Jacobs, 1995). Here I expand briefly on work on the limbic system
including the hippocampus and amygdala which play an important role in producing
different types of memory.
The limbic system is involved in emotions and behaviour necessaiy for self-preservation
and for survival of the species (MacLean, 1985) and in the storage and retrieval of
memory. Two particular parts of the limbic system have been implicated in the
processing of emotionally charged memories: the amygdala and the hippocampus.
The amygdala is responsible for the evaluation of the emotional meaning of incoming
stimuli (LeDoux, 1986). Lesions of the amygdala interfere with a wide range of
emotional memory processes, including inhibitory avoidance, fear-potentiated startle, and
conditioned fear (Davis 1992; Hemestetter, 1992; Kesner, 1992; LeDoux, 1992).
The hippocampus is a cortical structure which is involved in a variety of cognitive
functions. The hippocampus plays an important role in spatio-temporal processing (Nadel
& Jacobs, 1995) and the categorisation and storage of incoming stimuli in memory (van
der Kolk, 1995). This is at the core of the cognitive map model (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978).
According to this model, the hippocampus is responssible for estabilishing episodic
memories, and the processing of spatiotemporal features of these memories, spatial
(where) information and temporal (when) information. Nadel and Jacobs (in press)
emphasised the neurochemical activity of the bippocampus in stress situations. Basically,
the hippocampus has two kinds of neurons or cortisol receptors; mineralocorticoid (MRs)
and glucocorticoid (GRs) receptors. In the resting condition, the level of cortisol is low
while, in the stress condition, its level increases. In the rest condition, about 70% of the
hippocampal MR and 10% of the GR receptors are occupied by corticosterone whereas
during stress situations corticosterone occupied about 70% of MR and up to 90% of the
GR receptors. When a memory is formed under stress, a basic component of normal
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memoiy formation, i.e. the hippocampus, is disabled, so memoty without spatiotemporal
content is created. Therefore another component of normal memory formation i.e.
amygdala can be potentiated, leading to highly charged emotional memories. With
respect to PTSD, Nadel and Jacobs postulate that when a traumatic event memory is
retrieved, the retrieved information is deprived of spatiotemporal context. This
formulation emphasised that memories of traumatic experiences are timeless, frameless
as if they are free floating and could come to consciousness by internal or external
triggers. When memories which are likely to have visual characteristics are triggered they
have a very "live" and fresh quality and for the PTSD sufferer it is as if they happening
in the here and now rather than belonging to a specific time and place in the past.
2.4.3.2. Laterality of cereberal hemispheres
There is a body of research which shows brain hemispheric specialisation, particularly
in emotions. Lateralised brain lesion studies (Heilman et al., 1974) and studies with
various methods of stimuli presentation such as tachistoscopic presentation, single nostril
presentation of odours and dichotic listening tasks reveal greater sensitivity of the right
hemisphere in emotional information processing (e.g. Bradley et al, 1991; McCaffeiy et
al., 1993). To study the role of the limbic system in memories of traumatic experiences,
Rauch et al. (in press) conducted a study with PTSD patients using positron emission
tomography (PET). Eight PTSD patients responded to a script-driven imagery
provocation pardigm, in which PET scanning was performed during induced recall of
traumatic experiences. The results revealed a significanly high level of regional cerebral
blood flow (rCBF) in right sided limbic, paralimbic and visual areas.
Hagh-Shenas, Goldstein and Yule (in press) carried out a study to test the following
hypothesis. They proposed that if the right hemisphere is disproportionately engaged in
the processing of emotional information in contrast to the left hemisphere, trauma-related
information which is highly charged with emotion should activate the right hemisphere
significantly greater than the left. They assumed that the trauma-related information is
non-verbal and visual whereas the non-traumatic information is verbal, thus it would be
reasonable to fmd higher levels of right hemisphere activation in the processing of
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traumatic information and greater left hemisphere activation in non-traumatic but
negative information. Seven different tasks, including mental arithmetic, music, listening
to eight trauma-related cue words (for PTSD patients) or personal negative experience
cue words (for control subjects) and smelling four different odours including: smoke, of
garlic and decayed food, of forest, and peppenrnnt. EEG recordings were used to record
the brain activations from frontal, temporal, and parieto-occipital regions from the left
and right hemisphere. Ten PTSD (bum accident) patients matched on age, and sex, with
10 control subjects participated in this study. AU subjects were right handed and were not
normosmic (i.e., no identifiable olfactory deficit) according to their reports. The results
indicated that the right hemisphere, temporal area is more activated than the left
hemisphere in trauma related information in PTSD patients. This finding is consistent
with Bremniner Ct al. (1995) who found decreased right hippocampus volume in patients
with PTSD. In sum the results of neuropsychological studies using PET, MRI, and EEG
show that emotions associated with the PTSD symptomatic state are mediated by the
limbic system including the hippocampus in the right hemisphere. The study descrided
in Chapter 8 sought to investigate neuropsychological issues by assessing general
memory performance of patients with PTSD using a standard neuropsychological
memory test.
2.5. PTSD IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
2.5.1. PTSD symtomatology in children and adolescents
According to DSM-IV, PTSD can occur at any time of the life span, including childhood.
Theoretically it has been suggested that PTSD symptoms may depend on the
developmental stage of the individual at the time of the trauma (Schwarz & Perry, 1994).
PTSD in DSM-1V is classified as a subgroup of anxiety disorders. The main problem is
that the criteria were not developed on the basis of studies of young people (Yule, 1992).
So, there are several essential questions like: Do the same symptoms manifest? do they
manifest differently at different age? do they cluster differently, and so on (Yule, 1992).
The main body of research in PTSD has been with adults, particularly combat veterans.
In contrast, there are far fewer studies of children and adolescents to answer the
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aforementioned questions in this field. In recent years, investigations of PTSD in children
and adolescents speculate that there are some differences from adult PTSD (Terr, 1983;
Yule & Williams, 1990; Yule, Udwin, & Murdoch, 1990; Yule & Udwin, 1991; Yule,
1992, 1993, 1994).
Yule et al.'s experiences of assessing and working with child and adolescent survivors
lead them to describe the following reactions in young people with PTSD. Repetitive and
intrusive thoughts, sleep disturbances and waking through the night, flashbacks, fears of
the dark, bad dreams, nightmares, being irritable and angry, separation difficulties even
among teenagers, difficulties in talking even with parents and peers. Children and
adolescents report a number of cognitive changes such as difficulties in concentration,
particularly in schoolwork, memory problems both in mastering new materials and
remembering old skills. They also become alert to dangers. Yule and Gold (1993)
following DSMIII-R and ICD-10 classified these symptoms into three main groups in
children and adolescents, mainly in the 8 to 18 years range or junior to secondary age, as
follows:
1- Reexperiencing the traumatic event.
2- Avoiding thinking about the experience. The most common symptoms of this kind
are, not talking with parents, not talking with peers, foreshortened future and change of
prionties, guilt.
3- Heightened anxiety and arousal that may appear as: concentration difficulties; sleep
disturbance; separation difficulties; memory problems; heightened alertness to dangers.
These symptoms seem to have varing time course. According to Gordon and Wraith
(1993), responses of children and adolescents to disasters are divided in three main
stages:
A- Short-term responses (first week) including fear and insecurity emotional reactions,
regressed and disorganized behaviour, heightened arousal, confusion and disorientation.
B- Medium-term effects (first week to one year) including general stress signs,
relationship problems, mood disturbance, attitude changes, discharge behaviour,
pseudoneurotic symptoms, loss of developmental pathway, and school and performance
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problems.
C- Long- term responses (second year and beyond): developmental deviations, school
failure and poor performance, personality change, chronic peers problem, poor physical
health, preoccupation with other traumas and identity changes.
Investigations of children and adolescents with PTSD indicate that children and
adolescents experience more trauma-related fears than normal control children (Wolfe
et al., 1989; Yule et al., 1990), especially with respect to fears of a recurrence of the
trauma (Pynoos & Nader, 1988).
Yule (1994) noted that young people with PTSD demonstrate most of the same
symptoms of adults and there may be considerable comorbidity with depression,
generalised anxiety, or pathological grief reactions.
2.5.2. Epidemiology
According to DSM-ffl R there is no direct information about the epidemiology of PTSD
(APA, 1987), but it is clear that severe trauma such as war, natural disasters, torture and
life threatening combat will produce PTSD in a high percentage of individuals
particularly in children and adolescents. Pynoos et al (1987) performed a study on the
epidemiology of PTSD following a sniper attack on the playground of school. The data
were derived from a PTSD index, which indicates an obvious dose-response relationship.
Children who were under fire obtained significantly higher scores (twice) than those
walking home and much higher than (four times) those who were not at school on the day
of the accident. They report that about 80% of the exposed children demonstrated the
inimediate onset of a full range of PTSD symptoms regardless of age or sex, while the
children who were not in direct danger rarely showed acute PTSD unless other situational
factors were also present.
At 14 month follow-up, Nader et al. (1991) reported that 74% of the most severely
exposed childen in the playground still demonstrated symptoms of PTSD, whereas more
than 80% of the unexposed children did not show such symptoms. Similar findings were
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found by Pynoos et a!. (1993) with Armenian earthquake survivors with whom the PTSD
reaction index was also used.
Other studies also documented veiy high prevalence rates of PTSD following severe
disasters (McFarlane, 1987; Yule et al., 1990). It is important to say that most of these
studies documented a strong relationship between severity of the exposure to the stressor
and symptoms of PTSD. The role of subjective factors in developing of PTSD are
important. It has been argued that in both adults and children high levels of pathology are
related to the belief that the survivors were going to die during the incident, as well as to
the experience of seeing dead and mutilated bodies (Williams et a!., 1993; Yule et aL,
1992).
2.5.3. Developmental considerations
Theoretically, it has been argued that the manifestation of the PTSD symptoms depends
on the developmental stage of the individual during or at the time of the trauma. In spite
of some data indicating no relationship between symptomatology of PTSD and
developmental factors such as age, others document evidence supporting the hypothesis
that symptomatology is related to biopsychosocial developmental factors (Lyons, 1987).
Also as noted above, although there are some similarities between adults and children in
syrnptomatology, there are some significant differences between the long term responses
of children and adults which have been described by Ten (1983): (a) children do not
demonstrate "psychogenic amnesia" or "psychic numbing", (b) posttraumatic play and
reenactment are frequently observed in children and it is important in personality
development, (c) children frequently report dreams related to their experience, and (d)
have a limited view of themselves and the future and a consequent inability to make plans
for the future.
In order to look at the effects of developmental aspects on PTSD in young people, the
current study sought to investigate the effects of age on the information processing in
children and adolescents with PTSD and in children of adults with PTSD.
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2.53.1. Neurodevelopmental Factors
A body of studies investigating neurodevelopmental aspects of PTSD has proposed that
the developing brain forms in response to the intensity, pattern, and nature of sensory,
perceptual, and affective experience during childhood and adolescence (Perry Ct a!., 1990;
Perry, 1994). Schwarz, and Perry (1994) state that:
"A child's brain is undergoing critical and sensitive periods of differentiation. During this
time, stressor-activated neurotransmitters and hormones can play major roles in
neurogenesis, migration, synaptogenesis, and neurochemical differentiation......its
plasticity of the brain makes the developing brain more susceptible to formation of
malignant memories that affect not only the stress response system, but also the emerging
organizations of neural networks regulating other basic states and characteristics of the
individual (pp. 313, 1994)".
The organization of developing systems in traumatized children includes experience of
fear, threat, unpredictability, frustration, anger, helplessness, hunger, pain, startle
response, behavioural impulsivity, altered cardiovascular regulation and sleep
abnormalities (Perry, 1994). It is clear that such children will be at risk of developing
traumatized brain characteristics when exposed to any psychosocial stressor in the future
(Perry, 1994). There is also a correlation between severe childhood trauma and adult
psychiatric problems, particulary PTSD (Davidson & Smith, 1990).
2.5.3.2. Premorbid History
It is documented that prior emotional developed conditions probably increase the child's
vulnerability to the event and also that stressful events are likely to exacerbate preexisting
symptoms (Gillis, 1991). A traumatized child's cognitive development will influence
their interpretation of traumatic events, as well as reported symptoms (Keppel-Benson
& 011endick, 1993). Schwarz & Bruce (1994) suggested that malignant memories rooted
in early developmental trawna are likely to manifest later as disorders of self, personality,
ego functions, and cognitive functions such as attention or affect and arousal.
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2.5.3.3. Sex
It is documented that gender differences influence the develpment of reactions to trauma.
Investigations show that females are more vulnerable to the effects of disasters than
males (Lonigan Ct al., 1991; Yule, 1992a; Pynoos et a!., 1993). Yule found that girls
scored higher than boys on anxiety, depression, and fears as well as on the Impact of
Event Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979). Burke et al. (1986) reported that young boys (6 years
old) were more affected than girls, but 10 year old girls were more affected than boys.
In the present set of studies, gender effect were examined across all four cognitive tasks
to see whether the cognitive functions of young people with PTSD or children of adults
with PTSD are affected by gender.
2.5.3.4. Family Factors
Children's PTSD has been reported to be associated with parental PTSD symptoms and
family factors (Green et al., 1991). Moreover, Kelly (1990) points out that a traumatic
event which leads to PTSD in children can also cause traumatic responses in family
members. Child and adolescent survivors find difficulty in confiding their inner feelings
to their parents, in part to protect the parents from getting upset (Yule, 1991; Yule &
Williams, 1990). However, according to Schwarz and Perry (1994), a family which
includes a symptomatic child-parent model may lead to the members synergistically
triggering each other and expand arousal, re-experiencing, and avoidance symptoms in
vicious cycles. The characteristics of such a system depends on individual, pre-event and
post-event factors. One of the main aims behind the current thesis is to investigate
whether the cognitive functions (namely attention and memory) of children and
adolescents of parents who were involved in a severe traumatic event (while their
children were not) are affected by the parents' trauma.
2.5.3.5. School factors
As already noted, school age children often display poor concentration and difficulites
in learning, and this dullness and functional impariment of mental activities causes
decline in school performance. School age children may report guilt, hypervigilance,
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change in play, change or loss their intersts, return to the old or onset new fears, sleep
disorder, and impaired concentration, functioning (Schwarz, & Perry, 1994). Tsui (1990)
documented that academic performance was affected by adolescents' traumatic
experiences. His fmdings indicate that while, girls' who survived the sinking of the
Jupiter cruise ship were above average in tenns of academic accomplishments before the
accident, they had significantly dropped below the average one year after the accident.
As a summary, the results of the empirical and clinical studies have shown that most of
the developmental aspects such as brain development, emotional conditions, family
structure, and ac ademic performance are affected by the traumatic event which leads to
PTSD.
2.5.4. Assessment of PTSD in children and adolescents
There are now a number of sources from which information can be obtained for the
assessment of post-traumatic reactions in children and adolescents (Finch & Daugherty,
1993). The most important measures which are frequently used to assess PTSD in young
people are as follow:
2.5.4.1. Self-Report Measures
2.5.4.1.1. Impact of Event Scale (IES)
This measure was among the first PTSD assessment instruments and derives from
Horowitz' formulation of PTSD (Horowitz et al.1979; Zilberg et al. 1982) which focused
on avoidance and intrusive thoughts. The IES asks the patient to describe a target event
and then rate the frequency with which 15 symptoms have occurred within the last week.
Horowitz et al. (1979) reported good internal consistency of the subscales, (coefficient
alpha = 0.78 for intrusion and 0.82 for avoidance). A correlation of 0.42 (p <0.0002)
between the intrusion and avoidance subscale scores was reported which indicates that
the two subscales are associated, but do not measure identical dimensions. A good test-
retest reliability was also found (0.87 for the total stress scores, 0.89 for the intrusion
subscale, and 0.79 for the avoidance subscale).
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The IES was developed for use with adult patients, and not with children and adolescents
until Yule's studies of child survivors of shipping disasters (e.g. Yule & Williams, 1990;
Yule & Udwrn, 1990) which found the questions meaningful and reported scores as high
as those of traumatised adults. in the current studies the LES was used to assess PTSD
symptoms (namely intrusion and avoidance) in children and adolescents with PTSD.
2.5.4.2. Structured Interviews
2.5.4.2.1. The Children's PTSD Reaction Index (McNally, 1991)
The children's PTSD Reaction Index is probably the most widly used structured
interview for assessment of PTSD in children and adolescents (McNally, 1991) and it
shows good internal consistency and relates well to clinical judgement of the severity of
PTSD (Yule et. al., 1992; Yule, 1994). This measure, first developed by Frederick and
Pynoos (1988), has had several versions and has been used in a number of studies with
childern and adolescents aged 5-17. The Children's PTSD Reaction Index consists of 20
items which can be used via interview or self-report.
2.5.4.2.2. Children's PTSD Inventory (Saigh, 1989)
The Children's PTSD Inventoiy was developed on the basis of the DSM-ffl (APA, 1980)
criteria for formulating a PTSD diagnosis. The instrument presents four subtests that are
scored on a dichotomous basis (i.e. 1 for presence and 0 for absence of symptoms). The
first subtest assesses traumatisation through experimental, vicarious, or verbal mediation
(e.g. "Have you had a very bad experience?", Did you see someone else having a very
bad experience?" "Have you heard about someone else who had a very bad
experience?"). The first subtest also makes provisions for the verbatim description of the
experiences as reported by the examinee. The second subtest assesses unwanted anxiety-
evoking recollections of the trauma (e.g. "Are you having a lot of unwanted thoughts
about this?") and the third subtest assesses general affect (E.g. "Has it become difficult
for you to feel things or show other people how you feel?"). Finally, the fourth subtest
assesses divergent symptoms which were not apparent before the trauma (e.g. "Do you
avoid people and places that remind you of what happened?").
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2.5.4.2.3. Clinician-Administered Post-Traumatic Stress disorder Scale (CAPS)
The CAPS consists of 17 questions which permits one to assess all of the DSMffl-R
symptoms of PTSD in both present and life-time incidence, intensity and frequency. The
CAPS covers all three dimensions of PTSD including, re-experiencing, avoidance
/numbing and hyperarousal, and can be administered repeatedly. It also assesses
symptoms which are associated with PTSD such as depression, anxiety, homicidiality,
guilt. The CAPS has been recently validated with Vietnam combat veterans and
preliminary results confirmed the validity and reliability of the instrument (Keane et al.
1992).
There are also various semi-structured interviews to assess PTSD in young people
according to DSM criteria. All of these measures are useful to explore the traumatized
children's symptoms. However, Yule (1994) argued that "given that the phenomenology
of PTSD in children is not yet fully established empirically, they can be only a guide to
assessment and diagnosis. They are useful as screening devices, but are no substitute for
a careful, individual, but expensive clinical interview. (pp, 233) ".
2.6. Theories of PTSD
An increasing variety of theories has been developed to describe the aetiology and
symptomatology of PTSD. Early psychodynamic formulations emphasised the concept
of "energy overload" in which the individual's emotions become overpowered.
Behavioural models used to explain PTSD are generally based on two factor learning
theory (Mowrer, 1960). More recently, a developmental model has been proposed by
Pynoos Ct al. (1995) to conceptualise PTSD in children and adolescents. A variety of
cognitive models have also emerged (Horowitz, 1979; Rachman, 1980; Foa et al., 1989;
Creamer et al., 1992; Dalgleish & Power, 1995). Two theories which are non-cognitive
will be discussed in the current chapter, while the cognitive models are discussed more




The first systematic theory about the connection between traumatic events and
psychopathology was developed by Janet (1889). According to Janet, trauma results from
a failure to take effective action against a potential threat. This view is similar to current
cognitive psychodynamic theoiy. Dissociation of thoughts, actions and feelings from
conscious awareness and voluntary control was the key concept in Janet's formulation
(Janet, 1889). For example, a person who responds to a severe event with strong
emotions, such as intense anxiety and anger may fail to control these intense emotions,
and may react by dissociating. The individual may also not be able to integrate the
memories of the event into the memory system. Subsequently, this dissociation may
subconsciously affect behaviour and result in various disturbances, such as amnesia,
narrowing of consciousness, obsessional preoccupations and somatic symptoms. There
are clearly some similarities between Janet's view and modern psychodynamic theory
regarding the interpretation of posttraumatic phenomena such as the tendency to deny or
avoid thoughts and feelings about the traumatic event (Kieber & Brom, 1992).
psychodynamic theory deals with the relation between repressed material, integral
personality ftmctions and defense mechanisms, Janet, as noted, emphasised the
dissociation of memories of traumatic events from conscious awareness. Although
Janet's ideas have been forgotten for a long period of time, recently there has been a
revival of interest in the issues he was dealing with, such as dissociation, hypnosis, and
the storage of the traumatic experience in memory (Van der Kolk et al., 1989; Van der
Hart & Freedman, 1989).
2.6.1.2. Freud's theory
In Freud's view trauma was basically defined as any experience which causes distressing
affect, such as fright, anxiety, physical pain, and so on. Freud emphasised two different
factors which are important in developing what would now be called PTSD: (1) the
quantitative aspect of the external event (the severity of the stressor), and (2) the
'preparedness' of the person involved in a traumatic event in terms of the personal
meaning of the event. There is a relationship between the concept of the traumatic event
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and the idea of "stimulus barrier" in psychoanalysis theory (Freud, 1920). A traumatic
event produces a breakthrough in the "stimulus barrier" and leads to to an overstimulation
situation which the individual confronts without any defence. According to Freud there
is also a conflict between the ego and id when the traumatic event happens which is
repressed into the unconscious. These circumstances lead the individual who experienced
a severe event towards a posttraumatic reaction.
Freud's theory had a great influence upon later theories of PTSD such as Horowitz'
formulation which link the psychodynamic model with information processing and
developmental approaches. Pynoos et a!. (1995) were also influenced by Freud's theory
in developing their twofold developmental model of childhood traumatic stress (see
below, section 2.5.3).
2.6.2. Mowrer's two Factor Theory
Mowrer (1960) suggested a two factor theory of avoidance behaviour. This model had
a considerable influence on psychopathological and treatment models of anxiety
disorders. For example, this model has been applied with some success to phobic and
obsessive compulsive behaviour. The theory consists of two basic components: (1)
anxiety is learned by classical conditioning in which a neutral stimulus comes to signal
an aversive or traumatic event. (2) The conditioned anxiety provokes escape and
avoidance behaviour. Avoidance behaviour is subsequently reinforced by the reduction
of the anxiety drive.
In the case of PTSD, the application of the two process theory would mean that in the
first stage, when the individual is exposed to a trauma (unconditioned stimulus) s/he
acquires the ability to be upset by any situation which occurs in proximity to the trauma
(conditioned stimulus). Due to instrumental learning (second factor) avoidance and
escape behaviour from both the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli occur to decrease
the level of anxiety. By higher order conditioning, a wide range of stimuli elicit arousal
(stimulus generalisation).
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Recently psychologists have tried to adopt Mowrer's theory to address characteristics of
people who have experienced a severe traumatic event (Keane, Zimmerling, & Caddell,
1985; Becker, Skinner, Abel, Axelord, & Cichon, 1984; Kilpatrick, Veronen, and
Best,1985). For example Keane, et. al. (1985) proposed that the individual who
experienced a severe trauma (such as combat trauma) may become conditioned to a wide
range of stimuli that are related to the trauma. These neutral stimuli (e.g. sound, time of
day) then become associated with the original stimulus or trauma event through the
process of classical conditioning, and therefore evoke the fear and anxiety. This
phenomenon, due to processes of stimulus generalisation and higher order conditioning,
then extends to a wide variety of situations which can elicit fear and anxiety responses
in traumatised people. Thus, sudden loud noises such as a car backfiring, may elicit the
PTSD responses i.e. re-experiencing, hyperarousal (in the classical conditioning stage)
and avoidance behaviours (in the operant conditioning stage).
There are some critical points regarding to this theory which are as follows:
1- Although Mowrer's theory has been used to explain the symptomatology of PTSD
with a variety of traumatised individuals, it seems unable to account for all aspects of the
disorder. The startle response, which is characterised as a result of increased arousal in
PTSD but is not present in other anxiety disorders such as agoraphobia and phobia, is not
explained well by learning theory (Foa et a!., 1989).
2- It has been argued that learning theory does not adequately account for nightmares
(Foa et at., 1989) although it may plausibly explain intrusive thoughts or flashbacks.
3- Finally, Peterson et al. (1991) noted that the potential problem with learning theories
is that they do not pay enough attention to higher order structures such as attributions,
motivation, no to developmental aspects, and interventions.
2.6.3. The Twofold Developmental Model of Childhood Traumatic Stress
Children who suffer from PTSD are affected by developmental factors. Their
experiences, symptomatic presentation, emotion, course of recovery and behaviour are
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all affected by developmental processes (Pynoos & Nader, 1993). Developmental aspects
also influence the cognitive functions of traumatised children such as appraisals,
perception, interpretation and coping. An important question in this area concerns the
aetiology of these effects, whether objective (external) factors are more important than
subjective (internal) factors. Discussion of this point led Pynoos et a!. (1995) to present
a developmental model of responses in traumatised children and young people.
Pynoos and his colleagues (Pynoos & Nader, 1993; Pynoss, Steinberg, & Wraith, 1995)
were inspired by Freud's work (1926) on traumatic helplessness which emphasised the
external and internal danger in development of the traumatic reaction. Pynoos et al. stated
that:
"In traumatic situations, the experience of external threat involves an estimation of the
extreme magnitude of the threat, the unavailability or ineffectualness of contemplated or
actual protective actions by self or others, and the experience of physical helplessness at
irreversible traumatic moments. The experience of internal threat includes a sense of
inability to tolerate the affective responses and physiological reactions, as well as a sense
of catastrophic personal consequence. The latter includes both dire external and
psychodynamic consequences (Pynoos et al., 1995, p. 76)."
The extent of the external and internal threat proposed by Pynoos et al. depend on the
differences in level of exposure, development, maturity, prexisting experiences and
subjective appraisals of the child. The internal responses of the traumatised child
encompass the autonomic or affective reactions and the emerging attribution of symbolic
meaning and psychosexual interpretation. As children grow up, their cognitive abilities
change. They rely less on external cues (such as the caretaker) in their appraisal of life
threat, and more on internal cues and understanding of the potential threat. Adolescents
may rely on their appraisals and images of threat, even when it is not carried out.
Internally, children are confronted with a variety of threats such as physical and affective
responses, sense of helplessness, self-concept disturbance, loss of love, super ego
condemnation, processes of identification. According to this model, the children
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demonstrate a developmental hierarchy of responses to the external danger in their
conscious fantasies which, coincidentally, assimilate changes in how they address internal
danger.
2.6.3.1. Traumatic reminders
Based on clinical experiences with children, Pynoos et al. explained that the types of
common traumatic reminders include the event-specific circumstances, precipitating
conditions, characteristics of an assailant, signs of danger; endangering objects,
associated affective exchanges, indicators of distress, unwanted results and signs of injury
or death, and parent or teacher reactions during or at reunion. Internal reactions of the
children include, kinesthetic, sensory, and bodily sensations, a sense of helplessness, fear,
ineffectualness, and feelings of aloneness, shame, guilt, anger, and sadness.
According to Pynoos et al. different aspects of traumatic reminders such as nature,
context, frequency, and impact may vary with development and experience, and
particularly with the capacity for appropriate cognitive discrimination. Development
influences the degree to which a traumatic reminder exacerbates reactions to
nontraumatic stress, reactivates or intensifies earlier traumatic distress, or recruits issues
of risk and protection from an earlier developmental schema. However, the child may
be challenged by two or more sets of reminders, to both current and past experiences
(Pynoos Ct a!., 1991).
Traumatic events are commonly associated with four main factors which act as secondary
stresses: family function, social structure and values, community and school organization,
and individual challenges to the child. Family functioning may be affectd by events such
as parental loss, separation of child from the family and so on. A major source of
secondary stress for children is postrauma disturbance in the family. As Pynoos et al.
state: "These are often due to parent's own traumatic reactions or grief-related
preoccupations, exacerbation of their preexisting psychopathology, and demands on them
from secondary adversities (pp. 81, 1995)."
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It seems that children and adolescents often describe their own experiences in detail,
because they do not show anmesia symptoms which we can see in adults with PTSD.
Sometimes children try to omit some parts of the experience from conscious memory or
reorganise an experience in order to reduce internal or external threat. Another point
about the memory of traumatised children is that specific trauma-related imaginary
actions are assimilated into the memory representations of the event (Pynoos & Nader,
1989). Children suffering from PTSD try to contend with a loss or traumatic injuries by
employing mechanisims such as fantasy or denial to react against internal or external
danger. The fantasies about traumatic events involve conscious and unconscious
attempts to fmd ways of acting out and reducing the anxiety. Retaliation fantasies is one
important source of understanding how children address their traumatic helplessness after
the event.
2.6.3.2. Proximal stress-related psychopathology
The ability of children to tolerate and respond to acute events is variable. The outcome
may also vary from a relatively successful adaptation that includes restored
psychological, interpersonal, and academic performance to severe trauma-related
pathology and developmental disturbance.
The reactions to trauma may appear in different recognizable patterns of psychiatric
disorder.
"Children and adolescents' posttrauma psychopathology have been reported to include
PTSD, phobic and overanxious disorders, trauma-related disorders of attachment and
conduct, new onset attention deficit disorder, depression, substance abuse, and
dissociative, sleep, and somatization disorders. (p. 81, 1995)"
The most frequent diagnoses which correlate with degree of exposure are PTSD,
depression, attention deficit, and phobic disorder. Depression also is correlated with the
frequency and intensity of grief reactions (Pynoos & Nader, 1992).
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In summary the developmental model provides a comprehensive formulation for
integrating various aspects of traumatic stress which are involved in the aetiology, course,
and outcome of PTSD in children and adolescents. This model pays attention to the
traumatic experiences; the role of traumatic reminders; the nature, severity, and course
of posttraumatic distress and its interactions with emerging personality, development,
psychopathology, and the social ecology of the child.
Pynoos et al.'s model explains the effect of the traumatic event on children and
adolescents takes into account of the developmental considerations. Pynoos et al.'s
formulation also pays attention to differences in outcome following the traumatic event
between young people and adults. So it should be applicable to the current study which
involves young people who suffer directly from PTSD or children of adults with PT SD.
2.7. Summary and conclusion
At the begining of this chapter in a historical and conceptual perspective of PTSD was
considered. PTSD is defmed as an emotional reaction to events, disasters or accidents
that are outside the range of usual human experience. PTSD has three main
characteristics: reexperiencing, avoidance and hypervigilance. Some of the arguments
on the classification of PTSD as a sub-group of anxiety disorders or dissociative disorders
and a short discussion of the symptomatology, biological and neuropsychological
findings and assessment of PTSD in adults and children was presented. A review of the
literature related to children and adolescents with PTSD including the symptomatology
of PTSD in children and adolescents, differences between long term responses of children
and adults, comorbidity with depression, generalized anxiety, and pathological grief
reactions were presented. The developmental considerations were described where the
manifestation of PTSD symptoms depends on the developmental stage of the individual
during the time of the trauma and is affected by factors such as age, sex, family functions,
and the traumatic event's effect on the school performance of students with PTSD. Three
non-cognitive theories including: the psychodynamic (Janet and Freud), Mowrer's (1968)
two factor theory and the developmental model of Pynoos et al. (1995) were described.
In the experimental chapters of this thesis the cognitive functions of young people
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suffering from PTSD and children of parents with PTSD and studied with respect to





At the beginning of the last decade there was a serious debate revolving around two
different views about the relationship between cognition and emotion. For example,
Zajonc (1980) proposed that emotion can be completely independent of cognition.
According to this view, some emotional reactions, such as fear, can be evoked by, for
example, accidentally stepping on a snake, and they seem to happen very fast. In fact, the
suggestion is that the emotional reaction of fear is likely to be completed before cognitive
analysis of the stimulus has ended. The alternative view suggests that cognitive analysis
is not only necessary for the production of emotions, but it is the main factor in their
production (Lazarus, 1982). This view also emphasises that the emotional reaction will
be rapid due to automatic processing of the stimulus which is involuntary, non-conscious,
and fast in nature, yet still cognitive.
Although some disagreement abut the direction of the relationship between cognition and
emotion still remains, the view that cognition is closely related to the emotion is now
generally agreed (Izard, 1993). Most current debates revolve around types of processing.
Cognitive psychology suggests a distinction between strategic and automatic processing.
Automatic processing is relatively independent from consciousness, while strategic
processing depends on awareness and consciousness (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).
Cognitive theories such as the network model (e.g. Bower, 1992) assume that some of
the critical processes involved in emotion are automatic (e.g. spreading activation), and
different emotions probably vary in the level of automatic processing involved (Mathews
& McLeod, 1994). Any understanding of the relation between cognition and emotion
needs to consider the interface between automatic and strategic processes. Although it
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seems that many of the cognitive factors involved in emotion are automatic, intentional
strategic processing can sometimes modify such automatic operations (Mathews, 1993;
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1994). This thesis concentrates on two main cognitive functions
i.e. attention and memory in PTSD which both contain consider elements of automatic
and strategic processing. This chapter reviews the theoretical issues regarding these
processes and also reviews theoretical frameworks which address the relationship
between cognition and emotional disorders, particularly PTSD.
3.2. Attention
Everyone is continually confronted with a wide range of choices, and must decide to
which subset of the massive influx of discriminable stimuli to attend, or what way to
process the selected display. Attention and higher processing are complementary
domains of cognition. Although attention sometimes can refer to concentration, it is
generally used to refer to selectivity of processing (Eysenck, 1991). Regarding definition
most authors (Eysenk, 1991; Dalgleish, 1994) refer to William James' description of
attention. James states that attention is:
"...the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought" (James, 1890/1 952, p. 261)."
David Marr (1982) has described three levels of analysis of cognitive processing: (a)
computational level which is the most abstract and is a description of what the system as
a whole is doing; (b) the representational level which is a specification of how the task
is carried out; (c) the hardware level which is the machinery within which the
representational level operates. In the case of humans the last level is the central nervous
system. For example, Dalgleish (1994) has applied this framework to attention and has
suggested that within the computational level, the processing of attention occurs in two
different domains, automatic and controlled or preattentive and attentive. The
characteristics of these two domains are summarised by Dalgleish (1994) as follows:
"Within a computational framework attention can be conceptualized as the process by
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which a small subset of all the possible information represented in one processing
domain, Domain A, is selected for processing in a qualitatively different processing
domain, Domain B. Domain A is characterized by processing which is rapid, unavailable
to conscious stimuli, ineffectual with respect to the capacity to perform other tasks, and
finally, modular. In contrast, Domain B processing is conceived of as slow, of limited
capacity, flexible, and available to consciousness" (Daigleish, 1994 P. 157).
According to Kinsbourne (1994) some selections are prenatally preprogrammed in the
nervous system, (e.g. startle response to an unexpected terrible stimulus at the first
exposure), while others although slowly and ec&rv wi1 cecome essentially automatic
(e.g. as in the Stroop test, where the subject reads the word, even when s/he knows that
it is an irrelevant distractor). Attention develops as a systematic increase in the child's
ability to extend inborn response tendencies, when it is adaptively profitable to replace
them with alternative responses in a particular situation. One can consider two types of
attention: focused-attention and divided-attention.
In a focused-attention task, the subject is instructed to concentrate on one of several
stimuli in the environment and ignore others, and the experimenter can assess the ability
of the subject to focus attention on the target stimuli and resist interference. For example,
in a dichotic listening task, two rows of words are presented coincidentally, at a fast rate
through the headphones to the two ears, and the subject is asked to listen and respond
only to the message presented to one ear and to ignore the other.
In a divided attention task, the subject is instructed to divide attention among concurrent
stimuli. In a typical design, the subject is required to divide attention between two rows
of words presented dichotically, or to perform a manual tracking task together with a
classification task both presented visually on the computer screen (Eysenck, 1991, 1994).
The Stroop and attentional probe dot tasks (see Chapters 5 and 6 respectively) are two
ways to measure attention. Both biases are valid (e.g. Eysenck, 1992) as measures of
involuntary attention or distractibility in which the subject's performance is indirectly
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affected in the stimulus content. In the case of PTSD, it seems that the experience of a
traumatic event might produce heightened distractibility in tasks unrelated to the
traumatic situation. The disruption would probably be greater if the distracting stimuli
were related to the traumatic event or were a reminder of the traumatic situation.
Therefore, PTSD patients should show an attentional bias, in which traumatic stimuli are
preferentially processed (i.e. more likely to distract the subject) in situations in which
trauma-related and neutral stimuli are presented concurrently.
As noted, the Modified Stroop task is commonly used as an experimental paradigm
which involves distraction (see Chapter 5). Stroop (1935) found that the speed of naming
the colours in which words were printed was greatly slowed when the words were
themselves colour names differing from their ink colour (e.g. the word "RED" printed in
green). This paradigm has been modified at the begining of the last decade to study the
effect of threatening stimuli in cognitive processing of emotional disorders. In the adult
PTSD literature, the general finding is that PTSD patients are slower to colour-name
trauma-related words relative to normal subjects, the argument being that these words are
more distracting.
In the case of the attentional probe dot task, a threatening and non-threatening stimulus
are presented concurrently, and the allocation of processing resources to the two stimuli
is assessed by examining reaction times to a neutral probe which immediately follows the
two words on the screen. Anxious patients generally show a selective attentional bias
favouring threat-related stimuli. For example, Macleod et al. (1986) presented negative
and neutral words pairs on a computer screen and asked subjects to detect the occurrence
of small dot probes that could appear in the location of either stimulus word following
termination of the display. Anxious patients were relatively faster to detect probes which
replaced threat words. Two experiments using the modified Stroop and dot probe tasks
with children with PTSD are described in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. The detailed
literature concerning those paradigms is reviewed in detail in the relevant chapters.
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3.3. Memory
3.3.1. Stages of Memory
Any system of memory for storing information needs to be able to encode the
information, to store the information, and finally to retrieve the same information. These
three stages are linked to each other, and it is difficult to establish any phenomenon as
entirely happening at a single stage; however, this classification of processing stages
seems to be useful in understanding memory systems.
3.3.1.1. Encoding
Encoding is the first stage of processing information, and involves learning and
memonsing. Immediate memory generally relies on encoding in terms of the
phonological or sound characteristics of the material. For example similar items in sound
(e.g. mad, map) are much less likely to be recalled correctly than dissimilar ones (e.g. pit,
day), because the system encodes the material in terms of sounds. There is no such effect
with similarity of meaning (e.g. large, big) (Baddeley, 1966). Different types of encoding
can be produced by instruction, manipulation, or combination of these two parameters
in experimental situations. Variation of encoding operations leads to differences in recall
or recognition.
3.3.1.2. Storage
Forgetting is defmed as a refelection of the loss of information or of lowered memory
performance following learning over time (Parkin, 1994; Baddeley, 1995). It can occur
due to decay of the information stored in memory over time, or by displacement when the
demands on that store exceed its capacity. Interference theory postulates that forgetting
results from contamination by other information stored either during prior learning
(proactive interference) or later learning (retroactive interference). Disruption of
memory will increase with greater amounts of prior or subsequent interfering material,




It focused attention and retrieval are conceived as serial processes which are both rate-
limited and capacity-limited. Regarding long-trem memory, retrieval acts as a memory
modifier such that retrieved information from long term memory is placed in working
memory where it can be further processed and placed again in storage (Siegel, 1993).
Retrieval acts in direct (i.e.recall, cued recall and recognition tasks) and indirect (i.e.
priming effects, word stem completion) forms. The encoding specificity principle
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973) emphasises that reproduction (retrieval) is successful only
if a cue directly matches the original stored information.
3.3.2. Classification of memory
3.3.2.1. Declarative Memory
Declarative memory (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Cohen,l984) refers to the conscious
recollection of facts and events that are usually called "memory" and "remembering" in
ordinary language. "Fact-and-event memory" refer to memory for words, scenes, faces,
and stories which can be assessed by ordinary tests of recall and recognition. Other
similar terms include "explicit memory" (Schacter, 1987, 1992, 1994), "configural
memory" (Rudy & Sutherland, 1992, 1994), and "relation memory" (Eichenbaum, 1992).
Declarative memory comprise the two subsystems originally defmed by Tulving (1972)
as "episodic" or "events" and "semantic" or "facts" memory. Episodic or event memory
refers to the system involved in the recollection of personal experiences and events or
episodes from the past, for example, remembering what you had for lunch, or what date
you were born. Semantic memory refers to knowledge of the world; for example,
knowing the name of the Iranian capital, or knowing the name of the present president
of the USA.
3.3.2.1.1. Episodic Memory
The episodic memory system is supposed to be the most recently evolved system that has
grown out of semantic memory through working memory (Tulving, 1991). It consists of
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different kinds of information such as spatial, temporal, and contextual bounding together
with the individual's awareness of personal experiences and is sensitive to depth of
processing (Tulving, 1991, 1993). Episodic memory is strongly affected by degree of
attention and organisation, which is important for setting up memory structures that are
accessible to retrieval. Baddeley (1994) proposed that the episodic learning mechanism
is capable of rapidly forming links between stimuli experienced at the same time such
that one experience evokes another one. In general a conscious recollection of a previous
event or a study episode is an essential feature of episodic memory.
3.3.2.1.2. Semantic Memory
Semantic memory produces the acquisition and retention of factual information about the
world in the widest sense. The knowledge and beliefs about the world that people reach,
possess, and use in both general or specific, concrete or abstract forms are critically
related to semantic memory.
Semantic memory is proposed as a source of the material needed for thought and
recollection, and it goes beyond what can be immediately perceived (Nilsson, 1993).
However, the utilisation of information in semantic memory does not require a conscious
recollection of the situation in which the information was acquired. The
neuropsychological location of episodic and semantic memory is not clear, but it seems
that the prefrontal-cortical areas are involved in episodic memory, while the medial-
temporal-lobe regions are implicated in the semantic memory system (Schacter &
Tulving, 1994).
33.2.1.3. Recall and Recognition
It has been suggested that recall and recognition are normally two different ways of
measuring declarative memory. In one way, recall and recognition are related to each
other functionally, thus studies with amnesic patients indicate similar impairments. On
the other hand, studies with normal subjects show that recognition is supported in part
by priming which is processed automatically (Jacoby, 1983); this issue is discussed in
more detail below. According to the second view, recall depends on explicit (declarative)
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memory, while recognition is related to explicit and implicit (nondeclarative) memory.
Recent fmdmgs do not support the idea that recall and recognition have close functional
link to each other and are similarly impaired in amnesia (Haist, Shimamura, & Squire,
1992). However it seems that recall and recognition are related functions of declarative
memory while their processes can also differ from each other in significant ways (Squire,
1994).
In a recall test, the subject is asked to produce past experience by remembering
information, either via free recall or cued recall. Free recall refers to retrieving past
information or events in terms of a wider and more sophisticated array of cognitive
strategies which can be represented in several ways --such as words, actions, images and
abstract propositions-- as a basis for reconstructing and producing the relevant stored
information (Miller, 1984). An example of free recall is asking subjects to write down as
many words as they can remember from a set of words which has previously been
presented to them. In this task the subjects should try to remember the words without any
external information to help them (Parkin, 1987). Children's performance on free recall
is poorer than adolescents' and adults'. This is not related to less accuracy in what
children recall, but because their recollections contain much less information (Fundudis,
1989). For example, Saywitz (1987) found that children under 10 years of age provided
less material at free recall than adolescents, while, when the opportunity was given to the
subjects to use recognition cues, the children were able to remember events not reported
in free recall.
In a cued recall task, subjects are presented with some information to help them
remember the target stimulus. For example, to try to remember those words starting with
WA.. which have been presented earlier (Parkin, 1987). In a fragment completion task
(a measure of implicit memory), the subjects should complete the fragment using the first
word which comes to mind and whose first letters are the same as the first letters of the
fragment.
In a recognition task, the subject is presented with a stimulus along with irrelevant
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information, and the subject has to decide which pieces of information have been
presented before (Eysenck & Keane, 1990).
One of the clearest facts about memory is that it is usually much easier to remember
previous events or experiences when memory is tested by recognition rather than by
recall (Eysenck & Keane, 1990). Many experiments have shown that performance is best
with recognition testing, followed by cued recall, and then recall (Parkin, 1987). Children
are also more successful with memory based on recognition than recall tasks (Fundudis,
1989).
33.2.2. Nondeclarative Memory
Nondeclarative memory refers to knowledge to which the individual has no conscious
access and describes a wide range of skill-based kinds of learning (motor skills,
perceptual skills, and cognitive skills) habit formation, simple classical conditioning
(including some kinds of emotional learning), priming (see below), and other knowledge
expressed through performance rather than recollection. A similar concept to declarative
memory is "implicit memory" which was proposed by Schacter (1987).
3.3.2.2.1. Priming
Priming refers to a technique developed to study how context influences performance.
In other words this term refers to the improved facility for finding or processing a
perceptual object on the basis of recent experience (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). Priming
as a technique can measure responses to a second stimulus (target) as a function of its
relation to a first stimulus (the prime). Hence the prime acts as a context for the target.
For example, if subjects are presented with the word crocodile,then they are more likely
to reply "crocodile" to the stem cr0-, than if they had not recently encountered the word.
The priming effect happens across a wide range of modalities, and generally depends on
the repetition of the physical features of the original stimulus; it seems that priming is
much less sensitive to semantic or conceptual aspects of the primed material (Tulving &
Schacter, 1990). A body of studies suggest that the visual-word-form system serves
priming effects on perceptual or implicit memory tasks such as stem or fragment
82
completion, where the subject provides the first word that comes to mind in response to
three letter stems or graphemic fragments and perceptual or word identification, where
subjects try to identify briefly presented words (Schacter, 1994).
3.3.2.2.2. Procedural Memory
Procedural memory refers to the acquisition of skills, and is an action system. It is
expressed in behaviour rather than in cognitive responses, for example riding a bicycle,
walking, and swimming which are perceptual motor actions, or skills of reading, and
problem solving which are related to cognitive action. Generally, it does not require
conscious recollection of a given situation when the response or behaviour was learned
(Nilsson, 1993). Skills include two types: continuous, and discontinuous. In the first
type, each component of the skill serves as a cue to the next, as in driving a car, while in
the second one, a series of different stimulus-response links are involved, as in typing.
Forgetting can occur with discontinus tasks, whereas continuous tasks seem to indicate
little or no forgetting (Baddeley, 1990). Neuropsychological studies suggest that motor-
skill learning, which is one form of procedural memory, depends on the integrity of the
basal ganglia (Butters et al., 1990). Tulving (1991) suggests that procedural memory is
the oldest and episodic memory is the newest system. It seems that procedural memory
is the most primitive system and the one to develop first in infants, while episodic
memory develops after two or three years and is demonstrated only in higher mammals.
3.3.2.3. Everyday Memory
It has been argued that there are differences between memory as measured in the
laboratory and memory as perceived and used in everyday life (e.g. Sunderland, Harris,
& Baddeley, 1983; Baddeley, 1995). As Baddeley (1995) argues, the laboratory provides
the simplification and experimental control that allows the precise testing of a hypothesis,
whereas more naturalistic studies are essential if we are to evaluate the generality of our
theories. Although traditional tests of memory give useful information to our questions
such as "how an individual compares with the general population", or "whether a
memory deficit is restricted to certain kinds of material", they fail to answer many of the
questions relating to everyday life memory (Wilson, Cockburn, Baddeley, & Hiorns,
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1989). Hence, some kinds of memory which happen in everyday life may be difficult to
assess in the laboratory. Prospective memory, which is defined as a capacity to remember
to do things in the future, is an example of this. Baddeley states that:
....When someone complains of a bad memory it is much more likely to be because of
prospective memory lapses than because of a problem in learning lists of nonsense
syllables or recalling complex geometric figures, and yet until quite recently psychology
had nothing to say on the topic (1955, pp. 19).
To assess everyday memory, Wilson et al. (1989) developed a test of everyday memory
that tried to cover a whole range of everyday memory lapses in scorable form. The
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT) assesses such factors as remembering a
name, learning a new route, recognising faces, orientation in time and place, and
prospective memory. It also incorporates the recall of a short story. It has proved to be
both sensitive and to correlate very highly with lapses of everyday memory, as measured
by many hours of observation of patients by therapists (Wilson et al., 1989). In a
subsequent follow-up study, it proved to be the best predictor of whether a patient would
or would not be capable of living independently (Wilson, 1991). However, while the
RBMT is an excellent predictor of everyday memory problems, it does not aim to provide
an analytic estimate of memory performance.
As already mentioned, the main aim of this thesis is to study attention and memory in
children and adolescents who suffer from PTSD. Memory is considered in two respects:
(a) memory bias, and (b) general memory performance. The Stroop and attentional probe
dot tasks were used to study attentional bias, while recall and recognition tasks were used
to assess memory bias. To study general memory performance in young patients with
PTSD on the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT) was examined.
3.3.3. Memory and Emotion
To study the relation between emotion and memory, investigators have used different
types of memory task such as explicit (recall and recognition) and implicit memory
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paradigms with individuals with emotional disorders. According to cognitive theories the
nature of the memory tasks are not the same. Explicit memory (recall and recognition)
tasks assess emotional information directly, so the processing of information is strategic.
While the mechanisim of implicit tasks is automatic and the emotional information is
assessed indirectly. Mathews (1993) states that:
"Evidence of strategic influences on the recall of emotional information does not, of
course, show that all selective encoding is strategic.....Evidence of emotional effects on
indirect tests would thus argue for the involvement of automatic processes" (Mathews,
1993 P. 496).
In the implicit memory task as noted above, subjects are required to complete word stems
or word fragments with whatever word first comes to mind. Subjects are more likely to
produce a word which they have encountered recently, although they do not recall having
seen it before. For example, an individual is asked to complete the letters st.. .with the
first word to come to his or her mind. So s/he might say "selection" because he or she has
read it recently rather than, for example "seldom". As already mentioned, in the explicit
(recall and recognition) task the subject is asked to remember the words that have been
presented previously. The detailed results of studies using explicit memory tests with
emotional disorders (anxiety, depression and PTSD) are reviewed in Chapter 7.
3.3.4. Theories of emotional disorders
In the last two decades a number of influential cognitive approaches were developed to
describe the relation between cognition and emotional disorders rather than normal
emotions. In contrast to approaches to the understanding of normal emotion, cognitive
theories of emotional disorders have usually focused on a specific disorders such as
depression or PTSD rather than covering a range of emotional disorders. In the following
section I will present two groups of emotional disorder theories. First, those theories
which focused mostly on depression and anxiety disorders such as the schemata theory
of Beck (1979, 1985), Bower's network model (1981, 1982), Lang's theory (1984, 1985),
and Williams et al.'s model (1988). These cognitive theories have had an important role
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in the development of other models of specific disorders, for example Foa's model of
PTSD was inspired by Lang's model. The second group of cognitive approaches attempt
to explain PTSD in a cognitive framework, among these is Horowitz' model (1979, 1980)
Creamer et al. (1992) theory, Foa et al.'s (1989) model, Brewin et al. (1995)'s dual-
representation theory, and Power, Daigleish's (1996) SPAARS approach.
3.3.4.1. Beck's Schema Theory
Beck and his colleagues (Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Beck & Freeman,
1990; Wright, Beck, Newman, & Liese, 1993) have suggested a cognitive model of
information processing to explain the relationship between cognition and emotion and
its implications for the emotional disorders. Originally, the cognitive therapy model was
developed by working on depression and then, extended to other types of disorders such
as anxiety, personality disorders and addiction. Beck's model was essentially based on
clinical observations and a few experimental research studies. This model consists of two
main components: cognitive structure (schema), and cognitive processing.
Cognitive structure (schema) is defmed as a structured group of concepts which
constitute the generic knowledge about events, scenarios, actions, or objects that has been
acquired from past experience (Eysenck, 1994). The first systematic schema theory was
developed by Bartlett (1932) who proposed the schema as a unity of knowledge stored
in long-term memory, which influences information (particularly memory) processing.
Cognitive structure (schema), has been used by a number of researchers such as Piaget
(1948) and Rapaport (1951) to explain the cognitive functions of mind (Beck, 1976).
Beck (1976, 1985) described the role of cognitive structure (schema) in information
processing as follows:
....The organization is composed of assemblies or constellations of structural elements-
namely, cognitive schema. The schema are the basic structural components of cognitive
constellation. These schema are further organized into cognitive constellation, which are
grouped into the subsystems......When specific schema or a constellation of schema is
activated, their content directly influences the content of person's perceptions,
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interpretations, associations, and memories at a given time (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg,
1985; PP. 54,55).
Regarding the function of schemata, Beck and Clark (1988) pointed out that the cognitive
structure or schemata guide the screening, encoding, organizing, storing and retrieving
of information. Information which is compatible with the existing schema is elaborated
and encoded, whereas incompatible or inconsistent information is forgotten. When a
person is confronted with a particular situation, a schema which is relevant to the
stimulus configuration will be activated. Individual differences in patterns of processing
reflect differences in the schema which are active in the cognitive system. For example,
Beck proposed that depressed patients' schema are "depressogenic" which are
characterised by the processing of information along negative dimensions of concerning
loss and failure, while anxious patients are characterised by "danger schema" which are
activated by the processing of information related to threat and danger.
Beck suggested that in addition to schema, there is a superordinate organizing principle
which plays an important role in organizing the concepts and rules regarding cognitive
functions and which he termed a "mode". Each mode includes various groups of rules
and concepts which are organized in terms of general themes. Regarding the relationship
between schema and modes, Beck Ct al. (1985) state that:
activation of the schema leads directly to consideration of the operation of a sector
of the cognitive organization the modes. Under ordinary circumstances, the cognitive set
varies in response to change in the nature of the stimulus situation. If the content persists
over diverse situations, the set is reflecting the bias of a superordinate organization
principle labelled the "mode". The mode is a subsystem of the cognitive organization and
is designed to consummate certain adaptational principles relevant to survival,
maintenance, breeding, self-enhancement, and so on (Beck, Emery & Greenberg; 1985,
p 59).
So, according to this point of view, we have different modes such as depressive,
87
narcissistic, hostility, fear or danger modes. The type of schema which is activated in the
specific situation may be detennined by a dominant mode that may be active at the time.
Domination of a certain mode could also conceptualize the various syndromes in
different disorders; for example, in depression, the self-constricting mode is hypervalent;
or in anxiety the vulnerability or danger mode is highly activated. It is assumed that the
activity of the modes is reflected in typical thinking characteristics of disorders due to the
biased selection and processing of the information. Such conceptual errors may occur by
misinterpretation, overgeneralisation, and exaggeration. According to Beck any biases
result from the activation of the schema related to the content of the mode and also from
deactivation of inconsistent schema.
The second main component of Beck's cognitive therapy is cognitive processing. When
the cognitive system is confronted with a situation or stimulus, an automatic information
processing occurs for selection, interpretation, and appraisal of the stimulus. As Beck and
Emery (1985) emphasised the major feature of disorders such as anxiety and depression
is the nature of cognitive processing, in other words the processing of specific
information to produce negative automatic thoughts. Beck (e.g. Kovacs & Beck, 1977)
proposed a "cognitive triad" in depression which is defined as negative attitudes towards
the self, toward the outside world, and toward the future. The cognitive structure of
depressed individuals leads them to assess themselves as deficient, inadequate, or
unworthy. Depressed patients interpret their worlds as presenting obstacles which cause
failure, deprivation, or disparagement. Regarding the future, depressed people's negative
cognitive patterns lead them to believe the current difficulties or suffering will continue
indefinitely and that there will never be an end to their frustration and deprivation.
Therefore, such schema essentially produce a pervasive hopeless attitude. According to
Beck, a distinguishing characteristic of the negative cognitive triad in depressed people
is that the negative evaluations are unrealistic, distorted and illogical ways of thinking
that do not correspond to reality.
According to Beck, the major similarities in information processing between anxious and
depressed patients is that in both groups, maladaptive schemata regularly distort the
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processes which are involved in the perception, storage and retrieval of information.
In terms of differences between anxiety and depression, Beck and Clark (1988) proposed
the content specific hypothesis. According to this hypothesis anxious persons have a
heightened sense of vulnerability, which is related to physical or psychological threat.
Anxious people's thoughts focus on negative events in the future, and their negative
appraisals about people and events tend to be rather specific. In contrast, depressed
persons are concerned primarily about loss, and their negative attitudes, as already noted,
with are concerned with themselves, the world and the future, while their negative
thoughts tend to be more pervasive and global than those of anxious patients.
In the case of PTSD, on the basis of Beck's model, it seems possible to speculate that
when a person is confronted with a trauma, all information related to the trauma will be
stored in the cognitive structure (schema) as a group of concepts. Later, when the
traumatised individual is confrontated with any stimulus which is related to the traumatic
situation, the traumatic schema which is relevant to the stimulus configuration will be
activated. A particular pattern of information processing in PTSD refers to "traumatic
schema" which are characterised by the processing of information related to the traumatic
event. As PTSD is a sub-type of anxiety disorders, the content specific hypothesis might
well apply. This would be cnosistent with PTSD patients' heightened sense of
hyperarousal and avoidance, which is related to the traumatic situation and with the fact
that PTSD patients' thoughts focus on avoidance from any cue-related to a traumatic
event in the future, and that their appraisals about people and events past traumatic
experiences.
In spite of many significant contributions of the cognitive therapy model, there are some
limitations. The basic concepts are not clearly defined and are inconsistently used. Beck
has suggested separate theoretical explanations which describe the cognitive systems of
anxiety and depression (Beck et al., 1979). As mentioned earlier, Beck et al., (1985) have
explained the similarities between the two models but several distinctions are also drawn
between the two disorders. As noted, depression is particularly characterised by Beck in
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terms of a cognitive triad: a negative view of the self, of the world and of the future;
whereas the cognitive style of anxiety is focused on the concept of danger schemata.
3.3.4.2. Bower's network model of emotion and cognition
Bower (1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982) explained the relationship between cognition and
emotion in a network model. According to this model, all information (concepts, events,
and emotions) in long-term memory (LTM) is stored as a number of "nodes" in a
network. This theory has proposed associative models of memory networks, using the
idea of a "proposition" as the basic unit of memory (Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Bower,
1973). The nodes are linked together, therefore they become associative structures
providing a network. Activation of the appropriate nodes in LTM leads to accessibility
of the information. When the nodes are stimulated or activated, such activation energy
is transmitted via the associative connections, to other related nodes. Verbal or
physiological symbols, via internal or external sources, can serve to activate the nodes.
The activation also is selective and spreads from one activated node into the network to
different degrees which depend on a number of factors including the proximity of the
nodes, the power of the initial activation, and the time of lapse since activation. For
example, related nodes are more likely to be activated than unrelated nodes. Bower
argued that each emotional event is represented by a specific node in the LTM network
which acts as a "focussing point" for all associated aspects of that emotion. Each
emotion node has power connections with those nodes containing information causally
linked to past occurrences of that particular mood state.
As noted above, the activation of each node will spread via the associative connections
particularly to those related to mood-congruent information. Bower postulated that a wide
range of cognitive operations (e.g., memory and attention) which require access to
information from LTM should be facilitated when the required information is congruent
with the current mood-state. Therefore, when a person is in an emotional state (e.g.,
anxious or with PTSD), the relevant emotional node is activated by any congruent
internal or external stimulus and activation then will spread to associated nodes. These
associated nodes will typically contain information which is congruent in mood with the
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experienced emotion. In the case of PTSD, all trauma-related concepts would become
activated when the person is confronted with an experienced traumatic situation or any
trauma-related cues. So, in the case of the current research, according to Bower's model
the basic prediction is that all tasks involving access to stored infonnation should
demonstrate mood-congruent effects due to the increased activation of mood-congruent
information.
According to Bower, the presence of mood congruent biases affects a wide range of
cognitive operations, i.e., any cognitive process which requires access to information
from LTM should be facilitated when the required information is congruent to the current
mood-state. This mood-congruity effect suggests that people attend to and learn more
about events that match their emotional state, while mood-state-dependent retention,
refers to the fact that people recall an event better if they somehow reinstate the original
emotion during recall, and the experience during learning (Bower, 1981). To explain the
mood congruity effect, Bower emphasized selective reminding and emotional intensity.
For example when one is sad, a sad incident in a story is more likely than a happy
incident to remind one of a similar incident in one's life and vice versa when one is happy
(selective reminding). The emotional intensity is that the strength of the mood congruity
effect is a function of the emotional intensity of the memory. Data reported (Bower,
1981) have shown that mood induction led to mood-state-dependent memory, and a wide
range of processes such as free association, social judgements, perceptual categorisation
were influenced by it.
To explain a constellation of problems such as those formed in PTSD in terms of this
model one would need to take a line similar to that of Foa (see below) and propose that
all information related to the traumatic event is stored as a number of "nodes" in a
network. All the traumatic nodes (reminders) are linked together, therefore they become
an associative structure in the network. Activation of the trauma-related nodes in long
term memory (LTM) leads to increased accessibility of other trauma-related information.
When those nodes which are related to the traumatic situation are activated by a traumatic
reminder, then such activation energy is transmitted, to other trauma-related nodes
91
(reexperiencing). Following this activation a series of PTSD symptoms such as avoiding
traumatic situations or reminders and hyperarousal will be demonstrated. Any kind of
reminder, verbal or physiological, internal or external, could activate the trauma-related
nodes. Processing of trauma-related stimuli in LTM would therefore be facilitated when
the required information is congruent to the traumatic event. For a fuller discussion of the
application of a version of network theory to PTSD, see the discussion of Foa's model
below.
Although Bower's network theory indicates clearly the relationship between cognition
and emotion, it seems to have a number of limitations: (a) As the theory predicts, each
mood state should be associated with a range of biases such as attentional, perceptual,
and memory. Williams et al. (1988), however, have suggested that anxiety is related to
attentional biases, while depression may be more related to memory biases and that the
results from research were not in agreement with the network theory prediction (see the
detailed research reviews in Chapters 5, 6, 7). Bower (1987) also reported that
experiments failed to support the network model regarding the predicted effects of mood
on perception or to replicate some of the original mood state dependent retrieval effects.
(b) In this model, the networks were originally designed to present the relations between
individual words, therefore they are not necessarily appropriate for representing the
structure of other forms of information such as events and actions (Dalgleish, 1996). (c)
Bower's model fails to distinguish between different emotions and the predictions which
the model generates must be taken as referring to all emotions in equal measure which
is essentially a point for empirical investigation and is related to (a) above. (d) Bower
offered very little discussion about the content of the emotional nodes and spread of
energy along the links between nodes.
In summary, Bower's model was developed from experimental research with normal
subjects and was concerned with the investigation of emotion and its impact on selective
perception, imagination, thinking, and particularly state-dependency effects in memory.
In contrast, the cognitive schema model of Beck (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1979; Beck et al.,
1985; see above) has been developed within the field of clinical psychology, and
92
examined patterns of thinking in emotionally disordered patients. As a consequence,
Beck's ideas are more concerned with the differences between the structures of the
cognitive systems normal healthy subjects and subjects with clinical disorders (such as
those related to anxiety and depression) than are the ideas of Bower.
3.3.4.3. The cognitive model of Williams Ct al. (1988)
Network theoiy and schema theory both suggest a general bias in cognitive information
processing of emotional disorders, but do not predict that different emotions may show
different effects. Williams Ct al. 's (1988) review of the experimental evidence revealed
that bias for mood-congruent stimuli is not shown by all mood-disordered people on
every paradigm. A body of studies found attentional biases in anxious subjects (e.g.
Mathews & MacLeod, 1985, 1986; MacLeod et al., 1986; see Chapters 5, & 6 for more
details). However, depressed individuals have not shown such attentional biases (e.g.
Gotlib & McCann, 1984). In contrast a considerable number of studies have found
memory biases in depressed individuals (e.g. Bradley & Mathews, 1983; see Chapter 7
for more details), whereas findings with anxious subjects were negative (e.g. Mogg et al.,
1987).
In order to try to account for this pattern of data, Williams Ct al. developed Graf and
Mandler's (1984) distinction between two kinds of information processing, "integration"
(priming) and "elaboration". As they state:
"Priming is automatic, occurring because the processing of a stimulus (e.g. a word)
involves automatic activation of the multiple components involved in the representation
of the stimulus. The result is a strengthening of the internal organization of the
representation, making the word more "accessible".....Elaboration, a more strategic
process, consists of activation of a representation in relation to other associated
representations to form new spread of activation to associates produced by this process
of elaboration is to make the word more "retrievable" because such elaboration generates
new and reinstates old paths for retrieving the word" (p. 170-171, 1988).
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Williams et a!. reviewed a considerable number of studies with clinical and sub-clinically
anxious and depressed subjects to study this distinction with different emotional
disorders. Regarding anxiety, Williams et al. suggest that integrative or automatic
priming processes are biased towards the detection of anxiety-relevant stimuli. In other
words, the biases due to early selective processing of emotional information in anxious
subjects must be automatic, and pre-attentive. At the pre-attentive stage of processing,
they propose, there is a decision mechanism for assessing the threat value of a stimulus.
Bias arises because priorities for subsequent processing are determined, and resources
are oriented towards or away from the source of the stimulus. Normal subjects tend to
orient processing resources away from the location of a cue which has been processed as
a threat whereas anxious subjects orient towards.
As noted above, elaboration, which is a strategic process, consists of the activation of the
representation in association with other related representations and the structure of new
pathways of activation between them, as well as the strengthening of existing pathways.
The elaboration process is encoded with the representation and is able to act as a
mnemonic pathway for recognition and recall, even in neutral mood. Therefore, due to
this process, the representation will be more retrievable. According to Williams et al.,
depressed patients process negative information in an elaborated or strategic way.
So the integration/priming process increases the probability that information will be
produced (or seen, or heard) when only some of its components are presented, while
elaborative processing is required to find the relations among a set of unrelated pieces of
information (words) and to relate the occurrence of a word to its context (Graf &
Mandler, 1984). The decision by Williams et at. to regard 'integration' and 'priming' as
synonymous processes is a potentially confusing one. Priming effects are generally
conceptualised as operating on more than one representation in memory (as evidenced
by the semantic priming effect, e.g., Neely, 1977) and as such priming shares some of the
features assigned by Graf& Mandler to the process of elaboration. In contrast, Graf&
Mandler make it explicit that the hypothesised process of integration that they describe
is representation specific.
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Regarding the lack of attentional bias effects in depression, Williams et al. propose that
attentional processing is prevented in depressed individuals by resources being allocated
away from the stimulus. They interpret studies of attentional biases in depression either
as direct evidence that depressed subjects did not show such biases (MacLeod et aL,
1986) or as evidence that anxiety levels were not considered for those studies in which
attentional biases have been reported for depression (e.g. Gotlib & McCann, 1984).
In contrast, Williams et al. (1988) in their explanations as to why memory bias is related
to depression but does not generalise to anxiety disorders, suggest that "in some types of
disturbance there may be strong tendencies to direct processing resources away from
valent (phobic) material at the elaboration stage. In this case, fewer mnemonic cues
would be stored with an item rendering it less retrievable " (p. 172). It seems that this
automatic processing is biased towards the detection of threat in anxiety, but that
subsequent elaborative processing is biased away from the processing of threat (Williams
et al., 1988).
There is evidence supporting Williams et al.'s view that some types of emotional
information processing depend on automatic (integrative) processing, while others
involve more strategic (controlled) operations. However, it has been argued by others
that both of these processes (automatic and strategic) also involved in most emotions
(Bargh&Tota, 1988).
However, Williams et aL's (1988) have proposed a model of the information processing
systems involved in emotional disorders which tries to offer a clear distinction between
cognitive features of the two main disorders i.e. anxiety and depression using two
different sets of tasks which assess automatic and strategic processing.
In the case of PTSD, findings of studies on attention and the only study on memory bias
with PTSD individuals were consistent with those of anxiety disorders (see Chapters 5,6,
and 7 for detailed reviews). Stroop data suggest that PTSD patients showed an
attentional bias towards trauma-related stimuli (e.g. Thrasher Ct al., 1994), while a strong
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memory bias (recall and recognition) was not found (Zeitlin & McNally, 1991). So the
cognitive pattern in PTSD is the same as for other anxious subjects. Integrative or
automatic processes are biased towards the detection of trauma-related cues. In other
words, the attentional bias in PTSD seems to reflect the early selective processing of
traumatic information which is automatic, and pre-attentive.
It is important to say that the Williams et al. model is well supported by experimental
evidence which makes it a useful contribution to cognitive psychology. It seems that
terms such as the concept of inhibition (a basic concept in understanding the processing
of emotional information) which has been used by this model theoretically and practically
are well defmed and described. However, it contains some unclear points about the
relationship between pre-attentive effects, automatic effects and attentional bias effects
and, therefore, has some limitations as a proper cognitive model of anxiety or depression.
3.3.4.4. Lang's Theory
Lang (1979, 1984, 1985) advanced another network approach to emotions. He maintained
that emotional information is a construction of memory which is coded in the form of
propositions and these propositions are organised into associative networks. The
activation of each element will spread through the other components of the network. Lang
suggested that the emotion memory structure contains three types of information as
follows:
(1)- Information about external stimuli and their occurrence context.
(2)- Information about physiological, behavioural and cognitive responses to the stimuli.
(3)- Information about the interpretation of the stimuli and response data.
Lang postulated that the information network of an emotion is a kind of schema, which,
when a series of propositions are accessed by external or internal stimuli or both will
process as a unit. The schema network also is associated with a production system which
includes two components, an information analysis program and a program for response
generation which are roughly equivalent in activation to the cognitive work of emotional
expression.
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Lang developed his theory focusing on the study of fear, particularly in pathological
manifestations in phobias. The network is the declarative knowledge and the procedural
knowledge (test program and motor plane) is in the production system. Phobic signs are
produced when a series of input concepts match those in the network. Lang suggested
that the probability of a phobic production is determined by the number of matching
propositions which are present in short-term memory. Network activation occurs when
the phobic person is confronted with a real phobic object which is assumed to be a
stimulus match. Lang has also suggested that most of the stimuli which are related to the
actual phobic object such as pictures, verbal descriptions and so on can elicit the phobic
emotion. The schema may be activated as a unit by media, instructional or sensory input,
which contains information (in the conceptual form) matched in the network.
Although Lang's theory was not intended to explain PTSD directly, it has influenced
cognitive theories of PTSD. For example, Foa et al. applied Lang's model in their
explanation of PTSD. This model is discussed in the following section which reviews
cognitive theories of PTSD.
33.5. Cognitive Models of PTSD
In the last decade, a number of cognitive approaches to PTSD have been developed with
considerable interpretive and predictive power. Most of them place emphasis on certain
theoretical assumptions which propose that traumatised individuals take to the traumatic
experience a set of pre-existing beliefs and models of the world. The traumatic
experience presents information which is incompatible with these pre-existing models
(Daigleish, 1996). It has been argued that the efforts to absorb the new information
within the existing models leads to a variety of symptoms which make up the post-
traumatic stress reaction. In this situation, successful processing will happen when the
new information is integrated into the existing models. Unsuccessful processing occurs
when the individual is unable to reconcile the new trauma-related information with the
current models of the world. This can lead to pathological post-traumatic reactions such
as PTSD.
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Although cognitive theories endeavour to explain both the empirical and clinical findings
relating to PTSD, most of them do not account for all the information which is related to
the disorder. In this view, cognitive theories of PTSD can be divided into two distinct
groups. First, social-cognitive theories (e.g. Horowitz) emphasise the impact of the
trauma on individuals' lives and the processing and integration of the traumatic
experience into pre-existing experiences of the world. This leads them to offer good
description of other reactions such as anger, anxiety, and depression, which often
accompany PTSD. Second, information processing theories (e.g. Foa et al., 1989) focus
more on trauma-related threat, and the representation and processing of the traumatic
information in the cognitive system. The following section describes these two groups
of cognitive theories.
3.3.5.1. Horowitz' Information Processing Model
Horowitz' (1973, 1976, 1979, 1980,1986, & 1990) model of PTSD has been one of the
most influential social-cognitive models. It places a major emphasis on information
processing and cognitive formulations of emotion, although it has been influenced by
classical psychodynamic psychology (e.g., Freud, 1920 see chapter two). According to
Horowitz, traumatic events involve heavy amounts of internal and external information.
Most of this information cannot be matched with an individual cognitive schema,
therefore it is not integrated into memory and leads to information overload. One of the
basic elements of Horowitz' theory is "a completion tendency" which is defined as the
psychological "need to match new information with inner models based on older
information, and the revision of both until they agree" (Horowitz, 1986; p. 92). Horowitz
has argued that there are different phases in this processing of the traumatic information
as follows:
(a) massive stress and crying out; at this stage the individual is confronted with a
traumatic event and displays an immediate response to the catastrophic event. It contains
a fast unconscious appraisal of the self and the event and leads the person to demonstrate
various emotions such as fear, sadness, anger and even physiological changes. These
reactions are always followed by an information overload stage in which the traumatic
98
thoughts, images, and memories cannot be matched with the current schemata.
(b) When an individual cannot process the information, various psychological
mechanisms come into play to reduce the emotional flooding and help the individual to
keep the traumatic information out of awareness and therefore, it remains as unprocessed
active information. In this situation, denial and numbing are employed as defensive
mechanisms to keep the traumatic information unconscious. Horowitz explained the
avoidance stage as a consequence of active inhibitory efforts. If conscious, these
mechanisms are called suppression and if unconscious, they are called repression
(Horowitz, 1990).
(c) Intrusive thoughts such as flashbacks, repetitive nightmares, and unwanted thoughts
can be produced at all levels of traumatic information processing as a result of the
completion tendency. The intrusive thinking may continue for days, weeks, and even
months. The thoughts intrude on consciousness until the traumatic information is
processed. In this situation, avoidance reactions are again recruited to reduce the
emotional flooding. According to Horowitz, the tension between the completion tendency
and defensive mechanisms causes individuals to fluctuate between intrusion and
avoidance until they integrate the traumatic information with their prior experiences.
(d) At the transition phase, there are recurrences of avoidance and intrusive phenomena,
and the oscillation will continue between the two sides to promote balance. During this
phase, periods of relaxation occur during which neither defensive manoeuvres nor
emotional flooding is distinguished.
(e) Integration, which is characterised by completing the processing of traumatic
information, is not actually a phase. The processing of information continues until the
new information integrates with preexisting information or becomes part of the cognitive
model and inner schema. Failure of such processing causes the activation of traumatic
information without complete integration, therefore leading to chronic post-traumatic
stress disorder.
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Generally, Horowitz has developed a comprehensive model of PTSD. His explanation
of the processing of the traumatic event which leads to the symptoms such as intrusion
and denial has considerable explanatory potential for PTSD phenomenology. This model
also suggests the ways in which normal reactions to trauma can become chronic or
pathological. However, Horowitz' explanation of PTSD has some limitations (Daigleish,
1996).
1-There is little discussion as to why similar traumatic events have different effects on
individuals. Indeed, this model does not pay attention to the nature of the existing schema
structure and the ways in which it fails to adapt to new information from the traumatic
experience.
2- Horowitz' formulation offers no attempt to account for epidemiological data regarding
the frequency of late onset, though this could be associated with a long period of denial
which later breaks down.
3- Although Horowitz presents an obvious description of the time course of PTSD, it
seems that individuals do not always experience an initial period of denial, or later
oscillations between denial and intrusion.
4- Although Horowitz highlights the importance of processes such as social support, there
is little explanation within the model of how such factors might operate.
In terms of attentional or memory biases, although Horowitz' model has emphasised the
information processing of trauma-related material in PTSD patients, the model does not
discuss the elements of the cognitive structures of information processing (e.g., attention
and memory) and is therefore agnostic with respect to the presence or absence of
processing biases.
3.3.5.2. Janoff-Bulman's cognitive-appraisal model
Janoff-Bulman (1985, 1992; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983) proposed a cognitive-
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appraisal model of PTSD. According to Janoff-Bulman the nature of the pre-existing
models of the world which the individual carries into the traumatic situation plays an
important role in developing PTSD. In this model there are three basic assumptions that
combine to create the person's estimation of their own invulnerability: (a) Personal
assumptions of invulnerability, (b) the world as meaningful and comprehensible, and (c)
seeing the self in a positive and worthy way. Janoff-Bulman suggests that these
assumptions provide a meaningful cognitive structure in the individual's life. The basic
concept which this model uses to explain PTSD is that of 'shattering'. When an
individual is confrounted with a traumatic situation the structure of the basic assumptions
will break down or shatter and consequently the individual will fall into a confusion of
intrusion, avoidance and hyperarousal. The victim is faced with the dilemma, of trying
to reconcile the trauma with prior assumptions that are no longer adequate but with a
negative experience that is too overhelming to ignore. Thus, the individual must revise
and rebulid his / her basic assumptions.
Although, Janoff-Bulman's model describes the ways in which trauma-related
information is incongruent with the usual models and assumptions about the world which
people possess, there is little attempt to explain how such models are represented or what
processes are involved when they are shattered (Dalgleish, 1996). It seems that this model
also has problems in the explanation of individuals who develop PTSD following a
trauma but who have a pre-morbid psychiatric history. Such individuals would most
likely be charactensed by assumptions of personal 'vulnerability' and views of the self
in a 'negative' light. Therfore, seems that such premorbid negative assumptions ought
not to be shattered by a traumatic experience.
Like Horowitz' model, although Janoff-Bulman's says a little about biases in individuals
who suffer from PTSD.
3.3.5.3. Foa's Fear Network Theory
Foa and her colleagues (Foa & Kozak, 1989; Foa & Riggs, 1993; Foa, Steketee &
Rothbaum, 1989; Foa, Zinbarg & Rothbaum, 1992) inspired by Lang's analysis of fear
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structures (e.g. Lang, 1985; see above) explain PTSD symptomatology in an information-
processing model. Foa et a!. maintain that fear networks consist of three types of
information: information about the traumatic stimulus, information about cognitive,
physiological and behavioural responses to the trauma and information about the
interpretation of the stimulus and response elements of the structures. The fear network
can be activated, they argue by triggering stimuli (such as reminders of the trauma) which
causes information to enter consciousness in the network (the intrusion symptoms of
PTSD). In this situation, the individual endeavours to avoid and suppress such activation
which leads to the avoidance symptoms. If the information in the fear network integrates
with the memory structures, then resolution regarding the trauma information will occur.
According to Foa et a!., modification of the fear network by activation on the one hand
and modification of the memory structures by availability of the information which is
incompatible with the fear network are two main factors in integration. Foa et al. have
attempted to explain the aetiology of PTSD by the lack of predictability and
controllability of traumatic events or unconditioned stimuli as Foa et a!. have called them.
Controllability is "the probability that a given response will prevent or terminate the
unconditioned stimulus (US)" (Foa et al., 1986, p. 222). Predictability is determined "in
terms of the probability of the onset or termination of the US given the presence or
absence of a given signal" (Foa et a!.; 1986, p. 222). Foa et al. have argued that the
unpredictability and uncontrollability of the traumatic event cause problems in its
integration with a cognitive model in which the world is controllable and predictable;
regarding this issue they have stated that:
what distinguishes PTSD from other anxiety disorders is that the traumatic event
was of monumental significance and violated formerly held basic concept of safety. That
is to say, stimuli and responses that previously signalled safety have now become
associated with danger. In this way, one's world becomes less predictable and
controllable" (Foa et al., 1989, p 166).
Additionally, some other factors such as the severity of the event, the intensity of the
responses (both physiological and behavioural), and the low threshold for activation of
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the fear structure cause disruption of the cognitive processes of attention and memory
during the traumatic event. Hence, this disruption contributes to the formation of a
disintegrated fear network which is difficult to integrate with premorbid cognitive
structures.
Foa Ct al. have focused more on understanding the processing of traumatic information
in a cognitive system than, for example, Horowitz. Controllability and predictability also
highlight the role of the individual's interpretations and attributions of the traumatic
event. Furthermore, according to Foa et aL, the availability of information incompatible
with the trauma provides a framework for understanding the role of social support in
processing the information and also of the treatment of PTSD. However there are a few
limitation in the network model. First, it seems that network theory could not present an
architecture powerfi.il enough to cope with the whole range of PTSD phenomenology.
Second, Foa et al. have paid less attention to describing why fear networks develop in
some individuals and not others.
Foa et al. make some predictions concerning information processing, particularly biases
in PTSD. Foa et al. Suggest that individuals with PTSD will selectively attend to and
remember trauma-related information. Consequently, the kind of biases used in the
present research should reveal biases for this information.
3.3.5.4. The Cognitive Processing theory of Creamer, Burgess, & Pattison (1992)
Creamer et al. (1992) have proposed a cognitive model of PTSD which is a combination
of Horowitz' formulation (1976, 1979 & 1990) and the network conceptualisation of Foa
et al. (1989). They suggested five stages for processing trauma-related information as
follows:
(a) Objective Exposure: The severity of exposure to trauma does not directly affect the
following adjustment but the influence of it will be mediated by processing variables.
(b) Network Formation: The traumatic memory network will be determined by traumatic
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experience including stimulus, response, and meaning propositions. The level of
exposure is important at this stage, because it predicts the level of intrusive thoughts.
(c) Intrusion: According to Creamer et al. "the intrusive memories can be conceptualized
as processing". Some of them are functional and are associated with decreased levels of
symptoms, while others are dysfunctional and result in high levels of arousal which
precedes avoidance and escape as coping strategies. Creamer et al. predicted that the high
levels of intrusion associated with high levels of symptoms are a predictor of successful
recovery whereas low levels of intrusion are associated with chronic pathology.
(d) Avoidance: When the memory network is activated, it will cause reexperiencing
phenomena. Network activation produces high levels of physiological and psychological
arousal. In this situation the individuals endeavour to escape by avoidance of reminders
and traumatic memories which will reduce the activation of the fear network. The amount
of avoidance and escape responses is associated with the degree of intrusive thoughts and
with the preexisting style of coping.
(e) Outcome: When traumatic events occur, then activation and modification of the
memory network cause the psychological symptoms. Recovery will result when the
symptom level is reduced by the mechanism of network resolution processing. Creamer
et al. suggested that the degree of intrusive thoughts can be used as an indicator of this
network resolution processing. According to their experimental findings, high levels of
intrusion are a predictor of successful recovery while, low levels of intrusion are a
predictor of poor recovery.
Creamer et al. attempted to support their model with experimental evidence. They carried
out a study with victims of an office block shooting in Australia. The results of this
longitudinal study supported their model and previous cognitive processing
conceptualizations of PTSD (Foa et al., 1986; Horowitz, 1986). In this model intrusion
as a powerful predictor of global severity, provides a cognitive processing model of
posttrauma reaction. The memory network contains not only the content of intrusive
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memories but also response information, notably in the affective and physiological
domains. So, the occurrence of intrusive thoughts indicates that the memory network has
been activated and the individual's appraisals of the event influence both initial and long-
term reactions. Thus, any interpretation of the events is likely to be accompaned by
processing biases and according to this model, PTSD patients should show biases
towards trauma-related information.
3.3.5.5. Brewin's Dual Representation Theory
Brewin, Dalgleish and Joseph (in press) attempted to apply Brewin's dual representation
theory (1989) to PTSD. According to this approach, there are two levels in memory in
which trauma-related information can be represented, Verbally Accessible Memories
(yAMs) and Situationally Accessible Memories (SAMs). VAM representations which
contain sensory, response and meaning information about the traumatic event are
characterised by their ability to be intentionally retrived and progressively edited by the
traumatised person. SAMs contain information which cannot be intentionally accessed
by the person and are accessed only when aspects of the original traumatic situation cue
their activation, for example, flashbacks would be considered to be the result of the
activation of SAM representations, while the person's ability to recount the trauma in a
therapeutic situation, would be a function of the YAM representation.
According to this approach dealing with trauma-related information advances on two
fronts by the processing at the yAM and SAM levels. Brewin et al. (In press) have
proposed that persons consciously integrate the verbally accessible information in YAM
with their preexisting beliefs and model of the world and negative affect is reduced by
a resultant sense of safety, control and appropriate adjustments about the self and the
world. The activation of information in SAM through exposure to traumatic cues is the
other part of emotional processing in PTSD. This emotional processing usually happen
automatically when the person starts to edit VAM information progressively. Brewin et
al. suggest that successful emotional processing of VAM and SAM information regarding
the trauma may not always be possible, therefore in some situations when the difference
between the trauma and prior assumptions is too great, emotional processing of trauma-
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related information will become chronic.
It seems that Brewin et al.'s model suffers from some limitations: (a) although Brewin
et al. by presenting a dual representations view try to move away from single level
theories (e.g. Foa et al.), the model does not explain some important factors such as how
higher-order models or assumptions about the world and the self are represented. (b) the
model is also not clear about how the integration of VAM information related to the
trauma with pre-existmg information occurs and finally, (c) this model does not make
clear the relation or integration of VAMs and SAMs in the cognitive system. However,
this model does make some predictions about biases for to traumatic event information
and proposes about individuals with PTSD should exhibit memory and attention biases
for trauma-related information.
33.6. Summary and conclusions
At the beginning of the chapter two types of cognitive functions were defined, attention
and memory. Attention refers to selection of stimuli for future processing (Eysenck,
1991), and exists in two forms, focused-attention and divided attention. Theoretically,
memory consists of three stages encoding, storage and retrieval which are important in
the interpretation of different biases (e.g. automatic or strategic processing of
information) and in the later chapters this is discussed in more detail. Long term memory
is of two sorts, (a) declarative memory to which an individual has conscious access and
the contents of which can be stated directly either verbally or by some other means; this
includes semantic memory (general knowledge) and episodic memory (personal
knowledge). Recall and recognition are two ways to assess declarative memory. (b) non-
declarative memory is knowledge to which the individual has no conscious access and
can only be demonstrated indirectly through some form of action such as skill priming.
Everyday memory which is different in nature from long term memory was also
described.
The second part of the chapter reviewed the various cognitive theories of emotional
disorder. Four cognitive theories of emotional disorder were considered: Beck's (Beck
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& Emery, 1979; Beck et a!., 1985); Bower's (e.g. 1981); Williams et al's. (1988); and
Langs' (e.g. 1985). The models of Beck and of Bower, although developed independently,
make similar predictions about the effects of anxiety on the processing of emotional
information. Both of them suggest that all cognitive processes which deal with threat--
related information will show biases in favour of that information in anxious subjects.
Alternatively, the model of Williams et al. argues for a dissociation between attentional
processes and memory processes and proposes that subjects with anxiety states will show
attentional biases towards threat-related information but no corresponding memory bias.
According to Williams et al.'s model, PTSD patients should show attentional biases
towards trauma-related material, while they should exhibit no memory biases.
Finally, the last part of this chapter considered specific cognitive models of PTSD,
Horowitz (1979), Foa et al's. (1985), Creamer et al's. (1992), and Brewin et al's. (1995).
All of these theories share certain core theoretical assumptions. They suggest that
individuals with PTSD bring a set of pre-existing experiences to the traumatic event.
These two sets of information are incompatible with each other, and the attempt to
assimilate the new information with existing information leads to various phenomena
which characterise the post-traumatic reactions. If the individual is able to integrate the
new information into the existing representations, then successful processing will occur,
lack of ability in integration of the new information into the existing information leads
to pathological post-traumatic reactions such as PTSD. It seems that according to most
of these models, PTSD patients should perform on cognitive tasks (e.g. the Stroop) in a
different way from normal controls; thus is, they will show a bias towards trauma-related
information at least on attention tasks and perhaps on memory biases.
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CHAPTER 4
The Development of a Corpus of Emotional Words
Produced by Children and Adolescents.
4.1. Introduction
According to some theorists including Beck and Emery (1985), Beck and Clark (1988),
Bower (1981, 1987), Williams et al., (1988), there is a strong relationship between
cognition and emotion (see Chapter 3 for a review of the theories). Recently a number
of researchers (see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; for a review) have tried to study this
relationship using various experimental paradigms. They have studied cognitive biases
in memory, attention, and interpretation in emotional disorders such as anxiety and
depression (see Chapters 5 to 8 for a review of the literature). In these paradigms, words
with different emotional content (for example, threat, sad, happy, and neutral) are used
as stimuli. The frequency, length, emotionality, and self-relevance of the words are four
factors which influence subjects' responses to such tasks and this, therefore, suggests that
the words used in the tasks should be matched on these dimensions. To develop
experimental tasks for adults, words with different emotional content are chosen from
available sources and used as a stimuli. There are no published sources containing the
frequency of usage of emotional words by children and adolescents. The purpose of this
study therefore, is to develop a pooi of emotional words collected from children and
adolescents. This study was performed in collaboration with two other Ph.D students.
While there are studies of emotional words produced by adults (for example John, 1988;
Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Goozen & Frijda, 1993), only one study has been
published on children. Whissell and Nicholson (1991) studied children's production of
synonyms for seven key emotions: happy, sad, afraid, mad, comfortable, proud, and
guilty. They interviewed 74 children from Kindergarten, Grades 4, and 8 (aged 5, 9, and
13) individually and asked them if they knew any other word that meant the same feeling
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as "-------". If they gave a response, subjects were prompted with the same question to a
maximum of five prompts or until they failed to give an answer. Results from their study
have shown that children produced more synonyms in Grades 4 and 8 than in
Kindergarten, and more children from Kindergarten were unable to produce synonyms
than from the higher Grades. A significant emotion effect was discovered for the total
number of synonyms and the total of unique synonyms. For these variables, the words
'proud' and 'guilty' were associated with the lowest number of synonyms, while the words
'happy' and 'sad' were associated with the highest. At the kindergarten level only, boys
produced more synonyms than girls. There was no significant improvement in task
performance between Grades 4 and 8, although children's general vocabulaiy is still
increasing at this time.
4.2. Method
4.2.1. Subjects
Two hundred and twenty one children including 109 students from two primary schools
(47 boys and 62 girls; mean age 10.1 years, SD = 0.65 ) and 112 students from four
secondary schools (44 boys and 68 girls; mean age 14.29 years, SD = 1.4) in London,
participated in this study in 1993 and 1994, as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Number of subjects in primary and secondary schools, means of age in
years and standard deviations (SD).
School	 Primary _____ _____Secondary 	 ______ Total
Sex	 Girl Boy Total Girl Boy Total Girl 	 Boy Total
Number 62
	
47	 109	 68	 44	 112	 130	 91	 221
%	 56.9	 43.1	 100.0	 60.7	 39.3	 100.0	 58.8	 41.2	 100.0
Age(y.) 10.10 10.07	 10.10	 13.98 14.75 14.29	 12.50	 14.52 12.23
S.D.	 0.62	 0.69	 0.65	 1.30	 1.44	 1.40	 2.18	 2.60	 2.36
4.2.2. Measures
There are different methods of assessing emotional word usage in children; for example:
collecting emotional words from books which have been written for children by adults;
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extracting words from children's own writing; using pictures to represent different
emotional states and asking children to write in a single word the emotional states
represented; collecting the emotional words used in clinical tests for children such as
depression or anxiety scales; and, choosing words from related adult research and then
asking children whether or not the words have a similar meaning for them.
All these methods have disadvantages. Words which are written by adults for children
may not have the same meaning and importance for children. Children's own writings and
words produced by children of emotional states represented by different pictures do not
provide enough emotional words, and problems of distinguishing and categorising the
collected words still remain. It seems that the most appropriate way is to ask children to
imagine examples of different emotional states such as happiness, sadness, and then
write down as many emotional words which come to their minds in a limited time.
A questionnaire was therefore developed including 10 questions focusing on three
emotion-like states (happiness, sadness, & threatened), two types of self-descriptive
adjectives (çositive & negative), and two neutral categories (semantically related &
semantically unrelated). In order to prompt children to produce more words for each
emotional state, two types of questions were asked. This means for a state such as
happiness, one of the questions asked subjects to write single words to describe happy
feelings and another asked them to write single words for things which can make children
happy.The questionnaire comprised eleven pages (A4 Form). The first page contained
instructions, as follows:
"Dear student:
We are interested in what words boys and girls use to describe how they feel
in different situations.
We would like you to answer the following questions. Please note that none of
the questions have right or wrong answers. You should write down all of the
words related to each question immediately they come into your mind.
Thank you very much."
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One question was written at the top of each of the remaining ten pages in bold form.
Below each question, there were 20 spaces numbered from 1 to 20 in which subjects
could write down responses. The subjects were given up to 5 minutes per page.
4.2.3. Pilot studies
Two pilot studies were conducted with 40 primary school pupils. The pilot studies
indicated that young children had difficulty understanding the meaning of some of the
original words such as "THREATENTNG" used in the questionnaire. Such words were
changed to easier words such as "SCARY". The questionnaire comprised three types of
questions: negative, positive and neutral. Responding to negative questions made children
tired and the negative and positive questions were therefore alternated. The two neutral
questions were put first and last. Both of these questions are easy and therefore starting
the questionnaire with one of them should reinforce children to answer the rest of the
questions (Appendix 4.1 shows the questions).
4.2.4. Procedure
Class teachers, in the presence of two of the investigators, read aloud the test instructions
while the students were looking at the first page. Students then had the opportunity to ask
questions which were answered by the investigators. The teacher then read aloud the first
question and asked the subjects to write down their responses in 5 minutes. The other
questions were administered in the same way. The test was administrated in two parts
with a 10 minute break between the 5th and 6th questions.
4.2.5. Modification of collected words
Having collected the data and entered them into a computer, some modifications were
made to the raw data as follows:
1- All Plural words were written in singular form (e.g. dogs changed to dog).
2- One form was chosen to represent words which also appeared in abbreviated form (e.g.
T.V. and television).
3- The gerund words and their verbs (e.g. play and playing) were written in verb form,
provided that the meaning of both words did not differ (cf. beat and beating).
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4- Where possible, the phrases or sentences written by subjects were changed to a single
word, otherwise they were omitted.
5- Adjectives with different suffixes (e.g. "ing", "ful", "ed" etc.) were written in a single
form, provided that their meaning was not changed.
6- All the words which occurred only once were omitted.
4.3. Results
Subjects produced about 21,000 words in total across the different groups of words. On
average, each subject produced 96.78 different words (SIY34.68). The numbers of words
produced in the different categories are presented in Table 4.2.
Subjects produced more words in the categories: "semantically related words(Animals)",
"semantically unrelated words" and "happy things" than in other categories. They also
produced fewer words in the categories "scary feelings", "sad things" and "negative self-
descriptive adjectives" (see Figure 4.1).
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Table 4.2 Means and standard Deviations (S.Ds) of the numbers of words produced by




Sex	 Girl	 Boy	 Total Girl	 Boy	 Total	 Girl	 Boy	 Total
N	 62	 47	 109	 68	 44	 112	 130	 91	 221
Neutral	 14.87 13.28 14.18 15.85	 14.27 15.23	 15.38	 13.79 14.71
S. D.	 5.98	 5.64	 5.87	 4.91	 6.44	 5.59	 5.45	 6.03	 5.74
Animals	 16.26 14.70 15.59 17.28	 15.55 16.60	 16.79	 15.11 16.10
S. D.	 4.14	 5.03	 4.59	 3.40	 5.82	 4.56	 3.79	 5.42	 4.59
Positive (adj)	 8.39	 7.15	 7.85	 9.53	 6.45	 8.32	 8.98	 6.81	 8.09
S.D.	 4.43	 3.38	 4.04	 5.11	 3.23	 4.70	 4.81	 3.31	 4.38
Negative (adj)
	
7.24	 6.53	 6.94	 9.37	 6.20	 8.13	 8.35	 6.37	 7.54
S. D.	 3.30	 3.46	 3.38	 5.84	 3.90	 5.37	 4.90	 3.66	 4.53
Happy feelings 8.18	 7.06	 7.70	 7.47	 7.36	 7.43	 7.81	 7.21	 7.56
S. D.	 3.94	 2.75	 3.51	 5.55	 3.84	 4.93	 4.85	 3.31	 4.28
Happythings	 12.52 10.53 11.66 14.06 	 9.00	 12.07	 13.32	 9.79	 11.87
S. D.	 5.23	 5.20	 5.28	 4.75	 4.61	 5.29	 5.03	 4.96	 5.28
Sadfeelings	 6.66	 6.47	 6.58	 11.09	 5.25	 8.79	 8.98	 5.88	 7.70
S. D.	 3.42	 3.63	 3.49	 5.83	 2.62	 5.60	 5.30	 3.22	 4.80
Sad things	 6.79	 5.30	 6.15	 8.75	 7.82	 8.38	 7.82	 6.52	 7.28
S. D.	 3.78	 3.06	 3.55	 5.88	 4.90	 5.51	 5.07	 4.23	 4.77
Scary feelings	 6.31	 5.57	 5.99	 7.32	 5.95	 6.79	 6.84	 5.76	 6.39
S. D.	 3.52	 3.78	 3.64	 5.95	 4.01	 5.30	 4.95	 3.87	 4.56
Scarythings	 7.85	 7.89	 7.87	 13.85	 6.95	 11.14	 10.99	 7.44	 9.53
S. D.	 4.43	 4.60	 4.49	 5.46	 4.40	 6.08	 5.81	 4.51	 5.59
Total number	 95.06 84.49 90.50 114.57 84.82 102.88 105.27 84.65 96.78




















Figure 4.1 :The distribution of words produced by subjects in different categories
-S
Types of words
In a School (2) x Sex (2) x Word Type (10) analysis of variance with repeated measures
on the last factor, the effects of School, [F(1, 217) = 4.97, p <0.05]; Sex, [F(l, 217) =
20.56, p < 0.001]; and Word Type, [F(9, 1953) = 199.37, p < 0.001]; were significant as
were the interactions of School x Sex, [F(1, 217) = 4.65, p <0.05]; School x Word Type,
{F(9, 1953) = 3.57, p < 0.001]; Sex x Word Type, [F(9, 1953) = 4.44, p <0.001]; School
x Sex x Word Type, [F(9, 1953) = 7.72, p <0.0011. These results are deconstructed as
follows:
4.3.1. School Effect (Primary Vs Secondary)
Subjects from secondary schools produced significantly more words (M = 102.88, SD =
38.48) than subjects from primaiy schools (M = 90.50 SD = 29.15). They also produced
significantly different numbers of words in each specific category. In order to clarify the
differences between the two groups in each category of words a series of T-tests was






















in 4 categories: negative self-descriptive adjectives [t (188) = 1.98, p < 0.05], sad feelings
[t(187) = 3.54, p <0.01], sad things [t(190) = 3.59, p < 0.001], and scary things [t(204)
= 4.56, p < 0.00 1). Differences between the two groups on producing words in other
categories: semantically related neutral words (animals), semantically unrelated neutral
words, positive self-descriptive adjectives, happy feelings , happy things, and scary
feelings were not significant (see Figure 4.2) (see results in Appendix 4.2).
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In order to examine in more detail the effect of age on the production of words, subjects
were divided into three groups: 11 years old and younger (M = 10.05, SD = 0.62); older
than 11 yearsandyoungerthan 14(M 12.67,SD0.94),and l4andolder(M 15.16,
SD = 0.90).
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In an Age Group (3) x Sex (2) x Word Type (10) analysis of variance with repeated
measures on the last factor, the effect of Age Group, [F(2, 215) = 7.58, p <0.01]; Sex,
[F(1, 215) = 24.75, p <0.001]; and Word Type, [F(9, 1935) = 173.11, p <0.001] were
significant as were the following interactions: Age Group x Sex, [F(2, 215) = 6.38, p <
0.05]; Age Group x Word Type, [F(18, 1935) = 2.31, p <0.001]; Sex x Word Type, [F(9,
1935) = 6.51, p <0.001]; Age Group x Sex x Word Type, [F(18, 1935) = 4.42, p <
0.001].
A one way analysis of variance and post hoc multiple comparisons (Student-Newman-
Keuls with P <0.05) were used to clarify these differences between the three groups.
Results showed that the three groups were significantly different [F(2, 220) = 8.02, P <
0.00 1], with older group produced significantly more words in total (M = 110.15, SD =
41.17) than the younger group (M = 89.99, DS = 28.97), and the middle group (M =
92.20, SD = 30.78) but the difference between the last two groups was not significant.
The groups were also significantly different in the number of words produced in 6
categories: negative self-descriptive adjectives [F(2, 220) = 5.44, p < 0.01]; and sad
feelings [F(2, 220) = 8.99, p < 0.001] in both of which the older group produced
significantly more words than the other two groups; sad things [F(2, 220) = 8.40, p <
0.001], semantically unrelated neutral words [F(2, 220) = 8.99, p <0.0011, and scary
feelings [F(2, 220) = 2.97, p <0.05] in which the older group produced significantly more
words than the younger group; and, finally, scaiy things [F(2, 220) = 14.10, p <0.001]
in which the older group produced significantly more words than the two other groups
and the middle group more than the younger group. The number of words produced by
the three groups was not significantly different in the 4 remaining categories:
semantically related neutral words (animals); positive self-descriptive adjectives; happy
feelings; and happy things. The mean numbers of words in the different categories




























In total, girls produced significantly more words than boys (M = 105.26, SD = 35.69 for
girls & M = 84.64, SD =29.32 for boys). Results of T-tests showed that there was no
significant differences between 2 groups on age (M = 12.15, SD = 2.60 for girls & M =
12.34, SD = 2.60 for boys) so it seems that this is a genuine effect of sex.
In order to clarilv the differences between boys and girls, more specifically for different
categories of words, a series of T-Tests was used. Results showed that girls produced
significantly more words in 8 categories of words: semantically related neutral words
(animals) [t (150) = 2.56, p < 0.05]; semantically unrelated neutral words [t(2 19) = 2.09,
p <0.05]; negative self-descriptive adjectives [t(218) = 3.44, P < 0.01]; positive self-
descriptive adjectives [t (219) = 3.98, p <0.001]; happy things [t(2 19) = 5.17, p <0.001];
sad feelings [t (215) = 5.39, P <0.001]; sad things [t(212) = 2.07, P <0.05]; scary things
















feelings and scary feelings (see Appendix 4.3). The mean numbers of words in different
categories produced by girls and boys are shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4:Mean numbers of words in different categories produced by girls and boys.
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Types of words
In order to examine the effect of sex on word production in primary and secondary school
students separately, two repeated measures analyses of variance were carried out.
First, for the primary school students: In a Sex (2) x Word Type (10) analysis of variance
with repeated measures on the last factor, the effect of Word Type was significant [F(9,
963) = 118.73, p < 0.001]. A trend was found for the effect of Sex [F(1, 107) = 3.60, p
= 0.06]; however, the interaction of Sex x Word Type was not significant [F(9, 963) =
1.05, ns].
Second, for the secondary school students: In a Sex (2) x Word Type (10) analysis of
variance with repeated measures on the last factor, the mean effects of Sex [F( 1, 110) =
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18.50, p <0.0011, and Word Type [F(9, 990) = 88.33, p < 0.001]; as well as the
interaction of Sex x Word Type [F(9, 990) = 10.01, p < 0.001] were significant. These
analyses showed that the effect of Sex on word production was only significant for the
secondary school students.
In order to clarify the differences between boys and girls on different categories of words
in the secondaiy school students, a series oft-tests was carried out. Results showed that
girls produced significantly more words in 5 categories: negative self-descriptive
adjectives [t(1 10) = 3.44, P <0.01]; positive self-descriptive adjectives [t (110) = 3.90,
P <0.001]; happy things [t (94) = 5.60, P <0.001]; sad feelings [t(100) = 7.22, P <
0.001]; scaiy things [t (105) = 7.36, P <0.001]. A trend was found for "semantically
related neutral words (animals) [t(62) = 1.79, P <0.01]. The mean numbers of words in
the different categories produced by girls and boys are shown in Figure 4.4. The summary
of findings is presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 The summary of findings
Type of word	 School	 Age	 Sex in the S. Sc.
Neutral (animal)	 Ns.	 Ns.	 G > B T.
Neutral	 Ns.	 O>Y'	 Ns.
Positive adjectives Ns.	 Ns.	 G > B **
Negative adjectives S > P *	 0> M , 0 > Y *	 G > B **
Happy feelings	 Ns.	 Ns.	 Ns.
Happy things	 Ns.	 Ns.	 G > B **
Sadfeelings	 S>P	 0>M*,0>Y*	 G>B**
Sadthings	 S>P	 0>Y'	 Ns.
Scaiy feelings	 Ns.	 0> Y *	 Ns.
Scarythings	 S>P	 O>M>Y*	 G>B**
Total	 S>P*	 0>M*,0>Y* G>B**




In the present study children were asked to generate emotional and non-emotional words
to 10 probe questions. Children were able to respond to the task at the primary school
level; however, their ability to produce words improved between primary and secondary
school. Children were able to categorise different emotions (feelings) and they also were
able to differentiate the feelings from the things which may cause these feelings. The
differences between primary and secondary school children in the generation of negative
emotional words: sad feelings; sad things; scary things; and negative adjectives were
significant, but the differences were not significant on the categories of the positive
emotional words: happy things; happy feelings; and positive adjectives. This reveals that
the time between primary and secondary school seems important for the expansion and
development of a negative emotional word vocabulary but not a positive.
Secondary school girls produced significantly more words than boys. This could be due
to a number of factors such as differential effects of education, the girls being more
motivated; girls having more compliance with the teacher and experimenters, girls having
stronger verbal abilities, or an interaction of one or more of these factors.
The main purpose of the study was to generate a corpus of emotional words used by
children for use in experimental investigations. The corpus should then permit more
rigorous investigation of cognition and emotion relations in children by allowing the
investigator(s) to balance materials for frequency of usage by children rather than by
merely applying adult-based frequency tables. Appendix 4.6 show the 25 most frequently
generated words by children and adolescents.
4.5. Development of a list of a list of PTSD words
To develop a suitable pool of PTSD words related to traumas, a pre-research
questionnaire on all three tasks (Stroop, Recall and Recognition) was undertaken. To
do this, 2 different lists of words related to road traffic and personal violence accidents
(in total 25 questionnaires) were given to psychologists and psychiatrists. These were all
experts in young people's problems (children and adolescents) and were working in the
Children's Department of the Maudsley Hospital and the Psychology Department of the
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Institute of Psychiatry. They were asked to rate the words, in the order of their severity
as follows:
Would you please look over the following list of words. The words are related to
Personal Violence Trauma (or Road Traffic Accidents) for young people (Age 10 to
17). Please rate each word in terms of how upsetting you find it.
Please use the following rating scale:
0= Not at all upsetting
1 = Mildly upsetting
2= Moderately upsetting
3 Highly upsetting
Please tick the most appropriate box.
Note 1- Do you think the young people (Age 10 to 17) can understand the meaning
of the words? If there is any word that they cannot understand, please indicate.
Note 2- If you know any other words related to Personal Violence Trauma, please
add at the end of the list.
Thank you very much for




THE PERFORMANCE OF CHILDREN WITH PTSD ON A
COLOUR NAMING TASK (THE MODIFIED STROOP
PARADIGM)
5.1. Introduction
There are two broad ways to study the relationship between emotion and cognition. One
is focused on structured interview and questionnaires; for example, Hibbert (1984) found
that panic patients worried about bodily injury while generalised anxiety patients worried
about personal inadequacy. A second method uses paradigms from cognitive psychology
(Wililiams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). These methods are not restricted to
conscious cognition and include studies of information processing (see Chapter 3 for a
detailed discussion).
In the last decade, much research has investigated cognitive aspects of emotional
disorders such as anxiety and depression. Information processing concepts have been
suggested as a basic framework for understanding disorders including PTSD (Beck &
Emery, 1985; Foa et a!., 1989). Long term disorders create cognitive structures (fear
structures) which are activated during emotional arousal (Williams, Watts, MacLeod &
Mathews, 1988). Patients with anxiety disorders are thought to develop fear structures
and presentation of information which is represented in a fear structure is thought to
activate it and consequently to evoke fear responses (Lang, 1977). Investigators have
used various experimental paradigms such as the Stroop colour naming task, an
attentional probe dot and various memory tasks to study how different people process
emotional information.
5.2. What is the Stroop task?
The foundation of Stroop's research is evident about 50 years before Stroop. McKeen
Cattell (1886) found that subjects can read actual words aloud faster than when they are
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asked to provide words corresponding to colours. For example saying "red" to a patch
of colour was slower than saying "red" to the word red (MacLeod, 1991). Cattell
concluded that in the word case, the association between the idea and name has become
an automatic process while in the case of naming colours and pictures, the subject must
choose the name by a voluntary effort (Cattell, 1886). John Ridley Stroop (1935) chose
this idea to investigate as a subject for his doctoral dissertation in experimental
psychology.
Stroop (1935) suggested that words and colours in a colour naming task might produce
interference which would provide a way to study certain automatic cognitive processes.
This task consists of two dimensions: The word and a physical attribute such as colour,
form etc. In the standard Stroop (1935) task, the colour of the ink prints the name of a
colour. The important variable is the degree of congruence between word and ink colour.
In the congruent condition both dimensions match while in the incongruent condition
they do not. Subjects should attend to one dimension while ignoring the other one.
Reaction time to the task is the main measure to compare these two different groups.
In the Stroop task, subjects are required to respond to one aspect of stimuli which vary
in two dimensions, and to ignore the other. In the standard version of the task, subjects
are shown words written in different colour inks, as noted above. In the situation of
reading the word, subjects are affected by ignoring the colour of the ink. When the task
is to name the ink colour, subjects are influenced by the word form. If the word conflicts
with the ink colour (e.g., GREEN in red ink), the subjects show a longer latency to
respond (i.e., say "red") than for control stimuli (e.g., a row of Xs printed in red ink) and
they are also faster if the word agrees with the ink colour (e.g., RED in red ink). Data
show that subjects are slower overall at colour naming than at word reading, suggesting
that colour naming is a less practiced task. The Stroop effect demonstrates a basic aspect
of attention in which people ignore some features of the environment, but not others.
The main question is how can this phenomenon be explained? The simplest interpretation
for the Stroop effect is that the difference between colour naming and word reading is
speed of processing. Subjects are customarily faster at reading words than naming
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colours. Due to this fact it is possible that the words are processed more rapidly than
colour information. Therefore, if the word coincides with the colour, the subject will be
facilitated in the colour naming response, in contrast, if the word conflicts with the colour
there will be a longer response time or interference for colour-naming, but because colour
information arrives at the response stage after the word information, it should have no
affect on the word reading process.
This type of account draws on the distinction between automatic and controlled processes
(Cattell, 1886; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Automatic processes are fast, do not require
attention for their execution and occur compulsorily. In contrast, controlled processes
require attention and occur voluntarily. From this point of view, investigators have used
the Stroop task for assessing automatic processing. Regarding this MacLeod states:
"The automaticity account, also due to Cattell, emphasizes the much greater practice
accrued by word reading relative to ink colour naming. This extensive practice has made
reading automatic: it is beyond volitional control and does not require attention. In
contrast, ink colour naming is a controlled process requiring attention. An automatic
process will interfere with a nonautomatic one, but not vice versa, producing
asymmetrical interference" (1994, pp. 358).
More recently, the Stroop task has been modified to include threat, positive and neutral
words in place of colour words for use in studies of subjects with emotional disorders
(Mathews & MacLeod; 1985). In this paradigm, words related to a specific category such
as threat are printed in a single card containing up to 100 words. Computerised Stroop
tasks have also been developed (McNally, 1990) to study information processing in
subjects who suffer from emotional disorders such as PTSD, panic and OCD. The
computerised version allows presentation of the words singly and randomly, while in the
card version each word group is usually presented on the same page, therefore there is
likely to be a contamination from the cumulative effect of words upon attention or
emotional reaction in the card versions. Interference happens because, despite the
subject's effort to focus on the colour in which the word is printed, the emotional
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significance of the word captures the attention of the subjects and produces delays in
colour naming, in contrast to the words that are not emotionally significant for the
subject. The Stroop colour naming task is considered to be a useful measure of attention
(MacLeod, 1991). In the next part I review the empirical findings using the modified
Stroop paradigm with emotional disorders.
5.3. Stroop Interference in Adults with Anxiety Disorders
The modified Stroop paradigm has been widely used by investigators to test attentional
bias in anxiety disorders. The results have demonstrated increased response latencies to
fear-relevant information. These effects are found in generalised anxiety disorder (GAD)
(e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 1986) simple phobia (e.g. Watts et al.,1986), panic disorder
(Ehiers et a!., 1988; McNally et a!., 1994), social phobia (Hope et a!., in press), OCD
(McCarthy et al., 1990) and PTSD (e.g. Kaspi & McNally, 1991; Cassiday et a!., 1992;
Thrasher Ct al., 1994).
5.3.1. The Stroop effect in subjects with generalised anxiety disorder
Mathews and MacLeod (1985) in a study with GADs and controls used a card version
of the modified Stroop task. The stimuli included 12 physical threat, 12 social threat, 12
positive and 12 neutral words. Each set of 12 words was written a total of 8 times on a
large card. The results indicated that anxious patients were significantly slower at colour
naming all types of words, especially social threat words. Interestingly, the anxious
patients were faster at colour naming physical threat-related stimuli than control words.
The authors concluded that state anxiety is the most important factor influencing
emotional Stroop interference. In this study, non-threat words were of mixed positive and
neutral valency (i.e. some were emotion related) and were not semantically related to
each other. This group of words was not matched for length and frequency with the two
other groups i.e. physical threat and social threat. Thus, any effects could be due to
differential processing of groups of semantically related words.
Mogg Ct a!. (1990) replicated the study of Mathews and MacLeod (1985). They found
that the patients showed very clear interference in the Stroop task compared with the
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control group and correlational analysis indicated trait anxiety to be a greater predicter
of the interference measure compared with state anxiety.
Richards and Miliwood (1989) used a computerised Stroop task with anxious subjects,
with three groups of words (lositive, neutral, and threat-related). The words were
presented on the screen of the computer one at a time and the subject reacted to the
stimuli by pressing a button. Anxious subjects showed significant interference when
reading the threat words relative to controls, while the patients were faster for positive
words than negative words. This study was the first computerised Stroop study with
anxious patients and it is possible that the difference in the findings from the card version
is due to the different pattern of presentation (Daigleish, 1994).
Mogg and Marden (1990) tried to address four questions in their Stroop study: 1) are
processing biases for threat stimuli a specific feature of clinical anxiety states? 2) is the
anxiety-related processing bias specific to threat-related information? 3) are such biases
also apparent for information which is relevant to personal concerns, even if those
concerns are unrelated to threat? and 4) can processing biases be explained in terms of
word familiarity effects? Four groups of subjects (12 per group), high trait anxious, low
trait anxious, rowers (students who were active rowing club members for at least one
year) and non-rowers were selected. The performance of the groups was compared on a
modified Stroop colour-naming task which consisted of six sets of words including,
physical threat, social threat, positive, neutral, high frequency, and rowing words. The
results appeared to suggest that anxious subjects selectively processed emotional
information in general, rather than threat words in particular.
In another study Mogg et al. (1990) used subjects with high and low trait anxiety to
investigate the relationship between state- and trait-anxiety and scores on the emotional
Stroop task. They found that high trait anxious subjects relative to controls were slower
at colour naming threat words. In addition, the results suggested that the subjects in a
high-stress condition showed a significant Stroop interference effect compared to
subjects in a low-stress condition. Analyses of these results indicated that both high trait
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anxiety and high stress are related to emotional Stroop performance.
Mogg eta!. (1993) used subliminal and supraliminal versions of the colour naming task
with five categories of stimuli with three groups of subjects including anxious, depressed
and normal controls. There were two types of negative words (anxiety-relevant and
depression-relevant) and neutral, positive and uncategorised neutral words. All five sets
of words were matched for length and frequency and the emotional words were matched
on ratings of emotionality by judges. The results showed that anxious subjects, compared
with depressed and normal subjects were relatively slow in colour naming negative words
that were subliminally presented. That is, there was a preattentive bias for negative
information. In addition the results indicated no evidence of any processing bias for
positive information in anxious and depressed subjects. These results contrast with
previous research using the card version of the Stroop task showing that anxious
individuals are slower in colour naming both threat-related and positive words compared
with controls (Martin et al. 1991; Mogg & Marden, 1990). Finally the results indicated
that the selective interference effect in colour naming performance was found for
negative information in general and not just threat-related information.
MacLeod and Hagan (1992) investigated the emotional Stroop effect using a
computerised task. The stimulus words used in the Stroop task were taken from Mathews
and MacLeod (1985) and comprised threat-related words and neutral words. Two
presentation conditions were used: masked, in which the words were presented for 20
msec and then replaced by a pattern mask in the same colour; and unmasked, in which
the words remained on the screen until the subject responded. A two month follow-up
was carried out with the same subjects. The results showed that anxiety, as measured by
the questionnaires, was associated with a selective slowing on the threat-related words
in the masked exposure condition in the Stroop task. There was no evidence that anxiety
was associated with greater Stroop interference in the unmasked condition.
Daigleish (1994, expts 1& 2) compared two sets of Stroop tasks (computer and card
presentation formats) with threat-related, positive, semantically-related neutral,
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semantically unrelated neutral, and bird-related words (i.e., the names of common birds).
The groups of subjects used were normals with trait anxiety scores of 50 or more,
normals with trait anxiety scores of less than 40 and ornithologists to control for
expertise. The ornithologist group was only included in the computer-presentation
condition. The results indicated that the high-trait anxious subjects showed increased
colour naming times for threat-related and positive words relative to semantically-related
neutral words in the card presentation format. In addition, there was an emotional Stroop
effect with threat-related stimuli in the low-anxious subjects. In contrast, the computer-
presentation format showed a significant emotional Stroop effect with threat-related
words in the anxious group but not in the control group and there were no emotional
Stroop effects associated with positive stimuli in either group. Regarding expertise, there
was a highly significant effect, with ornithologist subjects showing retardation on their
times to colour-name bird words (relative to semantically-related neutral words) and the
other subject groups showing no differenece. The results from both presentations
supported previous fmdings of emotional interference in subjects with anxiety problems.
In summary, the research using the modified Stroop paradigm with clinical and
nonclinical anxious individuals showed equivocal findings. The results of most of them
indicated that the subjects demonstrated longer response times with negative words than
with neutral words. Research using the card presentation format revealed a general effect
of emotionality as similar patterns of findings are found with positive words as well.
However, findings from the two types of studies with the card and computerised Stroop
formats with anxious individuals suggest that the anxious subjects exhibit an attentional
bias for threat-related stimuli comparing with the control subjects and compared with
neutral words.
5.3.2. The Stroop effect in adult subjects with other anxiety disorders (except PTSD)
There is a body of studies which has examined the emotional Stroop effect in other
anxiety disorders. These studies variously used the computer or card presentation
formats. Watts et al. (1986) carried out three experiments to examine emotional Stroop
task performance with phobic patients. In the first experiment, 35 spider phobics were
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presented with 4 sets of words including colour words, threat words, spider-related words
and control words. Spider phobics demonstrated significantly longer response times to
spider-related words than to neutral words. In the second experiment, spider phobics
from the first experiment were randomly assigned to treatment. Following four sessions
of treatment, the subjects had significantly reduced their response times to spider-related
words. Differences between posttreatment spider phobics and control subjects were not
significant. In the third experiment, 40 new spider phobics were administered two
equivalent forms of the spider Stroop. The only word common to both forms was spider.
Results revealed significantly longer response times to spider-related words in both
groups which showed the reliability of the two equivalent forms.
DiBenedetto and Evans (1989) studied subjects with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
(OCD) characterised by fear of contamination, and non-anxious medical patients. Six
sets of word cards including contamination, checking, general threat, and neutral colour
words were used in this study. OCD subjects showed significantly longer response times
to colour name words related to contamination than for checking, general threat, or
neutral words. The data suggested a specific attentional bias for feared stimuli in OCD
subjects.
Hope Ct al. (1990) compared subjects with social phobia and panic disorder. Stimuli
included social threat words, physical threat words, colour names, groups of Xs, and
neutral control words. Social phobics, but not panic subjects, demonstrated significantly
longer response times for social threat words than for all other stimuli. Panic subjects
demonstrated significantly longer response times for physical threat words than for all
other stimuli. Thus, the groups exhibited attentional biases for threat cues that are
specific to their individual fears.
McNally ct al. (1990) used a computerised Stroop paradigm to investigate selective
processing of threat cues in patients with panic disorder. Panic patients exhibited more
Stroop interference when colour naming fear words, bodily sensation words, and
catastrophe words.
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Taken together, research using the emotional Stroop paradigm with individuals suffering
from anxiety disorders other than GAD or PTSD has generally revealed increased Stroop
interference associated with words related to the disorder. Research with disorders such
as phobias suggests that this is not only a function of the individual's familiarity with the
material but is somehow related to its emotive content.
5.4. Emotional Stroop Effects in Depressed Adults
Modified Stroop tasks have been used to assess information processing in depression. In
most of these studies, target words were negative words related to depression and were
compared with neutral or positive words, using both clinical and non-clinical depressed
subjects.
Gotlib and Cane (1987) compared the performance of 15 undergraduate students with
low scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck et al., 1961) with 15
undergraduate students with high scores on the BDI on a modified Stroop Task. The
stimuli included three types of words: 50 self descriptive "depressed" adjectives, 50 self
descriptive "manic" adjectives, and 50 neutral words. The words were presented in
random order via a tachistoscope. The findings indicated a longer mean response latency
for depressed subjects to name the colour of depressed words relative to manic words,
while there were no differences in the non-depressed subjects (i.e. subjects with low
scores on the BDI). These findings were supported by Kileger and Cordner (1989).
Gotlib and Cane (1987) compared the performance of 35 depressed inpatients and 14
non-depressed controls before discharge and a week following discharge with the same
words used by Gotlib and MacCann (1984) on the Stroop task. Depressed subjects
demonstrated longer response latencies to the depressed words than the other cues before
discharge which replicated the Gotlib and MacCann (1984) finding.
Gotlib and McCann (1984) also in two studies tried to examine the nature of negative
schemata in depressed subjects. In the first study they assessed the relative accessibility
of positive and negative constructs in depressed and non-depressed university students,
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and in the second one they attempted to replicate the findings of the initial investigation
through a mood induction paradigm. In the first study 30 subjects were selected on the
basis of their scores on the BDI. The subjects were asked to name the colour of three
categories of words (depressed, manic and neutral). The results showed that depressed
subjects produced longer colour-naming response latencies to depressed words than to
neutral or manic words. In contrast, non-depressed students did not demonstrate
differential reaction times to the three types of words. In the second study, they compared
the performance of 30 undergraduate students who were randomly divided into three
experimental conditions, depression, elation, and neutral mood on a mood-induction
paradigm. The results suggested that, in spite of differences on the Mood Adjective
Checklist for the depressed group, there were no significant effects on this task. They
concluded that transient mood is not a sufficient explanation for the results obtained in
the first experiment.
Williams and Nulty (1986) in a study of 42 women who had volunteered for a project on
"worrying" half of whom were previously under treatment for anxiety were divided into
high and low depressed groups. They participated in a modified card Stroop task. The
results revealed a tendency for the high depressed group to show a larger difference
between the time taken to name the control words and emotional words, but this effect
was more clearly marked when subjects were assigned to groups on the basis of
depression levels ascertained 12 months previously. A question remains as to whether
this effect may be related to levels of anxiety. The results suggest that under some
circumstances the emotional Stroop may be assessing residual effects of previous
depression. These results supported previous findings of Williams and Broadbent (1986)
of significantly longer reaction times in the colour naming task for depression-related
words for a group which had attempted suicide.
It seems that self descriptive depressed adjective stimuli can produce longer latencies on
a colour-naming task in depressed subjects than other types of stimuli. Segal et. al (1988)
compared the performance of 14 subjects with unipolar depression, 9 anxiety and 14
normal controls on a card version of the modified S troop task. Each experimental trial
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consisted of the presentation of a prime word (personal adjectives words which had been
rated previously as either extremely self-descriptive or neutral) followed by a target word
that was printed in colour. The subjects were asked to name the colour of the target
words and then recall the prime words. Results indicated a significant interference effect
when the prime and the target were both self-descriptive adjectives than when only the
target was self-descriptive and the prime was not. For self-descriptive adjectives alone,
this effect was significant for the depressed group. The authors concluded that these
fmdings support the notion of a cognitive schema about the self.
Carter, Madock, and Magliozzi (1992) compared the performance of 24 subjects with
panic disorder (agoraphobia), 30 with major depression, and 25 normal controls with four
types of words: neutral, physical threat, anxious-related, and depressed-related words.
The results showed that panic subjects exhibited a significant interference towards both
threat and depressed words, while the depressed group showed a trend only towards
depressed-related words.
Kinderman (1994) compared the performance of patients with persecutory delusions,
non-psychotic depressed, and control subjects on a modified Stroop Task. They used
four separate cards: strings of Os, personally descriptive positive adjectives, personally
descriptive negative adjectives and neutral words. The results revealed that the depressed
group demonstrated a significant interference with colour-naming of negative words
comparing to neutral words, while the persecutory delusions group demonstrated greater
levels of interference for both negative and positive words.
In summary, fmdings from studies using the Stroop task with depressed subjects are less
consistent than fmdings with anxious patients, although some of them suggest a tendency
to find emotional Stroop effects toward depressed cues, particularly for self-descriptive
stimuli. This may be due to the level of anxiety which is present in depressed subjects.
Taken together, these findings may be taken as providing some support for Williams et
al. 's (1988) model (see Chapter 3) that suggests that, in depression, processing resources
are not automatically drawn toward negative information, while in anxiety, processing
of threat-related information are automatic and this bias does not depend on conscious
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awareness of the stimuli.
5.5. Stroop Interference in Adults with PTSD
Limitations of traditional methods such as self-report questionnaires or structured
interviews have inspired researchers increasingly to apply experimental methods such as
information-processing to study cognitive dysfunctions in disorders such as PTSD.
Investigators have carried out two types of information processing studies with subjects
with PTSD (McNally, 1995). First "valence-independent" studies demand that
individuals process information that varies in complexity, but not in emotional valence
such as studies on intelligence, short term memory and so on (for more details see
Chapter 8). Second "valence dependent" studies demand that subjects process
information related to the trauma such as attentional and memory biases using Stroop or
attentional deployment paradigms to assess attention, and recall and recognition tasks to
assess memory. This section attempts to review studies using the Stroop paradigm with
individuals who suffer from PTSD.
This paradigm has been used to test information processing and the effect of intrusive
thoughts on attention in PTSD with adults subjects (Kaspi & McNally, 1991; Cassiday
et al., 1992; McNally et al., 1992, 1993; Foa et al., 1991; Thrasher Ct al., 1994).
Foa et al. (1991) investigated selective processing of threat words with PTSD. In this
study 15 rape victims with PTSD, 13 rape victims without PTSD and 16 nontraumatised
control subjects were presented with four types of word: specific threat (rape-related)
words, general threat (related to physical harm and death) words, neutral words and non-
words. The results indicated that rape victims with PTSD took longer to respond on
colour naming to rape related words than other groups of words. Non-PTSD victims and
non-victim controls did not show significant differences across word types. These results
suggested that the Stroop interference to rape-related words is associated with PTSD
rather than simply with prior exposure to rape. The two groups of victims did not differ
with respect to extent of injury during the rape or life threat. Therefore, whereas both
PTSD and no-PTSD groups reported similar rape experiences, only the PTSD victims
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showed Stroop effects to rape-related words.
Cassiday et al. (1992) used a computerised Stroop Paradigm to investigate attentional
bias in rape victims with PTSD. The PTSD group comprised 11 women and 1 man; the
non-PTSD group comprised 12 women who had been raped but did not meet PTSD
criteria; the non-traumatised control group comprised 11 women and 1 man who had
never been sexually assaulted. They used four types of stimuli: high-threat words,
moderate-threat words, positive words and neutral words. They found that PTSD subjects
exhibited greater Stroop interference for high-threat words than for other words, and
exhibited greater interference for these words than did non-traumatised and normal
subjects. Their findings are generally consistent with those of Foa et a!. (1991) who
found that rape victims with PTSD exhibited interference for rape-related words.
Interference for high-threat words was significantly correlated with scores on the
intrusion subscale of the Impact of Event Scale, but not with the avoidance subscale.
They concluded that these data support the idea that the Stroop paradigm may provide
a non-introspective method of assessing negative intrusive cognitions.
Cassiday et al. also found that PTSD subjects exhibited greater interference for positive
words than neutral words. This finding is consistent with Martin et al.'s (1991)
emotionality hypothesis. This may indicate that anxiety-disordered individuals do,
indeed, selectively process any emotional information, not merely that associated with
threat. Although, in a body of studies using the modified Stroop paradigm anxious
subjects did not show a significant interference towards positive stimuli (e.g. Mogg et al.,
1990).
Thrasher, Daigleish & Yule, (1994) investigated three groups of subjects: high PTSD,
low PTSD and non-traumatised controls. All the subjects were survivors of the Herald
of Free Enterprise ferry sinking. There were five types of card-presented word: ferry
disaster words; general threat words; neutral, semantically-unrelated words; neutral
semantically-related words; and positive words. The group with high levels of PTSD
evidenced significantly longer response latencies for colour naming disaster related
134
words than for other word types. The results of the low-PTSD survivors and the non-
traumatised controls showed no significant differences between response latencies for
general threat words compared to neutral words.
A similar study was carried out by McNally et al. (1990) used a computerised Stroop
task. They presented four categories of words: semantically-unrelated neutral words,
positive words, obsessive-compulsive words (e.g. GERMS) and PTSD words to Vietnam
veterans with PTSD and without PTSD. The PTSD subjects indicated significantly longer
latencies to colour name the PTSD words rather than the other types of the words, but the
Vietnam veterans without PTSD did not.
McNally Ct al. (1993) recruited 24 Vietnam combat veterans who met PTSD criteria. The
subjects were asked to name the colours, from left to the right, in which the words were
printed. In the results, it appeared that PTSD patients exhibited interference for words
related to trauma, but did not exhibit such interference for neutral words, or words
relevant to another anxiety disorder. These findings closely replicate those of McNally
Ct al. (1990) who found that PTSD patients exhibited Stroop interference for trauma-
related words, but not for neutral words.
Kaspi et al. (1995) carried out a study using a computerised Stroop colour-naming task
with Vietnam combat veterans either with or without PTSD. The subjects were asked
to name the colour of neutral, positive, negative, and combat words. Words appeared
either randomly or blocked by type. Results showed that PTSD patients exhibited more
interference for combat words than for other words, whereas control subjects exhibited
similar, but less pronounced, patterns of interference. Positive words produced no more
interference than neutral words, and much less than combat words.
In summary, research using the colour naming task with individuals who suffer from
PTSD has found generally increased Stroop effects in word related to the trauma.
Daigleish concluded that "research with subjects with PTSD suggests that this is not
merely a function of the individuals familiarity with the material but is somehow related
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to its emotive content" (1994, p. 31). The data suggest that the S troop paradigm may
provide a non-introspective method of assessing negative intrusive cognitions. Most of
these fmdings are consistent with those of other studies that suggest that anxious patients
selectively attend to threat cues (Ehiers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; Hope et al.,
1990; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989; Wars et al., 1986).
5.6. Stroop Interference in Children
Only very few studies have investigated emotional bias in cognitive processing of
stimulus words in children, (Martin & Jones, 1992; Schneider et al., 1992; Motta et al.,
1994). The last two experiments which investigate the performance of children of adults
with PTSD on colour-naming are discussed in the second part of this chapter.
Martin, Horder, and Jones (1992) examined the cognitive performance of children of
different ages on both the standard Stroop and a modified spider Stroop task. They
recruited 48 children with equal numbers of young (aged 6 or 7 years), middle (aged 9
or 10 years), and old children (aged 12 or 13 years). Within each age group, equal
numbers of subjects were allocated to Phobic and Nonphobic groups on the basis of their
responses to questioning as to, first, whether they liked spiders and, second, whether they
would pick up spiders. A series of potential subjects was screened until the phobic groups
(two negative responses from each subject) and the Nonphobic groups (two positive
responses from each subject) were filled. Five sets of words were used in this study:
nonwords, colour words, control words, spider words, and practice words. Each subject
was tested individually, and was instructed to name aloud as fast as possible the colour
of the ink in which each word or nonword was written, while ignoring the meaning of the
words. They found that biased cognitive processing associated with spider phobia was
observed in children as young as 6 or 7 years old. Whereas both phobic and nonphobic
children displayed a standard Stroop effect (ink naming being significantly slower for
colour words than for nonwords), only phobic children displayed a spider Stroop effect
(ink naming significantly slower for spider words than for control words). Another major
finding was that the magnitude of the observed cognitive bias, i.e. the contrast between
Standard Stroop performance for phobic and nonphobic children, did not change
significantly over the entire range of ages studied. These results suggest that cognitive
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bias may change little with lapse of time since phobia acquisition.
5.7 Purpse of research
The main aim of the present research was to investigate attentional bias using the Stroop
colour-naming paradigm in three groups of young people: (I) children and adolescents
with PTSD due to road traffic accidents or personal violence; (2) non-symptomatic
children of adults (parents) patients who suffer from PTSD (the children were not
involved in the accident or trauma); and (3) normal control subjects.
The stimuli for this research were chosen from the corpus of emotionally laden words,
including a subset related to traumatic experiences and several subsets related to threat,
positive, sad, and neutral words described in Chapter 4.
5.8. EXPERIMENT (1)
INVESTIGATION OF STROOP PERFORMANCE IN CHILDREN WITH PTSD
5.8.1. Hypothesis
Children who suffer from PTSD will show significantly greater interference in colour-
naming (Stroop paradigm) negative words particularly trauma-related words, compared
with neutral words and with normal-control subjects.
5.8.2. Design
Reaction times of subjects to five different categories of words were subjected to a
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) that included one fixed between-group
factor (Group: PTSD patients vs. normal control subjects) and one fixed within-group
factor (5 categories of words: neutral, threat-related, depression-related, happy, and
trauma-related). For further analysis, another repeated measures ANOVA was conducted





Twenty three children and adolescents aged 9 to 17 who met Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd Edition-Revised, DSM ffl-R; American Psychiatric
Association, 1987) and International Classification Diseases (World Health Organisation,
lCD-b, 1992) criteria for PTSD who were matched on age, sex, verbal IQ and reading
ability with a group of children and adolescents without any psychiatric problems, took
part in this study. All PTSD subjects were involved in Road Traffic or Personal
Violence events. Most of the child patients were recruited from the children's department
of the Maudsley Hospital, where they had been seen by Prof. W. Yule and a few subjects
were identified also from other clinics in London or out of London. Of the 23 PTSD
subjects, 11 were boys and 12 girls with a mean age of 154.83 months (SD 35.06). The
control group was recruited from several primary and secondary schools from different
parts of London. Of the 23 normal subjects, 10 were boys and 13 girls with a mean age
of 162.61 months (SD 22.60).
Colour-blind subjects, identified by the Colour-Blindness Test (Ishihara, 1951) and those
who had low scores on either Basic Reading (below 85) or British Picture Vocabulary
(below 80) tests were excluded (see below).
5.8.3.2. Materials
5.8.3.2.1. Instrumentation
Following some pilot studies, a computerised version of the Stroop task including 120
stimuli was developed (the programme was written by L. N. Law at the Institute of
Psychiatiy). It consisted of 12 words in each group of words and used four different
colours. Each word was presented twice with two colours from four colours randomly.
The presentation time was 1.5 seconds. After 40 trials the computer automatically gave
a rest to the subject. The time delay after each word was two seconds. The tests were
conducted using an IBM- PC 486 portable computer with a colour LCD screen.
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(1) Voice Key: A sensitive voice key was used to register the vocal response of the
subjects automatically. The voice key connected to a microphone head set worn by the
subject. The sensitivity of the voice key could be increased or decreased by means of a
control.
(2) Key buttons: The key buttons consisted of five buttons, one button for each colour
(red, green, blue, and yellow) and the final button for changing the word on the screen
when it does not disappear automatically (because of some problems such as when the
computer did not detect the voice of the subject etc.) after the subject's word response and
after pushing the button related to each colour.
5.8.3.2.2. Stroop words
Five different categories of words including: (a) threatening words, (b) depression-related
words, (c) PTSD words related to trauma, (d) positive words, and (e) categorised neutral
words were used. All of the words were selected from the The Dictionary of Emotional
Words for Children and Adolescents which was developed in a separate study (see
Chapter 4). The groups of words were matched on length and frequency. Each word was
presented three times in four different colours (i.e. red, yellow, blue, and green)
randomly. In total 120 trials in three sets (each set included 40 trails) were presented to
each subject. After each set there was a short rest. Words used in the Stroop task are
shown in Appendix 5.1.
5.8.3.2.3. Psychological Measures
1- Revised Impact of Event Scale (IES, Horowitz et al., 1979): This has 15 items and
comprises two sub-scales, one of which measures the extent to which unwanted thoughts
and memories of the traumatic event intrude into consciousness and one which assesses
the degree to which thoughts and situations associated with the event are avoided. The
sum of the two subscales yields a total impact of event score. Items are scored on a 1-5
scale with scores ranging from 0-75. High reliability and sensitivity were reported for the
instrument. Results indicated a test-retest relibility of 0.87 for the total scores, 0.89 for
the intrusion sub-scale, and 0.79 for the avoidance sub-scale, and about 80% sensitivity.
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In a study of children aged 8 to 16 (Yule & Williams, 1990) it was found that children
who had survived a sea disaster are reported scores as high as those of traumatised adults.
2- Revised Children 's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978):
This scale has been widely used in studies of children from 8 to 16 years. It is a 37 item
questionnaire designed to assess the presence or absence of various symptoms of chronic,
trait anxiety. The respondent indicates "YES" or "NO" to statements. Nine lie-scale items
assess the validity of the subject's responses. All "yes" responses, except lie-scale items,
are scored in the positive direction for anxiety and are summed to produce a total anxiety
score. Three main factors are obtained physiological, worry/over sensitivity, and
concentration anxiety. It has been found to have high reliability and validity. Results
reveal about 0.83 for reliability, and 0.85 for validity.
3- Depression SeifRating Scale (DSRS, Birleson, 1981): This instrument is easy to use
and suitable for children and adolescents over 8 years. It consists of 18 items. Birleson
et. al provide evidence for the scale's utility in identifying depressed children while
excluding most non-depressed children. Each item comprises a statment and the child is
asked to indicate whether this applies to him/her "most of the time", "sometimes" or
"never". "Sometimes" scores one, "most" or "never" score nought or two, depending on
the positive or negative polarity of the item. On the DSRS a split-half reliability of 0.82
was obtained (Fundudis et al., 1991) which is consistent with the 0.86 reported by
Birleson (1981). It has been widely used in studies of PTSD in children.
4- British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS short form, Dunn et a!., 1981): This scale
is designed to measure a subject's receptive vocabulary for standard English. It shows the
extent of English vocabulary acquisition. This scale provides an estimate of one major
aspect of verbal ability for subjects who have grown up in a standard English speaking
environment. It is not a comprehensive test of general intelligence vocabulary.
5- Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions (WORD, Basic Reading, Rust et a!., 1993).
There are three separate components of WORD, each of which makes a distinctive
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contribution to the assessment of literacy skills. The Basic Reading subtest was used in
this study. Basic Reading is concerned with two aspects of the reading process; decoding
skills (phonetic analysis and word analysis) and word recognition. A sequence of
increasingly difficult items was specified, progressing from items with pictorial prompts
to groups of words of increasing complexity. All words in the Basic Reading subtest were
selected from various graded word lists and were then systematically selected to include
a wide variety of word types (e.g. basic sight words and words with common affixes and
to include a variety of vowel-consonant combinations (e.g. blends and digraphs).
5.833. Procedure
The test was started by the experimenter who activated the computer presentations of the
instruction and explanations about the test and what the subject should do during the test.
The test was carried out individually, and the subject was asked to sit in front of the
computer in a silent room, without any disruptions. The distance of the computer from
the subject was about 50 centimetres. The screen measured approximately 24 cm by 18
cm with a visual angle of subject to word stimulus of less than 2 degrees. The font of the
words was 24. The subject was asked to read the instructions carefully and asked if he
or she had any questions about the test. Finally, by pressing a key the instructions started
to appear on the screen. The instructions for the Stroop task were as follows:
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In this task you will see some words on the computer screen written in different
colours





What you have to do is ignore the word and say out loud the colour into the
microphone as quickly as possible.
Let's just check that the computer can hear you.
O.K. any questions?
Now we'll do some practice words. Before each word there will be a large cross on
the screen so you know where to look.
After each word there will be a pattern.
O.K.
Remember to ignore the words and to say the colours out loud as quickly as
The presentation of each word on the screen was 1.5 seconds. This was sufficient time
for the subject to understand and relate to the meaning of the words. If a subject's
response was an error, by pressing the space bar the experimenter omitted the response
from the data analysis. Finally, if the subject's voice did not activate the voice key, then
the previous word did not disappear. In this situation the experimenter changed the word
on the screen via a button press.
After ensuring that the procedures of the test were clear to the subject, the original test
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started. The task took about 15-20 minutes in total. All the psychological measures were
carried out after the Stroop task.
5.8.4. Results
5.8.4.1. Subject characteristics
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately on various measures of
psychopathology for the patient and control groups (see Table 5.1). One way ANOVAS
showed that there were no significant differences between the groups for age, verbal IQ,
or reading ability (Appendix 5.2), but the clinical group scored significantly higher on
the measures of depression [F(1, 44) = 11.62, P <0.001], and anxiety [F(1, 44) = 6.98,
P = 0.011]. PTSD patients' scores on the Impact of Event Scale are comparable with
Yule et al.'s studies of child survivors of shipping disasters (e.g.Yule et a!., 1992).
Table 5.1 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for PTSD
subjects and controls
PTSD	 NORMAL
MEAN	 SD MEAN	 SD












35.06	 162.83	 22.72	 n.s.
	
12.01	 98.43	 15.64	 n.s.
	
15.34	 95.39	 17.27	 n.s.
	
7.35	 8.48	 4.53	 **
	
8.25	 9.78	 5.12	 *
JES	 33.55	 19.46	 -	 -
LES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P <.01 & ** = P <0.001
5.8.4.2. Colour-Naming Reaction Times
Means and standard deviations for colour-naming latencies were calculated separately
for each group and each word type i.e. threat words (TW); sad words (SW); happy words
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(HW); neutral words (AW), and trauma-related words (PW). These data are shown in
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1.
Table 5.2 Means and standard deviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed and trauma (PTSD) words across
two groups (i.e. PTSD and normal controls).
WORD TYPE











	 0.16	 0.15	 0.17
	 0.17
NORMAL MEAN
	 0.77	 0.77	 0.79	 0.78
	 0.76
SD	 0.13	 0.15	 0.14	 0.15	 0.11
Mean response latencies were submitted to a two-way, Group (2) X Word Type (5)
mixed model ANOVA. The results showed a significant main effect of Group [F( 1, 44)
< 17.15, P = 0.001]. The PTSD group being much slower than the normal control
group. There was also a significant interaction [F(4, 176 ) 4.40, P = 0.002]. The results
indicated no Word Type effect [F(4, 176) = 1.04, P = 0.386].
To examine the interaction, two ANOVAs were performed across each group separately
on the mean reaction times of the colour naming task for the five categories of word. The
results indicated a significant difference across words in PTSD patients [F(4, 88) = 3.24,


















To investigate this effect of Word Type in the PTSD group further a series of ANOVAs
was performed which compared the mean colour-naming times of for each set of
emotional words (i.e. happy, depressed, threat and trauma-related words) with that for
neutral words. The results only indicated a significant difference between trauma-related
words and neutral words [F(l, 22) = 6.72, P = 0.017]. Appendix 5.3 shows the results for
depressed words, happy words and threat words comparing with neutral words in PTSD
patients.
5.8.4.3. Differential Index
This method was used in some of the previous studies (e.g., Williams & Broadbent,
1986; Kaspi & McNally, 1991; Thrasher, Daigleish & Yule, 1994). An interference
index was computed by subtracting the RTs to colour-name neutral words from the RTs
to colour name the trauma, happy, threat, and depressed words (see Figure 5.2). These
computed variables were compared across the two groups in a full factorial ANOVA of
Index Type (4) X Group (2). The results showed a significant interaction [F(1, 46) = 5.37,
P = 0.002], while the main effects of Group and Index Type were not significant
(Appendix 5.4). Two sets of ANOVAs were carried out separately across the two groups
to investigate this interaction. The results again revealed an effect of Word Type only in
PTSD subjects [F(l, 23) = 3.73, P = .015] while not in control subjects [F(1, 23) = 1.95,
P = 0.130].
To investigate this effect, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out across PTSD
patients for the four indices of words . The results indicated that the PTSD patients
showed longer differential reaction times to colour-name the trauma-related words than
happy words [t (22) = 2.46, P = 0.022], and threat words [t (22) = 3.20, P = 0.004], while
there were no significant differences between the index of trauma-related words and
depression-related words, or between other types of emotional words with each other i.e.



































	9.6 	 101.6	 15.1	 n.s.
	
10.2	 94.4	 20.0	 n.s.
	
4.5	 17.3	 8.8	 *
	
7.6	 17.4	 8.3	 n.s.
	
14.8	 36.6	 24.5	 n.s.
	







5.8.4.4. Type of Trauma Effect
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each group of patients i.e.
RTA and PV on various measures of psychopathology (Table 5.3). One way ANOVAs
showed that there were no significant differences between the two sub-groups for verbal
IQ, reading ability, anxiety, and Impact of Event Scale (Appendix 5.6), but the PV group
scored significantly higher on the DSRS [F(1, 22) = 5.67, P = .027] than the RTA group.
The PVgroup was also significantly older than the RTA group [F(1, 22) = 21.39, P =
0.00011.
Table 5.3 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological scales for the two
sub-groups of PTSD patients (i.e. RTA & PV)
RTA(N=13)	 PV(N=10)
	
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN SD
AGE (months)	 139.3	 29.8	 182.6	 13.5	 **
INTRUSION	 15.6	 6.7	 16.4	 12.5	 n.s.
LES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P < 0.05 & ** = P < 0.01
Means and standard deviations for colour-naming latencies were calculated separately
for each sub-group and each word type i.e. threat words (TW); sad words (SW); happy
words (HW); neutral words (AW), and trauma-related words (PW). These data are
shown in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.3.
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Table 5.4. Means and standard deviations (SD) of colour-naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, sad and trauma (PTSD) words across two
sub-groups (i.e. RTA & PV)
WORD TYPE




















SD	 0.17	 0.19	 0.12	 0.18	 0.18
To investigate whether or not there were any differences between the two types of trauma
a Group (2) X Word Type (5) ANOVA was performed. There were no main effects of
Group nor any interaction (Appendix 5.7), but a significant of effect of Word Type was
found [F(1, 21) 3.97, P = 0.005].
To study the Word Type effect, a series of paired sample T-tests was carried out across
the 5 categories of words. The results indicated significant differences between RTs of
trauma-related words and neutral words [t (22) = 2.59, P = 0.017], trauma-related words
and happy words [t (22) = 2.46, P = 0.022], and trauma-related words and threat words
[t (22) = 3.20, P = 0.004], while between other types of words there were no differences.
These results revealed that all patients had increased latency for trauma-related words.
The fmdings of ANOVAs with the interference indices replicated the findings with the
original reaction-time data for the 5 different types of word; therefore, the interference

















5.8.4.5. Preliminary developmental analyses
Is the Stroop performance in young people with PTSD affected by developmental
aspects? To examine this point, all subjects were divided into two sub-groups, those
below 13 years old and those over 13 years old. Subject characteristics for both sub-
groups of patients and controls are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.7.
5.8.4.5.1. Children (under 13 years old)
One Way ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between the two
sub-groups 1 (aged under 13 years) on age, verbal IQ, reading ability, or self reported
anxiety (although the scores were in the expected direction) (Appendix 5.8), but
PTSD patients scored significantly higher on the measure of depression than controls
[F(1, 15) = 4.57, P = 0.05].
Table 5.5 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for the two
child sub-groups 1, i.e. PTSD and normal subjects (aged under 13 years old)
PTSD (N = 10)	 NORMAL (N =6)




























RCMAS	 11.90	 6.74	 9.67	 0.76	 n.s.
1ES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P < 0.05
Table 5.6 shows the means and standard deviations of colour-naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed and trauma (PTSD) words across the
two child sub-groups (i.e. PTSD and normal controls).
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Table 5.6 Means and standard deviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed and trauma (PTSD) words across
the two child sub-groups (i.e. PTSD and controls aged under 13 years)
WORD TYPE
NEUTRAL HAPPY THREAT SAD TRAUMA




	 0.14	 0.17	 0.16
NORMAL MEAN	 0.89	 0.92
	
0.94	 0.92	 0.87
SD	 0.10	 0.11	 0.08	 0.07	 0.07
To study the Stroop effect on children (under 13 years old) means of the RTs for the five
types of word were submitted to a two-way, Group (2) X Word Type (5) mixed model
ANOVA across the two sub-groups. The results showed a significant interaction [F(4,
56) = 2.54, P = 0.05], while the main effects of Group and Word Type were not found
(Appendix 5.9).
To examine the interaction, two ANOVAs were performed across each group separately
on the mean reaction times of the colour naming task for the five categories of word. The
results indicated a non-significant difference across words in control subjects [F(4, 20)
= 2.43, P = 0.082], while there was no difference across the words in the patient group
[F(4, 36) 0.83, P = 0.5 15]. This means that the PTSD patients and normal control
children performed almost in the same way in the Stroop task.
To investigate this non-significant difference, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried
out across control subjects for the five types of words. The results indicated that the
control subjects showed longer differential reaction times to colour-name the trauma-
related words than depression-related words [t (5) = 2.96, P = 0.032], and threat words
[t (5) = 2.48, P = 0.004]. They also showed a trend towards longer reaction times to
colour-name the happy words than trauma-related words [t (5) = 2.48, P = 0.056], while
there were no significant differences between the RTs of other types of words with each
other (Appendix 5.10).
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5.8.4.5.2. Adolescents (over 13 years old)
One way ANOVA indicated that there were no significant differences between the two
adolescent sub-groups (aged over 13 years) on age, verbal IQ, and reading ability
(Appendix 5.11), but significant differences on self-reported anxiety [F(1, 29) = 7.81, P
= 0.009], and depression [F(l, 29) = 11.81, P = 0.002] were found. Table 5.8 shows
means and standard diviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies (sec.) for neutral
(animal), happy, threat, depressed and trauma (PTSD) words across two adolescent sub-
groups (i.e. PTSD and normal controls).
Table 5.7 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for the
adolescent sub-groups, i.e. PTSD and normal subjects (aged over 13 years old)
PTSD (N = 13)	 NORMAL (N = 17)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN SD
SEX(M:F)	 7:6	 8:9
AGE (months)	 182.08	 12.85	 172.94	 12.60	 n.s.
WORD
	 101.69	 13.81	 97.88	 18.17	 n.s.
BPVS
	 94.46	 18.40	 95.53	 16.78	 n.s.
DSRS
	
16.08	 8.66	 8.00	 3.86
RCMAS	 16.61	 8.96	 9.12	 5.71
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions. 	 * = P < .01, ** P = <001
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Table 5.8 Means and standard deviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed and trauma (PTSD) words across
the two child sub-groups (i.e. PTSD and controls aged over 13 years old).
WORD TYPE


















SD	 0.12	 0.13	 0.12	 0.14	 0.11
A repeated measures ANOVA of Group (2) X Word Type (5) was carried out to compare
the two sub-groups (i.e. PTSD patients and normal controls over 13 years old). The
results showed a main effect of Group [F(1, 28) = 12.2, P 0.0021 with the PTSD
subjects being slower overall, and an interaction [F(4, 112) = 3.40, P = 0.0 12], but a
Word Type main effect was not found [F(4, 112) = 1.611, P = 0.176].
To examine the interaction, two ANOVAs were performed across each group separately
on the mean reaction times of the colour naming task for the five categories of word. The
results indicated that a significant difference across words in the PTSD patients [F(4, 48)
= 2.76, P = 0.038], while there was no difference across the words in the control group
[F(4, 64) = 0.42, P = 0.794].
To investigate this significant difference, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out
across PTSD patients for the five types of words. The results indicated that the PTSD
patients showed longer differential reaction times to colour-name the trauma-related
words than neutral words [t (12) = 2.25, P = 0.044], and threat words [t (12) = 2.68, P =
0.02], while there were no significant differences between the RTs of other types of
words with each other (Appendix 5.12).
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5.8.4.6. Sex effect
Another question which still remains concerns whether the Stroop performance in young
patients with PTSD is affected by their sex ? To examine this point, PTSD subjects were
divided into two sub-groups: boys, and girls. Subject characteristics for both sub-groups
of patients are shown in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for boys
and girls with PTSD
BOYS(N= 11)	 GIRLS(N= 12)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
AGE (months)	 155.81	 36.42	 153.92	 35.38	 n.s.


























INTRUSION	 13.10	 9.94	 18.64	 9.08	 n.s.
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale including Avoidance and Intrusion Subscales, RCMAS = Revised
Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture
Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions. * = P < 0.1 &
=P<O.05
Table 5.10 shows means and standard diviations (SD) of colour-naming response
latencies (sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed and trauma (PTSD) words
across girls and boys with PTSD.
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Table 5.10 Means and standard deviations (SD) of colour-naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed and trauma (PTSD) words across
two sub-groups of PTSD patients (i.e. girls & boys)
WORD TYPE















SD	 0.18	 0.14	 0.14	 0.17	 0.17
One Way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between boys and
girls on age, verbal IQ, self-reported depression, self-reported anxiety, total scores on the
Impact of Event Scale, and scores on the intrusion subscale (Appendix 5.13), but the
results indicated ajust significant difference on the avoidance sub-scale of the IES F(1,
20) = 4.44, p = .049], and a trend was also found for reading ability [F(1, 22) = 3.30, P
= .083], whit girl patients obtaining higher scores compared with boy patients.
To examine the sex effect on Stroop performance, an ANOVA of Group (2) X Word
Type (5) was carried out. The results showed neither a main effect of Group, nor an
interaction (Appendix 5.14), but a main effect of Word Type was found [F(4, 84) = 3.11,
P = 0.0 19]. These results revealed that the boys and girls with PTSD performed in the
same way on the Stroop task.
To investigate this Word Type effect, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out
across all PTSD patients for the five types of words. The results indicated that the PTSD
patients showed longer differential reaction times to colour-name the trauma-related
words than neutral words [t (22) = 2.59, P = 0.017], happy words [t (22) = 2.46, P =
0.022], and threat words [t (22) = 3.20, P = 0.004], while there were no significant
differences between the RTs of other types of words with each other (Appendix 5.15).
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5.8.4.7. Correlational Analyses
To investigate the relationships between age, verbal IQ, reading ability, depression, and
anxiety scores on the one hand and interference times related to emotional words
particularly trauma-related words on the other hand, a series of correlations was
performed across all subjects. Another set of correlations examined the relationship
between 1ES scores and colour-naming times in the PTSD subjects only. The results are
shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12.
Table 5.11 Correlations between psychological measures and interference times for
emotional words across all subjects (N = 46)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed	 Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 0.20	 0.07	 -0.14	 0.09	 -0.43
P	 0.19	 0.65	 0.37	 0.55	 0.003**
BPVS	 -0.18	 -0.35	 0.21	 -0.1	 0.19
P	 0.23	 0.02*	 0.16	 0.49	 0.21
DSRS	 0.18	 0.35	 -0.33	 0.54	 0.23
P	 0.24	 0.02*	 0.82	 O.01	 0.13
RCMAS	 0.21	 0.26	 0.08	 0.43	 0.17
P	 0.16	 0.08	 0.61	 0.003**	 0.26
WORD	 -0.13	 -0.05	 0.51	 0.04	 0.06
P	 0.38	 0.73	 0.74	 0.79	 0.71
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS




Table 5.12 Correlations between scores IES including Avoidance and Intrusion
Subscales & interference time for emotional words across PTSD patients (N = 23)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed Threat	 Trauma	 Neutral
IES	 0.39	 0.43	 0.35	 0.45	 0.26
P	 0.07*	 0.04**	 0.11	 0.037**	 0.23
AVOIDANCE	 0.30	 0.34	 0.26	 0.36	 0.18
P	 0.19	 0.13	 0.26	 0.11	 0.43
INTRUSION	 0.46	 0.48	 0.42	 0.51	 0.35
P	 0.03**	 ØØ3**	 0.06**	 0.017**	 0.12
Table 5.13 Partial correlations between psychological measures and interference times
for controlling those measures across all subjects (N = 46)
WORD TYPE
Controlling Happy Depressed Threat Trauma Neutral
DSRS	 RCMAS	 0.16	 0.25	 0.12	 0.30	 0.16
P	 0.29	 0.10	 0.45	 0.05*	 0.31
RCMAS DSRS	 0.03	 -0.02	 0.05	 -0.12	 -0.16
P	 0.87	 0.89	 0.77	 0.94	 0.92
WORD	 BPVS	 -0.7	 0.17	 0.01	 -0.01	 -0.07
P	 0.63	 0.91	 0.96	 0.95	 0.67
BPVS	 RCMAS	 0.14	 0.01	 0.1	 0.11	 0.19
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05
As the results indicate there are strong positive correlations between interference times
for trauma-related words and scores on the depression and anxiety scales, which means
that high scores on these scales are associated with greater interference of trauma-related
information. There is also a significant correlation between scores on the depression scale
and interference time for depressed-related words. Finally the results revealed a negative
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correlation between verbal IQ and interference time for depressed words which indicates
that high scores on the depression scale accompany low performance on the BPVS.
There was a significant correlation between RTs for trauma-related words and total
scores on the IES. Furthermore, there was a strong relationship between scores on the
intrusion items of the IES and RTs to trauma-related words, but a non-significant
correlation between scores on the avoidance items of the IES and RTs of trauma-related
words. This means that high scores on the IES, particularly intrusion items, accompany
high RTs towards trauma-related words. Positive significant correlations were also found
between the scores of intrusion items of the IES and RTs of threat-related, depressed-
related, and happy words. The correlational analysis revealed a negative significant
correlation between age and RT to neutral words. In other words, older subjects have
shorter RT towards neutral words. Interestingly, partial correlation analysis for all
subjects indicated that there was a significant correlation between RTs of trauma-related
words and DSRS depression score after controlling for RCMAS anxiety score, while
there were no significant partial correlations between RTs of other types of words with
psychological measures.
5.8.5. Preliminary discussion
In sum, the results of the modified Stroop task with children with PTSD reveal a strong
significant main effect with PTSD patients being much slower than the normal control
group. There was also a significant interaction across groups with a significant difference
in colour-naming times between trauma-related words and neutral words only in the
PTSD patients. This supports the hypothesis that children and adolescents with PTSD
show an attentional bias towards trauma-related words. Preliminary developmental
analysis indicated that children with PTSD showed no significant differences in their
reaction times to different words, despite an interaction with the profile of colour-naming
in controls. In contrast, adolescents with PTSD were slower to colour-name trauma-
related words. However, it is important to note that the power of these developmental
analyses is low as the sample sizes in the child groups are very small and it is possible
that greater power could reveal a significant Word Type effect in children with PTSD.
Comparison of girls and boys with PTSD indicated no sex effect on the Stroop task.
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Correlational analysis showed a significant correlation between RTs for trauma-related
words and the IES scores particularly the intrusion items. This means that high scores on
the IES particularly for intrusion items accompany high RTs towards trauma-related
words which is in agreement with Cassiday et al.'s study (1992).
The results of the current experiment with the Stroop paradigm have shown that words
closely related to trauma produce more interference than negative words less closely
related to trauma including threat-related and depression-related words or positive
emotional words in children and adolescents with PTSD, though this effect is stronger
in adolescents. The fmdings of this study are in line with those in adults. Cassiday et al.
(1992) found that subjects with rape-related PTSD exhibited more interference for
trauma-related words than for words less related to the trauma. Thrasher Ct al. (1994) also
reported that shipwreck survivors with PTSD showed more interference for words
strongly related to the trauma than for general threat words. See the general discussion
at the end of the chapter for further examination of these results.
5.9. EXPERIMENT (2)
EMOTIONAL STROOP EFFECTS IN CHILDREN OF ADULTS WITH PTSD
5.9.1. Introduction
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that, like adults with anxiety disorders, child and
adolescent patients with PTSD exhibited biases to trauma-related cues. To extend these
findings it is necessary to study attentional bias with other groups of subjects involved
with traumatic events directly or indirectly. One such possibility is to study the children
of parents with PTSD. There are two studies involving children of parents with
emotional disorders (Schneider et al., 1992; Motta et al., 1994).
Schneider Ct al. (1992), used a modified card Stroop colour naming task with
asymptomatic children of parents with panic, phobic disorders and of parents without any
psychiatric disorder. The investigators found specific relationships between parent and
child characteristics. The highest interference scores occurred in exactly those children
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groups whose parents had the diagnosis that corresponded to the word content. Thus,
children of panic patients showed a larger attentional bias to panic-relevant words than
children of phobic patients and children of normal controls. Conversely, children of
phobic patients showed a larger attentional bias to phobic-relevant words than children
of the other two groups.
Motta et al. (1994) studied secondary traumatisation in adult children of Vietnam
veterans using a modified Stroop task. They compared the mean colour-naming time of
9 adult children of veterans with 35 children of non-veterans on the Stroop task. The
subjects were presented with five cards, each one containing 100 words: positive,
neutral, obsessive compulsive (e.g., filthy, faeces), PTSD (bodybags), and meaningless.
The words were printed in red, black, blue, green and yellow ink. Despite the low power,
the results indicated differences in colour-naming time between children of veterans and
those of non-veterans on the PTSD card. The authors also found that there were no
significant differences between the groups on trauma measures such as the Impact of
Event Scale and the MMPI-2 PTSD Scale. In summary, this study replicated the results
from Schneider et al. (1992) with children of panic and phobic patients.
The present experiment sought to extend and replicate the findings of Motta et al. with
a larger sample and with non-combat-related PTSD in the parents.
5.9.2. Hypothesis
Children of parents with PTSD (parents who were involved in a traumatic event in which
their children were not involved) will show a significant latency on a colour-naming task
towards negative words, particularly trauma-related words, compared with normal-
control subjects.
5.9.3. Subjects
Eighteen children and adolescents, aged 9 to 17, whose parents met Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd Edition, DSM-Ill-R; American Psychiatric
Association, 1987) and International Classification of Diseases (World Health
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Organization, ICD-1O; 1992) criteria for PTSD, were matched on age, sex, verbal IQ and
reading ability with a group of children and adolescents whose parents had not any
psychiatric problems. All the parents with PTSD were involved in either road traffic or
personal violence events, while their children were not. All the adult patients and their
children were introduced by the clinicians of the Psychology Department of the Institute
of Psychiatry. Of the 18 children of adults with PTSD, 9 were boys and 9 girls with a
mean age of 154.89 months (SD 35.33). The control group was the same as in
Experiment 1.
Colour-blind subjects and those who had low scores on Basic Reading (below 85) and
British Picture Vocabulary (below 85) tests were excluded. Psychological measures and,
the experimental task, and the design were the same as for Experiment 1.
5.9.4. Results
5.9.4.1. Subject Characteristics
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each group on various
measures of psychopathology for patients, and controls. One way ANOVA showed that
there were no significant differences between the groups for age, verbal IQ, reading
ability, or RCMAS score (Appendix 5.16), but the children of adults with PTSD scored
significantly higher on the depression scale [F(l, 40) = 5.98, P = 0.019]. Table 5.13
indicates the results of psychological measures for children of adults with PTSD and
normal control subjects.
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Table 5.14 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for
children of adults with PTSD and control subjects
CH.PTSD	 NORMAL
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
SEX(M:F)	 9:9	 10:13
AGE (months)	 154.89	 35.33	 162.83	 22.72	 n.s.
WORD	 99.50	 6.29	 98.43	 15.64	 n.s.
BPVS	 100.44	 14.45	 95.39	 17.27	 n.s.
DSRS	 11.39	 5.98	 8.48	 4.53	 *
RCMAS	 11.56	 7.01	 9.78	 5.12	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05
5.9.4.2. Colour-Naming Reaction Times
Means and standard deviations for colour-naming latencies were calculated separately
for each group and each word type i.e. threat words (TW); sad words (SW); happy words
(HW); neutral words (AW) and trauma-related words (PW). A summary of these data is
shown in Table 5.14 and Figure 5.4.
The mean response latencies were submitted to a two-way, Group (2) X Word Type (5)
mixed model ANOVA. The results did not show a main effect of Group [F(1, 39) = 2.02,
P = 0.163], but did reveal a significant Word Type X Group interaction [F(4, 156) 2.98,
P = 0.02], which qualified a main effect of Word Type [F(4, 156) 2.43, P = 0.05].
163
Table 5.15. Mean and standard deviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed & trauma-related words across the
two groups i.e. children of adults with PTSD and controls.
WORD	 TYPE
NEUTRAL HAPPY THREAT SAD TRAUMA
CH.PTSD MEAN	 0.83	 0.82	 0.86	 0.85	 0.86
SD	 0.14	 0.14	 0.16	 0.14	 0.17
NORMAL MEAN	 0.77	 0.77	 0.79	 0.78	 0.76
SD	 0.13	 0.15	 0.14	 0.15	 0.11
CH.PTSD = Children of adults with PTSD
To examine this interaction two ANOVAs examining children of PTSD and control
groups separately for the five types of words were performed. Results revealed a
significant effect of Word Type for the children of adults with PTSD [F(4, 68) =3.47, P
= 0.0 12], but not for the control group [F(4, 88) = 1.75, P = 0.146].
To investigate this Word type effect in children of PTSD patients and thus whether or not
the emotional Stroop effect was specific to trauma words or other types of emotional
words, a series of ANOVAs was performed which compared the mean reaction times on
the colour naming task for each set of emotional words (i.e. happy, depressed, threat and
trauma-related words) with neutral words. A marginally significant difference between
trauma-related words and neutral words {F(1, 17) = 4.21, P 0.056], and a trend between
threat words and neutral words [F(1, 17) = 3.33, P = 0.086] were found. While there was





























5.9.4.3. Preliminary Developmental Analyses
Is the Stroop performance in children of adults with PTSD affected by developmental
aspects? To study this point, as with the data from Experiment 1, all subjects were
divided into two sub-groups, those under 13 years old and those over 13 years old.
Subject characteristics for both sub-groups of patients and controls are shown in Tables
5.15 and 5.17.
5.9.4.3.1. Children (under 13 years old)
One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between the two
sub-groups (aged under 13 years) on age, verbal IQ, reading ability, RCMAS anxiety,
DSRS or depression (Appendix 5.18).
Table 5.16 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for
children of adults with PTSD and normal subjects (aged under 13 years old)
CH.PTSD (N =9) 	 NORMAL (N =6)








125.44	 19.49	 133.33	 18.64	 n.s.
	
100.22	 9.04	 100.83	 16.24	 n.s.
	
102.44	 16.73	 94.33	 19.61	 n.s.
	
10.66	 7.31	 7.00	 2.28	 n.s.
RCMAS	 9.89	 8.30	 9.67	 0.76	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions
Table 5.16 shows colour naming response latencies (sec.) for neutral (animal), happy,
threat, depression-related & trauma-related words across the two groups i.e. children of
adults with PTSD and controls aged under 13 years old.
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Table 5.17. Means and standards deviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed & trauma-related words across the
two groups i.e. children of adults with PTSD and controls aged under 13 years.
WORD	 TYPE
















SD	 0.01	 0.11	 0.08	 0.07	 0.07
CH.PTSD = Children of adults with PTSD
To study the Stroop effect on the children under 13 years old, means of the RTs for the
five types of words were submitted to a two-way, Group (2) X Word Type (5) mixed
model ANOVA. The results showed a significant interaction [F(4, 52) = 2.68, P = 0.04 1],
while, neither a main effect of Group nor Word Type was found (Appendix 5.19).
To examine the interaction, two ANOVAs were performed for each group separately on
the mean reaction times of the colour naming task for the five categories of word. The
results indicated that significant difference across words in children of adults with PTSD
subjects [F(4, 32) = 2.66, P = 0.05], while there was a trend in the control group [F(4, 20)
= 2.43, P = 0.08].
To investigate the word effect across children of adults with PTSD subjects, a series of
paired sample t-tests was carried out for the five types of words. The results indicated
that the children of adults with PTSD showed longer differential reaction times to colour-
name the threat words than depression-related words [t (8) = 3.21, P = 0.0 12], and happy
words [t (8) = 3.11, P = 0.014],while there were no significant differences between the
RTs of other types of words with each other (Appendix 5.20).
Another set of paired sample t-tests was carried out to investigate the trend effect across
control subjects for the five types of words. The results indicated that the control subjects
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showed longer differential reaction times to colour-name the trauma-related words than
depression-related words [t (5) = 2.96, P = 0.032], and threat words [t (5) = 2.48, P =
0.004]. They also showed a trend towards longer reaction times to colour-name the
happy words than trauma-related words [t (5) = 2.48, P = 0.056], while there were no
significant differences between the RTs of other types of words with each other
(Appendix 5.21).
5.9.4.3.2. Adolescents (over 13 years old)
One way ANOVAs indicated that there were no significant differences between the two
groups aged over 13 years on age, verbal IQ, and reading ability, or RCMAS anxiety
(Appendix 5.22). There was a trend, however, for the children of adults with PTSD to be
older than the controls and for them also to be more anxious. But there was a significant
difference on DSRS depression [F(1, 25) = 5.84, P = 0.024] with the children of adults
with PTSD being more depressed.
Table 5.18 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for
children of adults with PTSD and normal subjects (aged over 13 years old)
	
CH.PTSD (N = 9)	 NORMAL (N = 17)













17.94	 172.94	 12.60	 n.s.
	
0.67	 97.88	 18.17	 n.s.
	
12.44	 95.53	 16.78	 n.s.
	
4.62	 8.00	 3.86	 *
RCMAS	 9.00	 13.22	 9.12	 5.71	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05
Table 5.18 shows colour naming response latencies (sec.) for neutral (animal), happy,
threat, depressed & trauma-related words across the two groups i.e. children of adults
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with PTSD and controls aged over 13 years.
Table 5.19. Means and standard deviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed & trauma-related words across the
two groups i.e. children of adults with PTSD and controls aged over 13 years.
WORD TYPE
NEUTRAL HAPPY THREAT SAD TRAUMA
CH.PTSD MEAN	 0.76	 0.76	 0.78	 0.80	 0.79
SD	 0.11	 0.12	 0.12	 0.12	 0.15
NORMAL MEAN	 0.74	 0.73	 0.74	 0.74	 0.73
SD	 0.12	 0.13	 0.12	 0.14	 0.11
CH.PTSD = Children of adults with PTSD
A repeated measures Group (2) X Word Type (5) ANOVA was carried out to compare
the groups (i.e. children of adults with PTSD and normal controls over 13 years old). The
results showed no main effect of Group, interaction, or Word Type effect (Appendix
5.23). These preliminary findings revealed that adolescent children of adults with PTSD
and normal adolescent subjects performed in the same way on the modefied Stroop task.
5.9.4.4. Sex Effect
To examine any sex effect between boys and girls among PTSD children, the subjects
were divided into two groups. Subject characteristics for both groups are shown in Table
5.19.
One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between boys and
girls on age, verbal IQ, RCMAS anxiety, or reading ability (Appendix 5.24). But there
was a trend on DSRS depression {F(1, 15) = 3.99, P = .065], with girls tending to be






Table 5.20 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for boys
and girls of adults with PTSD
BOYS(N=9)	 GIRLS(N=9)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
	
142.75	 29.66	 166.87	 10.83	 n.s.
	
98.00	 6.52	 98.75	 7.70	 n.s.
	
100.50	 19.27	 100.50	 11.64	 n.s.
8.50	 5.29	 14.25	 6.18	 *
RCMAS	 9.25	 6.85	 14.00	 7.67	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.1
Table 5.20 shows the colour naming response latencies (sec.) for neutral (animal), happy,
threat, depressed & trauma-related words across the two groups of children of adults with
PTSD i.e. girls and boys with PTSD.
Table 5.21. Means and standard deviations (SD) of colour naming response latencies
(sec.) for neutral (animal), happy, threat, depressed & trauma-related words across
girls and boys of children of adults with PTSD.
WORD TYPE
NEUTRAL HAPPY THREAT SAD TRAUMA
BOYS	 MEAN	 0.83	 0.90	 0.94	 0.92	 0.95
SD	 0.14	 0.14	 0.14	 0.14	 0.16
GIRLS	 MEAN	 0.77	 0.73	 0.77	 0.77	 0.77
SD	 0.13	 0.09	 0.12	 0.10	 0.12
To examine the sex effect on Stroop performance, an ANOVA of Group (2) X Word
Type (5) was carried out. The results revealed a main effect of Group [F(1, 14) = 5.88,
P = 0.029] with girls being faster to react than boys, and no interaction [F(4, 56) = 0.35,
P = 0.84], but a trend of Word Type effect [F(4, 56) = 2.42, P = 0.059] was found.
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To investigate this trend, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out across all
children of adults with PTSD for the five types of words. The results indicated that
children of adults with PTSD showed significantly longer reaction times to colour-name
depression-related words than happy words [t (17) = 2.65, P = 0.016], trauma-related
words than happy words [t (17) = 2.51, P = 0.023], and threat words than happy words
[t (17) = 2.51, P = 0.022]. They also showed non-significantly longer reaction times to
colour-name trauma-related words than neutral words {t (17) = 2.05, P = 0.056], and
threat words than neutral words [t (17) = 1.83, P = 0.086], while there were no significant
differences between the RTs of other types of words with each other (Appendix 5.25).
5.9.4.5. Correlational Analyses
To find the relationships between age, verbal IQ, reading ability, depression, and anxiety
on the one hand and interference times related to emotional words particularly trauma-
related words on the other hand, a series of correlations was performed across all the
subjects. The results are shown in Table 5.21.
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Table 5.22 Correlations between psychological measures and interference times for
emotional words across Children of adults with PTSD and normal subjects (N = 41)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed	 Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 -0.20	 0.06	 -0.40	 -0.19	 -0.53
P	 0.88	 0.68	 0.01*	 0.23	 0.001
BPVS	 0.15	 -0.03	 0.06	 0.19	 -0.04
P	 0.34	 0.68	 0.73	 0.23	 0.80
DSRS	 -0.39	 -0.04	 -0.01	 0.12	 -0.09
P	 0.01*	 0.81	 0.95	 0.46	 0.59
RCMAS	 0.09	 0.01	 0.10	 0.20	 -0.14
P	 0.57	 0.95	 0.52	 0.20	 0.37
WORD	 -0.05	 -0.07	 0.11	 0.05	 0.06
P	 0.76	 0.66	 0.50	 0.73	 0.71
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05
As the results indicate there is a negative correlation between interference time of threat
words and age factor, this means that with increasing age, interference time of threat
words comes down. In other words, younger subjects showed more interference than
older ones. A negative correlation between DSRS depression and the interference time
of happy words was also found, which means that high scores on the depression scale
accompany shorter interference times for happy words.
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5.10. COMPARISON BETWEEN CHILDREN WITH PTSD AND CHILDREN OF
ADULTS WITH PTSD
5.10.1. Subject Characteristics
Analyses were carried out comparing children with PTSD, children of adults with PTSD
and controls. One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences
between the groups for age, verbal IQ, and reading ability (Appendix 5.26), but children
with PTSD scored significantly higher on DSRS depression [F(2, 63) = 5.79, P 0.005]
and RCMAS anxiety [F(2, 63) = 3.45, P = 0.038]. Post hoc analysis (Scheffe) indicated
that these differences were related only to the PTSD patients.
5.10.2. Colour-naming reaction times
To compare the three groups of subjects used in Experiments 1 and 2 and also to find any
differences between children with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD on the
emotional Stroop task, a full-factorial ANOVA with WordType (5) X Group (3) was
carried out. This indicated that there was a main effect of Group [F(2, 61) = 8.85, P <
0.001], an interaction [F(8, 244) = 2.98, P = 0.003] and a main effect of Word Type [F(4,
244) = 2.86, P = 0.024].
To study the Word Type effect a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out between
pairs of 5 categories of words. The results indicated that all the subjects including PTSD
patients, children of adults with PTSD and normal controls had more latency to colour-
name trauma-related words than neutral words [t (64) = 2.24, P = 0.029] and happy
words [t(64) = 2.20, P = 0.031].
Separate ANOVAs for each group separately are reported earlier in the chapter and reveal
differential slowing for trauma-related words in the PTSD subjects and the children of
adults with PTSD but not in the contris.
A second ANOVA was carried out between child PTSD patients and children of adults
with PTSD. The results indicated that there was a significant main effect of Group [F( 1,
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39) = 5.89, P = 0.02], but no interaction [F(4, 156) = 1.44, P = 0.224]. The results also
revealed a Word Type effect across the two groups [F(4, 156) = 4.71, P = 0.001].
To study the Word Type effect a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out between
pairs of 5 categories of words. The results indicated that all the subjects including PTSD
patients and children of adults with PTSD had more latency on trauma-related words than
neutral words [t (41) = 3.30, P = 0.002], happy words [t (41) = 3.53, P = 0.001], and
threat words [t (41) = 2.59, P = 0.0 13]. All subjects also had more latency on depression-
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5.11. Discussion
The main aim of the current study was to investigate the performance of young people
with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD relative to controls on the Stroop colour-
naming task. In line with previous literature on adult subjects, it was expected that the
children and adolescents with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD should show
greater interference towards trauma-related information than controls on the task.
In summary, the results indicated that children and adolescents with PTSD showed longer
reaction times towards trauma-related material relative to the controls. The results also
revealed no significant difference between two sub-groups of PTSD patients who had
experienced road traffic accident and personal violence. Regarding developmental
aspects, although children with PTSD (under 13 years) performed almost the same as
controls, adolescents with PTSD exhibited longer RTs towards trauma-related words
relative to controls. Regarding sex effects, no significant difference was found between
girls and boys with PTSD. Correlational analyses revealed a positive correlation between
RTs for trauma-related material and the scores on the DSRS depression and RCMAS
anxiety scales. There was a significant correlation between RTs for trauma-related words
and scores on the IES which was mainly carried by the intrusion items.The results of the
second experiment indicated that children of adults with PTSD exhibited longer RTs for
trauma-related and threat words relative to neutral words and to controls. Children (under
13 years) of adults with PTSD showed longer latencies towards trauma-related and threat
material relative to controls, while adolescent of adults with PTSD performed roughly
the same as controls. No sex effect was found across boys and girls of adults with PTSD.
Correlational analyses indicated that high scores on the depression scale accompany
shorter interference times towards happy words.
In accordance with the hypothesis, the results indicated that young patients with PTSD
exhibit a selective processing bias for trauma related words relative to other types of
words i.e. general threat, depressed, happy and neutral words. The PTSD group also
showed a significantly longer latency to name the colour of all the words compared with
the control group. Moreover, the degree of interference for trauma-related words was
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significantly related to a self-report measure of intrusive cognitions and avoidance
concerning the subject's own trauma (i.e. IES, Horowitz et a!., 1979). According to
Dawkins and Furnham (1989), the emotional cues in the Stroop task may activate task-
irrelevant, seif-preoccupying processes which divide limited attentional capacity, thereby
slowing colour-naming. It has been also argued that long term disorders create cognitive
fear structures which are activated during emotional arousal (Foa et al., 1989; Williams,
Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). Patients with PTSD are thought to develop fear
structures which are related to the traumatic event, and the presentation of information
which is represented in a fear structure is assumed to activate it and consequently to
evoke post-traumatic reactions (see Chapter 3). In line with this, Cassiday Ct. al. (1992)
showed that the amount of interference correlates with the score on the Impact of Event
Scale (intrusion sub-scale) in a similar way to the present data. These findings suggest
that the Stroop paradigm may provide a nonintrospective method for assessing negative
thoughts and avoidance behaviours in children who suffer from PTSD.
The trend correlation between RT's to trauma words and scores on the depression scale
and the strong relationships between RT's to the depression-related words and total scores
of IES and intrusion items of IES support the idea that PTSD may have a comorbidity
with depression. Clinical findings report that depression is often secondary to PTSD and
high rates of co-occurrence of depression and PTSD in epidemiological studies have been
thoroughly established (Blank, 1994). In the attentional deployment task, PTSD patients
tended to shift attention away from depressed words, a trend towards a correlation
between depressed bias scores and total scores of the JES was found which is in contrast
with the group results.
The results of this study support previous findings using the modified Stroop tasks with
adults who suffer from PTSD (e.g. Trandel & McNally, 1987; McNally et al., 1990;
McCarthy et a!., 1990; Ehlers et a!., 1988; Foa et al., 1991; Foa et al., 1991; and
Thrasher et al., 1994). Similar patterns of selective processing of threat material in other
adult anxious patients have also been reported (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg
et a!., 1989 and Mathews et a!., 1993).
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Furthermore, these results are in agreement with the few other studies with children e.g.
Schneider Ct aL(1992) which have found specific Stroop interference in children of panic
and phobic patients for congruent words and Martin & Jones, (1992) who found
interference on the modified Stroop task with phobia words in children with spider
phobia.
The results also suggest that the Stroop interference to trauma-related words is associated
with experiencing PTSD rather than simply with exposure to a specific trauma. Indeed,
the two sub-groups of traumatised subjects (i.e. trauma related to Road Traffic Accident
& Personal violence) did not differ with respect to their performance on the task. Thus,
whereas the Stroop task presented three types of negative words i.e threat, depressed and
trauma-related words, both groups of PTSD subjects only exhibited Stroop interference
for trauma-related words. Several additional studies support the conclusion that this
interference is associated with PTSD itself (Kaspi & McNally, 1991; McNally, English,
& Howard, 1993; 1992; Foa et.al , 1991; Thrasher, Daigleish & Yule, 1994; Martin and
Jones, 1992; Kaspi et al., 1995; Vrana et al., in press).
Regarding the second experiment, the results revealed that the children of PTSD subjects
showed a greater interference to trauma-related words than other words and relative to
controls. They also showed more interference to general threat words than neutral and
positive words. These results indicate that the children of parents suffering from PTSD
are affected by their parents' problems. It seems that the trauma played a threatening role
in their cognitive structures because they are also affected by general threat cues. This
finding is consistent with the Schneider et.al ; (1992) study which found a specific
relationship between parent and child characteristics. Children of parents with panic
problems showed greater interference to panic words than other groups, whereas children
of phobic patients showed a larger Stroop bias to phobia-relevant content. The data also
supported Motta et. al.'s (1994) finding that children of adults with PTSD on the
modified Stroop task indicated a significant latency to trauma-related words relative to
the control group and suggested that a Stroop task containing emotionally-related words
may be more sensitive than current standard measures in detecting the effects of
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secondaiy trauma.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Green et al. (1991) reported that children's PTSD is
associated with parental PTSD symptoms and family factors. Schwarz and Perry (1994)
also postulated that a family which includes a symptomatic child-parent model may lead
to the members synergistically triggering each other leading to arousal, re-experiencing,
and avoidance symptoms in vicious cycles. The characteristics of such a system depend
on individual, pre-event and post-event factors. So, it seems reasonable that the child is
affected by the parent's traumatic experience. The presence of cognitive fear structures
which are created by the parent's traumatic events can possibly explain this interference.
As discussed in Chapter 3, fear structures are the patterns of interpretation of information
which are stored in the child's memory which seem to facilitate the integration of new
information (in this case the traumatic event experienced by the parent) about one's
experiential world. Activation of fear structures leads to interference of other structures
that are required for the integration of information relevant to competing tasks.
Developmental considerations show that younger patients (aged under 13 years)
exhibited shorter reaction time towards trauma-related words on the Stroop task relative
to older patients (aged over 13 years), while younger children of adults with PTSD (under
13 years) exhibited greater interference towards trauma-related and threat materials
relative to older subjects (over 13 years old). Correlational analyses with PTSD patients
indicated that there were no relationships between age and total scores of the IES,
Intrusion items of IES, or Avoidance items of the IES. These findings indicate that
younger children of adults with PTSD should be more vulnerable than older children of
adults with PTSD towards parents' traumatic events.
One possible explanation of this difference is terms of Pynoos et al.'s (1995)
developmental model. According to Pynoos et al., as children grow up, their cognitive
abilities change, and they rely less on external cues in their appraisal of life threat, and
more on internal cues for understanding the potential threat. Adolescents may rely on
their appraisals and images of threat, even when it is not carried out (see Chapter 2). In
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the case of PTSD patients, it might be that older patients appraise the consequnces of a
traumatic event more internally so that, in the absence of traumatic cues, they may be
involved whit the internal reminders of the traumatic event. In contrast, perhaps younger
patients pay less attention to internal cues and more to external cues. Therefore, a Stroop
task may produce more interference towards trauma-related words in older patients than
younger ones. Regarding children of adults with PTSD, it seems that younger subjects
may appraise the traumatic event of their parents as an external cue more than older
subjects. Therefore, they showed longer reaction times towards trauma-related and
general threat words.
As a summary the results of these two experiments revealed that the two groups of
subjects were affected in different ways i.e. the children of adults with PTSD were
affected by general negative words including trauma-related information while the PTSD
group was effected just by trauma-related stimuli, probably because they were directly
involved in the events whereas the children of adults with PTSD did not directly
experience the traumatic events.
The present study shows that a modified Stroop paradigm with suitably selected words
that are matched for length, frequency of usage and emotional valence can be used to
investigate processing biases in children with PTSD and children of adults with PT SD.
This methodology can be used to investigate developmental aspects of emotional
processing in traumatised children.
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CHAPTER 6
AN INVESTIGATION OF ATTENTIONAL BIAS IN CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS WITH PTSD USING THE PROBE DOT
TASK
6.1. Introduction
The relationship between emotion and cognition is an important area of cognitive
psychology (see Chapter 3). Experimental research in this area increasingly uses a variety
of methods. Earlier research studies were concerned with the effect of manipulating the
emotionality of the stimulus on performance on cognitive tasks and concluded that the
processing of negative information is often suppressed. In the last decade, a body of
research using different experimental methods such as the Stroop paradigm, lexical
decision tasks, explicit and implicit memory tasks, and attention deployment tasks
clarified this issue. The Stroop paradigm has already been discussed in Chapter 5, and
memory bias (recall and recognition) will be discussed later (in Chapter 7). The main
focus of this chapter is on the attentional deployment or probe dot task.
This paradigm was introduced by MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) and enables one
to measure visual attention distribution directly. In this task, pairs of words were
presented to two areas on the screen, one in the upper and the other in the lower area. The
subjects were asked to read the upper word ignoring the lower one. Occasionally a small
dot was presented on the screen after the words had disappeared for a short interval in the
same location as one of the words. The subject was instructed to press a key immediately
when the dot was detected. Detection latencies, which provided a sensitive measure of
visual attention, were recorded for probes automatically. On the trials of interest, one of
the two words was threat-related and when the dot followed a threat word rather than a
neutral word, the patients were relatively faster in detecting the dot if it was in the same
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position as the threat word, and slower if it was in the non-threat position, compared with
normal subjects. Using such words with anxious subjects suggested that anxious patients
deploy attention more to threat words than does the normal population.
MacLeod et a!. (1986) mentioned two advantages for the deployment methodology: first,
it avoids using self-report questionnaires that can affect the result of any test because of
response bias, self report methods capture only those aspects of cognition which can be
verbalised, and such data only provide limited support for the cognitive model of the
anxiety disorders (see Chapter 3). Second, the probe dot task gives the opportunity for
the direct assessment of visual attention, because it requires a neutral response (button
press) to a neutral stimulus (probe dot). This is different from, for example, the Stroop
task, which requires a response to an emotional stimulus and is thus more susceptible to
response bias effects.
In spite of some advantages, it seems that this paradigm also suffers from some
limitations. First MacLeod Ct al. (1986) emphasised shifts in attention with anxious
subjects shifting attention towards threat and normal subjects away. However, another
possibility is that all subjects inirnediately shifted attention to the location of the threat
word, but the anxious subjects could not shift their attention away due to their appraisial
of the word which is more threatening than in normals. Daigleish (1994) argued that
although this interpretation is still an attentional effect, it may not be an attentional bias.
A second limitation of this task is that upper and lower screen positions are supposed to
be equivalent. However, the methodology requires subjects to read the top word of the
pair and so it seems that these two positions are quite different. A subject has to read a
threat word at the top of the screen on half of the critical trials and then respond to a
probe either at the top or the bottom of the screen, therefore the resultant reaction time
is not a measure of the subject's attentional bias for the threat word, because the subject
was already attending to the threat word in order to read it.
6.2 Probe dot interference in adults with anxiety disorders
This paradigm has been used in several studies in the last decade to assess attentional
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bias in people with emotional disorders. All subjects recruited in these studies were either
clinical or non-clinical anxious or depressed subjects.
In the prototypical study referred to above, MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) tested
32 subjects (16 anxious patients and 16 normal controls). The patients were divided into
two equal sized sub-groups according to whether they reported worrying primarily over
physically- or socially- related concerns. The task consisted of 24 physical threat and 24
social threat words each paired with a neutral word. Each word pair was presented on the
screen of the microcomputer for 500 ms. Dot probes occurred on 96 of the 288 trials and
could replace either of the two displayed words. Dot probes only occured on trials with
a threat word. The results clearly supported the original hypothesis that high anxiety
leads to a bias in selective attention toward emotionally threatening information, whereas
normal subjects tended to shift attention away from such information. It means that
clinically anxious patients detect the probes which replaced threat-related words faster
than the probes which replaced non threat words.
Mogg, Mathews and Eysenck (1992) assessed attentional responses to threat stimuli
using the attentional probe dot task in anxious patients, subjects who had recovered from
a clinical anxiety state, and normal controls. They found that: (I) anxious patients are
relatively faster at detecting probes which replaced threat rather than non-threat words.
So, the fmding of MacLeod et al.'s (1986) study was replicated. (II) The social threat
words are related to the severity of the social worries of anxious patients, but not the
physical threat words. This means, at least in the area of social worries, that the bias is
related to the predominant worries of anxious patients. And (ifi) the responses of the
recovered anxious patients are not significantly different from those of either the
currently anxious or control groups.
Asmundsen, Sandier, Wilson, and Walker (1992) studied attentional performance in 18
panic attack patients and 18 normal control subjects using the probe dot deployment task.
Physical threat and social threat words were extracted from MacLeod et al.'s (1986)
research. The results revealed a significantly longer reaction time to detect the probe in
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the anxious group compared with normal subjects. Interestingly, panic patients showed
an attentional bias toward physical threat cues i.e. when the probes replaced a physical
threat stimulus, the patients detected the probes faster than when the probe followed
social threat cues, while normal subjects exhibited equal response latencies for probes
following both physical and social threat cues. Also, they found a significantly greater
attentional deployment effect in the patient group when the probe appeared in the upper
position where subjects were actively reading, than when it appeared in the lower area.
These findings were consistent with those MacLeod et al. (1986).
Beck, Stanley, Averill, Baldwin and Deagle (1992) presented the task to a group of panic
disorder patients and a normal control group. However, the task which was used in this
experiment had two differences to that used by MacLeod et al. (1986). First, the dot
probe appeared simultaneously with the word pair, on the left side of either the top or
bottom word. They argued that presenting the dot probes after the word pair offset is not
a 'true' dual task procedure and even a small delay between the primary (threat-related
words) and secondary (dot probe detection) tasks can affect reaction times. They assert
that, "...when interference of the secondary task occurs in the presence of threat related
stimuli on the primary task, attentional bias is inferred" (P. 626). Second, subjects were
asked to press the key to indicate both the presence and absence of detection probes.
They state that this modification reduced the possibility of a motor response bias instead
of reaction time differences in both groups. The results showed that panic disorder
patients revealed slower reaction times to detect probes which replaced physical panic-
related threat, social threat, and positive emotional stimuli but not neutral stimuli.
In summary, the results of these few studies suggest that the attentional probe dot
paradigm provides a good indication of the subject's visual attention following a threat
word presented on the computer screen. It seems that further studies with different types
of emotional disorders will help to clarify a clear interpretation of the task.
6.3. Attentional probe dot Interference in Sub-clinical anxious subjects
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) selected 36 medical students to participate in the
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attentional deployment task. All subjects completed both the Spielberger State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) on two occasions,
12 and 1 week before a major examination. The subjects were divided into two equal-
sized groups by perfonning a median split on the basis of their trait anxiety scores. The
main task included a short practice session consisting of 32 neutral word pairs and 288
experimental trials which were presented on the VDU screen of a microcomputer. The
results suggested that the attentional response to generally threatening stimuli is primarily
associated with the level of trait anxiety. Hence, high-trait subjects but not low-trait
subjects tended to shift attention towards generally threatening stimuli on both test
occasions. High and low trait subjects showed no attentional bias towards or away from
examination-relevant stimuli a long time before the examination. However, the results
were quiet different when the levels of state anxiety were high (one week before
examination). At that time, high trait subjects showed an increased attentional bias
towards such threat stimuli, while low-trait subjects showed increased attentional
avoidance of such stimuli. They concluded that the attentional bias to currently relevant
stimuli may be associated with neither trait nor state anxiety alone, but with an interactive
function involving both these variables.
Mogg et al. (1990) carried out a research study consisting of two different experiments,
colour-naming and attention deployment tasks. In the second experiment, out of 100
medical students, the highest 20 and lowest 20 scorers on the trait version of the STAI
were recruited. The critical stimuli were 24 general threat and 24 achievement threat
words. Each of 288 pairs of words was presented for 500 ms and two factors were varied
independently, i.e. threat position and probe position. The main aim of this study was to
examine whether or not an attentional bias for threat information is a function of state or
trait anxiety. To manipulate the stress level of the subjects, they used an anagram task
presented by a computer and giving false feedback for each stress condition. The result
of this experiment failed to show a relationship between trait anxiety and attentional bias
in the non-clinical population. However, both experiments indicated that all subjects
under high stress exhibited an attentional bias towards threat-related cues, whereas
subjects in the low-stress condition showed no such effect.
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Fox (1993) selected 30 subjects from a general population of students to perform an
attentional probe dot task. The subjects were divided into three groups, high anxious i.e.
those who scored above the population mean on STAT-trait and below the population
mean on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MC: Crowne & Marlowe,
1960), low anxious who were below the mean on both scales, and repressors who were
below the mean on STAT-trait and above the mean on the MC. All the words used in this
study were drawn from Mathews et al's (1989) study. Fox demonstrated that the task
clearly distinguished between the groups: high-anxious subjects shifted visual attention
towards socially threatening stimuli; low-anxious subjects showed no consistent pattern
of attentional bias; repressors shifted visual attention away from such stimuli. This
pattern was not obtained for physical threat words. The author concluded that her results
replicate the findings of MacLeod and Mathews (1988) that the high trait anxious
subjects shift attention toward emotionally threatening material in their visual
environment and, further, that low-trait anxiety subjects cannot necessairly be considered
as a homogeneous group.
Broadbent and Broadbent (1988) performed a probe dot task study using normal subjects
with high and low trait anxiety. Their study included four experiments. In the first
experiment, the subjects performed a task similar to that of MacLeod et al. (1986) which
used two sets of words i.e. physical and social threat and neutral filler words; the second
experiment was the same as experiment 1 but filler pairs were replaced by new pairs that
each contained one animal name; experiment 3 was the same as experiment 2 with a
difference in the order of presentation of threat and animal pairs; and fmally, the fourth
experiment was similar to experiment 1 with a difference in the exposure time of pairs
of words. The results indicated a selective attentional bias related to anxiety and no
relationship appeared for neutral information. Trait anxiety made little difference but if
State was added into the analysis, the best relationship was found with an interaction with
Trait. Broadbent and Broadbent concluded that: "... the effect must be to some extent due
to lasting personality characteristics. It is not something that happens to everybody when
in a temporary state"(1988, P. 165).
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In conclusion, these studies appear to suggest that anxiety, particularly clinically
diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder, is associated with an attentional bias to threat,
and attentional responses to prolonged stress may be determined by individual
differences in vulnerability to anxiety. These findings are also supported by other studies
using different methods to assess attentional bias in anxiety disorders i.e., the Stroop
colour-naming task (for more details see Chapter 5), the colour-perception task (Mogg
et al., 1991), the two string lexical decision task (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mogg et
al. 1991), the dichotic listening paradigm (Mathews & MacLeod, 1986; Burgess et al.,
1981; Foa & McNally, 1986; & Trandal & McNally, 1987) and the attentional search task
(Mathews et aL, exp. 1 & exp. 2, 1990). For more information see Eysenck (1992) and
Williams et a!. (1988).
6.4. Visual attentional biases in depressed individuals using attention deployment
tasks
The most influential theoiy regarding cognitive processing in depression is Beck's (1967;
Beck, et aL, 1979) theory (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion). Beck suggested that
several cognitive processes are involved in the aetiology and maintenance of depression.
He postulated that depressed people are characterised by a "cognitive triad", in which
they exhibit a negative view of themselves, of their experience, and of the future.
Depressed individuals also engage in faulty information processing, including
overgeneralising from negative experiences, selectively abstracting negative details out
of context, and taking personal responsibility for negative events. Finally, according to
Beck's theory, depressed people are characterised by negative schemata, and these affect
the encoding, storage and retrieval of information. Several studies have been conducted
testing Beck's theory. Overall, the results have provided mixed support for this aspect of
Beck's cognitive model of depression and in this section these studies which have
employed the dot probe task are considered.
MacLeod et al. (1986) in the same study in which they investigated anxious subjects (see
literature review of attentional deployment and anxiety), recruited a group of 16 subjects
with a primary diagnosis of depression and tested them on the same paradigm. The main
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aim behind the study was to test this hypothesis that the attentional bias toward
emotionally threatening words may be associated with depression rather than anxiety.
The mean BDI score in this group was veiy reliably higher than that of either anxious
subjects, or the non-anxious controls. However, the results indicated no significant bias
towards threat words in the depressed group.
Gotlib, MeLachian and Katz (1988) conducted a study using a modified attentional
deployment task to examine Beck's postulate that depressed persons attend to depressed
or negative content. They selected 24 subjects on the basis of their scores on the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck Ct al., 1961): 12 subjects with BDI scores of 5 and
below as the non-depressed group; and 12 subjects whose scores were 10 and greater as
the depressed group. The attentional deployment task consisted of three types of stimuli -
manic-neutral, depressed-neutral, and manic-depressed. The results indicated that the
depressed subjects did not attend to depressed content words more frequently than they
did to manic- or neutral-content words. Thus, these findings failed to support Beck's
theory (Beck et al., 1979) that depressed people selectively attend to negative stimuli and
experiences. In contrast, the non-depressed individuals were found to attend more
frequently to manic content words than to depressed or neutral words and did not attend
to neutral-content words more or less frequently than they did to depressed-content
words.
Hill and Dutton (1989) recruited two groups (N = 16 in each) of subjects, a depressed
group with a mean BDI score of2l.3 (SD = 8.4) and a non-depressed group with a mean
of 2.0 (SD = 1.5). The critical stimuli consisted of 32 words which had previously been
rated as self-esteem threatening by a student sample and a set of emotionally neutral
words. All subjects participated in the attentional deployment task. The results revealed
that, as expected, depressed subjects showed significantly longer overall reaction times.
However, in spite of the longer reaction times of depressed individuals, no evidence was
found that depression is associated with greater selective attention to negative stimuli.
A trend was found for depressed subjects to show better recall than non-depressed
subjects for threat words, but the group did not differ in the recall of emotionally neutral
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words. They concluded that depression is not associated with a bias to show greater
selective attention to stimuli threatening self esteem.
To summarise, the findings of the veiy few studies on depressed subjects using the
attentional deployment task suggest that depressed people do not exhibit an attentional
bias to threat. This is in agreement with some of the research using the Stroop paradigm
with depressed individuals (see Chapter 5). These findings support Williams et al.,
(1988) model which proposed greater strategic processing of emotional infromation in
depressed subjects and bout automatic processing (see Chapters 3 & 5 for a discussion).
6.5. Attentional bias in children and adolescents using the attentional probe dot task
There are a few published or unpublished research studies using the attentional
deployment task to assess attentional bias in children and adolescents with emotional
disorders. As with the adult research, these few studies have been done on subjects with
anxiety disorders other than PTSD and there is no study with children and adolescents
who suffer from PTSD.
Vasey, Elhag & Daleiden (1994, unpublished) carried out a study with high and low
anxious children to examine attentional bias on a probe detection task. There were 40
subjects selected from 365 children in the sixth and eighth grades. Based on cut-off
scores, 20 subjects (10 boys and 10 girls) whose scores on the Test Anxiety Scale for
Children (TASC, Sarason et al., 1960) were 12 or greater for boys (M = 17.6, SD = 3.7)
and 16 or greater for girls (M= 19.0, SD= 2.7) were designated the high-test anxious
group. Twenty subjects (10 boys and 10 girls) whose scores were 7 or less for boy (M =
5.0, SD = 2.3) and 10 or less for girls (M = 5.3, SD = 3.3) were designated the low-test-
anxious group. The task was a modified probe detection task based on MacLeod et al.
(1986). The duration of word presentation was 1250 (msec) and it consisted of 160 trials
of which 60 were followed by probes. Forty of the 60 probed trials were critical trials
which contained emotionally threatening words and there were 20 probed trials in which
both words were neutral in content. The results revealed that high-test-anxious children,
like clinically-anxious adult patients show a clear attentional bias toward emotionally
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threatening stimuli. Furthermore, this study provides the first evidence that the attentional
bias away from emotionally-threatening stimuli seen among low-anxious adults also
occurs among low-test anxious children. Finally the authors concluded that selective
attention mechanisms influence children's processing of threatening information and
may play a role in the regulation and dysregulation of childhood anxiety.
Vasey, Daleiden, Williams & Brown (1995) followed up their earlier study and used the
attentional probe dot task to examine the hypothesis that children with anxiety disorders
show an attentional bias toward threat words, while the normal controls show an
attentional bias away from threat words. They selected 12 anxious patients and 12 normal
subjects aged 9 to 14-years-old. All anxious children met criteria for a diagnosis of at
least one anxiety disorder such as overanxious, separation anxiety, social phobia,
avoidant disorder, obsessive compulsive, simple phobia and posttraumatic stress
disorders. Both groups of subjects were matched for age, sex and socioeconomic status.
The subjects also completed the Vocabulary sub-test of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children-Revised (WISC-R; Wechsler, 1974) and the Word Identification sub-test
of the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test-Revised (WRMT-R; Woodcock, 1987). The
probe detection task was presented to the subjects with a 1250 msec presentation time
for each word. The results supported the hypothesis that anxiety-disordered children
exhibit a mood-congruent attentional bias toward emotionally threatening cues. The
correlational analysis also showed that there was not a significant relationship between
attentional bias and depression score. Furthermore, it replicated the findings of Vasey Ct
al. (1994) in test-anxious children, suggesting that such an attentional bias is a reliable
phenomenon among anxious children.
Taghavi,Neshat, Moradi, Yule & Dalgleish (in preparation) employed the same paradigm
as MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata (1986) with anxious and depressed children. The only
difference between this study and that of MacLeod et al.(1986) is that in the former, the
experimenters used three types of word instead of two: physical threat, social threat and
depressed relevant stimuli. Twenty three children suffering from anxiety disorders, 16
with depression and 23 normal controls matched for sex, age and verbal IQ participated
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in this research. The results indicated that anxious children, but not depressed, mixed
depressed/anxious children nor normal controls, consistently deploy attention towards
both types of threat-related stimuli but not to depression-related stimuli. These findings
with depression are in agreement with the results with adult depressed subjects ( Gotlib
et al., 1988; Hill & Dutton, 1989; see above).
In sum, the results of the few studies with anxious children and adolescents using a
modified attentional deployment task have indicated that anxious subjects have shown
biases in their attention towards threat stimuli (Vasey et al, unpublished; 1995; Taghavi
et al., unpublished) but that the results with depressed children (Taghavi et a!.,
unpublished) are in line with the results of the two studies with adult depressed subjects
(Gotlib et at., 1988; & Hill & Dutton, 1989) which are in contrast with Beck's postulation
(Beck Ct al., 1979) that depressed individuals selectively attend to negative cues and
experiences. Both sets of studies revealed that depressed subjects did not attend to
depressed-relevant words more than they did to neutral-content words.
Unfortunately, there is no published study on adults or children and adolescents who
suffer from PTSD using the attentional deployment task. The main aim of the current
research is to study attentional bias in children and adolescents with PTSD in a different
way from the Stroop task. As MacLeod et al. (1986) hypothesised, whereas anxious
subjects seemed to shift their attention towards the threatening materials, control subjects
seemed to shift their attention away from threatening stimuli. A modified probe dot task




Children who suffer from PTSD will show a significant attentiona! bias (on the
Attentional Deployment Task) towards threat stimuli i.e. physical threat, and social threat
and depression-related words relative to normal control subjects but should show no such




Probe detection latencies were subjected to a full factorial ANOVA with repeated
measures that included Group (2:PTSD patients vs. normal control subjects) as
the between-subjects factor and Word Type (2: threat words including physical
threat ^ social threat /2 vs. depressed-related words) as the within-subjects factor.
For further analyses, another repeated measures ANOVA involving Threat
Position (2: upper threat vs. lower threat) and Probe Position (2: upper probe vs.
lower probe) was carried out. The dependent variable was RT to the dot probe.
6.6.2.2. Subjects
Twenty four children and adolescents aged 9 to 17 who met Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd Edition-Revised, DSM llI-R American Psychiatric
Association, 1987) and International Classification of Diseases (World Health
Organization, ICD-l0, 1992) criteria for PTSD were matched on age, sex, verbal IQ and
reading ability with a group of children and adolescents without any psychiatric problems
(see subject characteristics). All PTSD subjects were involved in either Road Traffic or
Personal Violence accidents. Most of the patients were recruited from the Children's
Department of the Mausdely Hospital, and had been seen by Prof. W. Yule. A few
subjects were also identified from other clinics in London or out of London. Of the 24
PTSD subjects, 13 were boys and 11 girls with a mean age of 154 months (SD=34.53).
The control group was recruited from several primary and secondary schools from
different parts of London. Of the 24 normal subjects, 13 were boys and 11 girls with a
mean age of 154 months (SD22.12).
Those subjects who had low scores on a Basic Reading (below 85) and British Picture
Vocabulary (below 80) tests were excluded (see subject characteristics).
6.6.3. Materials
The probe detection task of MacLeod et al. (1986) was modified for use with children
and adolescents. Forty eight emotional words in three sets were used in this study: 16
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physical threat (e.g. explosion, murder), 16 social threat (e.g., confused, rejected) and 16
depression-related (e.g., lonely, lost). All of the words were chosen from "The
Dictionary of Emotional Words for Children and Adolescents" which was generated by
children and adolescents in a separate study (see Chapter 4). Each emotional word was
matched with a neutral word for length and frequency. Ten psychologists rated the
threatening words which had already been produced by children, as social or physical
threat or both. One hundred and forty eight neutral words, matched for length and
frequency, with the emotional words, were used as fillers. These words again were
selected from the same source. The practice trials consisted of 12 pairs of neutral words
(Appendix 6.1 shows the different sets of words used in the attentional probe dot task).
The task consisted of 198 trials; 64 out of 198 were followed by probes. The 48 critical
trials were designed to yield a 3 (social threat, physical threat and depression-related) X
2 (upper threat vs lower threat) X 2 (upper probe vs lower probe) within subjects
factorial design. In the upper threat (UT) trials, the upper word was emotionally
threatening and the lower word was emotionally neutral. In lower threat (LT) trials, the
upper word was neutral and the lower word was emotionally threatening (for more details
see instrumentation).
To compare the results of this study withother studies using anxious and depressed
children with the same procedure (see Chapter 9) only social threat, physical threat, and
depressed materials and not trauma-related words were used.
6.6.3.2. Instrumentation
The following instrumentation was used in this task:
(I) Computer: An IBM-PC 486 portable computer with a colour LCD screen.
(II)Key buttons: The key buttons consisted of one button for recording subjects' reaction
time to the probe dots which controlled the stimulus presentation and allowed for visual
probe detection latencies with 1 msec. accuracy. The program of this test was designed
by the experimenter and written by Mr Les Law, programmer in the Institute of
Psychiatry. These tests have been checked by psychologists and psychiatrists several
times and revised after pilot studies.
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6.63.3. Task presentation
The presentation model of the task is almost the same as MacLeod Ct al.'s (1986) and
Mogg et al.'s (1990) studies with some minor differences. These differences are as
follows:
1- An IBM portable, PC ifi, computer was used to present the stimuli. Word pairs were
presented on a blue computer screen.
2- Presentation time of each word was 1500 msec., because the subjects were children
and adolescents (i.e. under 17 years old) and required longer to press the material. The
subject was seated about 60 cm. from the screen of the computer. The screen of the
computer measured approximately 24 cm by 18 cm. The font of the words was 24 with
a visual angle of less than 2 degrees.
3- The emotional stimuli were presented randomly in three different sets (physical threat,
social threat and depressed-related).
Each word-pair was presented for 1500 msec, in random order with 3 cm. distance from
the centre of the screen of the computer, above or below (visual angle of less than 2
degrees). On the 48 critical trials (threat-neutral and sad-neutral word pairs) and on 48
filler trials, a dot probe replaced either of the two displayed words and remained on the
screen until the subject's response; on the other 100 filler trials without probe, the next
word pair followed in 1000 msec. On each critical trial, the threat or sad word could
appear with equal probability in either the upper or lower position. The probe could
follow in either position with equal probability, yielding two independent factors: Threat
Position and the position of the subsequent visual probe (Probe Position). The
combination of these two factors gave rise to four possible conditions, and for any
subjects, 12 of the 48 critical trials appeared in each condition.
6.63.4. Psychological measures
The following psychological measures were used in the current study:
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1- The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond,
1978).
2- The Depression SelçRating Scale (DSRS, Birleson, 1981).
3- The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS, short form, Dunn et a!., 1981).
4- The Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions (WORD, Basic Reading, Rust et al.,
1993).
5- The Revised Impact of Event Scale (JES, Horowitz et al., 1979).
For details of all the psychological measures see Chapter 5.
6.6.4. Procedure
The task was carried out individually. The subject was asked to sit in front of the
computer in a quiet room, and was told to read the following instruction on the screen of
the computer.
In this task you are going to see words presented on the screen in pairs. One word will
appear just above the centre of the screen, and one just below. Please read the top word
of each pair aloud as soon as it appears. Sometime when the two words disappear a
small dot will remain either in the area where the top word appeared or in the area where
the bottom word appeared. When you see the dot, press the button as quickly as possible.
Are there any questions?	 --
Then the task continued if there was no question. When the subject understood the
instructions s/he was asked to start the task with the following sentence.
Press the button when you are ready.
Twelve trials including 4 probe trials, but no threat words, were presented to the subject
as a practice session. Afterwards, the subject was asked by the following question.
O.K. Would you like more
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If there was no question, the subject began the main experiment. The subject received a
break in the middle of the session for 3 minutes.Subsequently, the subject was asked to
complete the psychological questionnaires (i.e. Impact of Event Scale, anxiety,
depression, BPVS, and Basic Reading scales). It is important to say that the results of
a pilot study with 5 normal children and adolescents showed that the task had been
established well and the subjects were interested in it. In all, the task took 20-25 minutes.
6.6.5. Results
6.6.5.1. Subjects Characteristics
Means and standard deviations were calculated on various measures of psychopathology
for the patient and control groups (see Table 6.1). One way ANOVAs showed that there
were no significant differences between the groups for age, verbal IQ and reading ability
(Appendix 6.2), but as expected, the clinical group scored significantly higher on the
measures of depression [F(l, 47) = 10.75, P = 0.002] and anxiety [F(l, 47) = 5.11, P =
0.029]. PTSD patients scores on the Impact of Event Scale are comparable with Yule et
al.'s studies of child survivors of shipping disasters (e.g.Yule et aI.,1992).
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Table 6.1 Mean and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for PTSD
and controls
PTSD (N = 24)	 CONTROLS (N = 24)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
Age (months)	 154.00	 34.53	 154.00	 22.12	 n.s.
WORD	 100.58	 12.35	 105.50	 17.13	 n.s.
BPVS	 98.17	 15.16	 97.21	 15.30	 n.s.
DSRS	 13.62	 7.20	 8.37	 3.14	 **
RCMAS	 14.62	 8.07	 10.42	 4.24	 *
IES	 34.05	 19.19	 -	 -	 -
Intrusion	 15.68	 9.56	 -	 -	 -
Avoidance	 18.36	 10.49	 -	 -	 -
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale including two sub-scales i.e. intrusion & avoidance, RCMAS =
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British
Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P <
O.05&**P<O.O1
6.6.5.2. Performance on the Attentional Deployment Task
To minimise the influence of outlying data points, probe detection latencies less than 100
msec and more than 3sec were extracted for all subjects, in line with previous research.
The mean probe detection latencies were calculated separately for each condition for both
groups i.e. PTSD patients and normal controls. Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 show the means
and standard deviations for the subjects across depressed and threat words (threat
condition = physical condition + social condition /2).
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Table 6.2 Means and standard deviations (SD) of probe detection latencies for
threat words (physical threat + social threat /2) in sec.
PTSD	 CONTROLS
Upper Area	 Lower Area	 Upper Area	 Lower Area
Threat in	 0.672	 0.699	 0.482	 0.448
Upper Area (SD = 0.261) 	 (SD = 0.345) (SD = 0.143) (SD = 0.100)
Threat in	 0.7 16	 0.708	 0.450	 0.474
Lower Area (SD = 0.32 1) (SD = 0.300) (SD = 0.092) (SD 0.167)
Table 6.3 Means and standard deviations (SD) of probe detection latencies for
depressed words in sec.
PTSD	 CONTROLS
Upper Area Lower Area Upper Area Lower Area
Depressed in	 0.760	 0.714	 0.45 1	 0.475
Upper Area	 SD =0.443 SD = 0.367	 SD = 0.149 SD = 0.220
Depressed in	 0.637	 0.738	 0.48 1	 0.464
Lower Area	 SD = 0.263 SD = 0.3 25	 Sd = 0.234	 SD = 0.129
Table 6.4 Means and standard deviations (SD) of bias indices for different types
of words in sec (threat bias = social bias + physical bias / 2).
Social Bias	 Physical Bias Depressed Bias Threat Bias
PTSD	 0.044	 -0.001	 -0.073	 0.017
SD	 0.205	 0.126	 0.165	 0.133
CONTROLS	 -0.048	 -0.00 1	 0.003	 -0.029
SD	 0.122	 0.077	 0.085	 0.083
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) provided a formula in which "the relationship between
Threat Position by Probe Position was simplified in order to provide a single index of
attentionally mediated speeding of response to threat words by substituting the
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appropriate detection latencies into the following equation:
Attentional Bias Score = [(UP/LT-UPIUT)+(LPIUT-LPILT)]/2
where UP/LT corresponds to detection times when the upper area is probed but the threat
is in the lower area, and so on. This equation calculates the mean speed of detection
latencies to probes in the same area as the threat stimuli by subtracting them from
equivalent probe detection times when the threat is in a different location. It will result
in a value of zero if the position of the threat stimuli exerts no differential influence upon
the detection latencies for probes in either area. To the extent that any subjects attended
selectively to the area where the threat stimuli appeared, thus detecting probes
disproportionately rapidly in this area, the equation will result in a correspondingly large
positive value. To the extent that subjects moved attention away from the area where this
threat appeared, it will result in an appropriately large negative value" (MacLeod &
Mathews, 1988, P, 664). These indices are shown in the Table 6.4.
6.6.5.3. Analyses involving indices
To examine any emotional bias a full factorial ANOVA with repeated measures was
conducted with one between-subjects variable (Group: control vs. patients) and as one
within-subjects variable (Index Type: threat bias vs. depressed bias). The results showed
no main effect of Group [F (1, 46) = 0.47, P = 0.5], but a significant interaction
effect of Group X Index Type [IF(1, 46) 5.09, P = 0.029] was found.
To clarify this interaction two ANOVAs (threat vs. Depressed) were carried out across
the two groups of subjects separately. The results revealed only a trend towards a
significant effect of Index Type in PTSD patients [F(1, 23) = 3.31, P = 0.082] but not in
controls [F (1, 23) = 0.96, P = 0.34]. These findings indicate that PTSD patients had a
trend towards a bias towards threat words relative to depressed words. Figure 6.1 shows
the differences between two groups for depression-related and threat words. See below
for further deconstruction of these data.
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As previously mentioned the main purpose of the study was to examine attentional bias
in a different way from the Stroop procedure. Three types of words which related to
general threat (i.e. social and physical threat) and depression were used in different
positions. It is already clear that the PTSD patients showed a trend towards a greater
attentional bias towards general threat words (social threat +physical threat /2) than
depressed words, but the question still remains, as to whether the selective attentional
bias in young patients with PTSD is more affected by social threat or physical threat
information. To clarify the effect of the two different types of threat word, a repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted with Group (PTSD vs. control) X Word Type (social
threat vs. physical threat). The results yielded a nearly significant interaction between
Group and Word Type, [F(l,47) = 3.36, p = 0.073], but no main effect of Group or Word
Type (Appendix 6.3) was found. Figure 6.2 shows differences between PTSD and
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To deconstruct this near significant interaction two ANOVAs (social threat vs. physical
threat words) were carried out for the two groups separately. The results showed that
there were no differences between the two types of word in either group (Appendix 6.4).
To examine the near significant interaction further and to find the effect of each group
of threat words vs. depressed words, two sets of ANOVAs were undertaken. The results
of an ANOVA involving Group (PTSD patients vs. control) X Word Type (physical
threat vs. depressed) yielded no main effect of Group nor Word Type (Appendix 6.5),
but a marginal trend of Group X Word Type [F(l, 46) = 3.33, P = 0.075] was found. The
results of a second ANOVA involving Group (PTSD vs. normal control) X Word Type
(social threat vs. depressed) also revealed no main effect of Group, nor Word Type
(Appendix 6.6), but a significant interaction was found [F(1, 46) 5.27, P = 0.026].
To deconstruct these interactions a series oft-tests was carried out between three types
of emotional words (i.e. physical threat, social threat, and depressed words) across PTSD
patients and normal control subjects. The results indicated that there was not any
significant difference on physical threat words between the two groups [df(46) = 0.01,
P = 0.993], while a significant difference between the two groups on social threat
material was found [df (46) = 1.89, P = 0.049]. A marginal difference in the opposite
direction for depression-related words between the two groups was also found [df (46)
= 1.43, P = 0.052]. These findings revealed that PTSD patients showed a bias towards
social threat words relative to physical threat and depressed words.
6.6.5.4. Analyses of threat position and probe position
A full Factorial of ANOVA involving Group (PTSD vs. control) X Threat Position
(upper area vs. lower area) X Probe Position (upper area vs. lower area) X Word Type
(threat vs. depressed) was carried out. The results showed a strong main effect of Group
[F(1, 47) = 14.39, P = 0.0001] and a four way interaction [F(l, 46) = 5.06, P = 0.029]but
no other significant interactions or Word Type effect was found (Appendix 6.7).
To deconstruct this interaction two sets of ANOVAs involving Threat Position (upper
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area vs. lower area) X Probe Position (upper area vs. lower area) X Word Type (threat
vs. depressed) were conducted separately across PTSD patients and normal control
subjects. The results indicated only the predicted trend for three way interaction for
PTSD patients [F (1, 23) = 3.30, P = 0.082]. Again, to examine this trend, two sets of
ANOVA involving, Threat Position (upper area vs. lower area) X Probe Position (upper
area vs. lower area) for two types of words (namely depression related and threat words)
were carried out separately across PTSD patients. The results indicated an interaction
only for depressed words [F( 1,23) 4.68, P = 0.041] (Appendix 6.8). Finally, to test this
interaction two paired-sample t-test were carried out to compare probe position and
depressed word position. The results indicated a significant difference at the lower
position (depressed word) for upper and lower probes and upper position (depressed
word) for upper and lower probes [t (23) = 2.20, P = 0.03 8]. These results revealed that
PTSD patients attended to shift attention away from depression-related words.
In sum, the analyses of the probe detection are complicated. However, the main findings
are:
(1) Control subjects evidence no selective bias for either threat or depressed words.
(2) Relative to controls, PTSD subjects showed a small but significant bias in favour of
social threat words and away from depression-related words.
(3) In absolute terms, PTSD patients show a bias away from depressed words.
6.6.5.5. Type of trauma effect
The next aspect which was examined was the effect of type of trauma on dot probe task
performance. As seen in Chapter 5, there was no effect of trauma type on performance
of a colour-naming task (Stroop task).
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each sub-group of patients
i.e. road traffic accident (RTA) and personal violence (PV) victims on various measures
of psychopathology (Table 6.5). One way ANOVAs showed that there were no
significant differences between the sub-groups for verbal IQ, reading ability, anxiety, and
Impact of Event Scale, Intrusion sub-scale of IES, and Avoidance sub-scale of 1ES scores
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(Appendix 6.9) but, the PV group scored significantly higher on the measure of
depression [F(1, 22) = 5.29, P = .031] compared to the RTA group. The PV group was
also significantly older than the RTA group [F(1, 22) = 23.1, P = 0.0011.
Table 6.5 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for two
sub-groups of PTSD i.e. RTA & PV
RTA(N=14)	 PV(N=10)
	
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD































INTRUSION	 15.1	 6.7	 16.4	 12.5	 n.s.
LES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P < 0.05 & ** = P < 0.01
An ANOVA with repeated measures was carried out for Group (RTA vs. PV) X Word
Type (Threat words vs. Depressed words). The results showed neither a main effect of
Group nor interaction or Word Type effect (Appendix 6.10). These results revealed that
both sub-groups of patients performed in the same way on the dot probe task. Figure 6.3
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6.6.5.6. Preliminary developmental analyses
Is the selective attentional bias in young patients with PTSD affected by developmental
aspects? To examine this point, as with the Stroop task (see Chapter 5) all subjects were
divided into two groups, those below 13 years old and those over 13 years old. Subject
characteristics and mean latencies of the types of bias for both groups of patients and
controls are shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.8.
6.6.5.6.1. Children (under 13 years old)
One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between the two
groups (aged under 13 years) on age, verbal IQ, reading ability, anxiety scores, or
depression scores (Appendix 6.11).
Table 6.6 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for PTSD
and controls (aged under 13 years old)
PTSD(N = 11)	 NORMAL(N=11)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD




10.74	 109.17	 18.23	 n.s.
BPVS
	 102.09
	 9.46	 101.83	 10.60	 n.s.
DSRS
	 10.72
	 3.49	 8.25	 3.02	 n.s.
RCMAS	 12.27	 6.51	 11.58	 4.46	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions
To study performance on the probe dot task in children (under 13 years old) index scores
were computed as for the full sample and means of the biases for the two types of words
were submitted to a two-way ANOVA of Group (PTSD patients vs. control subjects) X
Index Type (threat words vs. depressed words). The results showed a significant
interaction [F(2, 20) = 9.76, P = 0.005] while neither a main effect of Group, nor Index
Type (Appendix 6.12) was found. Table 6.7 shows means and standard deviations of
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biases for children with PTSD and normal control subjects under 13 years old.
Table 6.7 Means and standard deviations (SD) of biases in sec. for PTSD & control
(aged under 13 years) (threat bias = social bias + physical bias / 2)
Social Bias	 Physical Bias Depressed Bias Threat Bias










SD	 0.161	 0.046	 0.114	 0.093
To clarif' the interaction, two sets of ANOVAs were undertaken across the two groups
separately. The results indicated a significant difference between threat and depressed
information in the younger PTSD group [F(1, 10) = 10.11, P = 0.01], while a significant
difference was not found on control subjects [F(1, 20) = 3.94, P = 0.61]. This result
indicated that younger children with PTSD showed selective attentional bias for threat
words, relative to depressed words as with the full sample.
6.6.5.6.2. Adolescents (over 13 years old)
One way ANOVAs indicated that there were no significant differences between the two
groups (aged over 13 years) on age, verbal IQ, and reading ability (Appendix 6.13), but
significant differences on anxiety scores [F(1, 22) = 5.63, P = 0.027], and depression
scores [F(1, 22) = 5.96, P = 0.024] were found. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show means and
standard deviations of psychological measures and bias scores for adolescents.
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Table 6.8 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for PTSD
and controls (aged over 13 years old)
PTSD(N = 12)	 NORMAL(N=11)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
AGE(months)	 180.42	 11.88	 172.36	 9.78	 n.s.
WORD
	 101.31	 13.96	 98.75
	 15.24	 n.s.
BPVS







RCMAS	 16.62	 8.96	 9.25	 3.62	 **
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions.	 =P<O.O1; **P=<000l
A repeated measures ANOVA of Group (PTSD vs. control subjects) X Word Type
(threat words vs. depressed words) was carried out. The results showed no main effects
nor interaction (Appendix 6.14).
Table 6.9 Mean and standard deviations (SD) of biases in sec. for PTSD and controls
(aged over 13 years) (Threat bias = social bias + physical bias / 2)
Socials Bias Physical Bias Depressed Bias Threat Bias








SD	 0.068	 0.104	 0.053	 0.073
6.6.5.7. Sex effect
To examine sex effects, PTSD subjects were divided into two groups: boys and girls.
Subject characteristics for both groups of patient are shown in Table 6.10.
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Table 6.10 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for boys
and girls with PTSD
BOYS(N=12)	 GIRLS(N=12)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
AGE (months)	 154.08	 35.24	 153.92	 35.38	 n.s.
WORD	 95.91	 14.05	 105.67	 7.28	 *
BPVS	 98.08	 15.31	 98.25	 15.69	 n.s.
DSRS	 12.58	 5.11	 14.67	 8.95	 n.s.
RCMS	 12.25	 7.60	 17.00	 8.16	 n.s.
IES	 26.82	 17.14	 39.33	 19.38	 n.s.
AVOIDANCE	 14.09	 8.70	 22.64	 10.75	 *
INTRUSION	 12.73	 9.51	 18.64	 9.08	 n.s.
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale including Avoidance and Intrusion Subscales, RCMAS =
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British
Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions. * = P <
0.1
One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between boys and
girls on age, verbal IQ, depression scale, anxiety scale, Impact of Event Scale total
scores, or Intrusion subscale scores (Appendix 6.15), but the results indicated a
marginally significant difference on the avoidance sub-scale of the IES [F(1, 20) = 4.2,
p = .054], and a trend was also found on reading ability [F(1, 23) = 3.85, P = .062], with
girls obtaining higher scores on the avoidance subscale and on the Basic Reading Scale
compared with boys. Bias scores for boys and girls with PTSD were calculated as for the
full sample and the means are shown in Table 6.11.
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Table 6.11 Means and standard deviations (SD) of biases in sec. for boys and girls
with PTSD (threat bias = social bias + physical bias / 2)














	 0.074	 -0.022	 -0.062
	
0.026
SD	 0.107	 0.155	 0.158	 0.088
To examine any sex effect, an ANOVA with repeated measures was performed of Group
(PTSD boys vs. PTSD girls) X Word Type (threat bias vs. depressed bias). The results
revealed no main effects or interaction (Appendix 6-16). Therefore, as with the Stroop
task, both sub-groups performed in the same way on the attentional deployment task.
6.6.5.8. Correlational analyses
Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show the correlational analyses between psychological variables
and biases across all subjects and for PTSD patients only, respectively. Correlational
analysis showed that there is a significant negative correlation between reading ability
and threat bias and trends for the other types of bias. This means that high scores on the
Basic Reading Scale relate to shorter reaction times to respond to probes. There is also
a positive significant correlation between depressed bias and age. In other words, younger
subjects shifted away more from depressed-related words relative to older subjects.
Significant correlations between different types of biases (i.e. physical bias, social bias,
depressed bias or threat bias) and other psychological measures across all subjects were
not found. Correlational analysis with the PTSD subjects only indicated a marginal
relationship between total and intrusion sub-scale scores of the Impact of Event Scale
(IES) and depressed bias. Further correlational analyses revealed that age and the total
score of the IES did not correlate with each other for all PTSD patients [r = 0.30, P =
0.16], but a marginally positive correlation beween age and IES was found for girls with
PTSD [r = 0.54, P = 0.069].
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Table 6.12 Correlations between psychological measures and biases across all
subjects i.e. PTSD patients and normal controls (N = 48)
Threat	 Social Threat Physical Threat 	 Depressed
Age	 0.20	 0.12	 0.23	 0.31
P	 0.18	 0.43	 0.11	 0.03**
BPVS	 -0.17	 -0.13	 -0.16	 0.08
P	 0.24	 0.38	 0.28	 0.58
DSRS	 0.16	 0.16	 0.07	 0.05
P	 0.29	 0.28	 0.61	 0.75
RCMAS	 0.14	 0.06	 0.20	 0.18
P	 0.34	 0.67	 0.17	 0.21
WORD	 -0.32	 -0.27	 -0.24	 0.25
P	 0.03**	 0.07*	 0.1*	 0.08*
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions.
Table 6.13 Correlations between IES & Biases of emotional words across PTSD
patients (N = 24)
Threat	 Social Threat	 Physical Threat Depressed
IES	 -0.20	 -0.28	 0.037	 0.38
P	 0.36	 0.19	 0.86	 0.07*
AVOIDANCE	 -0.18	 -0.22	 -0.03	 0.32
P	 0.42	 0.33	 0.91	 0.14
iNTRUSION	 -0.30	 -0.28	 -0.24	 0.38
P	 0.18	 0.20	 0.29	 0.08*
LES = Impact of Event Scale including intrusion and avoidance items; Threat Bias = ( Physical Bias +
Social Bias)/2	 P<O.l& **P<005
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6.6.6. Discussion
The main aim behind the current research was to study attentional bias in young people
with PTSD using the attentional probe dot task. It was expected that PTSD patients
should shift their attention towards any threatening material relative to controls, but show
no bias for depression-related information.
In summary, the results of this research indicated that PTSD patients showed an
attentional bias towards threat words (physical threat + social threatl2) relative to
controls, while they shift away from depression-related material. Further analysis
revealed that this bias referred to social threat information rather than phsical threat
material. In addition, analysis for the PTSD group alone, revealed an absolute bias away
from depression words in this group. Both sub-groups of PTSD (namely, RTA & PV)
performed on the same way in attentional probe dot task. Regarding sex effect, no
difference on the performance of attention was found. While younger children with
PTSD showed a bias towards threat stimuli relative to depression stimuli, older PTSD
patients exhbited no bias for any particular material. Correlational analysis showed
support for this age effect with a significant negative correlation between age and bias
towards depressed words. Correlations also revealed a consistent relationship between
reading ability and any form of bias which is not surprising as the task involved reading.
The one puzzling correlation was a positive relationship between IES scores and
depression bias in the PTSD subjects. This means that, although as a group PTSD
subjects evidenced a bias away from depressed words, within the group the extent of this
bias was lower as the subjects were more symptomatic on the IES.
The current study supports the original hypothesis that PTSD patients as a subgroup of
anxiety disorders exhibit a bias in selective attention that favours the pick up of
emotionally threatening information thought it seems to be confined to social threat, and
to younger subjects. Although PTSD patients were significantly more depressed than
controls, they actually showed a significant attentional bias away from depression-related
words.
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Although, the bias in favour of threat seems to be a consistent finding, there remain some
puzzling questions: (1) why is this bias restricted only to social threat and not to physical
threat? (2) why is there a bias away from depressed words in PTSD patients despite their
high levels of depression? and (3) why despite this bias away, is there a marginally
significant positive correlation within the PTSD patients between IES scores and
depression bias?
Regarding the first question, differences between physical and social threat words have
generally not been studied, because the subjects have not been divided according to their
primary concerns (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986). In the current study, the differences
between social threat and physical threat may be explained by the fact that PTSD patients
may have been highly selected on the basis of their defence against social threat. If
PTSD patients are more sensitive and alert to stimlui which are interpreted as threatening
cues, then, in this case, they might interpret social information as more threatening than
physical. This interpretation lead the patients toward a processing bias for social threat
information. As noted earlier, trauma-related words were not used in this study, and it
seems likely that the performance of PTSD patients was affected by this point. One might
predict that PTSD patients would show a bias favouring trauma-related material than
threat words as was observed in the Stroop task with five catergories of words (i.e. threat,
happy, depressed, neutral, and trauma-related, see Chapter 5).
In terms of the second question, generally, depressed subjects fail to show an attention
shift towards any types of negative material including threat or depressed information.
As Mathews and MacLeod (1994) concluded, attentional probe tasks have yielded less
consistent support for the hypothesis that depression would be associated with a bias
towards negative emotional material (see the literature review in this chapter and in
Chapter 5). However, although PTSD patients scored high on levels of depression
relative to controls, PTSD patients were also more anxious than controls. Therefore, it
seems possible that the effects of anxiety overwhelmed any weak influences of
depression.
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Finally, regarding the third question about a marginal correlation between IES scores and
depressed bias which goes against the group fmdings,it seems that within traumatised
subjects, higher levels of trauma lead to selective bias in favour of all negative
information. However, across all subjects, both traumatised and controls, differences
with respect to whether material is depressive or anxiogenic arise.
It seems that the findings of this study with PTSD patients as a sub-group of anxiety
disorders are broadly in agreement with those of MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986)
who found that adult normal controls tended to shift attention away from threatening
stimuli, while anxious patients tended to shift towards threatening material.
These results are also consistent with other findings using the Stroop paradigm with
PTSD patients (e.g. Trandel & McNally, 1987; McNally et al., 1990; McCarthy et a!.,
1990; Ehlers eta!., 1988; Foa et al., 1991; Foa et a!., 1991; and Thrasher et al., 1994) of
an attention bias for threat and with results of the Stroop task reported in Chapter 5.
These findings also are broadly in agreement with those using child subjects with other
anxiety disorders and depression (Vasey et al. 1995, & Vasey et a!., 1994; Taghavi Ct a!.,
in preparation) which show a clear attentional bias toward emotionally threatening cues
in anxious subjects but not in depressed individuals. Vasey et al. also found an attentional
bias away from emotionally-threatening stimuli among low-test-anxious children, but
only among boy subjects.
In sum, the results of this study and other existing research with children (Taghavi et al.in
preparation, with anxious and depressed children and adolescents; Vasey et al. 1995, with
clinically anxious children; Vasey et al. 1995, with nonclinically anxious children)
support the affect-congruent effect hypothesis (Beck & Emery 1985) and the predictions
from network theory (Bower, 1981 & 1987) and the Williams et a!. (1988) model and
suggest that these can be usefully applied to young people with emotional disorders. The
findings show that a modified probe dot task with suitably selected trauma-related words





RECALL AND RECOGNITION MEMORY PERFORMANCE IN
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS WITH POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER
7.1. Introduction
Cognitive processes in emotional disorders can be investigated using self-report
techniques. Such approaches, however, suffer from problems of interpretation such as
response bias. There has, therefore, been increasing interest in the application of
experimental cognitive paradigms including information processing paradigms and
memory tasks (recall & recognition) to examine differences in how people with
emotional disorders such as anxiety and depressive disorders process material relevant
to their disorder. Much of this interest has stemmed from the theoretical work of Beck
(e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck & Clark, 1988). Beck has debated that the thought
processes of individuals who become clinically anxious are characterised by certain
schema related to personal vulnerability and danger. It is assumed that these schema
remain latent until activated by appropriate environmental events (e.g., stressful life
events). When these schema are activated, then they influence the processing of threat-
related information via attention, comprehension and retrieval. Beck has focused on
structural aspects of emotion, danger and vulnerability schemas possessed by anxious
patients that only become active in stressful conditions, meaning that state anxiety is also
relevant in the production of affect-congruent effects (for more details see Chapter 3).
Another theoretical framework related to this area has been proposed by Bower (1981,
1987) as a network model. According to this model, information in long-term memory
is stored as nodes in a network, and nodes that are related to each other are connected
together. Information is accessed within the network by activation of the appropriate
node. When a given node is activated, activation spreads from that node to other nodes
connected to it, making them more available in the cognitive system. A key assumption
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is that each emotional state is represented by a node within the semantic network. When
an emotional state is experienced, this produces activation of the corresponding emotion
node. This then leads to activation of related nodes, most of which contain affect-
congruent information. As a consequence, someone in an anxious mood state should
show superior processing of anxiety-relevant stimuli compared with non-relevant stimuli
across a wide range of perceptual, attention, and memory tasks (see Chapter 3).
Beck and Bower differ in terms of how processing is involved in producing affect-
congruent effects. According to Beck, these effects stem primarily from top-down
processes initiating relevant schema, whereas Bower emphasises bottom-up processes
based on priming of nodes. In sum, both theorists predict that anxious individuals should
exhibit superior long-term memory over non-anxious individuals for information that is
relevant to anxiety. Therefore, according to Beck's and Bower's theories, anxious
subjects should show a bias in memory tasks for threat-related information.
Williams et al.'s model (1988) postulates that anxious patients have problems in the
encoding stage (early stage) of processing while depressive patients show problems in
the retrieval or late stages of processing. Memory tasks are related to retrieval or late
stages of information processing; therefore, anxious patients should not show a memory
bias towards threat-related stimuli, whereas depressed patients should show a memory
bias towards depression-related material.
In the last decade investigators have attempted to apply the above cognitive models of
information processing to address the issue of memory for trauma-related information in
PTSD (Foa Ct al., 1987; Janoff-Bulman, 1985, 1992; Chemtob et al., 1988; Creamer et
al., 1992; Dalgleish & Power, 1995 see Chapter 3 for a detailed review). While most of
these theories have been inspired by the main cognitive approaches (Lang, 1977, 1985;
Bower, 1980, 1982; Beck & Emery, 1985; Williams et al, 1988), they need support from
experimental evidence. Little research has been done on patients with PTSD using
experimental cognitive paradigms, and there are no published papers with children with
PTSD as subjects.
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7.2. Memory bias in adults with anxiety
As previously mentioned, experimental studies try to investigate information processing
(such as attention and memory) in adults with emotional disorders. Most of the studies
of memory bias were conducted with anxious and depressed subjects. There are two main
differences in memory bias studies between anxiety and depression. The first is reflected
in the methodology or design. The majority of studies on anxiety have used correlational
designs while, in most studies with depressed subjects, group designs have been used.
Although both designs are statistically acceptable, the correlational design tends to be
less sensitive. Secondly, the majority of anxiety studies have been carried out with
students, while more depression studies were conducted with clinically depressed
patients; therefore, these factors should be borne in mind when interpreting the results
(Watts, 1995). However, studies on memory bias with anxious subjects have revealed
equivocal results. Some studies have shown a memory bias for threat, particularly an
implicit memory bias, in anxious subjects, whereas some others have not. Studies with
depressed subjects have indicated a strong memory bias (explicit memory) or poor
memory towards negative cues compared with control subjects (Ellis, et al., 1984; Watts
& Sharrock, 1987; Mogg Ct. al., 1994).
Mogg et al. (1987) presented anxious and control subjects with the standard self-referent
task, with a mixture of positive, threatening-negative, and non-threatening negative
adjectives. On subsequent unexpected tests of recall and recognition, the anxious subjects
showed poor memory for threat material relative to controls, though this was not
significant. There were no differences between performance on self-referent and other
referent words.
To study memory bias (implicit and explicit) in anxious people, Mathews, Mogg, May
and Eysenck (1989) selected three groups of subjects (18 in each group): generalised
anxiety, recovered from anxiety, and control. They were presented with a list of neutral,
positive, and threatening words, and were asked to perform a self-reference encoding
task, and then complete cued recall and word completion tests, given in balanced order.
The materials included a pooi of 96 stimulus words, 48 emotional words including
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physical and social threat and 48 unrelated threat words including neutral and positive.
The 24 words in each threatening and non-threatening condition were subdivided into
three parallel sets which were matched for frequency and available stem completions.
Words were presented in a fixed order, each word was presented in turn for 10 seconds,
and subjects were asked to press a response button during that period when they had to
think about a scene. For the cued recall test, subjects were presented with a copy of the
appropriate response form and were told that the three-letter stems printed on the sheet
were the beginnings of some of the words that had been presented in the "imagination
task". They were asked to tiy to remember the words beginning with the three letter stems
and to write them down. For the word completion task (implicit memoiy) subjects were
asked to write down the first word that came into their mind beginning with the letters
printed on the sheet as quickly as possible. The results revealed that performance on the
explicit test were correlated with trait anxiety scores, but there were not clear significant
differences among the three groups of subjects. Anxious subjects produced more threat
word completions, which confirmed the prediction. To summarise, the results of this
study showed that implicit and explicit memory biases for threat information are
essentially independent of one another, and that, whereas explicit memory bias was
correlated at a low level with variations in trait anxiety, the clinical groups differed
significantly only in implicit memory for threat cues.
Mogg et al. (1992) established a study to test two hypotheses. First, to obtain more
definitive evidence on the question of whether or not there is a recognition memory bias
for or against threat words in anxious patients. Second, if no bias was found, the "trade
off' hypothesis was tested by assessing "know" and "remember" responses. These
responses were introduced by Tulving (1985) to measure two kind of awareness. A
"remember" response indicates that recognition of the word is accompanied by some
specific recollective experience of the prior occurrence of the word in the study list. A
"know" response indicates that recognition is not accompanied by any such recollective
experience, but that it is based instead on a feeling of familiarity. This was the most
important difference between this study and previous ones. They selected 24 generalised
anxiety and 24 control subjects. Study list words were presented on a deck of cards in
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a new random order for each subject. The subjects were told to attend carefi.illy to each
word because there would be a memory test for the words later in the session. For the
recognition task, the subjects were told to draw a circle around each word that they
recognised from the study cards; they were also to write an "R" for "remember" if their
recognition was accompanied by a conscious recollection of its prior occurrence in the
study list, or a "K" for "known" if they did not consciously recollect the word's
occurrence in the study list but recognised it on some other basis. The results failed to
confirm that anxiety is associated with an implicit memory bias towards threat words.
There was a significant difference between the two groups on "remember" responses
which supports the hypothesis that anxiety is associated with cognitive bias favouring
threat which operates primarily in conceptual, rather than other types of implicit memory
such as the perceptual system.
Eysenck and Byrne (1994) selected 40 student subjects aged 18 to 35 years. They were
divided into 3 groups on the basis of their scores on a state-trait anxiety scale. The task
consisted of 160 words, half of the words were emotionally threatening and half were
neutral. All words were rated for emotional and threat value by members of staff and
postgraduate students. The stimulus words were matched for word frequency and each
word had a unique three-letter stem which matched with the number of non-pool words
sharing the stem. There were three different memory tests; word completion, cued recall
and free recall which were presented to the subjects by computer. Subjects were told that
they would be presented with a series of words in two different conditions. In some cases
a single word would be presented while, in other cases, they would see a short phrase
describing a word and the first letter of the word that subjects were required to say aloud.
The experiment was conducted in three stages for word completion, cued recall and free
recall tasks. The results indicated the existence of negative memory biases in the high
trait-anxious group.
MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995) recruited 16 anxious patients (generalised anxiety
disorder) and 16 control subjects to participate in memory (explicit and implicit) tasks.
The subjects were presented with threatening and non threatening words in a colour-
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naming task. They were instructed to name the ink colour and to say the word itself.
After the encoding task, explicit and implicit memory were tested. Each subject was
required to perform four different types of tasks during the test session. First, the subject
was given a set of exposure calibration trials, to determine the exposure duration. Second,
the subject was exposed to one of the presentation word sets in a colour-naming encoding
task. Third, the subject was given a memory task including explicit and implicit memory
tests. The results provide clear support for the authors' experimental predictions; i.e. the
anxiety patients showed a relative implicit memory bias for threat words, while the two
subject groups did not reveal differences on the explicit memory test.
The fmdings on negative memory bias in sub-clinically anxious subjects have been more
complicated. In essence, high trait anxious normals sometimes exhibit an explicit
negative memory bias and they may also display an implicit negative memory bias
(Eysenk & Mogg, 1993), in contrast to anxious patients who do not appear to have an
explicit memory bias, but with indications that they possess an implicit memory bias.
According to Beck's and Bower's theories, the anxious subjects should exhibit both an
implicit and explicit negative memory bias. However, the results of research has failed
to unequivocally support these theories.
An alternative approach was proposed by Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews
(1988) to interpret these equivocal results. This approach assumes that the encoding of
threat-related and neutral information involves at least two major processes: relatively
automatic or basic processes occurring at a preattentive level, and more controlled
processes involving elaborate encoding of the personal stimulus. Automatic processing
will have a greater influence on threat-related stimuli in anxious subjects than non-
anxious groups. Moreover, it seems that clinically anxious patients may have developed
avoidance strategies that restrict the elaboration of processing, because of the highly
aversive effects of continued processing of the threat material.
In summary, the findings with clinically anxious adult subjects indicate a memory bias
for threat on implicit memory, while in most research with explicit memory tasks they
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did not show such a memory bias.
7.3. Memory biases in adults with depression
A considerable body of evidence shows that depressed subjects complain more about
their memory performance related to their mood or emotional state than is refelected on
their objective performance on memory tests (Watts 1995). However, many researchers
have shown that depression produces a general memory impairment (e.g. Ellis et al.,
1984; Watts & Sharrock, 1987). Furthermore, the research literature on mood congruent
memory with depressed and non-depressed subjects shows a memory bias for positive
material for non depressed subjects and a bias towards negative cues for depressed
subjects. There is also evidence (Watts, Morris & MacLeod, 1987) that depressed
patients are impaired even on recognition memory.
Depression memory problems are generally thought to be associated with long-term
memory and performance on short-term memory tasks is regarded as intact. For
example, Cohen et a!. (1982) found that depressed patients were impaired only on a
delayed recall task. However, like amnesic patients, depressed subjects indicate biases
in explicit memory tasks (such as recall and recognition) rather than implicit tasks, while
anxious subjects mostly show biases in implicit memory. However, one study (Elliott &
Greene, 1992) found that depressed subjects revealed biases on both explicit and implicit
tasks.
The literature on memory functions in depression is very extensive. The investigators
have researched memory performance with clinical, sub-clinical and normal subjects who
have received some form of mood induction. Here, I will review only a selected body of
research which illustrates memory functions in depressed individuals.
Bellew and Hill (1990) studied recall of positive and negative emotional nouns by sub-
clinically depressed and non-depressed groups. The experiment included two main parts.
In part 1 the subjects were presented with 15 simple negative nouns (not considered to
threaten self-esteem) and 15 emotionally positive nouns. Subjects were asked to read
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each word aloud and imagine the experience it conveyed. In part 2, 15 nouns related to
threat to self-esteem and 15 emotionally positive nouns were presented to the subjects
who were divided into two groups, those who had shown a depressive recall bias in part
1 and those who had failed to show the depressive recall bias in part 1, to study
susceptibility to induced depressive mood. The results indicated that the depressed group
showed better recall than the non-depressed group for self-esteem threat words.
Depressed subjects also showed a greater bias towards negative words than positive
words related to self. This experiment also showed that subclinical depression was not
associated with a bias towards better recall of negative material and normal mood was
not associated with better recall of simple positive words.
Bradley and Mathews (1988) recruited 9 major depressed, 11 recovered depressed and
12 non-psychiatric controls to investigate memory bias for negative and positive
adjectives. Three sets of words (8 positive and 8 negative adjectives in each set) in two
conditions (self and unfamiliar) were presented. In each presentation, subjects were
required to decide whether the word described themselves or an unfamiliar other person.
After each list there was a 20 sec. interference task followed by 2 mins. free recall.
Results showed that depressed subjects exhibited a negative self-referent bias in recall
while the recovered group and the controls recalled more positive than negative self-
referent material. There was no difference between the three groups on rating words
about the unfamiliar other person.This finding is consistent with those that suggest that
depressed memory effects can be entirely explained by current mood state (e.g. Bellew
& Hill, 1990).
Watkins, Mathews, Williams, and Fuller (1992) compared the performance of depressed
subjects and normal controls on implicit and explicit tasks. The task included depressed-
related, neutral positive, and physical threat words. All subjects participated in an
encoding task and a memory task. Following the practice words, subjects were presented
with 64 experimental words. This was followed by a distractor task. Finally, the subjects
performed the two memory tasks; cued recall and word completion. The results revealed
a mood-congruent memory bias in the explicit memory (cued recall) task but not in the
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implicit memory (word completion) task. In addition, depressed subjects showed a
memory bias towards depressed related words but not towards physical threat words. The
authors concluded that these findings suggest that the mechanism for the explicit
memory bias in depression is elaboration.
Bradley, Mogg, and Williams (1994) compared the performance of non-clinical, high
negative-affect and low negative-affect subjects on implicit and explicit memory. Five
categories of words (depression, anxiety, positive, categorised neutral and uncategorised
neutral) were used in this study. The implicit memory test was primed lexical decision
(i.e. deciding if a stimulus is a word or non-word). Two types of priming were examined:
supraliminal and subliminal. The measure of priming was the extent to which the lexical
decisions are faster due to previous exposure to the words. The explicit memory test was
an incidental free recall task. In the recall test all types of words except uncategorised
neutral words were used. The results showed that the high negative-affect group revealed
greater subliminal priming of depression-relevant than neutral control words. This
selective priming effect was more closely associated with depression than anxiety
measures. There were no significant differences between the high negative-affect group
and the low negative-affect group on the supraliminally primed lexical decision and free
recall tasks. However when state and trait anxiety were controlled together in
correlational analysis, Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores significantly correlated
with the depression word bias measure. On the other hand, when BDI scores were
partialled out, the depression word recall index did not positively correlate with either
state or trait anxiety. The results of this study seems to be inconsistent with the theories
of Beck (e.g. 1976), Bower (e.g. 1981), and Williams et al. (1988).
Denny and Hunt (1992) conducted a study on affective valence and memory in
depression. They compared the results of 16 depressed female patients and 16 non-
depressed women on a free recall (explicit) and word fragment completion (implicit) test.
They used 12 positive and 12 negative valence words. Recall level was significantly
higher for the non-depressed group than for the depressed group. Under free-recall
instructions, depressed subjects recalled significantly more negative words than positive
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words, whereas nondepressed control subjects recalled more positive than negative
words. Finally, comparisons revealed a significant between-groups difference in the
recall of positive words, but not negative words. The data from the word fragment
completion test (implicit memory) revealed no differences between groups or subjects.
The findings of this research indicated a strong explicit memory bias in subjects with
depression, which supports Williams et al's (1988) theory about elaborative or controlled
processing in depression.
Elliott and Greene (1992) compared the performance of 10 depressed patients with 10
normal controls on implicit and explicit memory. In the first phase of their study, subjects
were presented with a list of 86 six-letter words printed on cards (one word per card). The
first and last three words were buffer words that were not tested. The first three letters of
each word were also the first three letters of at least 10 other words listed in a standard
thesaurus. Subjects were instructed to listen as each word was presented. They then
received the word stem completion task. Next, subjects received the cued-recall task. In
the second phase, 50 word pairs, 32 consisting of a priming word and a homophone and
18 consisting of non-homophone buffer items were presented. Subjects were asked to
remember the second member of each word pair. A spelling test on the 32 homophones
then followed, presented on cassette tape. Then, subjects were asked to write down all
the words they could remember from the list. Results showed that, compared with the
control group, the depressed group had impairment on the explicit memory tasks (cued-
recall, and free recall) and on the implicit memory tasks (word completion, and spelling).
Bradley, Mogg, Galbraith and Perrett (1993) studied the incidental recall of 15 positive
and 15 negative trait adjectives in 21 high and 18 low Neuroticism (N) subjects in whom
depressed or neutral mood had been induced. The words were presented in random order
on audiotape and the subjects were asked to rate how well each word described them
using a 5 point scale. Results showed that the negative recall bias was an interactive
function of trait vulnerability (as reflected by N scores) and current mood state. In the
depressed mood condition, there was a trend for high Neuroticism to be associated with
relatively better recall of negative material. However, in neutral mood, high level of
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Neuroticism predicted relatively poorer recall of negative information.
In summaly, depression is associated with facilitated explicit memory biases for negative
cues. In most of the studies (and only a selection have been reviewed here) Williams et
aL's (1988) prediction that depressed patients would show an explicit memory bias and
no implicit memory bias was supported. Such findings are also in line with the
predictions of Beck (e.g. 1976) and Bower (e.g. 1981).
7.4. Memory performance in adults with PTSD
There are only a few published studies on memory performance in adult patients with
PTSD by Zeitlin & McNally (1991) and McNally et al. (1994; 1995), who studied
explicit (cued recall) and implicit (word completion) memory and autobiographical
memory disturbance.
Zeitlin and McNally (1991) selected 24 Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD and 24
Vietnam combat veterans without PTSD to study explicit and implicit memory bias. The
material consisted of 4 types of words, 24 combat, 24 social threat, 24 positive and 24
neutral words which were matched for length. Each word had a unique three-letter stem
within the word set, but for each word there was at least one other word which had the
same three-letter stem and a higher word frequency, which was not presented to the
subjects. The words were individually presented to the subjects on index cards. They
used three parallel word sets for three versions of the memory task including word
completion, and cued recall. To do the encoding task, half of the PTSD and half of the
control subjects were randomly divided into either an elaborative or a nonelaborative
encoding condition. Following the encoding task, subjects performed a distractor task
which was counting backwards from 300 by 3s for 2 mm. Subjects then performed either
the word completion or the cued recall memory test. For the word completion test,
subjects were asked to write down the first word that came to their mind, except proper
nouns, beginning with the three letter stems printed on the form. For the cued recall test
(explicit memory) subjects were asked to complete each stem by recalling the words and
writing down the missing letters.
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The results indicated that on the cued recall test, both groups recalled more combat words
than other words. Tests for simple main effects of group showed no significant difference
between the two groups on the recall of combat or social threat words, but control
subjects recalled more positive and neutral words. The data indicated that PTSD patients
have generally poor explicit memoly. However, difference scores obtained by subtracting
the mean recall for neutral words from the mean recall scores for the other words
revealed that PTSD patients exhibited a relative (not an absolute) explicit memoiy bias
for combat words. In total, PTSD patients tended to exhibit poor memory for everything
but combat words. On the word completion test, only PTSD subjects exhibited an
implicit memory bias for combat words. These results replicated those of Mathews et al.
(1989) who reported an implicit memory bias for threat in GAD patients.
McNally et al. (1994) recruited three groups of subjects, 39 male Vietnam combat
veterans with PTSD, 20 male Vietnam combat veterans as a non-PTSD psychiatric
control group and 23 male Vietnam combat veterans as a well-adjusted control group. All
groups were randomly assigned to either the combat prime condition or the neutral prime
condition. The subjects were presented with two videotapes; one involving scenes from
the Vietnam war (combat prime), and the other involving furniture (neutral prime), each
one lasted around 5-6 minutes. Each comprised 20 colour photographs. Cue words were
10 positive, 10 negative and 10 neutral words which were typed separately on a card.
Subjects completed the Visual Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS) which provided measures
of mood before and after the priming manipulation. The experimenter presented the
experimental words to the subjects one at a time and asked them to retrieve the first
specific personal memory that come in to their mind. All sessions were audio taped. The
results indicated that PTSD patients experienced difficulty retrieving specific
autobiographical memories, especially after having viewed the combat videotape. PTSD
subjects also retrieved more memories related to Vietnam than did other psychiatric
patients, but not more than the well-adjusted group. In summary, the findings of this
study are consistent with those of Williams and Dritschel (1988) with patients who had
recently attempted suicide.
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McNally et al. (1995) used an autobiographical cueing paradigm to study self-
representation in PTSD. They asked Vietnam combat veterans with and without PTSD
to derive a specific personal memoiy in response to trait adjectives having either positive
or negative valence. Nineteen Vietnam combat veterans with PTSD and 13 Vietnam
combat veterans without PTSD participated in this study. The task comprised 10 positive
and 10 negative cue words. Each word was the name of a trait or personal characteristic
which was printed on a separate card. The experimenter presented each word to the
subjects, read it aloud, began timing, stopped the stopwatch once, asked the subjects to
think of a time and retrieve a specific memory, and then asked the subjects to date the
episode. A specific memory was defmed as a discrete episode, lasting no longer than a
single day, that happened to the subject (e.g. Pillemer, Rhinehart & White, 1986;
Williams & Dritschel, 1988). The results indicated that PTSD subjects retrieved specific
memories less than controls and this was exactly the same for both positive and negative
cues, whereas control subjects were significantly more specific in response to positive
cues than to negative cues. Control subjects also were faster at retrieving a specific
positive memory than were PTSD subjects, while the two groups did not differ in latency
to retrieve specific positive memory cues. These fmdings were consistent with McNally
et al.'s previous research which found that PTSD subjects indicated greater difficulty
retrieving specific autobiographical memories than did subjects without PTSD.
In sum, the results of the few studies with adults with PTSD show that PTSD patients
generally suffer from poor memory to retrieve any type of information whether it be
positive, negative or neutral. PTSD patients seem also to exhibit an implicit memory
bias, but not an explicit memory bias for PTSD-related material and fmd it harder relative
to controls, to retrive specific autobiographical memories.
7.5. Memory bias in children
A few studies have been carried out on memory bias in children with emotional disorders
(Hammen & Zupan, 1984; Hughes et al., 1990; Whitman & Leitenberg, 1990; Neshat
Doost et al., 1996; Taghavi et al., in preparartion). The results of these studies showed
a memory bias in children with depressed mood. In other words, the evidence supported
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the negative self-schema model in children with depression and are consistent with the
findings in adults. There is only one study on memory for threat related-material with
anxious children which revealed no evidence of any memory bias. There is no study on
children with PTSD.
Hammen and Zupan (1984) conducted research on the memory performance of children
aged 8 to 12 years old. Subjects were divided into 2 groups on the basis of depression
scale (Children's Depression Inventory; CDI; Kovacs, 1980) scores: depressed and non-
depressed. Twenty two positive and 22 negative self-descriptive adjectives were used
as stimuli. Each word was presented under one of two encoding tasks: structural (is this
a long word?) Or self-referent (is this word like you?). The subjects were asked to answer
the questions by yes or no responses. The fmal task included a list of four categories of
words: positive-structural, positive-self-referent, negative-structural, and negative-self-
referent. The words were displayed on 3 x 5 cm. index cards contained in a booklet and
separated by blank index cards. The experimenter would say a word aloud and the subject
would answer the questions. After encoding, subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall
as many of the adjectives as they could in 5 minutes. Results showed that children
recalled significantly more words under the self-reference instructions compared with the
structural ones. They also recalled significantly more yes-rated self-reference words
compared to no-rated self-reference words. Depressed children judged a significantly
greater number of negative words as self-descriptive than did nondepressed children,
while the nondepressed endorsed significantly more positive self-descriptive words than
did the depressed. The nondepressed children recalled significantly more yes-rated self-
reference positive-content words, and less negative-content words. They also recalled
significantly more no-rated negative-content words than no-rated structural words.
Hughes, Worchel, Stanton, Stanton, and Hall (1990) studied the performance of 40
nonclinically depressed students and 49 nondepressed students on recall and recognition
tasks. The mean age for both groups was 12.3 years. They read a story for the subjects
and then administered the recall and recognition tests. The story consisted of 10 positive
and 10 negative events. The subjects were asked to recall as many as events that they
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could remember in about 8 minutes. In the recognition test, 20 new events (10 positive
and 10 negative) were mixed with the old events (10 positive and 10 negative) and were
presented to the subjects. The results revealed that girls recalled significantly more events
than boys. The subjects also recalled significantly more negative than positive events.
On the recognition test, positive events were recognised more than negative ones.
Depressed subjects discriminated fewer events than nondepressed subjects.
Whitman and Leitenberg (1990) carried out a study with a group of depressed children
comparing them with normal control subjects on recall of positive and negative cues.
Both groups were from fourth, fifth and sixth grade public elementary school students.
The subjects were 52 (14 boys and 38 girls) children chosen from a large group of 247
students (106 boys and 141 girls) who completed the (CDI, Kovacs 1980/1981). Each
subject was individually tested on a word association task shortly after taking the CDI.
In the test session, subjects were read and shown one at a time 40 words placed on index
cards. They were asked to generate what they felt was the most common or frequent
association given to each word by other children. Following completion of the word
association list, students were given the 40 words again and were asked to recall
responses and rate how many of their responses were correct and how many were
incorrect. The results indicated that children with depression did not remember the
content of positive events as well as did non-depressed children. They also showed a
poorer memory when asked to recall the correct answers that had been provided by the
investigator.
Neshat Doost et al. (1996) carried out a study with depressed children. They recruited
two groups of subjects with depression and mixed depression (mixed with anxiety) to
study memory bias. The study involved two different tasks. One task consisted of self
relevant (self descriptive) adjectives including positive, negative and neutral cues. The
second task consisted of five categories of different non-self-relevant words: threat,
happy, depressed-related, trauma-related and neutral-categorised words. The words were
presented in recall and recognition tasks via a computer. The results revealed that in the
first study, depressed subjects showed a memory bias towards negative (self reference)
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words, but they did not show any bias on the second task.
There is only one unpublished study with anxious subjects on memory bias (recall and
recognition). Taghavi et al. (1995) selected 24 anxious patients to study memory bias
using the same procedure as Neshat et al.'s second experiment. Anxious patients did not
show any bias on the recall task while they revealed a bias on the recognition task. It has
been argued that recognition tasks consist of two parts, familiarity and generation
(Mandler, 1980). It seems that the first part is integrative while the second part is
elaborative. Thus, the recognition bias in this study may be related to the integrative
effect of the task.
In summary, the results of these few studies of young people show that children and
adolescents with anxiety and depression more or less reveal the same pattern of memory
performance as has been found in adults and the results are thus consistent with the adult
theories (Beck, e.g., 1976; Bower, e.g.,1980; & Williams et al., 1988).
7.6. Purpose of research
The main aim of this research was to investigate memory bias using recall and
recognition paradigms in three groups of young people (all children and adolescents aged
9 to 17): (1) children and adolescents with PTSD due to road traffic accidents or personal
violence; (2) children of adult patients (parents) who suffer from PTSD, but whose
children do not (their children were not involved in the accident or trauma); and, (3)
normal control subjects.
The stimuli for this study were chosen from the initial study that established a corpus of
emotionally laden words, including a subset related to traumatic experiences and several
subsets related to threat, positive, sad, and neutral words (Chapter 4).
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7.7. EXPERIMENT 1
RECALL AND RECOGNITION MEMORY PERFORMANCE IN CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS WITH POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
7.7.1. Hypothesis
Children who suffer from PTSD do not show a significant explicit memory bias toward
negative words particularly trauma-related cues in line with the research on adults (e.g.
Zeitlin & McNally, 1991).
7.7.2. Design
Recall (number of recalled words) and Recognition (d' and Beta values) data were
subjected to repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) that included one fixed
between-group factor (PTSD patients vs. normal control subjects) and one fixed within-




Twenty four children and adolescents aged 9 to 17 who met Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd Edition-Revised, DSM ffl-R; American Psychiatric
Association, 1987) and International Classification Diseases (World Health Organization,
ICD-1O, 1992) criteria for PTSD and who were matched on age, sex, verbal IQ and
reading ability with a group of children and adolescents without any psychiatric problems
took part in this study. All PTSD subjects had been involved in Road Traffic or Personal
Violence Accidents. Most of the child patients were recruited from the Children's
Department of the Maudsley Hospital, where they had been seen by Prof. W. Yule, and
a few subjects were identified from other clinics. Of the 24 PTSD subjects, 13 were boys
and 11 girls with a mean age of 154.56 months (SD=34.33). The control group was
recruited from several primary and secondary schools from different parts of London.
Of the 25 normal subjects, 11 were boys and 14 girls with a mean age of 162.16 months
(SD=22.52).
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Those subjects who had low scores on a Basic Reading (below 85) and British Picture
Vocabulary (below 80) tests were excluded (see subject characteristics). The results of
memory performance on children of adults with PTSD will be reported later.
7.7.3.2. Materials
7.7.3.2.1. Psychological measures
1- Revised Impact of Event Scale (IES: Horowitz et al., 1979).
2-Revised Children's ManfestAnxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978).
3-Depression Self-Rating Scale (DSRS: Birleson, 1981).
4- British Picture Vocabulary scale (BPVS short form; Dunn et al., 1981).
5- Wechsler ObjectiveReadingDimensions (WORD; Basic Reading, Rust et a!, 1993).
For more details on all psychological measures see Chapter 5.
7.7.3.2.2. Memory words
(1) Recall words: Five different categories of words including: (a) threatening words, (b)
depressed words, (c) PTSD words related to trauma, (d) positive words, and (e)
categorised neutral words were used. Recognition words: 120 words, including the 60
recall words and 60 new words, were randomly mixed.
All of the words were selected from the "The Dictionary of Emotional Words for
Children and Adolescents "which was developed in a separate study (see Chapter 4). The
groups of words were matched on length and frequency both within and across the recall
and recognition sets. In both tasks, the words were presented in fixed random order. The
font of the words was 24 with a visual angle of less than 2 degree. Words are shown in
Appendix 7.1 and 7.2.
7.7.3.2.3. Instrumentation
The tests were conducted using a portable 486 IBM compatible computer with a colour
screen measuring 24 cm by 18 cm. A two switch button-key connected to the computer
allowed subjects' responses in the recognition test to be recorded by the computer. Two
comfortable size chairs for the subject and the experimenter and also two tables of
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appropriate size and height, one for the computer and it's equipment, and another for
writing, were used. The testing room was in a quiet environment away from other
people. The experimenter ensured that heating and lighting of the room were adequate
and that interruptions from outside the room were eliminated.
7.7.4. Procedure
7.7.4.1. Adminstration of the recall test
The test was carried out individually, and the subject was asked to sit in front of the
computer in the testing room without any disruptions. The distance of subjects from the
computer screen was about 60 cm. The subject was asked to read the following
instructions aloud and asked if he/she had any questions about the test. The instructions
were as follows:
"In this program we have some words which will be shown to you on the screen one
after another.
Look at each word, repeat it aloud three times, and think about it. Dose it make sense
to you?
Try to remember each word, because I will ask you to write them down at the end.
This is not like any test that you may have done in your school!"
After ensuring that the test was clear to the subject and that he/she could read the
instruction the presentation of the words began. Each word was presented in the centre
of the screen for 7 seconds. When all of the 60 words had been presented, the subject was
asked to count forward aloud in two's (246 .... ) until the computer beeped.
This counting took 1.5 minutes. The purpose of this counting was to control for primacy
and recency effects of the word list. The Pilot study indicated that without this
distraction, subjects remembered more words from the beginning and the end of the word
list than from the middle. Following the counting, the computer beeped and then the
subject was asked to write down as many words as he/she could remember. The subject
was informed that the spelling of the words was not important and was allowed to write
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down the words for 5 minutes until the computer beeped.
7.7.4.2. Adminstration of the recognition test
Following the recall test, the instructions for the recognition test were shown to the
subject on the computer screen. The subjects were asked to look at each word on the
screen and decide if the word had been shown to them earlier or not. A button box with
two keys labelled "yes" and "no" was placed in front of the subject and allowed the
subjects to respond to each word. All the answers and response latencies were recorded
by the computer. The data for each subject were recorded in a file. Each data file
contained the numbers of correct detections and false detections, correct rejections and
false rejections, mean latency time for responding to each word in each category, and the
standard deviations. The order of word presentation during recall and recognition was
also recorded. The instructions for the recognition task were as follow:
We now have some more words which will again be shown to you on the screen
one after the other.
Look at each word and think if it was one of the words that you were shown earlier.
Ifyou think it was.......................press Yes.
If you think it was not...................press No.
Then 120 recognition words then were shown on the screen of the computer as for the
recall task. The recall and recognition task together took around 20 minutes. At the end
of the main task the subjects were asked to fill out the psychological measures.
7.7.5. Results
7.7.5.1. Subject characteristics
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each group on various
measures of psychopathology for patients and controls (see Table 7.1). One way
ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between the groups for age,
verbal IQ, or reading ability (Appendix 7.3), but the clinical group scored significantly
higher on the measures of depression (F(1, 47) = 12.62, P = 0.0009) and anxiety (F(1, 47)
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= 10.59, P = 0.0021). PTSD patients' scores on the Impact of Event Scale are comparable
with Yule et al.'s studies of child survivors of shipping disasters (Yule et a!., 1992).
Table 7.1 Means and standard deviations (SD) of subject characteristics in the recall
task.
PTSD (N=24)	 CONTROL (N=25)



























IES	 34.78	 18.34	 -	 -
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P <.01; ** = P <0.001
7.7.5.2. Results of the recall test
Words were considered correct only if they were written by the subjects in exactly the
same grammatical form (e.g. if the target word was "worried" then "worry" was not
acceptable) in which they had been presented, but spelling errors were allowed. For each
subject the number of words correctly recalled was determined. Mean numbers of
recalled words by the two groups of subjects and standard deviations are shown in Table
7.2 and Figure 7.1. The numbers of incorrect (false memory) and total (total memory)
recalled words were counted. A one way ANOVA was carried out to compare the mean
numbers of falsely recalled words for the two groups of subjects. The result showed no
differences between PTSD patients and normal control subjects on the number of false
recalled words [F(1, 48) = 0.07, p = 0.745], while PTSD patients recalled less words in





































TOTAL RECALL	 14.60 (sd.3.65)	 11.87 (sd.=4.46)
Mean numbers of words recalled for the five types of words were submitted to a two-
way, Group (2) X Word Type (5) mixed-model ANOVA. The results showed a
significant main effect of Group [F(1, 47) = 4.90, P = 0.032]. The PTSD group
remembered less words than the normal control group. A significant effect was also
found for Word Type [F(4,188) = 7.47, P <0.001], while there was not any significant
interaction between the two groups in recalling the words [F (1, 47) = 1.81, P = 0.129].
To study the Word Type effect a series of paired sample T-tests was carried out between
pairs from the 5 categories of words. The results indicated that all subjects recalled more
neutral words than threat words [t (67) = 7.31, P <0.001], depressed words [t (67) =
2.06, P = 0.043], and happy words [t (67) = 4.09, P <0.001]. They also recalled more
trauma words than threat words [t (67) = 5.82, P <0.001], and happy words [t (67) = 3.5,
P <0.00 1], and finally all subjects remembered more depressed words than happy [t (67)
= 2.22, P < 0.03], and threat words [t (67) = 4.81, P < 0.00 1].
Therefore, the data revealed that PTSD patients did not show any bias towards trauma-
related or other types of words relative to controls, but that they generally suffer from
relatively poor explicit memory which is consistent with the findings with PTSD adults
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(Zeitlin &McNally et a!., 1990).
7.7.5.3. Differential index
This method was used by Zeitlin and McNally (1990). A differential index was computed
by subtracting the mean number of recalled neutral (animal) words from the mean
number of recalled words from each category of emotional words i.e. happy, depression-
related, trauma-related and threat words. These computed variables were compared
across the two groups in a full factorial Word Type (4) X Group (2) ANOVA. The results
showed a trend for a main effect of Group [F(1, 49) = 3.11, P = 0.084], while the
interaction did not reach significance [F(3, 141) = 1.47, P = 0.226]. There was also again
the same strong significant effect of Word Type [F(3, 141) = 6.57, P <0.001]. Figure 7.2
shows the differential indices of recalled emotional words in PTSD patients and normal
control subjects.
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7.7.5.4. Results of the recognition test
Signal detection theoiy (Hochhaus, 1972) was applied to analyse the data of the
recognition memory test. According to signal detection theory, two measures or factors
are involved in recognition memory tasks.
1- Discriminability measure (d'): This measure indicates the ability of the subject to
discriminate between the old target items and the new distractors, which is independent
of response bias factors. High values of d' show that the subject can discriminate old
targets from new targets. This means that subjects have a better ratio of "Yes" responses
to old items and "No" responses to the new items.
2- Response Bias (Beta): This factor is assumed to reflect the criterion adopted by the
subject; in other words, the subject's degree of caution in deciding whether an item is new
or old. High values of Beta indicate the subjects's willingness to say "Yes" to the items.
According to this model (e.g., Swets, 1964), estimations of d' and Beta can be calculated
on the basis of two other parameters, hit rate (HIR) and false alarm rate (FA). FIR is the
proportion of items presented which are confirmed by the subject and FA is the
proportion of times that an item is reported when no such item was actually presented.
The HR and FA are transformed to d' and Beta values by the following formula:
d' = ABS (HR) - ABS(FA)
Beta = ORD(HR)IORD(FA)
ABS = The distance from the mean to the point of dichotomy in the standard normal
distribution.
ORD = The ordinate at the point of dichotomy in the standard normal distribution
(Hochhaus, 1972).
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For each stimulus type the hit rates and false alarm rates were calculated, based on the
number of correct detections from old words and the number of false detections from the
new words as a proportion of the number of stimulus and filler words respectively. The
means and standard diviations for the two groups are shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Proportions of hit rate (HR) and false alarms (FA) for PTSD and control
subjects in the recognition memory test
TYPE OF WORD
NEUTRAL HAPPY SAD PTSD THREAT
HR MEAN	 0.795	 0.719	 0.753 0.774	 0.791
PTSD	 SD	 0.190	 0.215	 0.200 0.180	 0.115
FA MEAN	 0.167	 0.180	 0.333 0.310	 0.357
SD	 0.211	 0.230	 0.212 0.238	 0.284
HR MEAN	 0.843	 0.740	 0.793 0.797	 0.693
CONTROL	 SD	 0.132	 0.154	 0.123 0.160	 0.153
FA MEAN	 0.107	 0.137	 0.197 0.278	 0.235
SD	 0.111	 0.104	 0.131 0.251	 0.124
HR = hit rate, FA = false alarm
d' and Beta values were calculated according to hit rates and false alarm rates for the five
categories of words (neutral, happy, depression-related, threat and trauma-related). Table
7.4 and Figures 7.3 and 7.4 shows the d' and Beta valus.
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Table 7.4 Means and standard deviations (SD) of d' and Beta values for PTSD
patients and normal control subjects
TYPE OF WORD
NEUTRAL HAPPY SAD PTSD THREAT
d'	 MEAN	 2.21	 1.85	 1.33 1.61	 1.36
PTSD	 SD	 1.62	 1.41	 1.17 1.29	 1.28
Beta MEAN	 2.98	 3.76	 0.92 1.84	 3.27
SD	 3.98	 5.02	 0.54 2.81	 4.87
d'	 MEAN	 2.67	 2.04	 1.98 1.63	 1.37
CONTROL	 SD	 0.96	 0.93	 0.80 1.03	 0.49
Beta MEAN	 3.45	 3.22	 2.21 1.16	 1.31
SD	 4.14	 4.56	 3.53	 1.12	 0.70
7.7.5.5. d' analyses
A repeated measures, ANOVA was carried out for Group (2) X Word Type (5) for d'
variables to test the sensitivity of the recognition performance. The results indicated no
significant main effect of Group [F(1, 47) = 0.93, P = 0.339] while there were a trend
towards an interaction of Word Type X Group [F(1, 188) = 2.10 , P = 0.083], and a main
effect of Word Type [F(4, 188) = 18.19, P <0.0011. To examine the trend towards a
significant interaction, a series of two way ANOVAs of Group (2) X Word Type (2) was
performed to compare the two groups of subjects across each emotional word type
relative to neutral words. The results indicated no significant main effects of Group nor
any interactions between all categories of emotional words compared with neutral words.
There was only a trend towards a main effect of Group for d' values of depression-related








































To test the simple main effect of Word Type, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried
out across all 5 categories of words. The results indicated that the subjects recognised
more neutral words than threat words [t (48) = 7.75, P <0.001], depressed-related words
[t (48) = 5.46, P <0.001], happy words [t (48) = 3.60, P < 0.001], and trauma words [t
(48) = 6.03, P <0.001]. The subjects also recognised more happy words than trauma-
related words [t (48) = 2.68, P <0.01], and threat words [t (48) = 4.04, P <0.0011.
7.7.5.6. Beta analyses
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with Group (2) X Word Type (5) to
compare the Beta values across the two groups of subjects (PTSD patients and normal
control subjects). The results revealed neither a main effect of Group nor any interaction
(Appendix 7.3), but a significant of effect Word Type was found [F(4, 188) = 3.62, P =
0.007] between the two groups.
To examine the Word Type effect, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out across
all 5 categories of words for Beta values. The results indicated that the subjects had
response bias more towards neutral words than depression-related words [t (48) = 2.59,
P <0.05], and trauma-related words [t (48) = 2.75, P <0.01]. They also had response bias
towards happy words more than depression-related words [t (48) = 2.44, P <0.05] and
trauma-related words [t (48) = 2.87, P < 0.01]. Figure 7.4 shows the Beta values of the
PTSD patients and normal control subjects.
7.7.5.7. Type of trauma effects
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each sub-group of patients
(RTA: road traffic accidents & PV: personal violence) on various measures of
psychopathology. One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences
between the two sub-groups for verbal IQ, reading ability and the Impact of Event Scale
(lIES) (Appendix 7.4) but, the personal violence group scored significantly higher on the
measures of depression [F(l, 22) 11.74, P = 0.0024] and anxiety [F(1,22) = 4.69, P =
0.04 1] than the road traffic accident patients. The personal violence group was also
significantly older than the road traffic accident group [F(l,22) = 25.01, P = 0.0001].
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Table 7.5 indicates the means and standard deviations of the psychological scales for the
two types of trauma.
Table 7.5 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for two sub-
group of PTSD patients (RTA: road traffic accident and PV: personal violence)
RTA (N=15)	 PV (N=9)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
SEX(M:F)	 8:7	 -	 5:4	 -
AGE (months)	 140.25	 26.85	 185.44	 10.70	 **
WORD	 99.25	 11.89	 100.44	 15.60 n.s.
BPVS	 98.17	 14.29	 91.56	 19.00	 n.s.
DSRS	 11.67	 4.60	 19.11	 7.20
RCMAS	 14.42	 7.38	 19.33	 6.00	 *
IES	 33.83	 13.8	 39.67	 23.90	 n.s.
AVOIDANCE	 17.83	 8.65	 21.56	 12.30 n.s.
INTRUSION	 16.08	 6.61	 18.11	 12.00	 n.s.
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P <0.05; ** = P < 0.01
Mean numbers and standard deviations of recalled words by the two sub-groups of
patients are shown in the Table 7.6 and Figure 7.5.
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Table 7.6 Means and standard deviations (SD) of recalled words by two sub-groups of
PTSD patients (RTA: road traffic accident & PV: personal violence)







2.33 (SD = 1.76)
2.47 (SD = 1.36)
1.20 (SD = 1.15)
3.20 (SD = 2.11)








TOTAL RECALL	 11.20 (SD = 5.25)	 13.00 (SD =2.60)
To study the differences between the two types of traumatised patients (RTA and PV) on
the recall test, a repeated measures Word Type (5) X Group (2) ANOVA was performed.
There was no significant main effect of Group nor interaction or Word Type effect
(Appendix 7.5)
A one Way ANOVA was undertaken to investigate the difference on false recalls
between the two sub-groups of subjects. The results indicated that there was a significant
difference between the two groups on the recall of false memories [F(1, 22) = 9.90 , P =















A repeated measures, ANOVA was carried out for Group (2) X Word Type (5) within
subjects for d' variables to test the sensitivity of the recognition performance across
PTSD patients who were involved in RTA and PV. The results indicated no significant
main effect of Group nor any interaction (Appendix 7.6), but a Word Type effect [F(4,
88) = 6.05, P <0.001]. To test the Word Type effect, a series of paired sample t-tests
was carried out across all 5 categories of words. The results indicated that all PTSD
patients recognised more neutral words than threat words [t (43) = 4.29, P <0.0011,
depressed-related words [t (23) = 3.70, P <0.001], and trauma-related words [t (23) =
3.89, P <0.001]. The subjects also recognised more happy words than threat words [t
(23) 2.13, P <0.05], depression-related words [t (23) = 2.32, P <0.05], and trauma-
related words [F(23) = 2.13, P <0.05].
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted of Group (2) X Word Type (5) to compare
the Beta values across the two sub-groups of patients. The results revealed neither a main
effect of Group nor any interaction or Word Type effect (Appendix 7.6).
7.7.5.8. Developmental analyses
Is the memory performance in young patients with PTSD affected by developmental
aspects? To examine this point, all subjects were divided into two sub-groups, those
below 13 years old and those over 13 years old. Subject characteristics for both sub-
groups of patients and controls are shown in Tables 7.7 and 7.8.
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Table 7.7 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for PTSD
and normal subjects (aged under 13 years old)
PTSD (N = 12)	 NORMAL (N =7)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
AGE (months)	 122.27	 16.27	 133.71	 17.04	 n.s.
WORD	 97.72
	












RCMAS	 12.82	 6.73	 9.28	 1.98	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions * = P <0.05
Table 7.8 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for PTSD
and normal subjects (aged over 13 years old)
PTSD (N = 12)	 NORMAL (N = 13)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD












	 9.23	 5.79	 **
RCMAS	 18.00	 7.77	 10.23	 6.70	 **
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions.	 * = P < .01, ** P = <.00 1
One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between the two
groups (aged under 13 years) on age, verbal IQ, reading ability, or anxiety scale scores
(Appendix 7.7), but a significant differences between PTSD and control subgroups was
found on depression scale scores [F(1, 18) 5.69, P .029].
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Five control subjects (over 13 years old) were omitted to match the groups. One way
ANOVA indicated that there were no significant differences between the two groups
(aged over 13 years) on age, verbal IQ, and reading ability (Appendix 7.8), but there were
significant differences on the anxiety scale {F(1, 24) = 7.19, P = 0.0 13], and the
depression scale [F(1, 24) = 8.91, P = 0.006].
Regarding the under 13 year old subjects, the means of the recalled words for the five
types were submitted to a two-way, Group (2) X WordType (5) mixed-model ANOVA.
The results showed neither a main effect of Group, or any interaction effect (Appendix
7.9), but a main effect of Word Type was found [F(4, 68) = 5.01, P = .0011.
To examine the Word Type effect, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out across
all 5 categories of words. The results indicated that the children under 13 years old
remembered more neutral words than threat words [t (18) = 3.96, P <0.001], and
depression-related words more than threat words [t (18) = 3.10, P <0.006]. They also
remembered more happy words than threat words [t (18) = 2.20, P <0.05]. Finally all
children recalled more trauma-related words than threat words [t (18) = 4.62, P <0.001].
A similar repeated measures Group (2) X Word Type (5) ANOVA was submitted to
compare the groups over 13 years old. The results showed no main effect of Group [F(1,
28) = 0.40, P = 0.534], but a significant interaction [F(4, 92) = 2.81, P = 0.03], and a
main effect of Word Type [F(4, 92) = 5.05, P = .00 1] were found. To deconstruct this
interaction a series of Group (2) X Word Type (2) ANOVAs was performed to compare
neutral words with each type of emotional word. The results revealed two trends towards
an interaction when neutral words were compared with threat [F(1, 23) = 3.69, P = 0.067]
and trauma [F(1, 23) = 2.99, P = 0.097] words. To examine these trends a series of
ANOVAs was carried out across each sub-group separately to compare neutral words
with threat and trauma-related words. The results indicated only a significant effect
across controls for threat [F(1, 17) = 16.46, P = 0.001] trauma-related words [F(1, 17) =
4.71, P = 0.045] compared with neutral words. These fmdings revealed that normal
controls remembered more neutral words than threat and trauma-related words in the
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over 13 year group.
Two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted between Group (2) X Word Type (5)
to compare d' and Beta values across the two sub-groups of subjects aged under 13 years
old. The results revealed neither a main effect of Group for d' or Beta, nor any
interactions or Word Type effect for Beta values (Appendix 7.10), but a Word Type
effect ford' [F(4, 68) = 11.59, P <0.001] was found.To examine this Word Type effect,
a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out across all 5 categories of words. The
results indicated that the children under 13 years old recognised more neutral words than
threat words [t (18) = 4.92, P <0.0011, depression-related words [t (18) = 4.43, P <
0.001], happy words [t (18) = 2.33, P = 0.05], and trauma-related words [t (18) = 5.33,
P <0.001]. They also recognised more threat words than depression-related words [t
(18) = 2.21, P = 0.04], and happy words than trauma-related words [t (18) = 2.37, P =
0.029].
Another set of ANOVAs was carried out between Group (2) X Word Type (5) to
compare d' and Beta values across PTSD patients and controls over 13 years old. The
results showed no main effect of Group for d'or Beta values nor interactions for d'and
Beta (Appendix 7.11). However, a Word Type effect ford' [F(4, 112) = 8.05, P = 0.00 1]
was found. To test the Word Type effect a series of paired sample t-tests was counducted
across all 5 categories of words. The results indicated that all the adolescents over 13
years old recognised more neutral words than threat words [t (29) = 5.97, P <0.001],
depression-related words [t (29) = 3.51, P < 0.001], happy words [t (29) = 2.74, P <
0.01], and trauma-related words [t (29) = 3.78, P <0.001]. They also recognised more
threat words than happy words [t (29) = 3.52, P <0.001].
7.7.5.9. Sex effect
Another question that remains is whether the memory performance in young patients with
PTSD is affected by their sex? To examine this point, PTSD subjects were divided into
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Table 7.9: Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for boys
and girls with PTSD
BOYS(N=13)	 GIRLS(N=11)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
AGE (months)	 155.42	 33.25	 153.63	 37.09	 n.s.
INTRUSION	 13.42	 9.38	 20.40	 7.32	 n.s.
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale including Avoidance and Intrusion Subscales, RCMAS =
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British
Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions. * =
P < .05
One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between boys and
girls on age, verbal IQ, depression scores, anxiety scores, Impact of Event Scale, or
intrusion subscale scores (Appendix 7.12), but the results indicated significant
differences on reading ability [F(1, 22) = 4.54, p = 0.044], and the avoidance subscale of
the Impact of Event Scale [F(1, 22) = 5.64, P = .027], with girls obtaining higher scores
than boys. The girls with PTSD also obtained a near-significantly higher scores on the
anxiety scale [[F(1, 22) = 4.16, P = 0.054], Impact of Event scores [F(1,22) = 3.767, P
= 0.066], and intrusion sub-scale of the ES than boys with PTSD [F(1, 22) = 3.67, P =
0.07].
Regarding the recall task, means of the recalled words across the five word types were
submitted to a two-way, Group (2) X Word Type (5) mixed-model ANOVA. The results
showed neither a main effect of Group, or any interaction (Appendix 7.13), but a main
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effect of Word Type was found [F(4, 88) = 3.87, P = 0.006].
To examine the Word Type effect, a series of paired sample t-tests was carried out across
all 5 categories of words. The results indicated that all PTSD patients remembered more
neutral words than threat words [t (23) = 2.83, P <0.01]. PTSD patients also recalled
more depression-related words than threat words [t (23) = 2.44, P <0.05]. They also
remembered more trauma-related words than happy words [t (23) = 3.24, P <0.01] and
threat words [t {23) = 3.45, P = 0.0 1].
Two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for Group (2) X Word Type (5)
compare d' and Beta values across boys and girls. The results revealed neither main
effects of Group, nor any interactions ford' and Beta nor any Word Type effect of Beta
values (Appendix 7.14). However, a Word Type effect ford' [F(4, 88) = 7.07, P = 0.00 1]
was found. To examine the Word Type effect, a series of paired sample t-tests was
carried out across all 5 categories of words. The results indicated that the PTSD patients
recognised more neutral words than threat words [t (23) = 4.29, P <0.001], depression-
related words [t (23) = 3.71, P <0.01], and trauma-related words [t (23) = 3.89, P <
0.001]. They also recognised more happy words than threat words [t (23) = 2.13, P <
0.05], depression-related words [t (23) = 2.32, P <0.05], and trauma-related words [t (23)
= 2.13, P <0.05].
7.7.5.10. Correlational analyses
A summary of correlational analyses between psychological measures and different types
of words is as follows:
1- Correlational analysis showed a significant correlation between the number of threat
words recalled and the IES and the intrusion sub-scale of the IES.
2- There was bigly significant correlation between the WORD Basic Reading Scale and
recall of trauma-related words.
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3- There were also a trend for a correlation between recalled threat-related words and the
RCMAS anxiety scores and the DSRS depression scores.
4- A negative trend for a correlation between d' of threat words and RCMAS anxiety
scores was found. There were also a trend of a correlation between d' of depression-
related words with DSRS depression scores and RCMAS anxiety scores.
5- A strong correlation between number of trauma recalled words and reading ability
when verbal IQ was controlled for was found. A negative trend for a correlation between
number of happy recalled words and DSRS depression scores was also found.
6- DSRS depression scores were also positively correlated with Beta values of happy
words. Tables 7.10, 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14 show the correlational analyses.
Table 7.10 Correlations between psychological measures and number of the recalled
words across all subjects (N = 49) (df = 46)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 0.20	 0.10	 0.48	 0.06	 0.40
P	 0.18	 0.51	 0.001	 0.69	 0.005**
BPVS	 0.21	 0.18	 0.01	 -0.03	 0.03
P	 0.15	 0.21	 0.93	 0.83	 0.83
DSRS	 -0.23	 -0.13	 0.27	 0.13	 0.04
P	 0.10	 0.35	 0.06*	 0.39	 0.79
RCMAS	 -0.10	 -0.12	 0.24	 0.11	 0.11
P	 0.49	 0.40	 0.09*	 0.47	 0.43
WORD	 0.24	 0.12	 0.12	 0.38	 0.14
P	 0.10	 0.43	 0.42	 0.007**	 0.34
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P <0.05 & ** = P <0.01
257
Table 7.11 Correlations between scores IES including Avoidance and Intrusion
Subscales & number of the recalled words across PTSD patients (N = 24) (df = 22)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed Threat	 Trauma	 Neutral
IES	 -0.02	 -0.08	 0.43	 0.17	 0.08
P	 0.94	 0.70	 0.04	 0.43	 0.73
AVOIDANCE	 -0.09	 -0.04	 0.35	 0.17	 0.10
P	 0.70	 0.86	 0.10	 0.46	 0.65
INTRUSION	 -0.09	 -0.04	 0.42	 0.17	 0.01
P	 0.70	 0.86	 0.05*	 0.46	 0.96
Table 7.12 Partial correlations between psychological measures and number of the
recalled words, controlling for those measures across all subjects (N = 49) (df = 46)
WORD TYPE
Controlling Happy Depressed Threat Trauma Neutral
DSRS	 RCMAS	 -0.25	 -0.06	 0.12	 0.07	 -0.07
P	 0.09*	 0.66	 0.45	 0.64	 0.61
RCMAS DSRS	 0.12	 -0.03	 0.06	 0.9	 0.13
P	 0.40	 0.84	 0.68	 0.91	 0.37
WORD BPVS	 0.14	 0.01	 0.14	 0.50	 0.15
P	 0.34	 0.95	 0.35	 0.001	 0.30
BPVS	 WORD	 0.09	 0.14	 -0.07	 -0.35	 -0.07
P	 0.56	 0.34	 0.62	 0.13	 0.65
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05
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Table 7.13 Correlations between psychological measures and d' value across all
subjects (N = 49) (df = 47)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed	 Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 -0.09	 -0.10	 -0.20	 -0.05	 -0.21
P	 0.53	 0.50	 0.16	 0.73	 0.16
BPVS	 -0.06	 0.02	 0.14	 -0.13	 0.01
P	 0.68	 0.88	 0.35	 0.37	 0.96
DSRS	 -0.01	 -0.24	 -0.21	 -0.02	 -0.15
P	 0.99	 0.09	 0.14	 0.86	 0.31
RCMAS	 -0.10	 -0.26	 -0.28	 0.09	 -0.23
P	 0.48	 0.07*	 0.05**	 0.52	 0.10
WORD	 -0.13	 -0.23	 -0.14	 -0.22	 0.02
P	 0.36	 0.11	 0.35	 0.14	 0.91
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05 & ** = P < 0.01
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Table 7.14 Correlations between psychological measures and Beta value across all
subjects (N = 49) (df = 47)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 0.08	 0.04	 -0.17	 0.05	 0.11
P	 0.57	 0.80	 0.23	 0.76	 0.39
BPVS	 0.03	 -0.08	 -0.12	 -0.11	 -0.05
P	 0.83	 0.59	 0.40	 0.45	 0.68
DSRS	 0.28	 -0.11	 0.09	 -0.08	 -0.09
P	 ØØ5*	 0.43	 0.53	 0.59	 0.45
RCMAS	 0.19	 -0.14	 0.11	 0.12	 -0.02
P	 0.15	 0.35	 0.45	 0.39	 0.88
WORD	 0.23	 0.12	 0.05	 -0.15	 -0.03
P	 0.10	 0.39	 0.79	 0.29	 0.73
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05
7.8. EXPERIMENT (2)
MEMORY BIAS (RECALL & RECOGNITION EFFECTS) IN CHILDREN OF
ADULTS WITH PTSD
7.8.1. Hypothesis
Asymptomatic children of parents with PTSD will show a significant memory bias
towards negative words, particularly trauma-related words, relative to neutral words and
to normal-control subjects.
7.8.2. Method
The methodology of this experiment including design, materials, and procedures is the
same as for Experiment 1.
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7.8.3. Subjects
Eigheen children and adolescents (age 9 to 17) whose parents met Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd Edition, DSM Ill-R American Psychiatric
Association, 1987) and International Classification of Diseases (World Health
Organization, ICD-1O; 1992) criteria for PTSD were matched on age, sex, verbal IQ and
reading ability with a group of children and adolescents without any psychiatric problems
participated in Experiment 2.
All the parents with PTSD were involved in Road Traffic incidents or Personal
Violence. All the adult patients and their children were introduced by the clinicians of
the Psychology Department of the Institute of Psychiatry. Of the 18 children of adults
with PTSD, 9 were boys and 9 girls with a mean age of 154.89 months (SD 35.33). The
control group was the same as used in Experiment 1.
Those who had low scores on basic reading (below 85) and British Picture Vocabulary
(below 80) tests were excluded (see subject characteristics).
7.8.4. Results
7.8.5. Subject characteristics
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each group on various
measures of psychopathology (see Table 7.15). One way ANOVAs showed that there
were no significant differences between the groups on age, verbal IQ, reading ability, or
anxiety as measured by the RCMAS (Appendix 7.15), but the children of adults with
PTSD scored non-significantly higher on the depression scale [F(l,41 ) 3.56, P =
0.066] than did the control group.
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Table 7.15 Means and standard deviations (SD) of the psychological scales for
children of adults with PTSD (CH.PTSD) and normal control subjects
CH.PTSD(N = 18)	 NORMAL (N=25)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN SD
SEX(M:F)	 9:9	 -	 11:14	 -
AGE (months)	 154.89	 35.33	 162.16	 23.00 n.s.
WORD	 99.50	 6.29	 99.36	 15.00 n.s.
BPVS	 100.44	 14.45	 95.90	 17.00 n.s.
DSRS	 11.39	 5.98	 8.40	 4.40	 *
RCMAS	 11.56	 7.01	 9.49	 5.00	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulaiy Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.1
7.8.6. Results of the free recall test
As in Experiment 1 the number of words correctly recalled by each subject was
calculated. Means and standard deviations of the recalled words by the two groups of
subjects are shown in Table 7.16 and Figure 7.6. Numbers of incorrectly (false memory)
recalled words were counted. One way ANOVAs were carried out to compare the mean
numbers of false recalled words and total memory for the two groups of subjects. The
results showed no differences between the children of adults with PTSD and the normal
control subjects (Appendix 7.16).
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Table 7.1 6-Means and standard deviations (SD) of the recalled words by children of





















TOTAL RECALL	 14.60 (sd.3.65)	 13.78 (sd.=4.04
Means of the numbers of recalled words were submitted to a two-way, Group (2) X Word
Type (5) mixed model ANOVA. The results showed neither a main effect of Group, nor
any interaction effects (Appendix 7.17). There was a significant Word Type effect
[F(4,164) = 13.02, P<0.001] which showed that overall the subjects performed differently
across different types of words.
Tests for simple effects of Word Type indicated that subjects recalled more neutral words
than depressed words [t (43) 2.8, P <0.008], happy words [t (43) = 3.91, P <0.001],
and threat words [t (43) = 7.21, P < 0.001]. Both groups also remembered more trauma
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7.8.7. Results of the recognition test
As with Experiment 1, signal detection theory (Hochhaus,1972) was applied to the data
from the recognition memory test. For each stimulus type (neutral, happy, depression-
related, trauma-related and threat) the hit rate and false alarm rate scores were counted
from the number of correct detections and false detections as proportions of the numbers
of stimulus and filler words respectively. The means and standard diviations of hit rates
and false alarm rates for the two groups are shown in Table 7.17.
Table 7.17 Proportions of hit and false alarms for children of adults with PTSD
(CH.PTSD) and control subjects in the recognition memory test
TYPE OF WORD
NEUTRAL HAPPY SAD PTSD THREAT
HR Mean	 0.778	 0.708	 0.708 0.74 1	 0.662
CH.PTSD	 SD	 0.198	 0.167	 0.238 0.217	 0.209
FA Mean	 0.162	 0.148	 0.301 0.278	 0.281
SD	 0.231	 0.209	 0.169 0.251	 0.170
HA Mean	 0.843	 0.740	 0.793 0.797	 0.693
CONTROLS	 SD	 0.132	 0.154	 0.123 0.160	 0.153
FA Mean	 0.107	 0.137	 0.197 0.278	 0.235
SD	 0.111	 0.104	 0.131 0.251	 0.124
HR = Hit rate & FA = False alarm
The d' and Beta values were also calculated according to the hit rates and false alarm
rates using the formulae applied in Experiment 1. These are shown in Table 7.18.
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Table 7.18 Means and standard deviations (SD) of d' and Beta values for children of
adults with PTSD (CH.PTSD) and normal control subjects
TYPES OF WORDS
NEUTRAL HAPPY SAD PTSD THREAT
d'	 Mean	 2.09	 1.84	 1.30 1.55	 1.09
CH.PTSD	 SD	 1.69	 1.02	 1.04 1.24	 0.98
Beta Mean	 3.45	 3.60	 0.91 1.14	 1.12
SD	 3.63	 4.32	 0.55 0.67	 0.42
d'	 Mean	 2.67	 2.04	 1.98 1.63	 1.37
CONTROLS	 SD	 0.96	 0.93	 0.80 1.03	 0.49
Beta Mean	 3.45	 3.22	 2.21 1.16	 1.31
SD	 4.14	 4.56	 3.53	 1.12	 0.70
7.8.9. d' analyses
A repeated measures (ANOVA) was carried out between Group (2) X Word Type (5) for
d' to test the sensitivity of the recognition performance. The results indicated neither a
significant main effect of Group nor any interaction (Appendix 7.18), but a main effect
of Word Type was found [F(1, 43) = 18.83, P <0.001].
To verify the main effect of Word Type a series oft-tests was performed across pairs
from the five categories of words. The results indicated that subjects exhbited more
senstivity in recognition for neutral words than threat words [t (43) = 8, P <0.0011,
depressed words [t (43) = 5.52, P <0.001], happy (positive) words [t (43) = 2.90, P =
0.006] and trauma words [t (43) = 4.97, P < 0.001]. The subjects were also more
sensitive to happy (positive) words than threat words [t (43) = 5.94, P <0.001], and
trauma words [t(43) = 2.37, P = 0.022]. Figure 7.7 shows the d'values of the children
of adults with PTSD and normal control subjects.
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A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted between Group (2) X Word Type (5) to
compare the Beta values across the two groups of subjects. The results revealed neither
a main effect of Group nor any interaction (Appendix 7.19), but there was again a main
effect by Word Type [F(1, 43) = 7.07, P < 0.00 1]. Figure 7.8 shows the Beta values of
the two groups.
Simple t-tests to examine the effect of Word Type indicated that subjects had higher Beta
values for to neutral words than threat words [t (43) = 3.77, P = .001], depressed words
[t (43) = 2.67, P = .011], trauma words [t (43) 4.02, P = .000], and happy words [t (43)
= 3. 36, P = .002]. They also had higher Beta values for happy words than depressed
words [t (43) = 2.15, P = .037], and trauma-related words [t (43) = 3.46, p = .00 1].
In sum the results of these two analyses ford' and Beta indicated that children of adults
with PTSD do not show any selective memory bias on the recognition task. These
findings confirmed the results of the recall task.
7.8.11. Correlational analyses
Correlational analysis with the data from children of PTSD indicated the following
results:
1- Significant correlation between neutral recalled words and age and RCMAS anxiety
scores was found. There was also a trend towards a correlation between the number of
neutral recalled words and depression scale.
2- A negative trend towards a correlation was indicated between d' value of trauma
words and Basic Reading Scale.
3- The results showed a nearly significant negative correlations between British Picture
Vocabulary scores and d' values of threat words, depressed-related words, and trauma-
related words.
4- Regarding Beta values, negative correlations between Beta values of trauma-related




























5- Finally, the results revealed a trend towards a correlation between Beta values of threat
words and Basic Reading Scale scores. Tables 7.19 and 7.20 show the correlational
analyses.
6- There were negative correlations between Beta values of trauma-related words and
verbal IQ and reading ability.
Table 7.19 Correlations between psychological measures and numbers of recalled
words across all children of adults with PTSD and normal controls (N = 43) (df = 41)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 0.18	 0.26	 -0.03	 0.03	 0.37
P	 0.25	 0.09	 0.83	 0.85	 0.015**
BPVS	 0.18	 -0.09	 0.09	 -0.07	 0.24
P	 0.25	 0.57	 0.54	 0.64	 0.12
DSRS	 -0.04	 0.04	 0.07	 0.14	 0.27
P	 0.81	 0.81	 0.96	 0.37	 0.08*
RCMAS	 0.08	 0.02	 0.14	 0.23	 0.41
P	 0.62	 0.88	 0.38	 0.14	 O.006**
WORD	 0.13	 0.06	 0.08	 0.23	 0.13
P	 0.38	 0.71	 0.59	 0.13	 0.40
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P < 0.05 & ** = P <0.01
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Table 7.20 Correlations between psychological measures and d' value across all
subjects (N = 43) (df = 41)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed	 Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 -0.21	 -0.11	 -0.04	 -0.10	 -0.20
P	 0.17	 0.49	 0.80	 0.54	 0.19
BPVS	 -0.25	 -0.29	 -0.29	 -0.29	 0.10
P	 0.1*	 0.06*	 0.06*	 0.06*	 0.54
DSRS	 -0.02	 -0.09	 -0.06	 -0.14	 -0.01
P	 0.89	 0.57	 0.68	 0.36	 0.96
RCMAS	 -0.02	 -0.08	 -0.06	 -0.14	 -0.19
P	 0.88	 0.62	 0.70	 0.39	 0.90
WORD	 -0.19	 -0.1	 -0.10	 -0.28	 0.11
P	 0.25	 0.54	 0.50	 0.07*	 0.50
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. $ = P < 0.05 & 	 = P <0.01
271
Table 7.21 Correlations between psychological measures and Beta value across all
subjects(N=43)(df41)
WORD TYPE
Happy	 Depressed	 Threat	 Trauma Neutral
AGE	 -0.09	 0.02	 0.03	 -0.01	 0.12
P	 0.58	 0.88	 0.84	 0.97	 0.44
BPVS	 0.22	 0.07	 -0.14	 -0.30	 -0.24
P	 0.45	 0.64	 0.38	 Ø•Ø5*	 0.12
DSRS	 0.17	 0.06	 0.06	 -0.07	 -0.02
P	 0.28	 0.07	 0.69	 0.63	 0.88
RCMAS	 -0.08	 -0.07	 -0.07	 -0.26	 0.08
P	 0.61	 0.68	 0.64	 0.09	 0.62
WORD	 0.18	 0.12	 0.04	 -0.31	 -0.30
P	 0.23	 0.43	 0.79	 0.05*	 0.05*
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions. * = P <0.05 & 	 = p <o.oi
7.9. COMPARISON ACROSS THREE GROUPS:
CHILDREN WITH PTSD, CHILDREN OF ADULTS WITH PTSD, & NORMAL
CONTROLS
Analyses were carried out to compare the performance of the three groups on the recall
and recognition tasks. A repeated measures ANOVA between Group (3) X Word Type
(5) was conducted. The results showed neither a main effect of Group nor an intreaction
(Appendix 7.20), but a main effect of Word Type [F(2, 64) = 15.47, P <0.0011 was
found.
To examine this effect, a series oft-tests was carried out. The results indicated that all
subjects recalled more neutral words than depression-related words [t (67) = 2.06, P =
0.043], happy words [t (67) = 4.09, P = .000], and threat words [t (67) = 7.31, P < 0.001].
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The subjects also recalled more trauma-related words than happy words [t (67) = 3.50,
P = .001], and threat words [t (67) = 5.82, P < 0.001], while they remembered more
happy words than threat words [t (67) = 2.22, P = .03], and depression-related words [t
(67) = 2.22, p = .03].
Two sets of repeated measures ANOVA between Group (3) X Word Types were carried
out to compare the three groups on d' and Beta values. The results showed neither main
effects of Group ford' and Beta nor any interactions (Appendix 7.21). But the results
revealed significant main effects of Word Type ford' [F(4, 256) = 24.93, P <0.001] and
for Beta [F(4, 256) = 7.26, P <0.0011.
To examine the Word Type effects, two series oft-tests were carried ou. Regarding d',
the results indicated that all subjects recognized more neutral words than threat words [t
(66) = 8.92, P <0.001], depression-related words [t (66) = 6.55, P < 0.001], happy words
[t (66) = 3.54, P = .001], and trauma-related words [t (66) = 6.21, P <0.001]. The
subjects also recalled more depression-related words than threat words [t (66) = 2.64, P
= 0.01]. They also recognized more happy words than threat words [t (66) = 5.58, P <
0.001], depression-related words [t (66) = 2.99, P = .004], and trauma-related words [t
(66) = 3.04, P = 0.003]. Finally all subjects recognized more trauma-related words than
threat words [t (66) = 3.02, P 0.004] and happy words [t (66) 3.04, P = 0.003].
The results of second series of t-test show that all the subjects had more response bias
towards neutral words than threat words [t (66) 2.12, P = 0.038], depression-related
words [t (66) = 3.69, P <0.001], and trauma-related words {t (66) = 3.72, P <0.001]. All
the subjects also had response bias more towards happy words than threat words [t (66)
= 2.62, P = 0.011], depression-related words {t (66) 3.38, P = 0.00 1], and trauma-related
words [t (66) = 3.72, P < 0.00 1].
Correlational analyses indicated significant relationship between the recall of neutral
words and age [r (df = 67) = 0.39, P = 0.001], between RCMAS scores and recall of
threat words [r (df = 67) = 0.24, P = 0.048], and between WORD scores and the recall
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of trauma-related words [r (df = 67) = 0.32, P = 0.008].
7.10. Discussion
The main aim of this chapter was to study explicit memory bias in young people with
PTSD and children of adults with PTSD. Explicit memory is defmed as a conscious
recollection of previous experiences by a direct test such as recall or recognition. In the
current study recall and recognition paradigms were used to assess explicit memory bias
for negative emotional material in three groups of children and adolescents: (1) children
and adolescents with PTSD due to road traffic accidents or personal violence; (2)
children of adult patients (parents) who suffer from PTSD, but whose children do not
(their children were not involved in the accident or trauma); and, (3) normal control
subjects.
The results of Experiment 1 of the current study indicated that children and adolescents
with PTSD generally recalled less words than control subjects but this was not affected
by word type. All subjects recalled more neutral words than threat and happy words.
They also remembered more trauma-related and depression-related words than happy and
threat words. The results of the recognition test revealed that only control subjects
recognised more depressed words than PTSD patients but not significantly. Both groups
were sensitive towards all types of words in the same way. The results also indicated that
the two sub-groups of PTSD patients which were involved in the road traffic or personal
violence accidents performed in the same way on the recall task, but that the PV sub-
group produced more falsely recalled words than the RTA sub-group. Also both RTA
and PV sub-groups performed in the same way on the recognition test, although both of
them recognised more neutral words than other types of words. There was not any
difference between PTSD children and normal subjects (under 13 years) on the recall and
recognition task, while control adolescents remembered more neutral words than
adolescents with PTSD. Regarding sex effects, the results did not show any differences
between boys and girls with PTSD on the recall or recognition tasks. Finally,
correlational analysis revealed a significant relationship between reading ability and the
recall of trauma-related words which has confirmed by partial correlational analysis when
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verbal IQ was controlled. Significant correlations between IES, Intrusion sub-scale of
IES and the number of recalled threat words were found. Non-significant correlations
between the DSRS depression scale, the RCMAS anxiety scale and the number of threat
recalled words were also found.
The results of the second experiment revealed no significant differences on the recall or
recognition tasks between children of adults with PTSD and normal controls. All
subjects, as in Experiment 1, remembered more neutral words than other types of words
and recalled neutral words correlated with the age and self report anxiety. Comparing
across all three groups, the results showed no differences on the recall task. Again all
subjects recalled more neutral words than other categories of words. They also revealed
more response bias towards neutral words than other types of word.
The findings of the current studies support the hypotheses. Both experimental groups
(namely, children with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD) did not show a
significant explicit memory bias toward negative words particularly trauma-related cues
relative to controls. The fmdings also support those of Zeitlm & McNally (1991) who
found no significant explicit memory bias in adults who suffer from PTSD.
The findings of the current research (recall test) are also partly consistent with the
findings of Taghavi et al. (1996) with anxious child patients who found no explicit recall
memory bias in anxious subjects, but who found some differences in the recognition task,
in which anxious subjects recognised more threat words than controls. This difference
could be related to the nature of the two PTSD and anxiety disorders which seem
different in some aspects, particularly cognitive functioning. Furthermore, the number
of words recalled by child PTSD patients was significantly less than by control subjects
in the present study, while there was no fmding for the anxiety subjects (Taghavi et
al.,1996). This difference leads one to propose that PTSD patients are different in some
cognitive aspects from generally anxious patients. From a clinical perspective, one of the
major problems in PTSD patients is poor memory performance while anxious patients
do not report such problems. PTSD develops by an external cue while anxiety is probably
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more affected by an internal cue, and some symptoms such as flashback and memory
disturbance which are common in PTSD patients do not appear in anxiety disorder. Thus
it is easy to see different cognitive pattern in PTSD and anxiety.
The traditional view about explicit and implicit memory tries to distinguish between
these two types of memory. According to this view implicit memory is facilitated by
integrative processing, whereas elaborative processing plays an important role in
facilitating retrieval from explicit memory (Graf & Schater, 1985; Schacter & Graf,
1986; Schacter, 1987). Within this framework, the current findings about explicit
memory (recall and recognition) supported the integrative processing of traumatic
information about PTSD, but not the elaborative processing model.
The results of the recognition task show that there was no significant difference between
the two groups. This means that PTSD patients discriminate the old words from new
words much the same as normal control subjects. Hence, they do not show a relative
memory bias in the recognition task. This finding is in part in contrast with Zeitlin and
McNally's (1991) which found an implicit memory bias in adults with PTSD. This
shows that the nature of the recognition task as an expicit memory assessment is different
from the word-stem compelition task which used by Zeitlin and McNally.
Research with anxious patients shows that selective attention to emotional cues is a
strong effect (in tasks such as the Stroop task), whereas in depressed patients it is not. In
contrast, it is easy to show that depressed subjects recall more negative words related to
themselves in memory tasks (e.g. Mathews, 1993; Watkins Ct al., 1992), while it is
difficult to show the same pattern in anxious patients. Therefore, PTSD patients and
children of adults with PTSD do not show any memory bias, which is in agreement with
these findings.
The results of the only study on explicit, non-autobiographical memory with adults with
PTSD showed that combat veterans with PTSD exhibited an implicit memory bias
favoring trauma-relevant information, but they showed a non-significant explicit memory
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bias for trauma-related words (Zeitim and McNally, 1991). Adults subjects with PTSD
also exhibited autobiographical memory disturbaces. Vietnam combat veterans with
PTSD showed difficulties retrieving specific personal memories in response to cue words
having either positive, neutral, or negative valence (McNally Ct a!., 1994). Recently,
Neshat Doost et a!. (1996) found that depressed children exhibited a memory bias only
for negative words (depression-related words) in a recall and recognition task when the
task consisted of self relevant (self descriptive) adjective including positive, negative and
neutral stimuli, while they did not exhibit any bias toward negative words which were not
self descriptive. Taghavi et al. (1995) found that children with generalised anxiety
disorder did not show any bias for threat words on a recall task while they revealed a bias
for threat words on the recognition task.
The results of the total recalled words of the present study (Experiment 1) have shown
that children with PTSD recalled fewer words than normal control subjects. This finding
is consistent with clinical features of PTSD and other fmdings regarding poor memory
in child patients who suffer from PTSD (Yule, & Gold 1993; Last; 1993; Bouman &
Scholing; 1992). PTSD patients also recalled fewer happy words than other types of
words compared with a control group. PTSD patients and normal control subjects
recalled the same number of trauma-related words whereas PTSD patients recalled fewer
neutral words than control subjects; thus PTSD patients have a relative memory bias
toward trauma-related words. These results are in agreement with Zeitlin et al.'s (1991)
who found that adult PTSD patients recalled fewer neutral and positive words than
negative emotional words, while their control group recalled more neutral and positive
words than other types of words.
Regarding the second experiment, while children of adults with PTSD show selective
attention towards trauma-related and general threat words in the Stroop task (see Chapter
5, Experiment 2), they do not show any memory bias towards emotional words in both
recall and recognition. Interestingly, PTSD patients and the children of adults with PTSD
performed similarly on both tasks. This similar pattern of cognitive functions suggests
that children of adults with PTSD were affected by the parents' problems (trauma).
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In summary the results of the recall and recognition tasks with two groups of subjects i.e.
PTSD patients and children of adults with PTSD revealed that they do not show a
memory bias towards trauma-related words or other types of emotional words relative to
a normal control group. It seems that the PTSD fmdings are more or less in agreement
with the prediction of the Williams et al. (1988) model. They hypothesised that patients
with anxiety disorders should show an attentional bias towards threat-related cues while
they should not show a memory bias for such material.
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CHAPTER 8
MEMORY DEFICITS IN CHILD PATIENTS WITH PTSD
(PERFORMANCE ON THE RWERMEAD BEHAVIOURAL
MEMORY TEST)
8.1. Introduction
Patients with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) often complain about a wide range
of cognitive disturbances such as memory, concentration, attention, and difficulties in
planning and judgment. Evaluation of cogrntive aspects can help to define the nature of
the symptoms in PTSD. Various cognitive symptoms including memory problems,
psychogenic amnesia and concentration disturbance are described in the American
Psychiatric Association's (1994) diagnostic criteria for the disorder (see Chapter 2).
Empirical evidence of cognitive changes in PTSD would help to discriminate this
disorder from other closely related syndromes such as anxiety and major depression.
Application of neuropsychological assessment techniques to study the cognitive factors
in PTSD could be useful in the clinical and research exploration of the aetiology of
PTSD. Neuropsychological studies can investigate diagnostic criteria by discovering
which cognitive features are associated with trauma. Linking brain functions and
emotional disturbance may lead to better treatment planning for the disorder. Cognitive
evaluations can also contribute to theoritical explanations of PTSD.
This chapter reviews the literature related to the cognitive assessment of PTSD using
standard neuropsychological tests, and then discusses an experiment which evaluated the
memory performance of patients with PTSD using a standard neuropsychological
memory test, the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT, Wilson et a!., 1989).
8.2. Neuropsychological research on adults with PTSD
Patients with PTSD show a wide range of memory impairments, ranging from
involuntary recollections of the trauma to psychogenic amnesia (Yehuda et a!., 1995).
279
Attentional and concentration dysfunction may also accompany these memory
impairments. Several studies present evidence of neuropsychological impairment among
PTSD patients particularly those who were prisoners of war (POWs). Investigators
suggested that central nervous system (CNS) damage may have a basic role in the
performance difficulties of these people (Sutker et al. 1990).
Despite, the obvious memory-related dysfunction in PTSD, there has been only a little
published research on the performance of subjects with PTSD on standard
neuropsychological memory tests. Most of these studies have shown some
neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric problems in patients with PTSD. The nature of
these impairments varied from global cognitive and memory deficits to specific memory
disturbances for trauma related cues. Most of the studies were carried out with war
survivors such as those from World War II and the Korean conflict. There is very little
research about neuropsychological aspects following other types of trauma.
One of the first studies in this area was carried out by Kionoff et al. (1976). Their study
consisted of three different parts: neuropsychological; psychiatric; and physical. The
samples were prisoners of war who were interned in Japan (high stress group) or Europe
(low stress group) during the Second World War. The neuropsychological examination
consisted of the following: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Category Test, Tactual
Performance Test, Finger Tapping, Speech Perception, Seashore Rhythm, and Trail
Making Test. The results indicated that the high stress group's performance was
significantly worse on two variables: the Haistead Category and the Seashore Rhythm
Tests. Some what similar results were found on the Trail-Making Test, with the high
stress group's performance on trail B being significantly lower. Therefore, the results of
this study support the suggestion of neuropsychological problems among high stress
Prisoners of War.
Sutker et al. (1990) indicated that cognitive functions such as memory among POWs
were impaired by trauma. They selected three groups of subjects including 60 POWs with
more than 35% weight loss, 113 POWs with less than 35% weight loss and 50 combat
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control subjects. All subjects were administered the Revised Wechsler Adult Inteligence
Scale (WATS-R), and the Logical Memory indices of the Wechsler Memory Scale
(WMS) (in two conditions, immediate and 30-minutes delayed recall). The results
showed that the three groups differed significantly across the sub-tests of the WAIS-R.
Former POWs who reported loss of more than 35% of their preconfinement weights
showed significantly less proficient performances than did combat veterans on: the
WAIS-R performance IQ summary score, Arithmetic, Similarities, and Picture
Completion sub-tests, and an the Attention-Concentration scale. They were deficient
relative to their low weight-loss counterparts on Arithmetic and on the Attention-
Concentration factor. Former POWs with low weight loss did not differ significantly
from the combat controls on any of the WAIS-R items. In terms of memory function,
former POWs with high weight loss performed more poorly on measures of immediate
memory than did those in the low weight-loss group who were in turn less proficient than
were combat veterans. POWs in the high weight group also performed more poorly than
combat controls on the delayed memory items. Interestingly POWs with low weight loss
performed similarly to combat controls, differing only on immediate recall. The authors
concluded that deficits on immediate recall, Arithmetic, and Attention-Concentration
Factor performances were most apparent among the high weight loss group, and this
raises the possibility that memory problems may be more attributable to deficiencies in
attention, concentration and perhaps organising function than to storage or retrieval
processes.
Yehuda et al. (1995) studied memory functions including retroactive interference and
found that patients with chronic combat-related PTSD may have fairly specific deficits
in the monitoring and regulation of memory information. They selected 20 patients with
PTSD and 12 comparison subjects, matched for sex, age, race, and years of education.
All subjects were given a structured psychiatric assessment and a medical evaluation by
an experienced physician. Comparison subjects with a past or current psychiatric history,
according to the Schedule for Affective Disorder and Schizophrenia (SADS) criteria were
excluded. Subjects with PTSD who met diagnostic criteria for a primary psychiatric
disorder other than PTSD were also excluded. The subjects were tested for performance
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on measures of intellectual functioning using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS) and their memory performance was evaluated using the California Verbal
Learning Test, in which a list of 16 words (list A) is presented five times in succession,
and subjects are instructed to recall as many of the words as possible, in any order, after
each presentation of the word list. After the five test trials of list A, a second list of words
(list B), unrelated to the first list, is read to the subjects, who are instructed to recall as
many words as possible from list B. The subjects are then asked to recall list A again
(short delay) and, after a 20 minute interval, are asked to recall list A again (long delay).
The resultant dependent variables are trial 1 performance (initial attention and immediate
memory), trial 5 performance (cumulative learning), list B performance (active
interference from previous learning), word recall following the short delay subtracted
from the list A trial 1 performance (retroactive interference), and long delay recall
(retention of information). The results demonstrated that the PTSD patients showed
normal performance in the functions of initial attention and immediate memory,
cumulative learning, and active interference from previous learning, but that they seem
to have a circumscribed cognitive deficit, revealed by a significant decrement in retention
following exposure to an intervening word list.
These results may be compatible with the idea that memory dysfunction in PTSD may
involve the intermingling of past experiences with current experiences (e.g., intrusive
thoughts or flashbacks). Thus, the data suggested that patients with PTSD may have
fairly specific deficits in the monitoring and regulation of memory information.
Gil et al., (1990) evaluated cognitive deficits in PTSD patients by means of objective
tests. Twelve PTSD patients, 12 psychiatric controls, and 12 normal subjects participated.
In both patient groups, none of the subjects had undergone electroconvulsive therapy or
psychosurgery and none had a history of significant head trauma. The tests that were used
in this study included Intelligence tests (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and Army IQ
Test), tests sensitive to organicity (Mental Control from the Wechsler Memory Scale, The
Bender-Gestalt Test and the Benton Visual Reproduction Test), Verbal Fluency Tests,
Attention (Objective Vigilance Measure & Subjective concentration and Attention), and
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Memory Tests including Verbal and Nonverbal Memory, Remote Memory and
Subjective Memory Tests. One examiner administered all the tests in two sessions with
a 10 minute break between them. The results of this study showed that the PTSD subjects
had a basic impairment of cognitive functioning in comparison with the control group,
but that the two patient groups were indistinguishable on most of the cognitive measures
except the verbal Fluency test on which PTSD patients were appreciably (p <0.007)
more impaired than psychiatric controls when producing words starting with a given
letter (B).
Bremner et al., (1993) compared short-term memory function in patients with combat-
related PTSD (N = 26) who were matched for age, sex, education, handedness and other
factors that could affect memory function, with a group of control subjects (N=15). A
neuropsychological battery including: four sub-tests of the WAIS-R (Arithmetic,
Vocabulary, Picture Arrangement, and Block Design), two sub-tests of the WMS
(Logical memory or Verbal memory and Visual memory), and two components of the
Selective Reminding Test (Verbal and Visual sub-tests) were used in this study. The
hypothesis was that the scores on the scales for measuring memory function would be
lower for the PTSD patients than for the comparison subjects. The results indicated that
both groups of subjects had similar intelligence levels. The PTSD patients scored
significantly lower on the WMS logical memory (verbal) component measures for
immediate and delayed memory. Scores on the visual memory component of the WMS
were slightly lower in the patients with PTSD than the comparison group, although the
difference was not significant. The PTSD patients also scored significantly lower than
the comparison subjects on most of the measures for the Verbal and Visual sub-tests of
the Selective Reminding Test. The patients had significantly lower scores on the total
recall, long-term retrieval, long-term storage and delayed recall measures of the Verbal
component and on the total recall, continuous long-term retrieval, and long-term storage
measures for the visual component. The authors concluded that the PTSD patients
displayed memory problems comparable to those of other clinical populations with
clearly documented temporal lobe damage and hippocampal involvement. Their finding
of 67% retention on the logical memory component of the WMS is comparable to the
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53% retention level in patients with left temporal lobe epilepsy and 74% in patients with
right temporal lobe epilepsy previously observed (1980), while their comparison subjects'
performance was comparable both to the performance of the comparison subjects in that
study and to normative data.
A neurologic "hypersensitivity phenomenon" hypothesis had been advanced by Everly
(1987, 1989). In this theory high intensity neural stimulation is postulated to lead to a
subsequent hypersensivity for neurological excitation existing within the limbic circuitry.
Therefore, the hypothesis suggests that there is a heightened sensitivity for excitation in
the neural circuits of the limbic system. It seems that this hypersensivity could cause a
wide range of psychological dysfunctions which would be consistent with disturbance
of brain structures which play a basic role in memory (e.g, hippocampus). Everly and
Horton (1989) studied 14 patients with PTSD who were administered the Four-Word
Short-term Memory Test (Langhinrichsen & Horton, 1988). The test requires the
examiner to read four unrelated words and then say a three-digit number for an interval
of 15 or 30 sec. At the end of that interval, the subject repeats the to-be-remembered
material. In total, 10 or 12 trials, equally divided between the two time intervals, are
administered. The score is the percentage of total words correctly recalled. Preset
normative criteria were 55% correct on the 15 sec. trial and 45% correct on the 30 sec.
trial. The results suggested that 12 of 14 patients were impaired on one of the two
criteria. For the 15-sec. interval, 9 of the 14 and for the 30-sec. interval, 11 of the 14
patients appeared impaired. Additional analysis suggested that the cognitive impairment
did not reflect age-related short-term memory deficits. The postulation of Everly (1989)
was that PTSD is a condition of limbic system hypersensitivity and instability. A
correlate is that PTSD patients would show memory impairment which would support
Everly's (1989) hypothesis.
Sutker et al., (1991) conducted a study to compare POW survivors with appropriate
samples of combat veterans who have seen similar military duty using measures of
problem-solving functions, personality characteristics, mood states, and psychiatric
clinical diagnoses. The participants were 22 Korean conflict POW survivors and 22
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veterans who had seen similar combat but had not been taken captive. The assessment
protocol included the WAIS-R, the Logic Memory sub-test of the WMS, the MMPI, the
Beck Depression Inventory and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The results indicated
that the POW survivors and combat groups were similar in background characteristics,
but that the POW survivors had shown greater problems in adjustment and daily
functioning, encompassing physical, emotional, and behavioural domains, than the
combat veteran control group. The POW subjects performed more poorly than the
combat veterans on the WAIS-R problem-solving measures, but the differences did not
achieve significance using a Bonferrom procedure on the full scale scores. The POW
survivors performed less proficiently than the combat veterans on the WMS indices
overall. In sum, POW survivors were deficient relative to combat veterans of similar ages
and education characteristics on the WAIS-R and WMS tests of cognitive performance,
showing significantly poorer performance on tasks that require attention, concentration
and memory.
Finally Bremner et al. (1995) recruited 26 Vietnam veterans with a history of combat-
related PTSD and 22 comparison subjects matched for age, sex, race, handedness, height,
weight, years of education, socioeconomic status, and years of alcohol abuse. The
purpose of this study was to compare the hippocampal volume of patients with PTSD to
that of subjects without any psychiatric disorder. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
was used to measure the volume of the hippocampus. Verbal memory was assessed with
the logical component and visual memory with the figural component of the WMS, with
percent retention calculated as delayed recall divided by immediate recall multiplied by
100. The results revealed that PTSD patients had a statistically significant smaller (8%)
right hippocampal volume relative to that of the comparsion subjects, while there was no
difference in the volume of other brain regions (Caudate and temporal lobe). PTSD
patients also showed deficits in short-term verbal memory which were associated with
smaller right hippocampal volume. These findings are consistent with a smaller right
hippocampal volume in PTSD that is associated with functional deficits in verbal
memory.
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In summary, the results of these studies using neuropsychological assessments have
revealed that PTSD patients suffer from memoiy dysfunctions, particularly verbal
memory which seems to be related to brain morphology. Recent researchers postulate that
the memory deficits in PTSD patients are associated with right hippocampus morphology
(Nadel and Jacobs, 1995; Bremner et a!., 1995; Rauch Ct al., 1995).
8.3 Memory dysfunction in children and adolescents with PTSD
As with adults, traumatised children exhibit a spectrum of psychological consequences,
including altered attentional processes, deficits in cognitive systems necessary for
learning, inefficient memory systems, deficits in affective responsiveness, and so on (see
Chapter 2).
There are very few research studies of neuropsychological aspects of children who suffer
from PTSD. Recently Palmer (in press) carried out research on neuropsychological
functioning of 60 females who were between the ages of 7 to 12 years using a
neuropsychological battery and a set of history questionnaires. Thirty of the girls had a
known history of sexual abuse and the comparison group did not. The hypothesis of this
study was that "there are neurodevelopmental adaptations in the chronically traumatised
child which can negatively impact academic performance". The neuropsychological
battery consisted of tests of memory and learning, the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure,
the Test of Variables of Attention, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, and the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children-HI, Arithmetic, Vocabulary, Picture Arrangement,
Similarities and Block Design sub-tests. The results showed that the traumatised group
differed on neuropsychological function including memory, attention, higher cognitive
functions and freedom from distractibility relative to the control group. Furthermore, it
was hypothesised that the severity of the neuropsychological deficit is a function of the
age of onset of traumatisation and severity of abuse. Finally the results of this study
revealed a right hemispheric specialisation in children who suffer from traumatic events.
8.4 Purpose of research
The main aim of the present study was to investigate memory functions in child patients
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with PTSD using a standard neuropsychological memory test which is unrelated to the
trauma-content, to see whether memory problems in young people with PTSD reflect a
general cognitive deficit.
8.5 Hypothesis
Children who suffer from PTSD will show a significant memory deficit on a standard
neuropsychological test (i.e., the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test) which is
unrelated to the trauma, compared with normal control subjects.
8.6 Subjects
Eighteen children and adolescents aged 11 to 17 who met Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd Edition, DSM ffi-R; American Psychiatric Association,
1987) and International Classification of Diseases (World Health Organization, ICD-lO,
1992) criteria for PTSD were matched on age, sex, and verbal IQ with 22 children and
adolescents without any psychiatric problems. All PTSD subjects were involved in road
traffic or personal violence accidents. Most of the children patients were recruited from
the Children's Department of the Mausdely Hospital, who had been seen by Prof. W.
Yule. A few subjects were identified from other clinics in London or out of London. Of
the 18 PTSD subjects, 8 were boys and 10 girls with a mean age of 171.33 months (SD
= 24.43). Most of the control group were recruited from secondary schools and a few of
them from primary schools from different parts of London. Of the 22 normal subjects,
12 were boys and 10 girls with a mean age of 172.00 months (SD = 17.51).
8.7. Materials
8.7.1. Psychological measures
1- Revised Impact of Event Scale (IES, Horowitz, 1979).
2- Revised Children 's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978).
3-Depression Self-Rating Scale (DSRS, Birleson, 1981).
4-British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS short form, Dunn et al., 1981).
5- Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions (WORD, Basic Reading, Rust et al., 1993).
For details of all psychological measures see Chapter 4.
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8.7.2. The Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT)
The test which was used in this study is the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test
(RBMT), which was developed by Wilson, Cockburn, & Baddeley (1989) as a procedure
to assess everyday memory problems. According to its authors, this test is a bridge
between laboratory-based measures of memory and assessments obtained by
questionnaire and observation. The main aim of this test is to provide analogues of
everyday memory situations that appear to be vexatious for certain patients with memory
problems. It avoids some of the weakness of questionnaires, rating scales, and checklists
particularly for people with brain injury and poor memory as well (Wilson et al., 1989).
The test also provides a good estimate of every day memory problems (Wilson,
Cockburn, Baddeley & Hioms, 1989) and is useful for a wide age range of range (5 to
adult). An important feature of the RBMT is that it does not attach to any particular
theoretical model of memory and it administrable in 30 to 40 minutes.
Reliability of the test is very good; for example, the correlation between performance on
parallel forms (version A, B, C, & D) on the Screening Score are .84, .80, & .67
respectively. Considering data from all 118 patients who were tested twice, the
correlation between the two scores was .78 for the screening score & .85 for the profile
score (Wilson et a!. 1989). Validity of the RBMT was obtained by correlating
performance on this test with performance on a number of standard memory tests (e.g.
the Warnngton Recognition Memory Test for words and face, digit span, spatial span
using the corsi block technique etc.).
The RBMT contains from 12 different subtests that cover verbal, visual and visuo-spatial
memory in immediate, delayed and prospective conditions. This test emphasises skills
that are needed in real-life situations. The sub-tests of the RBMT are as follows:
1 & 2- Remembering a name (first name 1 & second name 2):
The subject is shown a portrait, told the person's name, asked to repeat it and told they
will be asked to recall the name later.
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3-Remembering a hidden belonging: Something is requested from the subject, and placed
in a specific place while he/she watches. The subject is required to ask for the belonging
and to remember the place when the examiner says "We have now finished this test".
4-Remembering an appointment: A timer is set for 20 minutes. The subject is told that,
when the timer rings, he/she should ask about his/her next appointment.
5-Picture recognition: The subjects are shown 10 pictures one at a time. After a delay of
a few minutes subjects are shown 20 pictures (the original 10 plus 10 distractors) one at
a time and have to say whether or not they have seen each picture before.
6-Remembering a newspaper article (immediate and delayed recall): A short prose
passage is read to the subject for immediate and delayed (20 minutes) recall.
7-Face recognition: 5 photographs are shown one at a time. Later 10 photograph are
shown (the original 5 plus 5 distractors) one at a time. The subject has to say whether or
not he/she has seen each photograph before.
8-Remembering a new route (immediate): The examiner traces a short path between a
series of specified locations in the room. The subject is asked to trace the same path.
9-Remembering a new route (delayed): After a 10 minutes delay the subject is again
asked to remember and trace the new route.
10-Delivering a message: When the examiner traces the path around the room, he/she
leaves an envelope marked "message" at a specified location. The subject is required to
pick up the envelope and leave it in the right place on both immediate and delayed routes.
11-Orientation: 9 different questions about time and place are asked as orientation. The
questions are as follow:
(a) what year is it now? (b) what month is it now? (c) what day of the week is it today?
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(d) in what place we are in now? (e) in which city or town we are in now? (f) how old
are you? (g) in what year you were born? (i) what is the name of the present Prime
Minister of Great Britain? (j) what is the name of the present President of the USA?
12-Date: The subject is asked to say the date.
8.7.2.1. The Standardised Proffle Score
There are two ways for scoring the RBMT, standardised score and screening score. In the
screening score, each item is scored pass (1 point) or fail (0 points) and the maximum
number of points is 12 obtained from 12 items. In the standardised score, each item is
allocated 2 points for normal and complete responses, 1 point (borderline) and 0 points
for abnormal responses. The points derive from a raw profile score.Table 8.1 shows the
standardised profile scores of RMBT items and the ranges of raw scores they derive
from.
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Table 8.1 Standardised Profile Scoring for the RBMT (Raw Scores are indicated in
the body of the table)
Item	 2 points	 1 points	 0 points
lst&2ndname	 4	 3	 0-2
Belonging	 4	 3	 0-2
Appointment	 2	 1	 0
Pictures	 10	 9	 0-8
Immediate route	 5	 4	 0-3
delayed route	 5	 4	 0-3
Message	 6	 5	 0-4
Orientation	 9	 8	 0-7
Date	 correct date	 1 day out	 2 or more days out
Faces	 5	 4	 0-3
Immediate Story	 6 or more	 4-5.5	 3.5 or less
Delayed story	4 or more	 2-3.5	 1.5 or less
8.7.2.2. Interpretation of the scores
For each subject, two scores, a simple pass/fail or Screening Score, and a standardised
Profile Score are produced. Standardisation of the Profile Score is necessary since the
Raw Scores vary from one item to another. This means that if Raw Scores are added to
make a total, then some components receive a much heavier weighting than others.
Standardisation equates the importance of each item by giving it a maximum weighting
of 2. The Screening Score ranges from 0-12, and the Standardised Profile Score ranges
from 0-24. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the cut-off points for level of memory function on
the RBMT for different groups of ages.
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Table 8.2 Cut - off points for level of memory function on the RBMT for 11 - 14 year
old children (Wilson Ct al., 1991)
Normal Range	 Borderline Range Abnormal Range
Screening Score	 9 - 12	 6- 8	 0- 5
Standardised Profile	 20-24	 15 - 19	 0- 14
Table 8.3 Cut - off pomts on the RMBT for adults from 16 - 69 years (Wilson et al.,
1989)
Normal Poor memory Moderately Impaired Severely Impaired
Screening	 10-12	 7-9	 3-6	 0-2
Score
Standardised	 22 -24	 17 -21	 10 - 16	 0 - 9
Profile Score
8.8. Procedure
The test was carried out individually, and the subject was asked to sit in front of the
experimenter behind a table in a silent room, without any disruptions. The subject was
asked to listen to the questions carefully and then answer the questions. After ensuring
that the test was clear to the subject, the test was started by the experimenter. Following




Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each group on various
measures of psychopathology for patient and control groups (see Table 8.4). One way
Analysis of varience (ANOVA) showed that there were no significant differences
between the groups for age and verbal IQ (Appendix 8-1), but the clinical group scored
significantly higher on the measures of depression [DSRS; F (1, 38) = 9.82, P = .0047]
and anxiety [RCMAS; F (1, 38) = 5.23, P = 0.02]. PTSD patients also obtained high
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score on the Impact of Event Scale consistent with Yule Ct al.'s studies of child survivors
of shipping disasters (Yule et a!., 1992). Interestingly, there was a highly significant
difference between the two groups in reading ability as measured in WORD scores [F (1,
38) = 8.90, P = 0.005] with the normal control subjects scoring higher than the PTSD
patients on this scale.
Table 8.4 Means and standarddeviations (SD) of the psychological measures for
PTSD patients and controls
PTSD (N=18)	 NORMAL (N=22)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD










































IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale including Avoidance and Intrusion Subscales, RCMAS =
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British
Picture Vocabulary, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions. * = P < 0.05
&**=P<0.01
8.9.2. RBMT data
First of all, standardised profile scores for all sub-tests of the RBMT for each group of
subjects separately were calculated. To analyse the data, t-tests for each item across the
two groups of subjects i.e. PTSD and normal control were used. This way of analysing
the data using multiple t-tests is taken from the previous literature (Wilson et al., 1989).
Table 8.5 and Figure 8.1 show the mean, standard deviation, t value and significance
levels for all sub-tests across both groups.
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Table 8.5 Means Scores (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Control subjects and
PTSD Patients on the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT)
RBMT items	 CONTROLS	 PATIENTS
M	 SD M	 SD tvalue p
Names	 1.86	 0.47 1.50	 0.86 1.61	 n.s.
Belonging	 1.68	 0.65 1.17	 0.86 2.17	 *
Appointment	 1.68	 0.57 1.11	 0.68 2.90	 **
Pictures	 2.00	 0.00 1.67	 0.69 2.06	 n.s.
Immediate Route	 1.91	 0.29 1.83	 0.38 0.71	 n.s.
Delayed Route	 1.90	 0.29 1.72	 0.46 1.49	 n.s.
Message	 2.00	 0.00 1.77	 0.43 2.20	 *
Orientation	 1.77	 0.53 1.05	 0.72 3.61
Date	 1.86	 0.35	 1.55	 0.78	 1.55	 n.s.
Faces	 1.90	 0.29 1.83	 0.38 0.71	 n.s.
Immediate Story	 1.91	 0.29 1.33	 0.84 2.77	 *
Delayed Story	 2.00	 0.00 1.72	 0.57 2.05	 *
Profile Total	 22.41	 1.89 18.50	 2.55 5.56	 **
Range	 18-24	 14-23
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Data analysis for each sub-test is as follows:
8.9.2.1. First name and Second name
A one way ANOVA was performed between the two groups for the 1St and 2nd name
items. The result showed that there were no significant differences between the two,
groups [F (1, 39) = 2.91, P = .096], which was confirmed by a t-test [df(39) = 1.61, P =
.119] for unequal variance (in a one way ANOVA when the level of significance on tests
for homogeneity of variance is less than 0.05, we should employ a t-test for unequal
variance). Therefore, both groups performed in the same way on this item.
8.9.2.2. Face Recognition
One way ANOVA showed that there was no difference between patients and normal
control subjects on the Object Recognition sub-test [F(l, 39) =50, P = .48] which shows
PTSD patients performed as well as normal subjects.
8.9.2.3. Route Immediate and Delayed
A Repeated Measures ANOVA was carried out across two items i.e. Route Immediate
and Delayed between PTSD patients and the comparison group. The results indicated that
there was no main effect of group [F(1, 38) = 1.89, P = .177] nor a Group x Delay
interaction [F(1, 38) = .80, P = .376]. The results of one way ANOVAs for route delayed
[F(1,39) 2.42, P = .13] and for route immediate [F(1, 39) = .50, P = .48] also confirmed
this finding. Hence, again on these items, patients performed as well as control subjects.
8.9.2.4. Picture Recognition
A one way ANOVA was performed with this item to compare the two groups. The
results revealed a significant difference between the two groups [F(l,39) = 5.22, P =
028], which was almost confirmed by the results oft-test for independent sample t-test
[t (39) = 2.06, P = 0.055]. This finding indicated that the PTSD subjects had somewhat
poorer memory for recogrnsing the pictures than the control group.
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8.9.2.5. Story Recall (Immediate and Delayed)
A one way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between PTSD patients and normal
control subjects on Story Immediate [F(l,39) = 9.02, P = 0.0047] and Story Delayed
Recall [F(l, 39) = 5.17, P = 0.029]. The Levene Tests for Homogeneity of Variance in
both analyses were significant; therefore, to confirm the results t- tests for independent
samples were performed for the two variables between the PTSD and normal control
groups. The results supported the previous finding for Immediate Recall [t (39) = 2.77,
P = 0.0 12] and the result was nearly significant for Delayed Recall [t (39) = 2.05 , P =
0.056].
The story Recall (version 1) consists of 21 items. Hence, in both the immediate and
delayed recall conditions, each subject has two raw scores. One way ANOVAs were
carried out with the raw scores between the two groups. The results were significant for
both Immediate [F(1, 39) = 11.99, P = 0.0011 and Delayed [F(l, 39) = 24.43, P <0.001]
Recall. The findings revealed that the PTSD subjects had relatively poor memory for
verbal material. These findings are consistent with the results of the Recall and
Recognition test (Chapter 6) and also with other findings related to memory (Zeitlin and
McNally, 1991). Figure 8.2 shows standardised scores for both groups i.e. PTSD patients
and normal control.
8.9.2.6. Orientation
One way ANOVA showed a significant difference between the two groups on the
Orientation standardised profile score [F(1, 39) = 13.06, P = 0.0009]. This result showed
that the PTSD subjects performed in a different way overall on this item compared with
the normal control subjects.
To break this down with respect to the different orientation questions, a series of
independent sample t- test was carried out to compare the two groups. The results
indicated that there was a strong significant difference between PTSD patients and



































present President of USA"? [t (1, 39) = 3.10, P = .005] which means that the patients
with PTSD made more mistakes than the comparison group. The patient group also made
more mistake on " what day is today"? than the control subjects, but the result did not
reach statistical significance [t (1, 39) = 1.84, p = .083].
8.9.2.7. Date
Patients with PTSD performed as well as the control group on responding to the date
(what date is it today?) [F(l, 39) = 2.739, P = .1062]. Along with the results of the
questions which related to time in the Orientation sub-test, such as recogrnsing the day
of the week or year of the birth, this suggests that PTSD patients had no any time
orientation difficulties. Figure 8.3 shows raw scores for two groups of subjects.
8.9.2.8. Prospective Items (Appointment, Belonging and Message Delivery)
Prospective memory is memory for actions to be performed in the future such as
remembering to return a library book, remembering to give someone a message, or
remembering to pick up the children at school. Prospective memory contrasts with
retrospective memory which is concerned with remembering information acquired in the
past. Most memory assessment and research has been concerned with retrospective
memory, using techniques such as recall or recognition to find out what information
people can remember from the very recent or the more distant past.
Three items from the RBMT are related to prospective memory and refer to future,
remembering at the end of the session to ask for a personal possession which was put
away at the begining of the session; remembering when an alarm rings to ask a specific
question given when the alarm was set 20 minutes earlier; and, finally, remembering to
ask for a message on the route round the room and deliver it at a specific point along the
route (Cockbum, Wilson, Baddeley, and Hioms, 1990). One way ANOVAs revealed that
there were strong significant differences between the two groups (i.e. PTSD and normal
control subjects) on all three prospective items { [F( 1, 39) = 8.42, P = .0061] for
Appointment standardised profile score; [F(1,39) = 4.63, P = .0366] for Belonging
standardised profile score; and [F (1, 39) = 5.97, P = .0 193] for Delivery standardised
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score), Levene Tests for homogeneity of variance were significant (P <0.001) for
Message Immediate and Delayed standardised profile scores. The result of an
independent sample t-tests (for unequal variances) for this last item, however, confirmed
the fmdings [t(39) = 2.20, P = .042].
To analyse prospective action in general a compound variable was computed by adding
the standarised profile scores of the three items which related to prospective memoly.
One way ANOVA was performed between the two groups for this variable. The result
indicated that there was a strong difference between the two groups with PTSD patients
performing worse than normal subjects on this task [F(1,39) = 12.86, P = .0009 with the
Levene Test significant (0.028)]. To confirm this finding an independent sample t-test
was carried out between the two groups. The result confirmed the previous finding [t (39)
= 3 .44, P = .002].
These fmdings show that the PTSD subjects present with a relative deficit in prospective
memory items compared to the normal control subjects. Figure 8.4 showes standardised



























8.9.2.9. Total Standardised Profile Score
Previous studies have revealed that different types of patients with memory problems
such as brain damage (Wilson et al., 1989) showed severe deficits in performing on the
RBMT total scores. To compare the present two groups of subjects on the total scores,
a one way ANOVA was carried out between PTSD patients and normal control subjects.
The results showed a highly significant difference between the two groups [F(l, 39) =
30.94, P <0.001] which indicated that the PTSD patients have a deficit in general
memory. This finding is consistent with the clinical features of PTSD concerning
memory problems. Distribution of memory scores (Table 8.6 and Figure 8.5) indicated
that 55.6% of child PTSD patients suffer from poor memory according to RBMT norms
and 22.2% also had impaired memory. This means that 77.8% of PTSD subjects had
memory problems, while only 22.2% showed a normal memory. In contrast only 13.6%
of control subjects presented with poor memory and none with impaired memory. Table
(8-7) and shows the cumulative distribution, percentage, frequency of memory levels for
PTSD patients and normal control subjects.
Table 8.6 Distribution of scores with respect to standardised RBMT memory levels
among PTSD patients and normal control subjects
PTSD	 CONTROL

























































Table 8.7 Cumulative percentage distributions of the total standard profile and
screening scores for the RBMT in the two groups (PTSD & controls)
STANDARDISED SCORE 	 SCREENThTG SCORE
VALUE CONTROL	 PTSD	 VALUE CONTROL PTSD
14	 11.1	 5	 11.1
15	 16.7	 6	 16.7
16	 22.2	 7	 9.1	 33.3
17	 33.3	 8	 13.6	 50.0
18	 9.1	 44.4	 9	 13.6	 72.2
19	 13.6	 50.0	 10	 31.8	 94.4
20	 13.6	 83.3	 11	 63.6	 100.0




8.9.2.10. Type of Trauma Effect
Means and standard deviations were calculated separately for each group of patients i.e.
RTA and PV on various measures of psychopathology (Table 8.8). One way ANOVAs
showed that there were no significant differences between the two sub-groups for verbal
IQ, reading ability, anxiety, and Impact of Event Scale (Appendix 8.2), but the PVgroup
scored significantly higher on the DSRS [F(1, 16) = 10.54, P = 0.005] than the RTA
group. The PVgroup was also significantly older than the RTA group [F(1, 16) = 11.67,
P = 0.003 8].
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Table 8.8 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological scales for the two
sub-groups of PTSD patients (i.e. RTA & PV)
RTA(N=9)	 PV(N=8)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN SD
AGE (months)	 155.22	 24.13	 186.87	 10.66	 *












12.83	 95.50	 14.19	 n.s.
	
4.92	 20.25	 6.78	 *
	
6.89	 20.12	 5.89	 n.s.
	
16.06	 42.50	 23.74	 n.s.
	
10.22	 23.00	 12.28	 n.s.
INTRUSION	 14.78	 7.12	 19.50	 11.99	 n.s.
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale, RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS =
Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) =
Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions * = P < 0.01
One way ANOVAs between the two sub-groups of patients who suffered from different
types of traumas i.e. personal violence or road traffic accident, showed that there were
no significant differences between the two sub-groups on all sub-tests of the RBMT
(Appendixes 8.3). These results indicated that the two sub-groups performed in the same
way on the memory task.
8.9.2.11. Preliminary Developmental analyses
Is the general memory performance in young people with PTSD affected by
developmental aspects? To examine this point, all subjects were divided into two sub-
groups, those below 14 years old and those over 14 years old. Subject characteristics for
both sub-groups of patients and controls are shown in Tables 8.9 and 8.10.
8.9.2.11.1. Children (under 14 years old)
One way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between the two
groups (aged under 14 years) on age, verbal IQ, reading ability, self reported anxiety, or
306
depression (Appendix 8.4).
Table 8.9 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for the two
child sub-groups i.e. PTSD and normal subjects (aged under 14 years old)
PTSD(N=6)	 NORMAL(N=8)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD


















	 10.50	 4.75	 n.s.
RCMAS	 15.17	 3.87	 12.12	 6.27	 n.s.
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading
Dimensions
One way ANOVAs between the two groups of subjects (i.e. PTSD & normal control
under 14 years old), showed that there were no significant differences between the two
sub-groups for all sub-tests of the RBMT (Appendix 8.5) except story immediate recall
[F(1, 13) = 11.56, P = 0.005] and the total score of the memory test [F(1, 13) = 13.11, P
= 0.0035]. PTSD patients scored significantly lower on story immediat recall (mean =
0.833, SD = 0.983 for PTSD and mean =2, SD =00 for controls) and on the total score
of the RBMT (mean = 18.17 SD = 2.32 for PTSD and mean = 22.25, SD = 1.91 for
controls) than normal control subjects.
8.9.2.11.2. Adolescents (over 14 years old)
One way ANOVAs indicated that there were no significant differences between the two
adolescent sub-groups (aged over 14 years) on age and verbal IQ (Appendix 8.6), but
significant differences on self-reported depression [F(1, 25) = 11.30, P = 0.0026], and
reading ability [F(1, 25) = 6.84, P = 0.015] were found. A non-significant trend was also
found between PTSD patients and normal controls on the self-reported anxiety [F(1, 25)
= 3.91, P = 0.06].
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Table 8.10 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for the
adolescent sub-groups, i.e. PTSD and normal subjects (aged over 14 years old)
PTSD (N = 12)	 NORMAL (N = 14)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN SD











	 9.57	 2.31	 **
RCMAS	 18.00	 7.77	 12.71	 5.85	 *
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsier Objective Reading
Dimensions.	 P<O.1, **p<O.05
One way ANOVAs between the two groups of subjects (i.e. PTSD & normal controls
over 14 years old), showed that there were significant differences between the two sub-
groups on appointment [F(1, 25) = 5.37, P = 0.029], belonging [F(1, 25) = 5.24, P =
0.031], message delivery [F(1, 25) = 6.46, P = 0.018], orientation [F(1, 25) = 14.77, P =
0.0008], prospective memory [F(1, 25) = 12.56, P = 0.0016], and total memory [F(1, 25)
= 17.24, P = 0.0004] aspects of the RBMT. Significant differences on date, face
recognition, first name and second name, picture recognition, route delayed, route
immediate, story delayed recall, or story immediate recall were not found (Appendix 8.7).
In comparison with the results of the children, indicates that most of the differences
between PTSD patients and normal controls are related to the older subjects. Table 8.11
shows mean scores and standard deviations on different items of the RBMT across
adolescents with PTSD and normal controls.
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Table 8.11 Means Scores (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for PTSD and controls
adolescents on the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT)
RBMT items	 CONTROLS	 PATIENTS
M	 SD	 M	 SD	 p
Names	 1.86	 0.53	 1.58	 0.79	 n.s.
Belonging	 1.71	 0.61	 1.08	 0.79	 *
Appointment	 1.57	 0.65	 1.00	 0.60	 *
Pictures	 2.00	 0.00	 1.58	 0.79	 n.s.
Immediate Route	 1.93	 0.27	 1.83	 0.39	 n.s.
Delayed Route	 1.93	 0.27	 1.75	 0.45	 n.s.
Message	 2.00	 0.00	 1.67	 0.49	 *
Orientation	 1.86	 0.36	 1.00	 0.42	 n.s.
Date	 1.93	 0.27	 1.67	 0.65	 n.s.
Faces	 1.86	 0.36	 1.75	 0.45	 n.s.
Immediate Story	 1.86	 0.36	 1.58	 0.67	 n.s.
Delayed Story	 2.00	 0.00	 1.83	 0.37	 *
Profile Total	 5.29	 1.35	 3.75	 1.29
Total Score	 22-50	 1.95	 18-67	 0.75	 **
*p<ØØ5 **p<ool
8.9.2.12. Sex effect
Another question which still remains concerns whether the memory performance in
young patients with PTSD is affected by their sex? To examine this point, PTSD
subjects were divided into two sub-groups: boys, and girls. Subjects characteristics for
both sub-groups of patients are shown in Table 8.12.
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Table 8.12 Means and standard deviations (SD) of psychological measures for boys
and girls with PTSD
BOYS(N=8)	 GIRLS(N=10)
MEAN	 SD	 MEAN	 SD
AGE (months)	 175.87	 18.18	 167.70	 28.96	 n.s.


























INTRUSION	 13.10	 9.94	 18.64	 9.08	 n.s.
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale including Avoidance and lntnision Subscales, RCMAS =
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS = British
Picture Vocabulary Scale, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions. * = P
0.1 &**=P< 0.05
One Way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences between boys and
girls on age, verbal IQ, reading ability, self-reported depression, self-reported anxiety,
total scores on the Impact of Event Scale, or scores on the intrusion subscale, (Appendix
8.8), but the results indicated a non-significant difference on the avoidance sub-scale of
the IES [F(1, 16) = 4.01, P = 0.064].
One way ANOVAs between boys and girls with PTSD showed that there were no
significant differences between the two sub-groups on all sub-tests of the RBMT
(Appendix 8.9) except on prospective memory items [F(1, 17) = 6.33, P = 0.023],
particularly appointment [F(1 ,17) = 5.09, P = 0.038]. These results indicated that the boys
exhibited reletively poor performance on prospective memory (mean = 3.25, SD = 1.28,
for boys and mean = 4.70, SD = 1.16 for girls for prospective items, mean = 0.88, SD =
0.30 for boys and mean = 1.40, SD = 0.27 for girls on the belonging item).
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8.9.2.13. Correlational Analyses
To find the relationships between age, verbal IQ, reading ability, depression, anxiety and
scores on the Impact of Event Scale on the one hand and total scores or prospective item
scores on the RBMT on the other hand, a series of correlations was performed across all
subjects. The results are shown in Tables 8.13 and 8.14.
Table .8.8 Correlations between psychological measures and total memory and
prospective memory scores across all subjects (N = 40)
Total Memory Score	 Prospective Memory Score

















WORD	 0.55	 0.00l'	 0.39	 0.014*
RCMAS = Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale, DSRS = Depression Self-Rating Scale, BPVS
= British Picture Vocabulary, WORD (Basic Reading) = Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions.
* p <005& **p<O 015
Table 8.9 Correlations between IES & total and prospective memory scores across
PTSD patients (N = 18)
Total Memory Score	 Prospective Memory Score
Correlation	 P value	 Correlation	 P value
IES	 -0.15	 0.55	 -0.17	 0.51
Avoidance -0.18	 0.48	 -0.16	 0.53
Intrusion	 -0.11	 0.68	 -0.17	 0.52
IES = Revised Impact of Event Scale including Avoidance and Intrusion Subscales
As the results indicate there were strong positive correlations between reading ability and
total and prospective memory scores on the RBMT. This suggest that differences
between the two groups might be a function of reading ability. There was also a negative
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correlation between depression scale and memory scores. This means that memory
performance was effected by the level of depression. Finally there was no correlation
between Impact of Event Scale, anxiety scale, or British Picture Vocabulary Scale and
TBMT performance.
8.10. Discussion
The patients with PTSD in this study scored lower on the total score on the Rivermead
Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT) compared to both control subjects and to the norms
of the RBMT (Wilson et al. 1990, 1989) thus revealing a general poor memory in the
PTSD patients. This result is consistent with Bremner et al's (1995) study showing a
deficit of short term memory in adults with PTSD. Generally, this finding is in agreement
with previous findings such as Goldestein Ct al. (1987), Sutker et al. (1988), Gil et a!.
(1990), Yehuda et al. (1995), Everly and Horton (1989), Sutker et al. (1991) [see review
of studies to this Chapter]. All of these studies found that PTSD patients suffer from
cognitive deficits and particularly memory deficits. Goldestein et al.(1987) found that
62% of their Prisoners of War (POWs) from World War II complained of memory and
concentration impairments and Sutker et a!. (1988) reported that 78% and 93% of POWs
from World War II and the Korean War reported similar cognitive problems. Everly and
Horton (1989) found that the majority of their 14 PTSD patients scored beyond a preset
cut-off for neuropsychological impairment. These findings were supported by the current
study's findings on total scores, as the majority of the PTSD patients in this study scored
below cut-off for normal memory performance. The current data also supported Sutker
et al.'s studies (1991) which found that POW survivors scored significantly poorer
performance on subtests that require attention, concentration, and memory on the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Wechsler Memory Scale.
The present results also are in agreement with Palmer's study with PTSD children (in
press) which found that traumatised children had deficits on neuropsychological
functions including memory, attention, and higher cognitive functions.
In terms of recall memory two items were used in this study: Story Immediate and
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Delayed recall. The results showed that the PTSD patients scored significantly lower than
the nonnal control subjects which is in agreement with the pattern of recall performance
in the memory experiment reported in Chapter 7. In that experiment the PTSD patients
recalled less words than control groups in all categories. These data are also in agreement
with the findings from other studies: Gil et al. (1990) speculated that PTSD patients were
considerably more impaired than normal controls and even psychiatric controls when
producing words starting with a given letter -a function of verbal fluency-. They explain
that this may suggest a specific speech problem in PTSD patients. Bremner et al. (1993)
also found that PTSD patients obtained significantly lower scores on the Verbal Memory
component of the Wechsler Memory Scale, i.e. 44% lower on immediate recall and 55%
lower on delayed recall. In the current study PTSD patients remembered only 30% of the
ideas in Story Immediate recall items while normal subjects remembered 44% which is
significantly higher than for the patient group. In the Story Delayed recall item of PTSD
patients recalled 22% which is also significantly lower than the control subjects' scores
of 41%. These findings supported Gil et al's and Bremner et al.'s results about verbal
memory. Interestingly PTSD patients also forgot significantly more words during
Immediate and Delayed Story recall; i.e. PTSD patients forgot 8%, while normal subjects
only forgot 3%. It is therefore possible to conclude that PTSD patients may have specific
deficits in remembering the words which are related to verbal tasks. The results of the
object Recognition item also showed a nearly significant difference between the two
groups which is consistent with the story recall findings and with other findings from
neuropsychological assessment of PTSD and suggests that the memory problems in
PTSD are not confined to verbal material.
A possible explanation for the poor memory performance in PTSD patients is that
deficits in concentration in PTSD patients are responsible (Bremner et al., 1993). It is not
possible, on the basis of the present data, to say whether the problems underlying
performance are attentional or mnemonic.
Regarding the Orientation item, PTSD patients were significantly different from normal
subjects and semantic questions such as "what is the name of present President of the
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USA?" seem more important than other types of question. This result is in agreement
with Cockburn et a!. (1990) who found the same problem in patients with dysphasia with
the same material. In the current study the PTSD patients showed significantly lower
performance on a reading test (WORD) than normal control subjects which is in the same
direction as the dysphasic patients.
There was a strong significant difference between clinical and non-clinical subjects on
the prospective items in present study. A typical prospective memory experiment would
include three stages, to form an intention, retaining the content of the intention, and
finally accomplishment of the action (Barba, 1993). Prospective memory is affected by
two types of cues, internal and external. Internal cues involve the internal manipulation
of information such as use of mnemonics and retrieval strategies, while external cues
involve the manipulation of the environment, such as writing notes and diaries (Harris,
1980) and subjects tend to use more external than internal cues (Meacham & Leiman;
1982). One possible explanation for prospective memory action in the current study is
that remembering a belonging should be the most difficult since there are at best non-
specific cues (the end of test session) and that the appointment item may be more difficult
than delivering a message because it is cued by the task in which it is embedded.
Therefore, the PTSD patients, due to concentration and attentional problems, may not be
able to utilise the cues (Barba, 1993). However, there are very few studies of these issues
with pathological populations and therefore any interpretation should be made with
caution.
As previously mentioned recent neuropsychological studies with PTSD have emphasised
the role of the hippocampal system to explain memory deficits in PTSD patients (Everly,
1987, 1989; Bremner et al., 1995). They postulate that a smaller right hippocampal
volume and possible alterations in symmetry of the hippocampus are associated with
memory deficits in PTSD. Two main explanations are as follows:
1- The neurologic hypersensitivity phenomenon (Everly, 1987, 1989): High intensity
neural stimulation is postulated to lead to a subsequent hypersensitivity for neurological
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excitation existing within the limbic circuitry. The hypothesis suggests that there is a
heightened sensitivity for excitation in the neural circuits of the limbic system. This
hypersensitivity is postulated to cause a wide variety of psychological disturbance.
2- A small right hippocampus from the time of birth may present a premorbid risk factor
for the development of PTSD. Extreme stress results in increased release of
glucocorticoids, excitatory amino acids, serotonin, and other neurotransmitters and
neuropeptides that could be associated with damage to the hippocampus.
The results indicated that the memory performance of PTSD patients were not
differentially affected by the type of trauma. Interestingly, boys with PTSD showed
poorer prospective memory than girls with PTSD, while total memory performance was
the same. Regarding developmental analysis, although a significant difference was found
between the two groups (aged under 14 years) on total memory scores, a significant
difference was found only on the story immediate recall item. This means that the
memory performance of younger patients was differentially affected most by short term
verbal memory. This fmding is consistent with other studies which found poor short-term
verbal memory in adult patients with PTSD (e.g. Bermner et al., 1993). Adolescents with
PTSD revealed a poor performance on more items including prospective items
(appointment, belonging, and message delivery), orientation, and to some extent picture
recognition, whereas their performance on story recall was the same as controls.
In summaiy, the cumulative percentage scores of the RBMTshow that the memory of the
patient sample is impaired compared to the control group. About 78% of PTSD patients
were under performing and fall into the categories labelled poor memory and impaired
memory. This is consistent with previous findings about memory in PTSD.
These findings may have some implications for the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD
patients. Neuropsychological procedures could be considered as an objective assessment
of PTSD and rehabilitation strategies oriented towards compensation for deficits in
memory may be useful for PTSD patients. The findings of this study and also other
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studies suggest that future studies with PTSD should concentrate on specific components
of the memoiy system as well as neuropsychological and neuroanatomical aspects to





Findings of studies on biases (attention and memory) with different groups of adult
subjects with emotional disorders revealed that the biases had an important role in
developing a preliminary cognitive model of emotional disorders including PTSD. These
findings also helped in presenting a clear view of the nature and inter-relationships of
the cognitive functions which appear to be operating in individuals with PTSD.
It was argued that the three models which were most relevant to an empirical research
programme with emotionally disordered subjects (namely, Bower, 1981; Beck et al.,
1985; and, Williams et a!., 1988) all appear to have some theoretical limitations.
However, the model of Williams et a!. seems more consistent with the status of
knowledge at an empirical level and it is more successful in the explanation of different
types of emotional disorders. Cognitive theories of PTSD most of which are based on
clinical experiences also suffer from some limitations. The Williams et a!. model and
other cognitive theories of PTSD have led to some research in adults, but there is no
research with children with PTSD. The beginning of Chapter 4 noted that there was not
a suitable source to develop some cognitive tasks (such as Stroop and memory) using
emotional words for young people. Thus, this Chapter described how a "Corpus of
Emotional Words Produced by Children and Adolescents" was developed. This resulted
in a basic instrument which was used to develop the experimental tasks described in
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 to study attentional biases or memory biases in children and
adolescents with PTSD.
It was suggested that we are not yet justified in making strong claims about attentional
or memory biases in children and adolescents with PTSD. The main aim of these
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experiments was to find how some paradigms such as Stroop, attentional deployment or
recall and recognition tasks operate in children with PTSD or children of adults with
PTSD, and the experimental findings are close to which one of theoretical frameworks.
Memory deficits in patients with PTSD were studied as information processing which is
independent from emotional valence. Such a paradigm was used in a body of research
to give a clear explanation of cognitive processing particularly memory deficits in adults
with PTSD. Again due to lack of empirical findings related to memory deficits in
children and adolescents with PTSD, the main aim of our experiment in Chapter 8 was
to investigate how young people with PTSD operate in a standard memory test.
However, it is possible to move beyond the paradigmatic level of explanation and begin
to make some claims about cognitive processing of young people who suffer from PTSD
directly or indirectly. In the current chapter the empirical findings related to attention and
memory, and their implications will be discussed.
9.2. Cognitive features of children and adolescents with PTSD
9.2.1. Attentional bias
The favoured explanation of the standard Stroop paradigm is in terms of some kind of
competition between generating the name of the ink colour and generating the word at
the verbal So, according to this interpretation there are two explanations
of the emotional Stroop effect: (1) activation: which is a function of increased
competition at the response stage with trauma-related material due to high "activation"
of trauma-related material in long-term memory; (2): inhibition: it is possible that
individuals with PTSD symptoms fmd it harder to "inhibit" the signal to produce the
word response if the word is trauma-related. Because colour-naming latency reflects
involuntary activation of meaning, interference generated by trauma-related material may
provide a quantitative index of intrusive cognitions (McNally, 1995).
The findings of the Stroop task in this thesis indicated that young patients with PTSD
exhibit a selective processing bias for trauma related words relative to other types of
words and to control subjects. The results of this study support previous findings using
the modified Stroop task with adults who suffer from PTSD (e.g. Trandel & McNally,
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1987; McNally et al., 1990; McCarthy eta!., 1990; Ehiers et al., 1988; Foa et a!., 1991;
Foa eta!., 1991; and Thrasher et al., 1994). Similar patterns of selective processing of
threat material in other adult anxious patients have also been reported (e.g. Mathews &
MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et a!., 1989 and Mathews et al., 1993). These findings are also
in line with Martin & Jones' (1992) findings which show that interference on the
modified Stroop task with phobia words is higher in children with spider phobia.
The results also suggest that the Stroop interference to trauma-related words is not
associated with exposure to a specific trauma. Indeed, the two sub-groups of traumatised
subjects (i.e. trauma related to road traffic accident & personal violence) did not differ
with respect to their performance on the task. Thus, whereas the Stroop task presented
three types of negative words i.e threat, depressed and trauma-related words, both groups
of PTSD subjects only exhibited Stroop interference for trauma-related words. Several
additional studies support a conclusion that this interference is associated with PTSD
itself (Kaspi & McNally, 1991; McNally, English, & Howard, 1993; 1992; Foa et.al .,
1991; Thrasher, Daigleish & Yule, 1994; Martin and Jones, 1992; Kaspi Ct a!., 1995;
Vrana et al., in press) as traumatised subjects without PTSD do not show the effects.
Moreover, as noted in Chapter 5 the degree of interference for trauma-related words was
significantly related to a self-report measure the IES. There were two positive significant
correlations between scores of the IES (particularly Intrusion items of the IES) and RTs
to colour-name trauma-related words. A possible explanation for this finding is task
irrelevant processing (Williams et a!., 1994). According to this explanation, emotional
stimuli activate task irrelevant self-preoccupying processes which spend attentional
capacity leading to slowing of colour-naming reaction times. In this case, it seems that
trauma-related information interferes in cognitive processing of children and adolescents
with PTSD because it is relevant to the individual's current situation.
With respect to developmental considerations, children (aged under 13 year old) with
PTSD performed the same as controls, but adolescents with PTSD (aged over 13 years)
exhibited longer RTs to colour-naming trauma-related words as well as being slower
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overall relative to controls. In contrast, children of adults with PTSD (aged under 13
years) showed longer RTs towards trauma and threat related material than adolescents
of adults with PTSD (aged over 13 years). It seems that differences between the two
groups of patients support this idea that young children with PTSD may not be fully
aware of the realistic threat of harm to themselves and so may be protected from strong
emotional reactions (Yule, 1995) or pay more attention towards external cues of the
traumatic event (Pynoos et al., 1995). However, these explanations are speculative and
the issue of developmental effects is one to which further studies should probably pay
attention (see Chapter 5).
The results of the second experiment also revealed that children of adults with PTSD
showed greater interference towards trauma-related and general threat material than other
types of words relative to controls. These findings suggest that the cognitive structures
of children of traumatised parents may be affected by the parents' PTSD while they did
not experience the same trauma. As noted in Chapter 2, studies reported that children
may be affected by parental PTSD symptoms and family factors (Green et al., 1991;
Schwarz and Perry, 1994; Yule, 1995). According to Yule, where parents had difficulties
processing their own emotional reactions, they were less successful in helping their
children or there is some evidence that psychological disturbance in PTSD is associated
to the preexisting or familial factors (Wolfe & Keane, 1993). However, as Peterson et
al. (1991) mentioned, parental response to trauma and to the child's reaction to the
traumatic events are important factors in the developing or amelioration of the child's
PTSD. So, it seems reasonable that the cognitive functions of children could be affected
by the parents' PTSD. As discussed earlier, activation of fear re (e.g. Foa et al.,
1989) by presentation of threatening information (in this case cues of the traumatic event
experienced by the parent) could lead to interference with other structures that are
required for the integration of information relevant in the Stroop task. In contrast to
children with PTSD who showed a selective processing bias only towards trauma-related
material, children of adults with PTSD revealed a bias towards both trauma and general
threat information. It seems that this is due to a general difficulty in maintaining
attentional focus when they are confronted with threat (when they became anxious about
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their parents' problems) or trauma-related (which caused a problem for their parents)
materials.
The results of the study with the attentional deployment task with PTSD patients are in
line with the Stroop findings. PTSD patients exhibited a bias in selective attention that
favours the pick up of emotionally threatening information particularly social threat
material, while they shift attention away from the depressed words. These findings are
broadly in agreement with those of MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) which found
that anxious patients tended to shift processing away towards threatening material
relative to controls. These fmdings are also broadly in agreement with those using child
subjects with other anxiety disorders and depression (Vasey et a!. 1995; Vasey et a!.,
1994; Taghavi et al., in preparation) which show a clear attentional bias toward
emotionally threatening cues in anxious subjects but not in depressed individuals.
According to the content specific hypothesis (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) and
associative network theory (e.g. Bower, 1980) anxiety is associated with a cognitive bias
favouring threat-related information, and this bias should be demonstrated throughought
processing activities, including encoding and retrieval. Long term emotional disorders
create cognitive fear structures which are activated during emotional arousal (Williams
et al., 1988). Individuals with anxiety disorders (such as PTSD) are expected to perceive
information relevant to their fears and allocated more resources to the processing of such
information. According to Beck, the negative appraisals of anxious subjects tend to be
rather specific and are associated more with danger and threat, while depression is
associated with schemata concerning negative aspects of the self, the world and the
future. The findings of the Stroop tasks with children with PTSD and children of adults
with PTSD have demonstrated a selective attentional bias towards trauma-related
information which is in line with the emotional disorders frameworks.
In line with this, Foa and Kozak (1986) and Mathews & MacLeod (1985) speculated that
the presence of cognitive fear structures or danger schemata, is the most important factor
in explaining selective processing. As discussed in Chapter 3, these structures are the
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patterns of interpretation of information which are stored in memory and are thought to
facilitate the integration of new information about one's experiential world. Thus, when
pathological structures are activated, they seem to interfere with the accessing of other
structures that are required for integration of information relevant to competing tasks.
This explanation predicts that any information associated with the traumatic event will
produce Stroop or probe dot interference.
Rachman (1980) argued that "emotional processing" is based on three conditions: (a)
presence of an emotional disturbance; (b) the disturbance has to decline; and (c) a return
to the normal situation or to routine behaviour. If an emotional disturbance occurs, while
the two other conditions (declining disturbance, and a return of routine behaviour) do not
occur, then the emotional processing will be incomplete. Persistence or return of
intrusive phenomena such as nightmares indicates incomplete emotional processing.
Rachman argued that indirect signs of PTSD may include an inability to concentrate on
the task, so leading to excessive restlessness and irritability. Therefore, the presence of
biases towards trauma-related information in children and adolescents with PTSD could
be interpreted as a result of intrusive signs of emotional activity due to the exposure of
the individual to trauma-related material.
It seems that the findings of the current study are also in line a number of cognitive
models of PTSD (e.g. Foa's fear network theory, 1989; the cognitive processing theory
of Creamer et al., 1992; Brewin et al.'s dual representation theory, in press). All of these
cognitive theories of PTSD share certain core theoretical assumptions. They suggest that
individuals with PTSD bring a set of pre-existing experiences to the traumatic event.
These two sets of information are incompatible with each other, and the attempt to
assimilate the traumatic information which is activated by traumatic reminders leads to
an interference on cognitive tasks such as the Stroop or attentional deployment. It seems
reasonable, therefore, to assume that, initially at least, there may be some mileage in
applying these adultocentric theories to children with PTSD.
322
9.2.2. Memory bias
Although the results showed clear evidence of processing biases in both attention-based
paradigms (Stroop and attentional deployment tasks) with PTSD patients and children
of adults with PTSD towards trauma-related material in the Stroop and threat material
in the probe dot, there was no evidence of any bias for such material in recall and
recognition memory tests in both groups of subjects.
The findings of the recall and recognition tests support the hypothesis that PTSD patients
do not show a significant explicit memory bias toward negative words, particularly
trauma-related cues, relative to controls. In line with this, Zeitlin & McNally (1991)
found no significant explicit memory bias in adults who suffer from PTSD. Children
with PTSD also tended to show poor overall memory performance which is consistent
with the clinical features of poor memory in PTSD patients (see below).
From a theoretical perspective, it seems that the current findings about recall and
recognition memory bias do not support content specific hypothesis of Beck (e.g., 1985).
According to Beck. anxiety is associated with future threat, while depression is
characterised by negative thoughts which are concerned with the past experience. Beck
states that:
a person is prepared to focus on important aspects of a situation and apply the
appropriate "formulas" to their analysis. This advance preparation involves the
activation of "cognitive structures" (schemas) that orient the individual to a situation and
help him to select relevant details from the environment and to recall relevant data." (p.
54, 1985)
Although children with PTSD overall recalled fewer words than controls, but they
retrieved trauma-related words the same as controls. Therefore, the findings of the current
thesis about memory bias is inconsistent with Beck's model.
In Bower's (e.g. 1980) affect congruent effect theory, when a person is in an emotional
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state (e.g. PTSD) the node related to that emotion is activated and activation spreads to
associated nodes which contain information which is congruent in mood with the
experienced emotion. In the case of PTSD, trauma-related information would become
activated due to traumatic network memory. Bower predicts that all tasks involving
access to stored information should demonstrate mood-congruent effects due to increased
activation of mood-congruent information. Thus, there should be mood-state dependent
recall. So, according to this explanation PTSD patients should recall more trauma-related
words than controls, but the fmdings are inconsistent with this hypothesis.
Cognitive theories of PTSD (e.g. Foa et al., 1989; Brewin et a!. in press) predict that the
memory network comprises certain types of information, including details of the context
in which trauma-related stimuli are present. When a trauma-related stimulus is
presented, the network memory becomes biased towards trauma-related cues. The results
of the recall and recognition tests with young people with PTSD suggest that the
activation of network memory in PTSD does not occur in retrieval form. So these
theories failed to explain recall and recognition performance on children with PTSD.
However, these data are in line with the Williams et al. (1988) model. In this model the
distinction between automatic and strategic processing is central. Anxiety disorders,
including PTSD, operate mainly on automatic processing, while depression operates on
strategic processes. Because memory is more strategic, and attention is automatic, this
is the reason why anxiety tends to show a selective attentional bias and the effect of
depression is more strong on memory. Thus, the fmdings of recall and recognition tests
are more fitted with Williams et a!. 's model.
In conclusion, the findings of these studies i.e attention and memory with children and
adolescents with PTSD which have been carried out for the first time revealed a similar
pattern of cognitive biases as adults. These data suggest that children with PTSD and
children of adults with PTSD are charactensed by a specific cognitive bias favouring
trauma-related words and threat words (in the absence of trauma-related words) at the
attentional level, but no such bias at the mnemonic level.
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9.2.3. Comparison with anxious and depressed children's findings
Two other sets of studies were carried out with the same 91 attention and memory task
but using anxious and depressed children (aged 9-17 years old). In this section I attempt
to compare these findings and present a brief discussion about information processing in
children and adolescents with emotional disorders.
The results of the Stroop task with anxious and depressed children indicated that anxious
children exhibited a selective attentional bias towards threatening information relative
to control subjects and other types of words i.e. depression-related, happy, trauma-
related, and neutral words (Taghavi et al., 1996) which is line with the findings of
children and adolescents with PTSD. While depressed patients revealed no such
selective processing bias towards depression-related or other types of words (Neshat-
Doost, 1996).
Regarding the attentional deployment paradigm, the findings provided evidence for the
existence of an attentional bias towards general threat stimuli in the absence of trauma-
related words in children who suffer from PTSD. When confronted with a threat cue,
PTSD patients responded to subsequent probes more quickly than when exposed to
depression-related cues. On the other hand, control subjects exhibited equal response
latencies for probes following both threat and depression-related material. Findings with
anxious children revealed that anxious children, but not normal controls, consistently
deploy attention towards both types of threat-related (physical threat & social threat)
stimuli but not to depression-related stimuli (Taghavi, 1996). Interestingly, the results
of the probe dot task with depressed and mixed depressed (patients who were highly
depressed and anxious) children showed that both clinical groups did not exhibit a
selective processing bias towards depressed or threat material but that they shift their
attention away from all negative words in the same way as controls. One possible
explanation for this differences between depression and anxiety disorders including
PTSD suggested that anxiety is characterised by attentional biases operating at a
perceptual stage or early stage of processing to facilitate the pickup of mood congruent,
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emotionally threatening materials, while depression is characterised by biases operating
at the retrieval level or late stage processing which facilitate the recall of mood-
congruent, emotionally negative information (MacLeod Ct a!., 1986; Mathews, 1993).
Such a distinction between cognitive processing of emotional disorders could lead to
make a clear clinical distinction between depression and anxiety. For example, depressed
patients generally attribute their negative affect to internal sources, while anxious
subjects particularly PTSD patients tend to attribute their affect to external sources which
sometimes leads to avoidance from certain kind of situation.
Regarding memory bias, the findings of the recall and recognition tests indicated that
anxious children showed no explicit recall memory bias, but they exhibited an explicit
recognition memory bias, such that anxious subjects recognised more threat words than
controls (Taghavi, 1996). PTSD children revealed neither recall nor recognition memory
bias towards any types of emotional words relative to controls. Depressed patients did
not show any memory bias in recall or recognition tests when they were confronted with
general negative words, but they exhibited a selective memory bias in both recall and
recognition tests when the presented words were self-descriptive adjectives (Neshat-
Doost, 1996). It seems that the findings of these studies are relatively in line with those
with adults with emotional disorders (e.g., Mathews et al., 1989; Richards & Whittaker,
1990).
Although cognitive theories such as Bower (e.g. 1980) fail to explain all these findings
in the same framework, the current fmdings fit better with Williams Ct al model (1988).
As noted above, depression is more associated with the bias in the late stage of
processing or strategic aspect of encoding, therefore, depressed patients attributed their
negative mood to the themselves. The question is raised as to why the negative bias is
only associated with the recall of personally relevant information in depression? It seems
that depressed subjects tend to recall negative material that has been encoded in relation
to themselves, as the material concerned is relevant to the current situation of the
individual. According to Beck (1976, 1987) depressed individuals have cognitive biases
about self, world, and future. Beck defmed these cognitive biases (even the biases about
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world and future) in a self-referent way. Results of studies by Butler and Mathews (1983)
are also consistent with the hypothesis that the cognitive biases of depressed individuals
are self-relevant.
Therefore, the theoretical hypotheses of Bower (e.g., 1981), and Beck and Emery (1985)
successfully predict that anxious and PTSD patients should exhibit an attentional bias
towards negative-related words and a memory bias towards depressed content in
depression. However, both of them failed to provide a satisfactory account of attention
in depression and an explicit memory bias in anxiety and PTSD patients.
In contrast, Williams et a!. (1988) suggested that anxiety disorders including PTSD are
associated with biases in attention and not memory bias, favouring emotionally threat-
related materials, while depression which is associated with a negative self-related bias
in recall is not associated with an attentional bias. As noted earlier Williams et a!. (1988)
proposed that depressed subjects could elaborate negative information such as is shown
on recall and recognition tests. They define 'elaboration' as 'the activation of a
representation in relation to other associated representations to form new relationships
between them and to activate old relationships' (p. 170). They suggested that such
elaboration is inhibited in anxiety including PTSD and that the presence of attentional
biases in anxious subjects may reflect automatic priming or integration processes (see
Chapters 3 and 7). The correspondence between the present data and the Williams et al.
(1988) model suggests that, initially at least, there may be some benefit in applying the
Williams et a!. framework to children with emotional disorders, including PTSD. The
similar pattern of findings in children with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD
further suggest that information processing approaches such as that of Williams et a!.
may have a range of application broader than that of the individuals actually experiencing
symptoms of emotional disorder.
9.2.4. Implications for processes underlying treatment
Foa and Kozak (1986) suggested that a successful treatment of individuals with anxiety
disorders modifies their cognitive fear structures. So, the selective processing of threat-
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related information will be decreased following successful treatment of the disorders.
For example, Watts (1986) showed that attentional bias with the Stroop paradigm in
spider phobics reduced after a course of behavioural therapy. In this line, Foa and
McNally (1986) also found that the attentional bias on a dichotic listening task
diminished in contamination anxiety. These fmdings suggest that anxiety is the cause of
the attentional bias towards threat information. In respect to the treatment of emotional
disorders Williams et a!. 's state that:
"....if the affective disturbances associated with exposure to a stimulus can be reduced,
in terms of our model this will reduce the output of the affective decision mechanisms.
At the preattentive stage this will reduce attentional deployment towards the source of
threat for anxious patients. At the elaboration stage this will reduce the spread to
associated negative concepts for depressed patients" (p. 181, 1988).
In the case of PTSD, it seems that the traumatic events cause specific attentional bias
which should reduce after systematic treatment. Therefore, pre and post-treatment
information processing performance may provide valuable information to see the
cognitive changes underlying different intervention approaches. At the present, self-
report measures such as Impact of Event Scale are the standard means of comparing
outcome across different treatment approaches of PTSD. These measures suffer from
problems of interpretation such as response bias. Information processing methods such
as Stroop effect are sensitive to changes of symptoms of PTSD and can be used not only
as outcome measure, but for assessing the fear and intrusive thoughts that are not elicited
by self-report measures.
Foa et al. (1989) proposed that reduction of fear can occur via two conditions: (a) the fear
memory must be activated through any of the three network elements: information about
the stimuli, responses, or meaning, and (b) new information must be provided that is
incompatible with the current fear structure in order for a new memory to be formed.
They suggested that systematic exposure to the traumatic memory in a safe environment
serves to modify the feared memory such that threat-related cues are reevaluated and
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habituated. Resick and Schnicke (1992) suggest a cognitive processing therapy of PTSD
based on information-emotional processing theory of PTSD. This method includes
education, exposure, and cognitive components. Their experimental study showed that
this method was effective in improving symptoms of PTSD patients.
However, it seems that cognitive therapy for PTSD provides means for activating the
memory structure. The cognitive activation would include conflicting beliefs and
meanings attributed to the event and expectations regarding the future that might not be
elicited by other forms of exposure therapy. Therefore, it may be suitable to develop a
therapy that will activate the memories of the event and will also provide corrective
information regarding conflicts attributions that interfere with complete processing. The
symptoms of PTSD such as intrusion, avoidance, and arousal are usually caused by
conflicts between the new information and prior structure which my be concerned with
danger and safety. Following traumatic events, PTSD individuals have overwhelming
emotions that they attempt to suppress or avoid. The exposure component of traumatic
events via processing of trauma-related information can elicit all of the emotions and
their related beliefs. So, the findings of the current thesis may lead to a useful cognitive
therapy which treats PTSD with exposure of trauma-related cues to reduce the symptoms
particularly those related to the intrusive thoughts in young people with PTSD.
Another implication of the current thesis' findings suggest that the use of information
processing tasks such as Stroop or neuropsychological memory test can serve as valuable
methods for differentiating PTSD patients from other groups of patients such as anxiety
disorders or those disorders which have comorbidity with PTSD. It seems that
attentional tasks (Stroop and attentional deployment tasks) could serve as useful
instruments for differentiating of PTSD following different types of trauma. For
example, survivors of ship disaster should show a selective processing bias towards
material related to the disaster, while assaults victims will show longer reaction times
towards information related to the assaults.
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9.2.5. Memory deficits in children with PTSD
As discussed in Chapter 8 PTSD patients showed a general poor memory in RBMT on
total score and on items such as story recall, prospective items or orientation. These
fmdings are supported by the clinical features of PTSD which include poor memory and
poor concentration (Yule, 1992) leading to poor performance in academic work (Yule,
1995). Although PTSD patients revealed a general poor memory relative to controls, they
performed in most items of the RBMT the same as controls (except prospective items,
story recall and orientation). All items of RBMT were carried out in the explicit form.
The distinction between implicit and explicit memory was proposed by Graf and Schater
(1985). Generally, implicit memory is facilitated by integrative processing, whereas
elaborative processing plays an important role in facilitating retrieval from explicit
memory. Implicit memory is investigated by instructions which do not reveal the fact
that memory is being assessed, while explicit memory is investigated by providing clear
instruction that perviously learned material is to be retrieved.
Although children and adolescents with PTSD did not show an explicit memory bias
towards trauma-related material but they exhibited a general poor explicit memory in the
RBMT. Similar pattern of explicit memory impairment was found in amnesic patients
(Schater & Graf, 1986; Schater, 1987). Yehuda et al. (1995) suggested that memory
dysfunction in PTSD may involve the intermingling of past experiences with current
experiences in the form of intrusive thoughts or flashbacks leading to a specific deficits
in the monitoring and regulation of memory infirmation. So the presence of substantial
memory deficits and forgetting provide an interesting contrast with the phenomenology
of intrusive recollections in PTSD which may be compatible with ideas relating to
psychogenic amnesia.
Neuropsychological explanations suggests that modification in the hippocampus and
possibly other brain structures involved in memory, such as the amygdala, prefrontal
cortex, and temporal lobe, may cause deficits in memory functions (see Chapter 8).
The findings of RBMT also showed that prospective memory of PTSD patients is more
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vulnerable than retrospective memory. Regarding prospective memory, Craik (1986)
suggests that remembering should be considered as an interaction between environmental
and organismic factors. When environmental support such as cues and context is weak,
as in free recall, successful remembering relies more on the self-initiated activities of the
rememberer which are voluntaiy and effortful. Therefore, the less contextual support and
the high level of self-initiated activities required, the more vulnerable a task will be to
impairment. According to Craik (1986) prospective memory tasks are more vulnerable
to impair than retrospective memory tasks. In respect of prospective memory deficit in
PTSD patients, it is possible to attribute this difference to the following factors: (a) PTSD
patients are hyperalert particularly to the environmental cues leading to weak contextual
support, (b) according to Levy and Loftus (1984) prospective memory tasks involve a
number of different cognitive operations including generating a cue to carry out the
action at the time; remembering what the action is, and finally carrying it. So these may
impair performance on the prospective memory tasks more than other types of memory
tasks. Further analysis showed that, although the total memory scores were the same for
boys and girls with PTSD, boys exhibited poorer prospective memory relative to girls.
This finding revealed that boys have more problems than girls in remembering those
actions which are related to the future.
Younger patients with PTSD (aged under 14 years old) showed an impairment only on
the story immediate recall sub-test, while they performed the same as controls in other
sub-tests. Adolescents with PTSD (aged over 14 years) revealed a poorer performance
on more items including prospective items (appointment, belonging, and message
delivery), orientation, and, to some extent on picture recognition, whereas they performed
the same as controls on the story recall. This means that the memory deficits in
adolescents with PTSD are more complicated than those in younger children.
Further studies using various neuropsychological tests with children and adolescents with
PTSD should be performed to support the possibility that the effects observed are specific
to PTSD. The current findings suggest that using some neuropsychological memory
instruments represent an objective assessment of memory functions in children with
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PTSD. Pre and post-treatment memory performance using neuropsychological standard
tests may represent useful information to see the memory changes underlying different
intervention approaches. This procedure may also be considered as a useful device in
rehabilitation strategies oriented towards compensation for deficits in memory. The
present findings also suggest that future studies with young people with PTSD should
focus on highly specific components of the memory system.
9.3. Future line of research
On a wider front, there are clearly numerous questions which remain unanswered. Issues
such as the relationship between PTSD and anxiety disorders; between PTSD and
dissociative disorders; the relationship between cognitive biases and cognitive symptoms
of PTSD such as intrusive thoughts or flashbacks, developmental effects on cognitive
functions of PTSD, the effects of treatment on the cognitive processing biases, the
relationship between PTSD and neurological disturbances and so on. For example,
although PTSD can be classified as a sub-group of anxiety disorders, there are some
differences between PTSD and anxiety on cognitive functions such as memory
impairment and poor concentration. It seems that further studies may make a clearer
distinction between the two types of disorder.
Progress in answering these questions is extremely important if any kind of broad picture
of the nature of the cognitive functions (i.e. attentional bias, memory bias or memory
deficits) associated with young people with PTSD is to emerge. The emotional Stroop
and recall and recognition tasks were the only paradigms which compared children with
PTSD and children of adults with PTSD with matched controls. The results showed a
significant Stroop effect with trauma-related material in both groups but no such effect
was found in recall and recognition paradigm. It was suggested that this might reflect the
greater amount of automatic processing or integration of trauma-related material in long-
term memory in PTSD patients. However, it would clearly have been desirable to have
both children with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD groups in all of the
experiments reported in this thesis to provide a broader ranging investigation of this
hypothesis.
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It seems sensible to present the tasks to different groups of traumatised children and
adolescents in order to see if the bias found with the young people who were involved
in the RTA or PV accidents is found in other types of PTSD patients. In Chapter Six we
used an attentional deployment task with threat and depression-related material and not
with trauma-related stimuli. It would be interesting to present this task with a corpus of
trauma-related material to different groups with PTSD to see if the bias found will be
shown by the subjects.
9.4. Summary
A useful source of emotional words (for children and adolescents) was developed to
permit better selection of words for use in studies of emotional information processing
in children and adolescents. It is hoped that this should be a useful source to develop
cognitive tasks using words with emotional valence. Three different computerised
cognitive paradigms (namely, Stroop, probe dot, and recall and recognition) that have
been used with adult patients with emotional disorders were successfully developed for
use with children and adolescents with PTSD and children of adults with PTSD. All
these tasks were used for the first time to study cognitive information processing in
young people who were involved directly or indirectly with a traumatic event. These
paradigms provide a new set of techniques that can be useful to investigate
developmental aspects of cognitive processing of emotional valence in young people.
As mentioned in each experimental chapter and the current chapter, developmental
considerations of the data illustrated some differences between the two groups of patients
in the processing of emotional information. The findings of Chapter 8 illustrated that
patients with PTSD suffer from poor memory which has major implication for clinicians
and investigators who deal with this disorder.
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1- We would like you to write down as many words that come into your mind.
3- Now, we would like you to list as many things as possible that make you happy.
2- If you see a child who is scared or afraid, which things do you think describe what
might have frightened him or her.
4- Think about a child who is sad and then write down as many words as you can to
describe this feeling.
5- When you feel very good about yourself, what words do you use to describe that
feeling?
6- Imagine a child who is feeling very bad about him or herself. Write down as many
words as you can to describe that feeling.
7- Now list as many words as you can that describe happy feelings.
8- If you see a child who is scared or afraid, write down as many words as you can to
describe those feelings.
9- Please list as many things as you can that make children feel sad.
10- We would like you to write down as many names of animals (e.g. birds, mammals,
amphibians, reptiles, etc) that you know as quickly as you can.
Appendix 4.2
Differences between the two groups on producing words in other categories: semantically
related neutral words (animals) [t (219) = 1.64, p = 0.102], semantically unrelated neutral
words [t (219) = 1.36, p = 0.175], positive self-descriptive adjectives [t (216) = 0.79, p
= 0.428], happy feelings [t (201) = 0.47, p = 0.574], happy things [t (219) = 0.58, p =
0.564], and scary feelings [t (197) = 1.30, p = 0.564].
Appendix 4.3
The differences were not significant in 4 categories: semantically unrelated neutral words
[t (75) = 1.39, p <0.169]; happy feelings [t (109) = 0.12, p = .904]; scary feelings [t (110)
= 1.45, p = 0.149]; and sad things [t (111) = 0.87, p = .385].
379
Appendix 4.4
The number of words produced by the three groups in the 4 categories: semantically
related neutral words (animals) [F(2, 220) = 2.513, p = 0.083]; positive self-descriptive
adjectives [F(2, 220) = 2.504, p =0.084]; happy feelings [F(2, 220) = 0.966, p < 0.382];
and happy things [F(2, 220) = 2.394, p < 0.093].
Appedix 4.5
The differences were not significant in two categories: happy feelings [t (219) = 1.09, p
= 0.276] and scary feelings [t (219) = 1.74, p 0.083].
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Appendix 4.6: The 25 most frequently generated words in the following categories: scary;
sad; happy; and neutral.
Ii	 ii
WORD COUNT	 Happy thing
I	 I
I	 I	 I
School	 Primary	 I	 Secondary	 Total
Sex GirlsiBoys	 Tot IGirisiBoys I Tot lGirlslBoys	 Tot

















I	 34	 19	 53 I	 47	 15 I	 62 I	 81	 34 I 115
% 54.8 40.4 148.6 169.1 134.1 1 55.4 162.3 1 37.4 I	 52
1211	 8129130114144151122173
1 33.9	 17 126.6 144.1	 31.8 1 39.3 139.2 124.2 I	 33
1 24 1 24 1 48 1	 81	 6114132130162
% 138.7 j51.1	 44 111.8 113.6 112.5 124.6 I	 33 128.1
1111101211221	 8130133118151
' 117.7 121.3 119.3	 32.4 118.2 f26.8 125.4 119.8 123.1
I	 22 I	 13 I	 35	 11 I	 2 I	 13	 33 I	 15 I	 48
% 1 35.5 127.7 132.1 116.2 I 4.5 111.6 125.4 116.5 121.7
1 27 1 13 1 40 1	4 1	 11	 5131114145
1 43.5 127.7 136.7 I 5.9 I 2.3 I 4.5 123.8 115.4 120.4
1 16 1 13 1 29 1	 81	 7115124120144
% 25.8 127.7 126.6	 11.8 115.9	 13.4 118.5 I	 22 119.9
1121
	
8 1 20 1 20 1	 3123132111143
119.4 I	 17 118.3 129.4 I 6.8	 20.5	 24.6 112.1 119.5
I	 3 1	 4 1	 7 1 24 1	 9133127113140
I 4.8 I 8.5 I 6.4 1 35.3 120.5 129.5 120.8 114.3 118.1
I	 7 1 13 1 20 1	 5115120112128140
% 111.3 127.7 118.3 I 7.4 134.1 117.9 I 9.2 130.8 118.1
1151 7 1 22 1 13 1 2 1 15 1 28 1 9137
124.2 114.9 120.2 119.1 I 4.5 113.4 121.5 I 9.9 116.7
1161101261	 9 1	 1110125111136
% 125.8 121.3 123.9 113.2 I 2.3 I 8.9 119.2 112.1 116.3
I	 9 1	 4 1	 131	 131	 101	 231	 221	 141	 36
% 114.5 I 8.5 111.9 119.1 122.7 120.5 116.9 115.4 116.3
1131	 7 1 20 1	 2113115115120135
I	 21 114.9 118.3 I 2.9 129.5 113.4 111.5 I	 22 115.8
1101
	
4 1 14 1 15 1	5 1 20 1 25 1	 9134
116.1 I 8.5 112.8 122.1	 11.4 117.9 119.2 I 9.9 115.4
1141
	
7 1 21 1	 81	 ii	 9 1 22 1	 8130
	
% 122.6 114.9 119.3 111.8 I 2.3 I	 8 116.9 I 8.8 113.6
381
Laughing	 I	 2 I	 6 I	 8 I	 17 I	 5 I	 22 I	 19 I	 ii I	 30
II	 I 3.2 112.8 I	 I	 25 111.4 119.6 114.6 112.1 113.6 II
Il Dad	 113161191712191201	 812811
II	 I	 21	 12.8 117.4 110.3 I 4.5	 8 115.4 I 8.8 112.7 II
fl 
Presents	 10	 10 I	 20 I	 4 I	 4 I	 8 I	 14 I	 14 I	 28
II	 % 116.1	 21.3 118.3 I 5.	 I 9.1	 7.1	 10.8 115.4 112.7 II
IParty	 1151	 71221310131181712511
II	 % 24.2 114.9	 20.2	 0	 2.7 113.8 I 7.7 111.3 fl
Hsun	 Ii	 213120111211211	 312411
II	 I 1.6 I 4.3 I 2.8 129.4 I 2.3 118.8 116.2 I 3.3 110.9 II
Il Animal	 1712191141	 1 1 15 1 21 1	 312411
II	 111.3 I 4.3	 8.3 (20.6 I 2.3	 13.4	 16.2 I 3.3 110.9 II
Shopping	 I	 21	 4	 61171	 1 1 18 1 19 1 	 s I	 2411
II	 3.2 I 8.5 I	 I	 25	 2.3 116.1 114.6 I 5.5 110.9 II
Draw	 1101	 6 1 16 1	 61	 ii	 7 1 16 1	 712311
II	 % 116.1	 12.8	 14 .7 I 8.8 I 2.3 I 6.2 112.3	 7.7 110.4 II
fl	 School	 1141	 4 1 18 1	 21	 3 1	 5 1 16 1	 712311
II	 % 122.6 I 8.5 116.5	 2.9 I 6.8 I 4.5	 12.3 J 7.7 110.4 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
Ii	 ii
WORD COUNT	 Happy feeling	 II
Ii	 I	 I
II	 School	 Primary	 I	 Secondary	 Total	 II
II	 Sex IGirlslBoys	 Tot IGirlsIBoys	 Tot IGirlalBoys	 Tot II
IF	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II	 Number I	 62	 47 I 109 I	 68	 44 I 112	 130	 91	 221 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
fl	 Joy	 1331251581251201451581	 45110311
II	 153.2 153.2 1 53.2 136.8 1 45.5 140.2 144.6 1 49.5	 46.6 II
Happy	 1421241661121161281541	 401
	 9411
II	 % 167.7 151.1 160.6 117.6 136.4 I	 25 141 . 5 I	 44 142.5 II
(I	 Good	 1271201471101101	 20(	 37 1	 301	 6711
II	 143.5 142.6	 43.1 114.7 122.7 117.9 128.5 I	 33 130.3 II
Love	 1211111321241111	 35 1	45 1	 221	 6711
II	 % 1 33.9 123.4 129.4 1 35.3 I	 25 131.2 134.6 124.2 130.3 II
Nice	 1181221401
	
S I	 11	 612312314611
II	 I	 29 146.8	 36.7 I 7.4 I 2.3 I 5.4 117.7 125.3 120.8 II
Excited	 10 (
	 I	 15 I	 13 I 15	 28 I 23 I 20	 4
II	 % 116.1	 10.6 113.8 119.1 134.1 I	 25 117.7 I	 22 119.5 II
Great	 16	 11 I	 27	 10 I	 3 I	 13 I	 26 I	 14 I	 40 fl
II	 % 125.8	 23.4 (24.8 114.7 I 6.8 111.6 I	 20 115.4 118.1 II
Fun	 1131111241	 61	 911511912013911
II	 I	 21 (23.4 I	 22 I 8.8 120.5 113.4 114.6 I	 22 117.6 II
Q Laughing	 12	 7	 19 I 10	 ( 19	 22	 16	 38
II	 119.4 114.9 117.4	 14.7 120.5 I	 17	 16.9	 17.6 117.2 II
Glad	 1161	 8 1 24 1	3 1	 711011911513411
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II	 % 125.8 I	 17	 22 I 4.4 115.9	 8.9 114.6 116.5 115.4 II
II Brilliant	 I 11	 20	 8	 3	 19 I 12 I 31
II	 117.7 119.1	 18.3 111.8 I 6.8	 9.8 114.6 113.2	 14
Wonderful	 1121	 7 1 19 1	 81	 4 1 12 1 20 1	 lii	 3111
II	 % 119.4 114.9 117.4 111.8 I 9.1 110.7 115.4 112.1 I	 14 II
Smile	 1101	 7 1 17 1	7 1	 411111711112811
II	 % 116.1	 14.9 115.6 110.3 I 9.1 I 9.8 j13.1 112.1 112.7 II
Friend	 1121	 8 1 20 1	 61	 11	 7 1 18 1	 912711
II	 119.4 I	 17 118.3 I 8.8	 2.3	 6.2 113.8 I 9.9 112.2 II
li Play	 1121912112121	 411411112511
II	 % 119.4 119.1 119.3 I 2.9 I 4.5	 3.6 110.8 112.1 111.3 II
Help	 I	 9 1 13 1 22 1 	 01	 11	 l	 911412311
II	 % 114.5	 27.7 120.2	 0	 2.3 I	 .9 I 6.9 115.4 110.4 II
Pleased	 I	 61	 7 1 13 1	4 1	 611011011312311
II	 9.7 114.9 111.9 I 5.9 113.6 I 8.9 I 7.7 114.3 110.4 II
fl	 Friendly	 1101	 8 1 18 1	4 1	 01	 4 1 14 1	 812211
II	 % 116.11	 17 1 16.5 1 5.9 1	0 1 3.6 1 10.8 1 8.8 1 	 loll
Il Enjoy	 I	 7 1	 21	 9 1	 I	 6 1 11 1 12 1	 812011
II	 % 111.3 I	 I 8.3	 7.4 113.6 I 9.8 I 9.2 I 8.8	 9 II
II	 Kind	 1111	 7 1 18 1 	 01	 01	 0 1 11 1	 711811
II	 % 117.7 114.9 116.5 I	 o	 o	 0 I 8.5 I 7.7 I 8.1 II
Excellent	 I	 61	 3 1	 9 1	 21	 4 1	 61	 81	 711511
II	 I	 I 6.4	 8.3 I 2.9 I 9.1 I 5.4 I 6.2 I 7.7 I 6.8 II
li Jolly	 1810181412161121	 211411
	
' 112.9 I	 0 I	 .3 I 5.9 I 4.5 I 5.4 I 9.2	 2.2 I 6.3 II
II	 Christmas	 I	 51	 4 1	 9 1	 01	 4 1	 4 1	 5 1	 811311
II	 I 8.1 I 8.5 I 8.3 I	 0 j 9.1 I 3.6 I 3.8 I 8.8 I 5.9 II
ll cheerful	 121315121517141	 811211
II	 I 3.2 I 6.4 I 4.6 I 2.9 111.4 I 6.2 I 3.1 I 8.8 I 5.4 II
Il content	 1110111515110161511111
II	 I 1.6 I	 0	 .9 I 7.4 111.4 I 8.9 I 4.6 I	 I	 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
Ii	 ii
II WORD COUNT	 Scary thing	 II
II
II	 School	 Primary	 Secondary	 Total	 II
Sex GirlsBoys	 Tot IGirlslBoys I Tot IGirlslBoys	 Tot
II	 Children I	 62 I	 47 I 109 I	 68 I	 I 112 I 130 I	 91 I 221 I
II	 I	 I	 I	 II
II Dark	 15 I	 12 I	 27	 32 I	 10	 42	 47	 22	 69 II
II	 %	 24.2 125.5 124.8 147.1 122.7	 37.5 136.2 124.2 131.2 II
II	 Dog	 12511213711711012714212216411
II	 140.3 125.5 1 33.9 I	 25	 22.7 124.1 132.3 124.2 I	 29 II
II	 Die	 I	 9 I	 I	 16 I	 26 j	 17 I	 43 I	 35 I	 24 I	 II
II	 % 114.5 114.9 114.7 138.2 138.6 138.4 126.9 126.4 126.7 II
II	 Bully	 I	 17 I	 9	 26 I	 20 I	 13	 33 I	 37 I	 22	 59 II
II	 127.4 119.1 123.9 129.4 129.5 129.5 128.5 124.2 126.7 II
II	 Ghost	 1131141271221	 212413511615111
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II	 21	 29.8 124.8 I32.4	 4.5	 21.4 l26.9 I17.6 123.1 II
fl	 Fire	 I	 8?	 8 1 16 1 19 1	3 1 22 1 27 ?	 ii?	 38
II	 %	 12.9 I	 17 114.7 127.9 I 6.8 119.6 l20.8 112.1 117.2 II
Spider	 I	 9 I	 8 I	 17 I	 14 I	 5 I	 19 I	 23 I	 13 I	 36 II
II	 % 114.5 I	 17	 15.6 120.6 111.4 I	 17 I17.7 114.3 116.3 II
Monster	 I	 4?	 5?	 9 1 19 1	 512412311013311
II	 I 6.5 110.6 I 8.3 127.9 111.4 121.4 117.7 I	 11 114.9 II
fl	 Lost	 I	 5?	 6 1 11 1 11 1	 811911611413011
II	 8.1	 12.8 110.1 116.2 j18.2 I	 17 112.3 115.4 113.6 II
Il Animal	 1712191111	 6 1 17 1 18 1	 812611
II	 96 111.3 I 4.3 I 8.3 116.2 113.6 115.2 113.8 I 8.8 111.8 II
lI Film	 151611119?	 411311411012411
II	 18.1112.8110.1113.219.1111.6110.8? 	 11110.911
fl Accident	 I	 4 1	 I	 8 1 10 ?	 611611411012411
II	 I 6.5 I 8.5 I 7.3 114.7 113.6 114.3 110.8 I	 11 110.9 II
fl	
Noise	 I	 8	 21101101	 3113?	 18?	 512311
II	 96 112.9 I 4.	 I 9.2 114.7 I 6.8 111.6 113.8 I 5.5 110.4 II
II	 Stranger	 I	 4?	 21	 6 1 14 ?	3 1 17 1 18 1	 512311
II	 I 6.5 I 4.3	 5.5 120.6 I 6.8 115.2 113.8 I 5.5 110.4 fl
Il Alone	 13131	 6 1 12 ?	4 1 16 1 15 1	 712211
II	 I 4.8 I 6.4 I 5.5 117.6 I 9.1 114.3 111.5 I	 I	 10 II
IlFight	 I	 3 1 6 ?	 918?	 4?	 12?	 ' i i	 101	 21??
II	 4.8 112.8 I 8.3	 11.8 I 9.1 110.7 I 8.5 I	 ii I 9.5 II
lI Hurt	 16?
	
'1 7 ?	 9 1 4 1 13 1 15 ?	 512011
II	 I 9.7 I 2.1 I 6.4 113.2 I 9.1 111.6 111.5 I 5.5 I	 9 II
Il People	 18141121414?	 8 1 12 1	 812011
II	 '	 12.9 I 8.5 I	 11 I 5.9 I 9.1 I 7.1 I 9.2 I 8.8 I	 9 II
Il car	 15151101712?	 9 1 12 ?	 7119??
II	 I 8.1 110.6 I 9.2 110.3 I 4.5 I	 8	 9.2 I 7.	 I 8.6 II
Il Man	 I	 8 1 5 1 13 1 4 1 1 ?	5 1 12 ?	 611811
II	 96	 12.9 110.6 111.9 I 5.9 I 2.3 I	 I 9.2 I 6.6 I 8.1 II
Il Teacher	 I	 6 1 3 1 9 ?	8 1 1 1	 9 1 14 ?	 411811
II	 I 9.7 I 6.4 I 8.3 111.8 I 2.3 I	 8 110.8 I 44	 8.1 II
Il cat	 I'll	 3 1 14 1 2 1 1 ?	3 1 13 ?	 4117II
II	 117.7 I 6.4 112.8 I 2.9 I 2.3 I 2.7 I	 10 I 4.4 I 7.7 II
Il school	 12141619?	 2 I 11 I 11 I	 611711
II	 I 3.2 I 8.5 I 5.5 113.2 I 4.5 I 9.8 I 8.5 I 6.6 I 7.7 II
II	 Nightmare	 I	 3?	 2?	 l	 7?	 5 1 12 ?	 1 0 ?	 711711
II	 I 4.8	 4.3 I 4.6 110.3 111.4 110.7 I 7.7 I 7.7 I 7.7 fl
lI Dad	 161
	 4?	 10?	 5?	 1?	 6111?	 511611
II	 I	 I 8.5 I 9.2 I 7.4 I 2.3 I 5.4 I 8.5 I 5.5	 7.2 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
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Ii
WORD COUNT	 Scary feeling	 II
I I	 II
Ii	 School	 Primary	 Secondary	 Total	 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II	 Sex IGirlsIBoys	 Tot IGirisIBoys	 Tot IGirlsIBoys	 Tot
II	 Nuniber	 62	 4	 109	 68 I	 44 I 112 I 130	 91 I 221 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II Scared	 I	 41 I	 25	 66	 15 I	 8	 23	 56	 33	 89 II
II	 % 166.1 153.2	 60.6 122.1 118.2 120.5 143.1 136.3 140.3 II
Frighten	 30	 20	 50 I 16 I 14 I 30 I 46 I 34 I 80 fl
II	 % 148.4 142.6 1 45.9 123.5 131.8 126.8 1 35.4 1 37.4	 36.2 II
Sad	 I	 33	 23	 56	 12 I	 ii I	 23 I	 45 I	 34 I	 79 II
II	 153.2 148.9	 51.4 117.6	 25 120.5 134.6 1 37.4	 35.7 II
II Afraid	 I	 29 I	 21	 50 I	 9 I	 8 I	 17	 38 I	 29 I	 67
II	 % 146.8 f44.7	 45.9 113.2 118.2	 15.2 129.2 131.9 130.3
Unhappy	 1231	 101	 33 1 	 131	 101	 231	 36	 201	 5611
II	 %	 37.1 121.3 130.3 (19.1 122.7 120.5 127.7 I	 22 125.3 II
II	 Upset	 I	 21 I	 13 I	 4 I	 I	 I	 I	 25 I	 18 I	 43 II
II	 133.9 127.7 131.2 I 5.9	 11.4 I	 8 119.2 119.8 119.5 II
Lonely	 1191	 7 1 26 1 12 1	 511713111214311
II	 %	 30.6 114.9 123.9 j17.6 111.4 115.2 123.8 113.2 119.5 II
Worry	 liii
	
8 1 19 1 10 1 	 811812111613711
II	 % 117.7	 '-	 117.4 114.7 118.2 116.1 116.2 117.6 116.7 II
Alone	 I	 ii	 4 1	 5 1 22 1	 813012311213511
II	 1.6	 8.5	 4.6 132.4 118.2 126.8 117.7 113.2 115.8 II
Il Cold	 1716113171	 5I12I14Il1I25II
II	 111.3	 12.8	 11.9 110.3 111.4 110.7 110.8 112.1 111.3 II
Horrible	 1121	 8 1 20 1 	 4j	 ii	 5 1 16 1 	 912511
II	 % 119.4 I	 17 118.3 I	 I 2.3	 112.3	 111.3 II
lI Hurt	 1716113151	 611111211212411
II	 % 111.3 112.8 111.9 I 7.4 113.6 I 9.8	 9.2 113.2 110.9 II
II	 Lost	 I	 8	 41121	 9 1	 3 1 12 1 17 1 	 712411
II	 112.9 I 8.5 I	 11 113.2 I 6.8 110.7 113.1 I 7.7 110.9 II
IlAngry	 1715112141
	 711111111212311
II	 % 111.3	 10.6 I	 I 5.9 115.9 I 9.8 I 8.5 113.2 110.4 II
fl Terrified	 8	 4 I 12 I	 7 I	 4	 11	 15 I	 8 I 23
II	 %	 12.9 I 8.5 I	 11	 10.3 I	 I 9.8 111.5 I 8.8 110.4 II
Nervous	 I	 3 1	 3 1	 61	 7 1	 I	 121	 101	 811811
II	 I 4.8 I 6.4 I 5.5 110.3	 11.4 110.7 I	 I 8.8 I 8.1
Il Petrify	 1712191313161101	 sI'sII
II	 % 111.3 I 4.3	 8.3 I	 I 6.8 I	 I	 I 5.5 I 6.8 II
lI cry	 141519111415151	 911411
II	 I 6.5 110.6 I 8.3 I 1.5 I 9.1 I 4.5 I 3.8 I 9.9 I 6.3 II
Confused	 I	 3!	 21	 5 1	 81	 ii	 9 1 11 1 	 311411
II	 I 4.8	 4.3 I 4.6 111.8 I 2.3 I	 8	 8.5 I 3.3 I 6.3 II
lI Dark	 111112191	 1 1 10 1 10 1 	 2(1211
II	 1.6	 2.1 I 1.8	 13.2 I 2.3 I 8.9 I 7.7 I 2.2 I 54
Unloved	 I	 4 1	 21	 61	 5 1	 ii	 61	 9(	 311211
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II	 I 6.5	 4.3	 5.5	 7.4 j 2.3	 5.4	 6.9 I 3.3 I 5.4 II
Il Anxious	 I	 0101017121917121911
II	 0	 0	 0 110.3 I	 I	 8	 5.4 I 2.2	 II
liShaking	 2	 41	 61	 21	 ii	 3 1	 4 1	 5 1	 911
II	 I 3.2 I 8.5 I 5.5 I 2.9 I 2.3 I 2.7	 3.1	 5•5 I 4.1
Shocked	 I	 3 1	 i i	 4 1	 21	 3 1	 5 1	 5 1	 4 1	 911
II	 4.8 I 2.1 I 3.7	 2.9	 6.8	 4.5	 3.8	 4.4 I 4.1
Unwanted	 I	 3 1 	 01	 3 1	 61	 01	 61	 9 1 	 01	 911
II	 %14.8I	 0 1 2.8 1 8.8 1	0 1 5.4 1 6.9 1 	 014.111
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
Ii
WORD COUNT	 Positive self-descriptive adjectives
II	 School	 Primary	 I	 Secondary	 I	 Total	 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II	 Sex IGirlsIBoys	 Tot lGirlsIBoys	 Tot IGirisiBoys	 Tot II
II	 Numberl	 621	 4711091	 681	 44 1 112 1 130 1	 91122111
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II Happy	 I	 52 I	 39	 91	 57 I	 I	 91	 109 I	 73 I 182 II
II	 %	 83.9 I	 83 183.5 183.8 1 77.3 181.2 183.8 180.2 182.4 II
Good	 1441341781	 9 1 14 1 23 1 53 1	 48110111
II	 I	 71 172.3 171.6 113.2 131.8 120.5 140.8 152.7 1 45.7 II
H	 Joy	 1201181381211121331	 411	 301	 7111
II	 %	 32.3 138.3 1 34.9 130.9 127.3 129.5 131.5 I	 33 132.1 II
fl	 Proud	 1181	 6 1 24 1 31 1 10 1 41 1 49 1	 161	 6511
II	 I	 29 112.8 I	 22 145.6 122.7 136.6 1 37 • 7 117.6	 29.4 II
Brilliant	 I 21	 18	 14	 11 I 25	 I 29	 64 II
II	 % 1 33.9 138.3 135.8 120.6 I	 25 122.3 126.9 131.9 I	 29
Great	 23	 13 I 36	 13 I	 6	 19 I 36 I 19	 55
II	 % 137.1 127.7 I	 33 119.1 113.6	 17 127.7 120.9 124.9 II
II	 Nice	 1211191401	 S I	 21	 712612114711
II	 33.9 140.4 136.7 I 7.4 I	 I 6.2 I	 20 123.1 121.3 II
fl	 Excited	 1151	 7 1 22 1 17 1	 812513211514711
II	 % 124.2 114.9 120.2 I	 25 118.2 122.3 124.6 116.5 121.3 II
Pleased	 18	 6	 24	 14	 8	 22 I 32 I 14 I 46
II	 I	 29 112.8 I	 22 120.6 118.2 119.6 124.6 115.4 120.8 II
H	 Glad	 1161	 9 1 25 1	5 1	 611112111513611
II	 % 125.8 119.1 122.9 I 7.4 113.6 I 9.8 116.2 116.5 116.3 II
II Excellent	 8 I	 12 I	 20 I	 10 I	 6	 16 I	 18 I	 18 I	 36
II	 % 112.9 125.5 118.3 114.7 113.6 114.3 113.8 119.8 116.3 II
II Wonderful	 I	 12 I	 7 I	 19 I	 12 I	 2 I	 14 I	 24 I	 9 I	 33 II
II	 % 119.4 114.9 117.4 117.6 	 4.5 112.5 118.5	 9.9 114.9 II
Il Love	 19131121161	 4 1 20 1 25 1	 713211
II	 % 114.5 I 6.4 I	 11 123.5 I 9.1 117.9 119.2 I 77 114.5 II
Il Fun	 191	 3 1	 121	 9j	 01	 9 1	 181	 312111
II	 114.5 I 6.4 I	 11 113.2 I	 0	 8 113.8 I 3.3 I 9.5 II
fl Friendly	 8	 5	 13	 6 I	 0 I	 6 T	 14 I	 5 I	 19 II
II	 % 112.9 110.6 111.9 I 8.8 I	 0	 5.4 110.8 I 5.5 I 8.6 II
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ll Help	 9171161111121101811811
II	 % 114.5 114.9 114.7 I 1.5 I 2.3 I 1.8 I 7.7 I 8.8 I 8.1
Confident	 I	 1	 1	 2	 12	 I 16 I 13 I	 I 18
II	 I 1.6	 2.1	 1.8 117.6 I 9.1 114.3 I	 10 I 5.5	 8.1
fl Fantastic	 I	 I	 3 I	 7	 10	 1 I	 11 I	 14	 4 I	 18 II
II	 I 6.5	 6.4 I 6.4 114.7 I 2.3 I 9.8 110.8 I 4.4 I 8.1 II
II	 Cool	 I	 0	 11	 1 1 11 1	2 1 13 1 11 1	 311411
II	 0	 2.1	 •	 116.2 I 4.5	 11.6	 8.5	 3.3 I 6.3 II
li wicked	 I	 4 1 4 1 8 1 4 1 2 1 6 1 8 1	 611411
II	 I 6.5 I 8.5 I 7.3 I 5.9 I	 I 5.4 I 6.2 I 6.6 I 6.3 II
Il Best	 141317141216181	 511311
II	 I 6.5 I 6.4	 6.4 I 5.9 I 4.5 I 5.4 I 6.2 I 5.5 I 5.9 II
Il Content	 1010101617113161711311
II	 %I	 01	 °l	 0I8.8115.9111.614.6I7.715.911
lI Free	 151116161	 °I	 6 1 11 1	 111211
II	 I 8.1 I 2.1	 5.5 I 8.8 I	 0 I 5.4 I 8.5 I 1.1 I 5.4 II
li Play	 1715112101010171511211
II	 %Il1.31l0.61	 1110101	 015.415.515.411
Il Kind	 151217131114181	 311111
II	 8.1	 4.3	 6.4	 4.4	 2.3	 3.6	 6.2	 3.3 I	 5 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
I,	 ii
WORD COUNT	 Negative self-descriptive adjectives
II	 II
II	 School	 Primary	 Secondary	 Total	 II
II	 Sex IGirlsIBoys	 Tot IGirlslBoys	 Tot IGirlsIBoys	 Tot
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
II	 Number I	 62 I	 47	 109 I	 68 I	 44 I 112 I 130 I	 91 I 221 II
Sad	 40	 21 j 61	 20	 24	 44	 60	 45 I 105




% 138.7 131.9 135.8 119.1 143.2 128.6 128.5 1 37.4 132.1
Bad	 1241281521	 61	 7113130135165
% 138.7 159.6	 47.7 I 8.8 115.9 111.6 123.1 138.5 129.4
Angry	 I	 21 I	 11 I	 32 I	 13 I	 8	 21 I	 34 I	 19 I	 53
% 1 33.9	 23.4 129.4 119.1 118.2 118.8 126.2 120.9 I	 24
Guilty	 I	 9 I	 3 I 12	 24 I 11	 35 I 33 I	 14	 47
% 114.5 I 6.4 I	 11	 35.3 I	 25 131.2 125.4 115.4 121.3
Upset	 I	 14 I	 3 I	 17 I	 10 I	 7 I	 17 I	 24 I	 10	 34
	
% 122.6 I 6.4 115.6 114.7 115.9 115.2 118.5 I	 11 115.4
Stupid	 I	 I	 6	 13 I	 12 I	 8	 20 I	 19 I	 14 I	 33
111.3 112.8 jll.9 117.6 118.2 117.9 114.6 115.4 114.9
Horrible	 I 15 I 10 I 25 I	 5 I	 3	 8	 20 I 13 I 33
% 124.2 121.3 122.9 I 7.4 I 6.8 I 7.1 115.4 114.3 114.9
Sorry	 I	 7 1	6 1 13 1	5 1	 7112112113125
% 111.3 112.8 111.9 I 7.4 115.9 110.7 I 9.2 114.3 111.3
Depressed	 I	 2	 0	 2	 14 I	 9 I 23 I 16 I	 9 I 25
	
3.2	 0 I 1.8 120.6 120.5 120.5 112.3 I 9.9 111.3
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llworry	 1911110191	 5 1 14 1 18 1	 612411
II	 14.5	 2.1 I 9.2 113.2 jll.4 112.5	 13.8 I 6.6 110.9 II
fl	 Mad	 1121101221
	 ii	 0	 111311012311
II	 % 119.4 121.3 120.2	 1.5 I	 0 I	 I	 10	 11 110.4 II
fl Naughty	 1111101211
	 ii	 ii	 2 1 12 1 11 1	 2311
II	 % 117.7	 21.3	 19.3 I 1.5 I 2.3 I 1.8 I 9.2 112.1 110.4 II
Ashamed	 I	 5 1	6 1 11 1	 61	 411011111012111
II	 8.1 j12.8 110.1 I 8.8 I 9.1	 8.9	 8.5	 11	 9.5
1 Terrible	 I	 9 I	 5 I	 14 I	 5 I	 2 I	 7 f	 14 I	 7	 21
II	 114.5 110.6 112.8 I 7.4 I 4.5 I 6.2 110.8 I 7.7 I 9.5 II
li Scared	 151	 61	 iii	 9 1	 01	 91	 141	 61	 2011




II	 0	 4.3 I 1.8 120.6 I 6.8 115.2 110.8 I 5.5	 8.6
li Hate	 1613191613191121	 611811
II	 I 9.7	 6.4	 8.3	 8.8	 6.8 I	 8	 9.2 I 6.6 I 8.1 II
Il Lost	 151318161
	
4 1 10 1 11 1	 7118H
II	 I 8.1 I 6.4 I 7.3 I 8.8 I 9.1 I 8.9 I 8.5 I 7.7 I 8.1 II
Il Nasty	 1617113121214181	 911711
II	 I	 114.9 111.9 I 2.9 I 4.5	 3.6 I 6.2 I 9.9 I 7.	 II
II	 Lonely	 I	 11	 2	 31	 7 1	7 1 14 1	 81	 911711
II	 I 1.6	 4.3 I 2.8 110.3 115.9 112.5	 6.2	 9.9 I	 II
fl	 Unwanted	 I	 11	 01	 1 1 14 1	 1 15 1 15 1	 111611
II	 I 1.6 I	 0	 .9 120.6	 2.3 113.4 111.5	 1.1	 7.2
Silly	 I	 7 1	5 1 12 1
	3 1	 01	 3 1 10 1	 511511
II	 111.3 11 0 .6 I	 11 I 4.4	 0	 2.7 I	 I 5.5 I 6.8 II
IlAnnoyed	 151419131316181	 711511
II	 8.1	 8.5	 8.3 I 4.4 I 6.8 I	 I 6.2 I	 .7 I 6.8 II
Unloved	 I	 4 1	 11	 5 1	7 1	3 1 10 1 11 1	 411511
II	 6.5	 2.1 I 4.6 110.3 I 6.8 I 8.9 I 8.5 I 4.4	 6.8
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
Ii	 ii
WORD COUNT	 Sad thing	 II
I'	 I
Ii	 I	 I	 I
II	 School I	 Primary	 I	 Secondary	 Total	 II
II	 Sex GirisiBoys I Tot IGirlsiBoys I Tot GirlslBoys	 Tot
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
II	 Numberl	 611	 47 1 108 1	 691	 44 1 113 1 130 1	 91122111
Die	 I	 22 I	 14	 36 I	 30 I	 18 I	 48 I	 52 I	 32 I	 84
	
% 136.1 129.8 1 33.3 1 43.5 140.9 142.5 I	 40 135.2 I	 38
Bully	 I	 15 I	 9	 24 I	 16	 15 I	 31 I	 31 I	 24 I	 55
	
% 124.6 119.1 122.2 123.2	 34.1 127.4	 23.8 126.4 124.9
Lost	 I	 81	 s I	 131	 7114121115119134
113.1 110.6 I	 12 110.1 131.8 118.6 	 11.5 120.9 115.4
Told off	 I 11 I	 6	 17	 6	 7	 13	 17	 13 I 30
I	 18 112.8 115.7 I 8.7 115.9 111.5 113.1 114.3 113.6
Fight	 I	 61	 8 1 14 1	5 1	 9114111117128
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II	 ) 9.8 I	 17 I	 13 I 7.2 (20.5 112.4 I 8.5 118.7 112.7 II
li Hurt	 1813111191	 7116117110127(1
II	 113.1 I 6.4	 10.2	 13 115.9 114.2 113.1 I	 11 112.2 II
1	 Lonely	 I	 81	 2 1 10 1	 81	 7 1 15 1 16 1	 912511
II	 113.1 I 4.3 I 9.3 111.6 (15.9 113.3 112.3 I 9.9 111.3 II
11 111	 I	 7(	 4 1 11 1	 61	 7 1 13 1 13 1 	 lii	 2411
II	 111.5	 8.5 110.2 I 8.7 115.9 111.5 I	 10 112.1 110.9 II
Names	 I	 141	 8 1 22 1	 11	 01	 1 1 15 1	 812311
II	 I	 23 I	 17 120.4	 1.4	 0	 .9	 11.5 I 8.8 110.4 II
Pain	 I	 01	 01	 0 1 13 1	8 1 21 1 13 1	 812111
II	 I	 0 I	 0	 0 118.8 118.2 118.6 I	 10	 8.8 I 9.5 II
(Shout	 I	 S I	 7 1 12 1	 61	 21	 8 1 11 1	 912011
II	 I 8.2 114.9 111.1 I 8.7 I 4.	 I 7.1 I 8.5 I	 I	 II
Friendless	 I	 9 I	 1	 10 j	 7 I	 I	 10 I	 16 (	 4 I	 20
II	 % 114.8 I 2.1 ) 9.3 110.1	 6.8	 8.8 112 . 3 I 4.4 I	 II
lI Hit	 19(51141311141121611811
II	 % 114.8 110.6 I	 13 I	 I 2.3	 3.5	 9.2 I 6.6 I 8.1 II
((Kick	 1101	 7 1 17 1 	 11	 01	 1 1 11 1	 711811
II	 116.4 114.9 115.7	 1.4 I	 0	 .9 I 8.5 I 7.	 8.1
((war	 I	 5J	 3 1 8 1 6 1 3 1 9 1 11 1	 6(1711
II	 I 8.2 I 6.4 I 7.4 I 8.7 I 6.8 (	 8	 8.5 I 6.6 I 7.7 II
(Divorce	 I	 01	 01	 0 1 14 1	2 1 16 1 14 1	 211611
II	 0	 0 (
	
0 120.3 I 4.5 114.2 110.8 I 2.2 I 7.2
(Argument	 I	 4 1 	 s I	 9(	 I	 ii	 61	 9 1	 611511
II	 6.6 (10.6 I 8.3 I 7.2 I 2.3 I 5.3 I 6.9 ( 6.6	 6.8
School	 I	 l(	 01	 11	 7 1	 6 1 13 1	 81	 611411
II	 I 1.6	 0	 .9 110.1 113.6 111.5 I 6.2 ( 6.6 I 6.3 II
Rejection	 I	 0	 0	 0	 13 (	 1	 14	 13	 1	 14 fl
II	 %I	 0(01	 0I18.812.3I12.4I1OI1.1I6.3I1
Il Sad	 151318131215181	 511311
II	 I 8.2	 6.4	 7.4	 4.3 I 4.5 I 4.4 I 6.2 I	 I	 II
Il Alone	 1311(41811191111	 211311
II	 I 4.9 I 2.1 I 3.7 111.6 I 2.3	 8	 8.5 I 2.2	 5.9
Il Unhappy	 151511012111317(611311
II	 8.2 (10.6 I 9.3	 2.9	 2.3	 2.7	 5.4 I 6.6	 5.9 II
((Hate	 131417121214151	 611111
II	 I 4.9	 8.5	 6.5 I 2.9 ( 4.5 I 3.5 I 3.8	 6.6 I	 5 II
Il Punch	 161
	 4 1	 101	 11	 01	 11	 7 1 	 411111
II	 I 9.8 I 8.5 I 9.3 I 1.4 I	 0 I	 .9 I 5.4	 4.4 I	 5
Loneliness	 I	 0 I	 0	 0	 11 I	 0 I	 ii I	 ii (	 0	 11 II
II	 %I	 01010115.91019.718.5101511
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
ii
fl WORD COUNT	 Sad feeling	 II
'I
II	 School	 Primary	 Secondary	 Total	 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 II
II	 Sex IGirlslBoys	 Tot IGirlsIBoys	 Tot (GirisiBoys	 Tot
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
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I	 26 I	 22 I	 48 I	 24 I	 22	 46 I	 50 I	 44 I	 94
% 141.9 46.8	 44 1 35.3 I	 50 41.1 j38.5 148.4 142.5
1311	 121	 43 1	 281	 8 1 36 1
	59 1	 20179
I	 50 125.5 1 39.4 141.2 118.2	 32.1 14 5 -4 I	 22 135.7
27	 21 I 48	 15	 10	 25	 42 I 31	 73
1 43.5 1 44.7 I	 44 122.1 122.7	 22.3 132.3 134.1 I	 33
20	 16 I 36	 15	 10 I 25	 35	 26	 61
	
% 32.3 I	 34	 33	 22.1 122.7 122.3 126.9 128.6 127.6
1191141331141
	 7121133121154
% 130.6 129.8 130.3 120.6 115.9 118.8 1 25.4 123.1 124.4
1171111281171	 5122134116150
	
% 27.4 123.4 125.7 I	 25 111.4 119.6 j26.2	 17.6 122.6
I	 81	 7 1 15 1 18 1 	 6124126113139
% 12.9 114.9 113.8 126.5 f13.6 121.4	 20 114.3 117.6
I	 4 1	8 1 12 1	201	 61261	 241	 14138
I 6.5 I	 17	 11 129.4 113.6 I23.2 118.5 115.4 117.2
1101	 7 1 17 1	l4	 sI	 19I	 241	 121	 36
% 116.1
	 14.9 115.6 I2o.6 111.4 I	 17 118.5	 13.2 116.3
1131	 91221111	 11	 121	 241	 10134
I	 21 119.1 20.2 116.2	 2.3	 10.7 118.5	 115.4
1111	 71181	 121	 4116123111134
% 117.7 114.9 116.5 117.6 I 9.1 114.3 117.7 112.1 115.4
I	 4 1	3 1	7 1 15 1	6 1 21 1 19 1	 9128
6.5 I 6.4 I 6.4 122.1 113.6 118.8 114.6 I 9.9 112.7
I	 61	 7 1 13 1	 21	 3115118110128
I	 114.9 111.9 117.6 I 6.8 113.4 113.8 I	 11 I12.7
I	 01	 01	 0 1 16 1	7 1 23 1 16 1	 7123
I	 0 I	 0 I	 0 123.5 115.9 120.5 112.3 I 7.7 110.4
I	 S I	6 1 11 1	61	 5111111111122
I 8.1 112.8 110.1 I 8.8 111.4 I 9.8 I 8.5 I12.1 I	 10
I	 5 1 10 1 15 1	4 1	 11	 5 I	9 1	 ill	 20
8.1 121.3 I13.8 I 5.	 2.3 I	 I 6.9 112.1 I
IsI	 31	 8	 BI	 4 1	 12!	 131	 71	 20
I 8.1 I 6.4 I 7.3 111.8 I 9.1 110.7 I	 10 I 7.7 I
1101	 5 1 15 1	4 1	 01	 4 1 14 1	 5119
	
% 116.1 110.6 I13.8 I 5.9	 0	 3.6 110.8 I 5.5	 8.6
1216181612181818116
I 3.2 112.8 I 7.3 I 8.8 I	 I 7.1 I 6.2 I 8.8 I 7.2
121416181211011016116
	
3.2 I 8.5 I 5.5	 11.8 I	 I 8.9 I	 I 6.6 I 7.2
Ill
	 3 1	4 1	 81	 4 1	 121	 9 1	7 1	 16
I 1.6 I 6.4 I 3.7 111.8	 9.1 110.7 I 6.9 I 7.7	 7.2
1315181413171718115
I 4.8 110.6 I 7.3 I 5.9 I 6.8 I 6.2 I	 I 8.8 I 6.8
I	 11	 21	 31111	 11	 121	 12I	 3I15
I 1.6 I 4.3 I 2.8 116.2 I 2.3 110.7 I 9.2 I 3•3 I 6.8
I	 7I	 3 1 10 1 3 1 2 1	5 I 10 I	 5j15
% 111.3 I 6.4 I 9.2 I 4.4 I 45 I 4.5 I 7.7 I 5.5 I 6.8
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Il Down	 121113161	 4 1 10 1	 81511311
II	 I 3.2 I 2.1	 2.8	 8.8	 9.1 I 8.9 I 6.2 I 5.5 I 5.9 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
Ii	 ii
fl WORD COUNT	 Categorised Neutral (Animal) 	 II
II
II	 School	 Primary	 Secondary	 Total
II	 I	 I	 II
II	 Sex IGirislBoys	 Tot IGirislBoys I Tot GirislBoys	 Tot
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II	 Nuinberl	 621	 4711091
	
681	 44111211301	 91122111
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II	 Dog	 1561	 36	 921	 561	 361	 9211121	 72118411
II	 ' 190.3 176.6 184.4 182.4 181.8 182.1 186.2 179.1 183.3 II
II	 Cat	 I	 56 I	 4 I	 90 I	 55 I	 34 I	 89 I 111 I	 68 I 179 II
II	 % 190.3 172.3	 82.6	 80.9 1 77.3 1 79.5 185.4 I74.7	 81 II
Lion	 38	 30	 68	 33 I 26 I 59 I 71 I 56	 127
II	 %	 61.3 163.8 162.4 148.5 159.1 152.7 154.6 	 61.5 15 7 .5 II
fl	 Tiger	 I	 I	 29 I	 66 I	 35 I	 25 I	 60 I	 72 I	 54 I 126 I
II	 159.7 161.7 160.6 151.5 156.8 153.6 155.4 159.3 I	 57 II
II	 Elephant	 I	 4 I	 23 I	 57 I	 42 I	 22 I	 64 I	 76	 45 I 121 II
II	 % 154.8 148.9 152.3	 61.8 I	 50 157.1	 58.5 149.5 154.8 II
II	 Fish	 I	 38 I	 24 I	 62 I	 30 I	 17 I	 I	 68 I	 41 I 109 II
II	 % 161.3 151.l 156.9 144.1 138.6 I	 42 152.3 145.1 149.3 II
II	 Horse	 I	 25 I	 8 I	 3	 I	 32	 17 I	 I	 5	 I	 25 I	 82
II	 % 140.3 I	 17 130.3 147.1 138.6 143.8 143.8 127.5 137.1 II
II	 Snake	 1251161411221	 191	 411	 4 7 1	 35 1	 8211
II	 % 140.3 I	 34 137.6 132.4 143.2 136.6 136.2 138.5 137.1 II
II	 Pig	 1241161401281	 913715212517711
II	 % 138.7 I	 34 136.7 141.2 120.5 I	 33 I	 40 127.5 134.8
II	 Cow	 1191111301	 291
	
171	 461	 481	 281
	
7611
II	 % 130.6 123.4 127.5 142.6 138.6 141.1 136.9 130.8 1 34.4 II
Rabbit	 I	 24	 10	 31 I	 10 I	 41 I	 55 I	 20 I	 7	 II
II	 % 138.7 121.3 131.2 145.6 122.7 136.6 142.3 I	 22 1 33.9 II
II Monkey	 12311714012111313414413017411
II	 137.1 136.2 136.7 130.9 129.5	 30.4 133.8 I	 33 1 33.5 II
II Mouse	 16 I	 10 I	 26 I	 21 I	 19 I	 40 I	 37 I	 29 I	 66 II
II	 % 125.8	 21.3	 23.9 130.9 143.2 1 35.7 128.5 131.9 129.9 II
II	 Frog	 11711613311811213013512816311
II	 % 127.4 I	 34 130.3 126.5 127.3 126.8 126.9 130.8 128.5 II
II	 Bird	 I	 19 I	 20 I	 9 I	 13	 10 I	 23 I	 32 I	 30 I	 62 fl
II	 % 130.6 142.6 135.8 119.1 122.7 120.5 124.6 I	 33 128.1 II
II	 Whale	 I	 16 I	 13 I	 29 I	 16 I	 13 I	 29 I	 32 I	 26 I	 58 II
II	 %	 25.8 127.7 126.6 123.5 129.5 125.9 124.6 128.6 126.2 II
fl Crocodile	 I	 21 I	 15 I	 36 I	 14 I	 6 I	 20 I	 35 I	 21 I	 56 II
II	 %	 33.9 131.9 I	 33 120.6 113.6 117.9 126.9 123.1 125.3 II
II	 Sheep	 1121	 71191171181351	 291	 251	 5411
II	 % 119.4 114.9 117.4 I	 25 140.9 131.2 122.3 127.5 124.4 II
II	 Eagle	 I	 19 I	 14 I	 33 I	 12 I	 6 I	 18 I	 31 I	 20 I	 51 II
II	 130.6 129.8	 30.3 117.6 113.6 116.1 123.8 I	 22 123.1 II
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Bear	 I	 14 I	 5	 19	 21	 10	 31	 35 I	 15 I	 50 II
II	 % 122.6 110.6 117.4 130.9	 22.7 127.7 126.9	 16.5 122.6 II
fl	 Shark	 1121171291	 9 1	 911812112614711
II	 % 19.4	 36.2 126.6	 13.2 120.5 116.1	 16.2 128.6	 21.3 II
II	 Spider	 I	 11	 10	 21	 14 I	 I	 23 I	 25 I	 19 I	 44 II
II	 % 117.7 121.3 119.3	 20.6 120.5 120.5 119.2 120.9 119.9 II
Dolphin	 I	 13 I	 9 I	 22 I	 14	 7 I	 21 I	 27 I	 16 I	 43 II
II	 I	 21 119.1 120.2	 20.6 115.9 118.8 120.8 117.6 119.5 II
Il Ant	 1151	 8 1 23 1 11 1	 711812611514111
II	 % 24.2 I	 17 121.1	 16.2 j15.9	 16.1	 20 116.5 118.6 II
lI Fox	 1191141331	 61	 'I	 7 1	 251	 151	 4011
II	 % 130.6 129.8 130.3	 8.8	 2.3 I 6.2 119.2 116.5	 18.1
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II
WORD COUNT	 Neutral	 II
II
School	 Primary	 Secondary	 Total	 11
II	 Sex IGirlslBoys I Tot iGirlslBoys	 Tot IGir15IB0Y5	 Tot II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
II	 Numberl	 621	 4711091	 681	 44111211301	 91122111
Dog	 1131131261141	 0114127113140
I	 21 127.7 123.9 120.6 	 0 112.5 120.8 114.3 118.1
Pen	 1151
	
3 1 18 1 13 1	6 1 19 1 28 1	 9137
% 124.2 I 6.4 116.5 119.1 113.6 I	 17 121.5	 9.9 116.7
School	 I	 5 1	 6 1 11 1	 8111119113117130
1 8.1 1 12.8 1 10.1 1 11.8 1	 2 5 1 	 71	 10118.7113.6
Football	 I	 5	 71121	 2 1 16 1 18 1	 7123130
I 8.1	 14.9 I	 11 I 2.9	 36.4 116.1 I 5.4 125.3 113.6
Paper	 1111
	
7 1 18 1	4 1	 7111115114129
% 117.7 j14.9	 16.5 I 5.9 115.9 I 9.8 111.5 115.4 113.1
Car	 I	 3 1	 101	 131	 7 1	 8115110118128
I 4.8 121.3 111.9 110.3 118.2 113.4 I 7.7 119.8 112.7
Cat	 1101	 8 1 18 1	 81	 ii	 9 1 18 1	 9127
116.1 I	 17 116.5 111.8 I 2.3	 8 113.8 I 9.9 112.2
Work	 1121
	
7 1 19 1	5 1	 3 1	 8117110127
119.4 114.9 117.4 I 7.4	 6.8	 7.1 113.1 I	 11 112.2
Maths	 I	 9 1	 6 1 15 1	7 1	 3 1 10 1 16 1	 9125
% 114.5 112.8 113.8 110.3	 6.8 I 8.9 112.3	 9.9 111.3
Computer	 I	 61	 I	 111	 2 1 11 1 13 1	 8116124
I 9.7 110.6 110.1 I 2.9 I	 25 111.6 I 6.2	 17.6 110.9
Book	 I	 81	 4 1 12 1 10 1	 1 11 1 18 1	 5123
% 112.9 I 8.5 I	 11 114.7 I 2.3 I 9.8 113.8 I 5.5 110.4
Horse	 I	 9 1	 2 1 11 1	61	 6 1 12 1 15 1	 8123
% 114.5 I 4.3	 10.1 I 8.8 113.6 110.7 111.5 I 8.8 110.4
Man	 1101
	
4 1 14 1	7 1	 11	 8 1 17 1	 5122
% 116.1 I 8.5 112.8 110.3 I 2.3 I 7.1	 13.1 I 5.5 I	 10
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II Food	 I	 7	 ii	 81	 81	 61	 141	 151	 7 1	 2211
II	 111.3 1 2.1 1 7.3 1 11.8 1 13.6 1 12.5 1 11.5 1 7.7 1 	 1011
II T.V.	 161319141	 811211011112111
II	 I	 I 6.4 I 8.3	 5.9 118.2	 10.7 I 7.7 112.1 I 9.5 II
Il Table	 Ill	 1121101911911111012111
II	 I 1.6 I 2.1 I 1.8 114.7 120.5 I	 17 I 8.5 I	 11 I 9.5 II
Tree	 I	 61	 4 1 10 1 	 81	 2 1 10 1 14 1 	 612011
II	 I 9.7	 8.5 I 9.2 111.8 I	 8.9 110.8 I 6.6 I	 9 II
II	 People	 I	 5 1	 4 1	 9 1	 3 1	 61	 9 1	 811011811
II	 I 8.1 I 8.5	 8.3	 4.4 113.6 I	 8	 6.2 I	 11	 8.1 II
Il Pencil	 191111015121	 7 1 14 1 	 311711
II	 % 114.5 I 2.1 I 9.2 I 7.4 I 4.5	 6.2 110.8 I	 I 7.7 II
Il Time	 1212141615111181	 711511
II	 I 3.2 I 4.3 I	 I 8.8 111.4 I 9.8	 6.2	 7.7 I 6.8 II
Il Bird	 121416171118191	 511411
II	 I 3.2 I 8.5 I 5.5 110.3 I 2.3	 7.1	 6.9 I 5.5 I 6.3 II
ll Drink	 151116121517171	 611311
II	 I 8.1	 2.1 I
	
I 2.9 111.4	 6.2 I 5.4	 6.6	 5.9 II
li Hot	 1210121614110181	 411211
II	 I 3.2 I	 0 I 1.8 I 8.8 I 9.1 I	 I 6.2 I 4	 I 5.4 II
Teacher	 I	 3 1	 ii	 4 1	 s I	 3 1	 81	 81	 411211
II	 I 4.8	 2.1 I 3.	 I	 6.8 I 7.1 I 6.2 I 4•4 I 5.4 II
II MUSIc	 1010101318111131811111
II	 I	 0 I	 0 I	 0 I 4	 118.2	 9.8	 2.3	 8.8 I	 II
II	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 II
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Appendix 4.7
Lists of trauma-related words
(a) Words related to Personal Violence
	
WORDS/POINTS ___ 1	 2 1
ACCIDENT	 0 3	 4	 0
VIOLENCE	 0 0	 3	 4
WITNESS	 3	 3	 1	 0
BURGLARY	 0 2 3	 2
TORTURE	 0 0 3	 4
SMASH	 0	 3	 2	 2
ASSAULT	 0	 0	 3	 3
TRAPPED	 0	 1	 4	 2
ATTACKED	 0	 1	 2	 4
HARM	 0 1	 6	 0
AGGRESSION	 0	 1	 5	 1
VICTIM	 0	 2	 4	 1
AMBULANCE	 1	 2 3	 1
TORTURER	 0 0 3	 4
KNIFE	 1	 1	 3	 2
GUN	 1	 2	 2	 2
KILLING	 0	 2	 1	 4
STRETCHER	 1	 5	 1	 0
SIREN	 1	 5	 1	 0
CRIME	 14	 2	 0
SERIOUS	 4	 2	 1	 0
POLICE	 2	 2	 2	 1
DEATH	 0	 3	 1	 3
HOSPITAL	 1	 2	 3	 1
SHOUT	 3	 3	 1	 0
MURDER	 0 2 2	 3
HOMICIDE	 2	 1	 1	 2
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Words related to personal violence, continued
	
WORDS / POINTS 0 ___ 2
	 ___
BLOOD	 0 2 3
	 2
NIGHTMARE	 0 1 4	 2
AGGRAVATED	 2 2	 2	 0
ANGRY	 13	 2	 1
BROKEN	 3	 3	 1	 0
BANDAGE	 2 2 3	 0
ROBB WRY	 1	 2 3	 1
EMERGENCY	 1 4 3	 1
INJURED	 1	 1	 5	 0
SCREAM	 1 2 3	 1
RISK	 2	 3	 1	 0
DANGER	 0	 51	 1
HURT	 0	 51	 1
SHOOTING	 0 2 5	 1
FIGHT	 0	 4	 2	 1
TERROR	 0	 1	 3
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(b) The words related to Road Traffic Accident
WORDS/POINTS 0
	 1	 2	 3
ACCIDENT	 0	 4	 2	 4
IMPACT	 2	 3	 5	 0
CRUSH	 0	 2	 6	 2
GLASS	 1	 2	 5	 1
WINDSCREEN	 3	 3	 3	 0
SMASH	 0	 2	 3	 5
SCREECH	 0	 2	 4	 2
TRAPPED	 0	 0	 7	 3
CASUALTY	 o	 3	 6	 1
CRASH	 0	 2	 3	 5
TRAFFIC	 6	 1	 3	 0
SEATBELT	 5	 2	 2	 1
AMBULANCE	 1	 2	 5	 2
DRWING	 6	 1	 2	 1
PASSENGER	 6	 2	 2	 0
DRIVER	 7	 0	 3	 0
FAST	 6	 1	 2	 1
STRETCHER	 o 4 6 0
SIREN	 1	 4	 3	 2
STREET	 7	 2	 1	 0
CAR	 6	 1	 2	 1
POLICE	 1	 5	 4	 ____
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Words related to the Road Traffic AcciØiets, continued
	
I WORDS I POiNTS 0	 1	 2	 ___
ROAD	 6	 2	 1	 1
HOSPITAL	 1	 4	 3	 2
SHOUT	 3	 5	 1	 1
CROSSING	 6	 3	 1	 0
BANG	 1	 6	 2	 1
SPEED	 2	 5	 2	 0
SCREAM	 0	 2	 5	 3
SUDDEN	 1	 9	 0	 0
EMERGENCY	 1	 5	 4	 1
INJURED	 0	 4	 6	 0
BLOOD	 0	 1	 4	 6
NIGHTMARE	 0	 2	 3	 5
MOTORBIKE	 6	 3	 2	 0
SORROW	 2	 3	 5	 0
BROKEN	 1	 4	 5	 0
COLLISION	 0	 6	 3	 1
DANGER	 1	 2	 7	 0
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Appendix 5.1
Words used in the Stroop Task
= Threat	 Sad	 Happy	 Neutral	 PTSD
1	 Cold	 Lonely	 Love	 Bird	 Glass
2	 Dark	 helpless	 Grateful	 Parrot	 Police
3	 Ghost	 Lost	 Park	 Kangaroo	 Crush
4	 Horrible	 Weak	 Kindness	 Donkey	 Casualty
5	 Worried	 Crying	 Smile	 Duck	 Danger
6	 Kidnapped	 Funeral	 Joke	 Lizard	 Bang
7	 School	 Alone	 Easter	 Sheep	 Injured
8	 Terrified	 Miserable	 Pleased	 Sparrow	 Bandage
9	 Bully	 Sick	 Rich	 Robin	 Blood
10 Petrified	 Bad	 Funfair	 Butterfly	 Emergency
11	 Failed	 Friendless	 Excited	 Zebra	 Hospital
.12... Bomb	 Aruument	 Brilliant	 Gorilla	 Siren
Appendix 5.2
Differences between PTSD patients and normal controls on age [F(1, 44) = 0.8, P =
0.376], verbal IQ [F(1, 44) = 0.45, P = 0.505], and reading ability [F(l, 44) = 0.478, P
= 0.793].
Appendix 5.3
ANOVAs of colour-naming times for depressed words [F(l, 23) = 1.83, P = 0.189],
happy words [F(l, 23) = 0.32, P = 0.5761, and threat words [F(1, 23) = 0.00, P = 0.988]
relative to neutral words in the PTSD group.
Appendix 5.4
Main effect of Group [F(1, 44) = 1.43, P = 0.239], and Index Type [F(1, 44) = 0.65, P
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= 0.582] for differential Index analysis across PTSD patients and controls.
Appendix 5.5
The results of paired sample t-test across all PTSD patients between the indices of happy
words and sad words [t (22) = 1.12, P = 0.276], happy words and threat words [t (22)
= 0.58, P = 0.566], trauma-related words and depressed words [t (22) = 1.39 P = 0.178],
and depressed words and threat words {t (22) = 1.71, P 0.102].
Appendix 5.6
Differences between RTA and PV groups on verbal IQ [F(1, 22) = 1.24, P = 0.279],
reading ability [F(1, 22) = 0.0007, P = 0.979], RCMAS anxiety score [F(1, 22) = 2.20,
P = 0.153], total score of IES [F(1, 21) = 0.428, P = 0.520], Intrusion sub-scale of IES
[F(l, 22) = 0.031, P = 0.862], and Avoidance sub-scale of IES [F(l, 22) = 0.59, P =
0.45 1].
Appendix 5.7
Main effect of Group {F(1, 21) = 0.89, P = 0.365], and interaction [F(4, 84) = 1.88, P
0.121] for colour-naming times across RTA and PV subjects.
Appendix 5.8
Differences between PTSD and control children (under 13 years) on age [F(1, 15) =
2.22, P = 0.158], verbal IQ [F(l, 15) = 1.75, P = 0.206], reading ability [F(1, 15) = 0.52,
P = 0.944], and RCMAS anxiety score [F(1, 15) 0.614, P = 0.446].
Appendix 5.9
The main effects of Group [F(1, 14) 3.37, P 0.088], and Word Type [F(4, 56) = 0.82,
P = 0.520] for colour-naming times across PTSD and control children (under 13 years).
Appendix 5.10
The results of paired sample t-tests across children control subjects between neutral
words and depression-related words [t (5) = 0.91, P = 0.403], neutral and happy words
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{t (5) = 1.71, P = 0.1491, neutral and trauma-related words [t (5) = 1.41, P = 0.219],
neutral and threat words [t (5) = 1.63, P = 0.163], between depressed words and happy
words [t (5) = 0.09, P = 0.93], depressed words and threat words [t (5) = 0.58, P =
0.589], and between happy and threat words [t (5) = 0.61, P = 0.566].
Appendix 5.11
Differences between PTSD and control adolescents on age [F(1, 29) = 3.80, P = 0.06 1],
verbal IQ [F(1, 29) 0.275, P = 0.870], and reading ability [F(1, 29) = 0.462, P =
0.502].
Appendix 5.12
The results of paired sample t-tests across adolescents with PTSD between neutral
words and depression-related words [t (12) 1.26, P = 0.233], neutral and happy words
[t (12) = 1.56, p = 0.144], neutral and threat words [t (12) = 0.05, P = 0.962], between
depressed words and happy words [t (12) = 0.65, P = 0.5281, depressed words and
trauma-related words [t (12) = 1.18, P = 0.261], depressed words and threat words [t
(12) = 1.66, P = 0.123], between happy words and trauma-related words [t (12) = 1.76,
P = 0.104], and between happy and threat words [t (12) = 1.29, P = 0.221].
Appendix 5.13
Differences between boys and girls with PTSD on age [F(1, 22) = 0.016, p = 0.900],
verbal IQ [F(l, 22) = 0.0327, P = 0.850], DSRS depression score [F(1, 22) = 0.598, P
= 0.448], RCMAS anxiety score [F(1, 22) = 2.32, P = 0.143], total scores on the IES =
[F(1, 22) = 2.55, P = 0.126], scores on the intrusion sub-scale of IES [F(1, 22) = 1.78,
P = 0.198].
Appendix 5.14
The main effect of Group [F(1, 22) = 0.40, P = 0.536], and interaction [F(4, 84) 0.69,
P = 0.60 1] across boys and girls with PTSD.
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Appendix 5.15
The results of paired sample t-tests across all PTSD patients between neutral words and
depression-related words [t (22) = 1.35, P = 0.189], neutral and happy words [t (22) =
0.57, P = 0.576], neutral and threat words [t (22) = 0.02, P = 0.988], between depressed
words and happy words [t (22) = 1.12, P = 0.276], depressed words and trauma-related
words [t (22) = 1.39, P = 0.178], depressed words and threat words [t (22) = 1.71, P =
0.102], and between happy and threat words [t (22) = 0.56, P = 0.566].
Appendix 5.16
Differences between children of adults with PTSD and controls on age [F(l, 40) = 0.72,
P = 0.40], verbal IQ [F(1, 40) = 1.08, P = 0.05], reading ability [F(l, 40) = 0.46, P =
0.86], and RCMAS anxiety score [F(1, 43) = 1.51, P = 0.227].
Appendix 5.17
ANOVAs comparing RTs to colour-name neutral words and happy words [F(1, 17) =
.93, P = 0.349], and depressed words [F(1, 17) = 2.65, P = 0.122] across children of
adults with PTSD.
Appendix 5.18
Differences between children of adult with PTSD and controls (under 113 years) on age
[F(1, 14) = 0.61, P = 0.449], verbal IQ [F(1, 14) = 0.739, P = 0.405], reading ability
[F(l, 14) = 0.009, P = 0.926], RCMAS anxiety scores [F(1, 14) = 0.004, P = 0.95], and
DSRS depression scores [F(1, 14) = 1.39, P = 0.260].
Appendix 5.19
The main effect of Group [F(1, 13) = 0.01, P = 0.997], and Word Type [F(4, 52) = 2.29,
P = 0.72] for colour-naming times of children of adults with PTSD and controls (aged
under 13 years).
Appendix 5.20
The results of paired sample t-tests across children of adults with PTSD between neutral
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words and depression-related words [t (8) = 0.09, P = 0.934], neutral and happy words
[t (8) = 1.17, P = 0.277], neutral words and trauma-related words [t (8) = 1.20, P =
0.264], neutral and threat words [t (8) = 1.57, P = 0.156], between depressed words and
happy words [t (8) = 1.47, P = 0.0 18], depressed words and trauma-related words [t (8)
= 1.51, P = 0.169], happy and trauma-related words [t (8) = 1.83, P 0.104], and
between trauma-related words and threat words [t (8) = 0.27, P = 0.792].
Appendix 5.21
The results of paired sample t-tests across children control subjects between neutral
words and depression-related words [t (5) = 0.91, P = 0.403], neutral and happy words
[t (5) = 1.71, P = 0.149], neutral and trauma-related words {t (5) = 1.41, P = 0.219],
neutral and threat words [t (5) = 1.63, P = 0.163], between depressed words and happy
words [t (5) = 0.09, P = 0.93], depressed words and threat words [t (5) = 0.58, P =
0.589], and between happy and threat words [t (5) = 0.61, P = 0.566].
Appendix 5.22
Differences between children of adults with PTSD and controls (aged over 13 years) on
age [F(1, 25) = 3.58, P = 0.07], verbal IQ [F(1, 25) = 0.21, P = 0.752], reading ability
[F(1, 25) = 0.027, P = 0.871], and RCMAS anxiety scores [F(1, 25) = 3.14, P = 0.089].
Appendix 5.23
The main effect of Group [F(l, 24) = 0.71, P = 0.0409], interaction [F(4, 96) = 1.56, P
= 0.19], and Word Type [F(4, 96) = 1.03, P = 0.395] for children of adults with PTSD
and controls (aged over 13 years).
Appendix 5.24
Differences between boys and girls of adults with PTSD on age [F(1, 15) = 2.56, P =
0.132], verbal IQ [F(1, 15) = 0.00, P = 1], RCMAS anxiety scores [F(1, 15) = 1.17, P
= 0.2 13], and reading ability [F(1, 15) = 0.1, P = 0.75].
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Appendix 5.25
The results of paired sample t-tests across all children of adults with PTSD between
neutral words and depression-related words [t (17) = 1.63, P = 0.122], neutral and happy
words [t (17) = 0.95, P = 0.349], between depressed words and trauma-related words [t
(17) = 1.08, P = 0.293], depressed words and threat words [t (17) = 0.75, P = 0.466], and
between trauma-related words and threat words [t (17) = 0.29, P = 0.779].
Appendix 5.26
Diferences between children with PTSD, children of adults with PTSD, and normal
controls on age [F(2, 63) = 0.454, P = 0.637], verbal IQ [F(2, 63) = 0.58, P = 0.563], and
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Appendix 6.2
Diffrences between PTSD and normal control subjects on age [F(1, 46) = 0.001, P =
0.0991, verbal IQ [F(1, 46) = 0.048, P = 0.83], and reading ability [F(1, 46) = 0.61, P
=0.44].
Appendix 6.3
Main effects of Group [F(1, 46) = 2.09, P = 0.155], and Word Type [F(1, 46) = 0.1, p
= 0.7511 between PTSD patients and controls for social threat and physical threat.
Appendix 6.4
The results of separate ANOVAs for social threat vs. physical threat words across PTSD
[F(1, 23) = 1.53, P = 0.228] and control {F(1, 23) = 2.36, P 0.138] subjects.
Appendix 6.5
Main effects of Group [F(1, 46) = 1.99, P = 0.165], and Word Type [F(1,46) = 0.81, P
= 0.372] for physical threat vs. depressed words across PTSD patients and controls.
Appendix 6.6
Main effects of Group [F(1, 46) =0.11, P = 0.744], and Word Type [F(1,46) = 1.43, P
= 0.238] for social threat vs. depressed words across PTSD patients and controls.
Appendix 6.7
Two way interaction for Group X Word Type [F(1, 46) = 1.01, P = 0.320], Threat
Position X Word Type [F(1, 46) = 0.01, P = 0.920], for Word Type X Probe Position
[F(1, 46) = 1.68, P = 0.201]. Three way interaction for Group X Word Type X Probe
[F(1, 46) = 0.02, P = 0.889], for word position X Group X Probe [F(1, 46) = 0.46, p =
0.499].
Appendix 6.8
Terms fro Word Type F(1, 23) = 0.77, P = 0.389], Word Position [F(1, 23) = 0.13, P
= 0.726], Probe Position [F(1, 23) = 0.74, P = 0.398], Word Type X Word Position [F(1,
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23) = 2.92, P = 0.101], Word X Probe Position [F(1, 23) = 0.17, P = 0.682], and Word
Position X Probe Position [F(1, 23) = 2.45, P 0.131] across PTSD patients.
Differences Word Type [F(1, 23) = 0.27, P = 0.608], Word Position [F(1, 23) = 0.23, P
= 0.639], Probe Position [F(1, 23) = 0.29, P = 0.597], Word Type X Word Position [F(1,
23) = 0.17, P = 0.681], Word Type X Probe Position [F(1, 23) = 1.37, P = 0.253], Word
Position X Probe Position [F(1, 23) = 0.97, P = 0.335], and Word Type X Word Position
X Probe Position [F(1, 23) = 2.10, P = 0.161] across control subjects.
Differences fro Word Position [F(1, 23) = 1.34, P = 0.260], and Probe Position [F(1, 23)
= 0.95, P = 0.34 1] across PTSD patients.
Appendix 6.9
Differences between two subgroups of patients (RTA & PV) on verbal IQ [F( 1, 22) =
1.06, P = 0.31], reading ability [F(1, 22) = 0.112, P = 0.74], RCMAS anxiety scores
[F(1, 22) = 2.12, P = 0.16], total scores of IES [F(1, 21) = 0.505, P = 0.48], intrusion
subscale of IES [F(1, 21) = 0.55, P = 0.47], and avoidance subscale of IES [F(1, 21) =
0.99, P = 0.76].
Appendix 6.10
The main effect of Group [F(1, 23) = 2.78, P = 0.110], interaction [F(1, 22) = .58, P =
.456], and Word Type effect [F(1, 22) = 2.73, P = 0.23 8] for two subgroups of patients
(i.eRTA&PV).
Appendix 6.11
Diffrences between two groups of children (aged under 13 years) on age [F(1, 21) =
3.93, P = 0.061] verbal IQ, [F(1, 21) = 0.004, P = 0.95] reading ability,[F(1, 21) = 1.80,
P = 0.195], anxiety scale,[F(1,21) = 0.139, P = 0.713], and depression scale [F(1, 21) =
2.62, P = 0.12].
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Appendix 6.12
Main effects of Group [F(1, 20) = 2.41, P = 0.136] and Word Type [F(1, 10) = 0.92, P
= 0.361] for threat bias and depressed bias across subjects under 13 years old.
Appendix 6.13
Differences on psychological measures across subjects over 13 years old on age [F(1,
22) = 3.11, P = 0.092], verbal IQ [F(1, 22) = 0.035, P = 0.85], and reading ability [F(l,
22) = 0.256, P = 0.62].
Appendix 6.14
Main effect of Group [F(1, 23) = 0.54, P = 0.468], interaction [F(l, 23) = 0.37, P =
0.55], and Word Type effect [F(l, 23) = 0.07, P = 0.797] for threat bias scores and
depressed bias scores across two groups of subjects over 13 years old.
Appendix 6.15
Differences on psychological measures for age [F(1, 23) = 0.0001, P = 0.99 1], verbal
IQ [F(1, 23) = 0.0007, P = 0.979], DSRS depression scores [F(1, 23) = 0.491, P =
0.491], RCMAS anxiety scores [F(1, 22) = 2.18, P = 0.154], total scores of IES [F(1, 22)
= 2.67, P 0.117], and intrusion subscale of IES [F(l, 21) 2.22, P = 0.152] across
boys and girls with PTSD.
Appendix 6.16
Main effect of Group [F(1, 21) = 0.30, P = 0.589], interaction [F(1, 21) = 0.001, P =
0.967], and Word Type effect [F(1, 21) = 3.17, P = 0.089] for threat bias and depressed
bias across boys and girls with PTSD.
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Appendix 7.1
List of Recall Words
408
List of the Buffer Words for Recognition task
N THREAT SAD
	 HAPPY	 ANIMAL PTSD
I	 Noise	 Lonely	 Love	 Zebra	 Tears
2	 Dark	 helpless	 Grateful	 Parrot	 Siren
3	 Ghost	 Lost	 Park	 Dinosaur	 Speed
4	 Horrible	 Friendless	 Kindness	 Donkey	 Impact
5	 Worried	 Crying	 Money	 Bird	 Police
6	 Explosion	 Funeral	 Fishing	 Lizard	 Danger
7	 Stupid	 Pollution	 Easter	 Crocodile	 Injured
8	 Terrified	 Miserable	 Pleased	 Sparrow	 Bandage
9	 Bully	 Bad	 Brilliant	 Ant	 Blood
10 Petrified	 Unwanted	 Funfair	 Butterfly	 Emergency
11	 Failed	 Blamed	 Singing	 Chicken	 Hospital
1.2..... Kidnap	Sorry	 Excited	 Kangaroo	 Casualty
Appendix 7.2
Differences between two groups (PTSD patients & controls) on age [F(1, 47) = 0.83, P
= 0.366], verbal IQ [F(1, 47) = 0.0013, P =0.971], and reading ability [F(1, 47) = 0.002,
P = 0.964].
Appendix 7.3
Main effect of Group [F(1, 47) = 0.29, P = 0.590], and interaction [F(4, 188) = 1.63, P
= 0.169] for Beta value between PTSD patients and normal controls.
Appendix 7.4
Differences between two sub-group of PTSD patients (RTA & PV) on verbal IQ [F(1,
23) = 1.03, P = 0.321], reading ability [F(1, 23) = 0.071, P = 0.723], total score of the
Impact of event scale [F(1, 21) = 1.05, P = 0.317], avoidance sub-scale of the IES {F(1,
21) = 0.419, P = 0.525], and intrusion sub-scale of the IES [F(l, 21) = 0.98, P = 0.334].
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Appendix 7.5
Main effect of Group [F(1, 22) .56, P = .461] and interaction [F(4, 88) = 1.79, P
0.138] for recalled words between two sub-groups of PTSD patients involving in the
RTA or PV.
Appendix 7.6
Main effect of Group [F(1, 22) = 0.42, P = 0.526] and interaction [F(4, 88) = 0.98 , P
= 0.476] for d' value across two sub-groups of PTSD (RTA & PV). Main effect [F(1,
22) = 0.61, P = 0.444], interaction [F(4, 88) = 1.07, P = 0.378], and Word Type effect
[F(4, 88) = 2.13, P = 0.084] for Beta value across two sub-groups of PTSD (RTA &
PV).
Appendix 7.7
Differences between the two groups (aged under 13 years) on age [F( 1, 17) = 2.04, P =
0.172], verbal IQ [F(1, 17) = .427, P = .522], reading ability [F(1, 17) = .227, P = 0.639],
and RCMAS anxiety score [F(1, 17) = 1.89, P = 0.187].
Appendix 7.8
Differences between the two groups (aged over 13 years) on age [F(1, 24) = 1.9, P =
0.180], vebal IQ [F(1, 24) = 0.57, P = 0.455], and reading ability [F(1, 24) = 0.78, P =
0.544].
Appendix 7.9
Main effect of Group [F(1, 17) = 3.07, P = .098], and interaction [F(4, 68) = .62, P =
.647] for recall memory across PTSD patients and normal controls (aged under 13
years).
Appendix 7.10
Main effects of Group for d'[F(l, 18) = .65, P = .432], or Beta [F(1, 18) = .00, P = .985],
and interaction ford' [F(4, 68) = 2.02, P .101] or Beta [F(4, 68) = 1.04, P = .395], or
Word Type effect for Beta [F(4, 68) = 1. 38, P 0.250] values across PTSD and normal
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controls under 13 years old.
Appendix 7.11
Main effect of Group for d'[F(l, 28) = 0.49, P = 0.490], for Beta [F(1, 28) = 0.46, P =
0.501]values, interaction ford' [F(4, 112) = 1.32, p = 0.265] and for Beta [F(4, 112) =
1.48, P = 0.213] across adolescents with PTSD and controls.
Appendix 7.12
Differences between girls and boys on age [F(1, 23) = .015, P = .904], verbal IQ [F(1,
23) = .0004, P = 0.985], depression scores [F(1, 23) = 1.47, P = 0.237].
Appendix 7.13
Main effect of[F(1, 22) = 0.2.37, P = 0.138] and interaction [F(4, 88) = 1.20, P = 0.315]
for boys and girls with PTSD.
Appendix 7.14
Main effect for d'[F(l, 22) = 1.68, P = 0.208], for Beta [F(1, 22) = 1.13, P = 0.3], and
interaction for d' [F(4, 88) .34, P = 0.850] and for Beta [F(4, 88) = .37, P = .827]
values across boys and girls with PTSD.
Appendix 7.15
Differences between children of adults with PTSD and controls on age [F(1, 42) = 0.67,
P = 0.415], verbal IQ [F(1, 42) = 0.854, P = 0.361], reading ability [F(1, 42) = 0.0013,
P = 0.971], and anxiety scale [F(1, 42) 1.28, P = 0.264].
Appendix 7.16
Differences between children of adults with PTSD and controls of false memory [F( 1,
42) = 1.22, P = 0.273], and total memory [F(l, 42) = 0.486, P = 0.490].
Appendix 7.17
Main effect ofF(1, 41) = 0.92, P = 0.344] and interaction [F(4,164) = 1.44, P = 0.224]
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on recall memory between children of adults with PTSD and normals.
Appendix 7.18
Main effect of[F(1, 41) = 1.91, P = 0.175] and interaction ford' value [F(4, 164) = 1.64,
P = 0.1671 between children of adults with PTSD and controls.
Appendix 7.19
Main effect of[F(1, 41) = 0.23, P = 0.6381 and interaction [F(4, 164) = 0.52, P = 0.724]
for Beta value between children of adults with PTSD and controls.
Appendix 7.20
Main effect of[F(2, 64) = 2.50, P = 0.09] and interaction [F(8, 256) = 1.47, P = 0.169]
on the recalled words for children with PTSD, children of adults with PTSD and
controls.
Appendix 7.21
Main effects of Group ford' [F(2, 64) = 0.79, P = 0.458] and Beta [F(2, 64) = 0.46, P
= 0.634] and interactions ford' [F(8, 256) = 1.40, P = 0.197] and Beta [F(8, 256) =
1.15, P = 0.33 1] values across three groups: Children with PTSD, children of adults
with PTSD and normal controls.
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Appendix 8.1
Differences between PTSD patients and normal controls on age [F (1, 38) = 0.01, P =
0.89] and verbal IQ [F (1, 38) = 0.38, P 0.54].
Appendix 8.2
Differences between PTSD patients with RTA and PV trauma on verbal IQ [F( 1, 16) =
1.20, P = 0.29], reading ability [F(1, 16) 1.62, P = 0.222], IES [F(1, 16) = 1.07, P =
0.318], Avoidance [F(1, 16) = 0.95, P = 0.344], Intrusion {F(1, 16) = 1, P = 0.332], and
anxiety [F(1, 16) = 3.56, P = 0.08].
Appendix 8.3
Differences between PTSD patients with RTA and PV trauma on appointment [F(1, 16)
= 1.94, P = 1.84], belonging [F(1, 16) = 0.0044, P = 0.948], date [F(l, 16) = 1.16, P =
0.298], face recognition [F(1, 16) = .5 13, P = 0.485], first name and second name [F(1,
16) = 0.0303, P = 0.864], message delivery [F(1, 16) = 0.16, P = 0.901], orientation
[F(l, 16) = 0.112, P = 0.743], picture recognition [F(l, 16) = 2.48, P = 0.136],
prospective [F(1, 16) = 0.432, P = 0.52 1], route delayed [F(l, 16) = 2.93, P = 0.168],
route immediate [F(1, 16) = 0.247, P 0.626], story delayed [F(1, 16) = 0.80, P =
0.781], story immediate [F(1, 16) = 0.422, P = 0.523], and total score [F(1, 16) = 0.16,
P=0.90].
Appendix 8.4
Differences between PTSD patients and controls (aged under 14 years) on age [F(1, 13)
= 3.78, P = 0.076], self reported anxiety [F(1, 13) 1.09, P 0.317], verbal IQ [F(1, 13)
= 0.079, P = 0.78], depression [F(1, 13) = 0.12, P = 0.75], and reading ability [F(l, 13)
= 1.81,P=0.203].
Appendix 8.5
Diffrences between PTSD patients and controls (aged under 14 years) on appointment
[F(1, 13) = 2.87, P = 0.116], belonging [F(1, 13) = 0.38, P = 0.549], date [F(1, 13) =
1.04, P = 0.327], first name and second name [F(1, 13) = 1.94, P = 0.188], orientation
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[F(1, 13) = 1.28, P = 0.278], picture recognition [F(1, 13) = 1.37, P = 0.264],
prospective [F(1, 13) = 1.65, P = 0.223], route delayed [F(1, 13) = 0.81, P = 0.386],
route immediate [F(l, 13) = 0.042, P = 0.84], and story delayed [F(l, 13) = 0.94, P =
0.112].
Appendix 8.6
Differences between PTSD patients and controls (aged over 14 years) on age [F(1, 25)
= 0.776, P = 0.387], and verbal IQ [F(1, 25) = 0.339, P 0.566].
Appendix 8.7
Differences between PTSD patients and controls (aged over 14 year) on date [F(1, 25)
= 1.9, P = 0.181], face recognition [F(1,25) = 0.45, P = 0.51, first name and second
name [F(1, 25) = 1.09, P = 0.306], orientation [F(1, 13) = 1.28, P = 0.278], picture
recognition [F(1, 25) = 3.89, P = 0.06], route delayed [F(1, 25) = 1.55, P = 0.224], route
immideate [F(1, 25) = 0.54, P 0.469], story delayed {F(1, 25) = 2.58, P = 0.121] and
story immediate [F(1, 25) = 1.75, P = 0.198]..
Appendix 8.8
Differences between boys and girls with PTSD on age [F(1, 17) = 0.48, P = 0.497,
anxiety [F(1, 17) = 1.76, P = 0.202], verbal IQ [F(1, 17) = 0.199, P = 0.661], reading
ability [F(1, 17) = 0.002, P = 0.966], depression [F(1, 17) 0.697, P = 0.416], IES
[F(1, 17) = 4.09, P = 0.614], Avoidance [F(1, 17) = 4.01, P = 0.064], and Intrusion
[F(1, 17) = 3.32, P = 0.088].
Appendix 8.9
Differences between boys and girls with PTSD on belonging [F(1, 17) 1.74, P =
0.206], date [F(1, 17) = 0.753, P = 0.2398], face recognition F(1, 17) = 0.667, P =
0.426], first name and second name [F(1, 17) = 3.09, P = 0.98], message delevery {F(1,
17) 1.94, P = 0.183], orientation [F(1, 17) = 0.886, P = 0.36], picture recognition [F(1,
17) = 1.36, P = 0.261], route delayed [F(1, 17) = 0.627, P = 0.044], route immediate
[F(1, 17) = 0.667, P = 0.426], story delayed [F(1, 17) = 0.317, P = 0.861], story
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immediate [F(1, 17) = 1.82, P = 0.196], and total score [F(1, 17) = 0.131, P = 0.722].
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Please answer as honestly as you can. The statements refer to how you have
felt over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. It is important
to say how you have felt. Put one tick for each statement.
Most Sometimes Never
1. I look forward to things as much as I used to
2. I sleep very well. _______________________
3. I feel like crying. _______________________
4. I feel like going out to play.______________
5. I feel like running away._________________
6. I get tummy aches.______________________
7. I have lots of energy.__________________
8.Ienjoymy food.__________________
9. I can stick up for myself._______________
10. I think life is not worth living.__________
11. I am good at things I do. ______________
12. I enjoy the things I do as much as I used to
13. I like talking with my family._________
14. I have horrible dreams._______________
15. I feel very lonely.____________________
16. I am easily cheered up._______________
17. I feel so sad I can hardly stand it._______
18. I feel very bored.______________________
Thank you
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The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS)
(Reynolds Richmond, 1978)
How I Think And Feel
1. I have trouble making up my mind
	
Yes	 No
2. I get nervous when things do not go
the right way for me	 Yes	 No
3. Others seem to do things easier than I can	 Yes	 No
4. I like everyone I know	 Yes	 No
5. Often I have trouble getting my breath
	
Yes	 No
6. I worry a lot of the time	 Yes	 No
7. I am afraid of a lot of things 	 Yes	 No
8. I am always kind
	
Yes	 No
9. I get mad easily	 Yes	 No
10. I worry about what my parents will say to me 	 Yes	 No
11. I feel that others do not like the way I do things 	 Yes	 No
12. I always have good manners 	 Yes	 No
13. It is hard for me to get to sleep at night 	 Yes	 No
14. I worry about what other people think about me 	 Yes	 No
15. I feel alone even when there are people with me 	 Yes	 No
16. I am always good
	
Yes	 No
17. Often I feel sick in my stomach
	
Yes	 No
18. My feelings get hurt easily 	 Yes	 No
19. My hands feel sweaty	 Yes	 No
20. I am always nice	 Yes	 No
21. I am tired a lot	 Yes	 No
22. I worry about what is going to happen	 Yes	 No
23. Other people are happier than I
	
Yes	 No
24. I tell the truth every single time 	 Yes	 No
25. I have bad dreams	 Yes	 No
26. My feelings get hurt easily when I am fussed at 	 Yes	 No
27. I feel someone will tell me I do things the wrong way Yes	 No
29. I never get angry	 Yes	 No
30. I wake up scared some of the time	 Yes	 No
31. I worry when I go to bed at night
	 Yes	 No
32. It is hard for me to keep my mind on my school work Yes	 No
33. I never say things I shouldn't 	 Yes	 No
34. I wiggle in my seat a lot	 Yes	 No
35. I am nervous	 Yes	 No
36. A lot of people are against me	 Yes	 No
37. I never lie	 Yes	 No





REVISED IMPACT OF EVENTS SCALE
On ________________ you experienced
Below is a list of comments made by people after stressful life events.
Please check each item, indicating how frequently these comments were
true for you DURING THE PAST SEVEN DAYS. If they did not occur during
that time, please mark the "not at all" column.
FREQUENCY
Comment	 Not at Rarely Some- Often
all	 times
1. thought about .t when I
!'jn'L mea tc	 ______ _______
2. I avoided letting myself get upset when
I thought about it or was reminded of it 	 ________
3. I tried to remove it from memory.
4. I had trouble falling asleep or stay-
ing asleep because of pictures or
thoughts about it that came into my mind	 ________
5. I had waves of strong feeling about it.
6. I had dreams about it.
7. I stayed away from
remindersof it.	 _______ _______
8. I felt as if it hadn't
happened or it wasn't real. 	 _______ _______
9. I tried not to talk about it.
lO.Pictures about it popped into
mymind.	 _______ _______ ______ _______
ll.Other things kept making me
thinkabout it.	 _______ _______ ______ _______
12.1 was aware that I still had a
lot of feelings about it, but
I didn't deal with them.	 _____
13.1 tried not to think about it
l4.Any reminder brought back
feelingsabout it.	 ________ ________ ______ _______
15.My feelings about it were
kindof numb.	 ________ ________ _______ _______
LOND Ml
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